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
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DARWIN, THOMISTS, AND SECONDARY CAUSALITY

ARMAND MAURER

AT FIRST SIGHT IT WOULD SEEM INCONGRUOUS, even an oxymoron, to juxtapose the names of Charles Darwin and Thomas Aquinas. Darwin was a biologist of the nineteenth century whose theory of evolution demanded the mutability of natural species. Thomas Aquinas, the father of Thomism, was a theologian and philosopher of the thirteenth century who held that forms in themselves and the species they constitute are immutable.¹ Six centuries separated Darwin and Aquinas, centuries that witnessed the decline of Thomism and scholasticism in general, with Descartes's rejection of substantial forms (except in humans) and the advent of English empiricism and the positivism of Auguste Comte. Living in an antischolastic environment and convinced of the mutability of species, it would seem unlikely that Darwin would have any connection with Aquinas.

This paper aims to show that there is a connection, though indirect, between Darwin and Thomists through Darwin's use of the notion of secondary causes in his early essays and *The Origin of Species*. The notion of secondary causes has a long history in medieval philosophy, and it plays an important role in Thomistic philosophy, in particular appealing to the notion of secondary causality and to the principle that it is better for God the creator to do by means of secondary causes what he can do by himself. Darwin himself accepts this principle when he contends that it is better that the creator produce species by secondary causes rather than by special creation. This essay examines Darwin's and the Thomists' understandings of the notion of secondary causes and their use of the principle, and it suggests that it was

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¹ According to Aquinas, forms are not subject to change but consist in an unchanging essence. However, they are subject to change insofar as their subject changes. Only God is absolutely immutable. "[F]ormae dicuntur invariables, quia non possunt esse subiectum variationis; subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum secundum eas variatur"; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3. See *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 6.

mainly through the Spanish Thomist Francisco Suárez that the notion of secondary causes and the allied principle were brought to the attention of Darwin and his circle of naturalists. At the same time the paper reveals an important side of Darwinism that is often neglected in popular accounts. The essay points out Darwin's interest in philosophy, even in metaphysics, and their influence on his scientific methodology and the theory of evolution.

I

Darwin. Throughout *The Origin of Species* Charles Darwin marshals evidence from biology, geology, and other sciences in support of his theory of evolution as "descent with modification," according to the law of natural selection.² In concluding his book, he acknowledges that some of the most eminent authors disagree with him on the origin of species and are "fully satisfied with the view that each species has been independently created."³ No doubt Darwin had in mind contemporary naturalists like Richard Owen, Adam Sedgwick, William Whewell, Sir Charles Lyell, and Sir John Herschel.⁴ Since these Christians and others at the time were not convinced by his scientific evidence and regarded evolution as incompatible with their religious beliefs, Darwin tried to persuade them to accept the evolution of species rather than their independent creation by appealing to the

² Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, 6th ed. (New York: Dutton, 1928), 450. Unless otherwise noted, references are to this edition. Darwin was convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the exclusive means of evolution. Other factors such as the environment and use and disuse play a role in it. *Ibid.*, 454. See Michael Crawford and David Marsh, *The Driving Fire. Food, Evolution and the Future* (London: Heinemann, 1989), 2.

³ *The Origin*, 462.

⁴ For Darwin's life, thought, and relations to his fellow naturalists, see Adrian Desmond and James Moore, *Darwin* (New York: Warner Books, 1992); John Bowlby, *Charles Darwin. A New Life* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); Ronald W. Clark, *The Survival of Charles Darwin. A Biography of a Man and an Idea* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984); Peter Brent, *Charles Darwin, A Man of Enlarged Curiosity* (London: Heinemann, 1981); Janet Browne, *Charles Darwin*, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1995, 2002); Edward Manier, *The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978); Neal C. Gillespie, *Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

belief in a creator and the production of things by means of secondary causes:

To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the individual. When I view all beings not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled.⁵

Darwin here contends that no special intervention of the creator is necessary to explain an individual's birth and death; these are accounted for by secondary causes according to the laws of nature. So too, in accordance with these laws (which include the laws of the struggle for life and natural selection),⁶ the production and extinction of all individuals, past and present, can be more adequately explained by secondary causes than by special creation. His reason is that he feels that individuals acquire a dignity when they are viewed as descendants of a few primitive beings rather than as independently created. He does not explain why this ennobles them, but we can surmise that it is because he sees them not as nothing in themselves because miraculously created but as somethings that are victorious in the struggle for life. We feel somewhat the same difference between a person who inherits money and one who earns it with his own efforts. The argument makes no mention of the descent of species but only of the production of individuals, yet this implies the descent of species for in Darwin's view varieties and species (which are nothing but "well-marked and permanent varieties"⁷) are groupings of individuals having a common descent or ancestry.⁸

This is not the first time Darwin proposed a reason for accepting evolution based on the notion of secondary causes. In an essay written in 1842, predating *The Origin of Species* (1859), he gave another reason why it is better that the creator use secondary causes (here called "secondary means") to produce individuals rather than create them independently: it would belittle the deity to think that he specially created each individual. "It is derogatory," Darwin writes, "that the creator of countless systems of worlds should have created each

⁵ *The Origin*, 462.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 462–3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 450.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, 50.

of the myriads of creeping parasites and slimy worms which have swarmed each day of life on this our globe. The creation and extinction of forms is the effect of secondary means."⁹ Consequently, from the point of view of both the creator and his creatures it is better that species evolve by secondary causes rather than being independently created.

While Darwin was revising the conclusion of the sixth edition of *The Origin* (1872), he received the support of his friend Charles Kingsley, an Anglican clergyman and novelist who wanted to reconcile science and religion. Darwin wrote that he had just received a letter from Kingsley (whom he cited anonymously as a "celebrated author and divine"), praising the book and adding that he has gradually learned to see that it is "just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self-development into other and more needful forms, as to believe that He required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws."¹⁰ Darwin was overjoyed when he read these supportive remarks of his friend, which imply God's use of secondary causes. Surprisingly, he omitted the next sentence in Kingsley's letter, which suggested that it might even be a "*loftier* thought" that God created original forms capable of self-development than that he created each form independently.¹¹

The notion of secondary causes was a commonplace in Darwin's day, and others besides Darwin speculated about the creator's possible use of them in producing species. Darwin's good friend, Sir John Herschel, the renowned astronomer, wrote to Lyell in 1836 that the "mystery of mysteries," that is, "the replacement of extinct species by

⁹ *The Foundations of the Origin of Species. Two Essays Written in 1842 and 1844 by Charles Darwin*, ed. Francis Darwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 41.

¹⁰ *The Origin*, 455. Kingsley was one of the first Anglican clergymen to support Darwin's theory. He engaged in controversy with John Henry (later Cardinal) Newman over the Oxford movement. Newman replied with his *Apologia pro Vita Sua*.

¹¹ My italics. For Kingsley's letter see *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin and Selected Letters*, ed. Francis Darwin (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 242. For the authorship of the letter see Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 477. Neal Gillespie writes apropos of Darwin's citing Kingsley's letter: "It has been suggested that Darwin welcomed this support from Kingsley as a means of overcoming popular opposition to evolution. It seems to me, in view of his theological concern in the *Origin*, that he also welcomed it as a reassurance of his own belief"; Gillespie, *Charles Darwin*, 132.

others," might be solved by assuming that the creator "operates through a series of intermediate causes and that in consequence, the origination of fresh species, could it ever come under our cognizance would be found to be a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process." He adds, however, that "we perceive no indications of any process actually in progress which is likely to issue in such a result."¹² It was precisely this process that Darwin was to supply by his law of natural selection.

Another close friend of Darwin, the eminent geologist Sir Charles Lyell, also thought of the creator's possible use of intermediate or secondary causes in the production of new species. Indeed, he said that he implied this in his *Principles of Geology*, a book Darwin read with admiration on the *Beagle* and to which he was indebted. Lyell wrote to Darwin in 1838: "In regard to the origination of new species I am very glad to find that you think it probable that it may be carried on through the intervention of intermediate causes." When the intervention of these causes first occurred to him, Lyell continued, "the idea struck me as the grandest which I had ever conceived so far as regards the attributes of the Presiding Mind."¹³

In a letter to the Catholic biologist St. George Mivart, one of Darwin's staunchest critics, the American botanist Asa Gray wrote that he concurred with Mivart that God uses secondary causes in the natural production of creatures. "Agreeing that plants and animals were produced by Omnipotent fiat," Gray wrote, "does not exclude the idea of natural order and what we call secondary causes. The record of the fiat—'Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed', etc., 'let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind'—seems even to imply them." Mivart added that this "leads to the conclusion that the various kinds were produced through natural agencies."¹⁴ The question remains, what are these agencies? Mivart was willing to give Darwin's natural selection a minor role in evolution, but he denied the pure Darwinian theory "which relies upon the survival

¹² Cited by Clark, *The Survival of Charles Darwin*, 41.

¹³ Cited in *ibid.*, 57. Clark perceptively concludes: "The belief was to have a long history among those who tried to square their religious feelings with the evidence for the mutability of species. God moved in a mysterious way his wonders to perform, and that way might even include evolution"; *ibid.*

¹⁴ St. George Mivart, *On the Genesis of Species*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1871), 291–2. See Genesis 1:11–12, 24.

of the fittest by means of minute fortuitous indefinite variations." Mivart insisted that there must be the "concurrence of some other and internal natural law or laws co-operating with external influences and with 'Natural Selection' in the evolution of organic forms," but he could not say what these additional laws might be.¹⁵ Mivart thought Christians were perfectly free to accept the theory of evolution, which he believed had the support of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Suárez, "a writer widely venerated as an authority and one whose orthodoxy has never been questioned."¹⁶

William Paley, the English theologian and philosopher whose notion of a designer-God was one of Darwin's main objects of criticism, resorted to "second causes" as the means whereby God brings about his effects. He conceived these causes in nature as so many mechanisms, like the wheels and cogs of a watch. As they will not work unless there is a force or power at their center, like a spring, so the secondary causes in nature, like plants or animals with parts related to each other for the good of the whole organism, need an intelligence to account for the orderly action of their parts. Paley wrote, "[T]here must be more in nature than what we see; and, amongst the things unseen, there must be an intelligent, designing, author."¹⁷

Darwin struck at the heart of Paley's theory by denying that secondary causes in nature are mechanical, like springs and cogs of a watch. With the discovery of the law of natural selection, he wrote, "We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows."¹⁸ In a letter to Asa Gray in 1860 Darwin inclined (with some hesitation) to see design at least in the laws of nature, if not in their effects: "I am inclined," Darwin wrote, "to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that

¹⁵ Mivart, *On the Genesis of Species*, 75-6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 303.

¹⁷ William Paley, *Natural Theology: or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity* (London: Wilks and Taylor, 1902), 450-1.

¹⁸ *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*, ed. Nora Barlow (New York: Norton, 1958), 87.

the whole subject is too profound for human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton."¹⁹

Across the Atlantic, Asa Gray accepted with some hesitation Darwin's theory of natural selection as a sort of "mediate creation," which he thought consistent with his religious beliefs. To him, it was "the only alternative to supernatural creation [of species]."²⁰ Gray wrote, "All appears to have come to be in the course of Nature, and therefore under secondary causes; but what these are, or how connected and interfused with first cause, we know not now, perhaps shall never know."²¹ He pointed out that the fathers of the Church and philosophers like Thomas Aquinas were aware of God's use of secondary causes in natural productions, so that "mediate production of species by natural selection *may* indeed be completely theistic."²² Like Mivart, however, he found it difficult (as some biologists still do today) to accept Darwin's idea that simple additions of differences can produce a complex organ.²³

Clearly, the notion of God's use of secondary causes in the production of things was widespread among the naturalists in Darwin's day. He invented neither it nor the idea that it enhances both God and creatures. Darwin's originality as a scientist lies in presenting evidence of the natural agencies that function as secondary causes of the production of new individuals and species, namely the laws of nature, and especially the struggle for existence and natural selection.

What is the nature of Darwin's argument for evolution by secondary causes and what is its value? It does not belong to science but to natural theology for it concerns God the creator and the laws he has implanted in matter. It should more properly be called metaphysical for the argument turns on the distinction between primary and secondary causes, which are traditionally the concern of metaphysics. More specifically, it has the hallmark of a dialectical argument for it rests on the notion of secondary causes and the principle that it is better, or at least as good, that the first cause produce through secondary

¹⁹ Cited by Carl Zimmer, *Evolution. The Triumph of an Idea* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 342. See Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 479.

²⁰ Asa Gray, *Natural Science and Religion* (New York: Scribners, 1880), 71.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

²² *Ibid.*, 68.

²³ *Ibid.*, 76. See, for example, Michael J. Behe, *Darwin's Black Box* (New York: The Free Press, 1996).

causes what it can produce by itself. Since the time of Aristotle and medieval logicians, a dialectical argument has been considered to be one that uses commonly accepted principles or opinions leading to conclusions that are not necessarily true but tentative and probable.²⁴ Since Darwin's argument rests upon a commonly accepted principle, it should not be considered demonstrative but dialectical and only probably true.

Darwin's argument is in the first edition of *The Origin* (1859), and he retained it in the sixth and final edition of 1872. When he wrote *The Origin*, he firmly believed in the existence of God and considered himself a theist. In his *Autobiography* he says that his reason tells him of "the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist."²⁵ But this conviction was difficult for him to sustain when he thought that if the human mind evolved from the lowly mind of a primitive animal, how can we trust it in such lofty matters? He concludes: "I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic."²⁶ However, while acknowledging himself to be an agnostic, he added, "but not always."²⁷ About 1850 he gave up his Christian faith (though not theism) for various reasons, including his failure to reconcile Christianity with the evil and terrible suffering he saw in the world, especially the death of his beloved daughter Anne.²⁸

²⁴ For the nature of dialectic in the Middle Ages and its sources in Greek philosophy, see Osmund Lewry, "Dialectic," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* (New York: Scribners, 1984), 4:168–71. Aquinas describes the relations between metaphysics and dialectic in *Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum*, bk. 4, lect. 4, ed. M.-R. Cathala and Raymundus M. Spiazzi (Turin/Rome: Marietti, 1964), 160 n. 574.

²⁵ *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*, 92–3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 94. See also *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Including an Autobiographical Chapter*, ed. Francis Darwin, 2 vols. (New York: Appleton, 1898), 1:282. For Darwin's views on religion see Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 622–37; Gillespie, *Charles Darwin*, 134–45.

²⁷ See Gillespie, *Charles Darwin*, 142.

²⁸ For Darwin's reasons for abandoning Christianity as a revealed doctrine see his *Autobiography*, 85–96.

It may come as a surprise that Darwin proposed a metaphysical argument for evolution in *The Origin of Species*. Most modern accounts of Darwinian evolution pass over it in silence for it hardly fits in with Darwin's later agnosticism, which leaves no room for the distinction between the creator as a primary cause and creatures as efficacious secondary causes. It is not clear how much credence he gave to the argument when he wrote it; but at that time he still firmly believed in the existence of God, and this would suggest that he also believed in the persuasiveness of the argument. It is significant that he retained the argument in the last edition of *The Origin*. Up to that late date he seems to have thought the argument worthwhile to persuade religious-minded naturalists that even on religious and philosophical grounds there is reason to accept the evolution of species.

The fact that Darwin proposed a metaphysical argument for evolution by no means makes him a metaphysician. He was a widely read biologist living in the nineteenth century and influenced by his culture, which was steeped in religion and philosophy. Among the many books he read during the years 1836–37 were several in metaphysics, but he acknowledged that he was not at all fitted for these studies.²⁹ He could have added that he saw little value in metaphysics. He remarked that one might as well try to "illuminate the midnight sky with a candle as to throw the light of reason on metaphysics."³⁰ Again, he said: "To study Metaphysics, as they have always been studied appears to me to be like puzzling at astronomy without mechanics."³¹ Still, through his education and wide reading he absorbed metaphysical notions current in his day, which many neo-Darwinians have expunged from the doctrine of evolution. Edward Manier points out that "Charles Darwin's philosophical reading significantly influenced his

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 84–5. Darwin implies that he read them at his leisure, when tired of working at science. Unfortunately, he does not identify these books in metaphysics. Edward Manier (*The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle*, 14–20) describes Darwin's cultural circle about 1837–39 and the books with a philosophical perspective that were ready at hand. For another listing of books Darwin read or intended to read see L. Robert Stevens, *Charles Darwin* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978), 107.

³⁰ Cited by Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 634.

³¹ *Metaphysics, Materialism, & the Evolution of Mind. Early Writings of Charles Darwin*, transcribed and annotated by Paul H. Barrett, with a Commentary by Howard E. Gruber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 71. Darwin was not averse to metaphysics in itself but to most of the metaphysics in his day. He was confident that his own study would "transform the whole of metaphysics." Cited by Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 237.

scientific activities."³² For example, Darwin intimates that evolution has a direction—though not an absolute one—rising in a “scale” or “ladder” of nature from plants to animals to humans. He thought that all existence is not on the same level: there is a “scale” of nature or life, a “chain of beings”—a well-known metaphysical notion.³³ Darwin did not hesitate to use value words like “good,” “progress,” and “perfection,” in his account of evolution—words generally avoided by contemporary neo-Darwinians who view evolution on the model of mechanics.³⁴ Thus, Darwin writes, “And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.”³⁵ Darwin also adopted, or at least was inclined to, metaphysical positions such as materialism, positivism,³⁶ the denial of the distinction between mind and brain, soul and body, and reason and instinct.³⁷ It should be noted that in the 1830s and 1840s he wrote notebooks that explore the subjects of materialism, metaphysics, and the evolution of mind.³⁸

³² Manier, *The Young Darwin*, 14. See Michael Ruse, “Darwin's Debt to Philosophy. An Examination of the Influence of the Philosophical Ideas of John F. W. Herschel and William Whewell on the Development of Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 6 (1975): 159–81.

³³ *The Origin*, chap. 3, p. 77; *Charles Darwin's Natural Selection*, ed. R. C. Stauffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975), 471. The latter work publishes Darwin's manuscript from which *The Origin of Species* was taken. For the history of the notion of “a great chain of being,” see Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

³⁴ For a criticism of the mechanization of the doctrine of evolution see Etienne Gilson, *From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again. A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution*, trans. John Lyon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 17–31.

³⁵ *The Origin*, 462. Darwin said, however, “in my theory there is no absolute tendency to progression.” He viewed an inexorable ascent of life and guaranteed progress as a radical myth. See Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 275.

³⁶ “Darwin's own approach to evolution fell short of complete positivism. Because of the theological elements in his thought, he continued to speculate—how seriously is admittedly a question—on the possibility of the creation of the first form of life and was loath to abandon the universe to the full meaninglessness that a completely positive view of the cosmos entailed”; Gillespie, *Charles Darwin*, 146. As for Darwin's materialism, it would seem to be “nothing more than positivism. It committed him, not to a metaphysics of matter in motion as the ultimate reality, but only to a system of naturalistic and lawful science. This system put God as a participant out of the natural world, it is true, but it did not make it inconsistent to deal with the idea of God or to see him as the Creator of the laws of nature”; *ibid.*, 140.

³⁷ See Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 360, 453.

Darwin gave some thought to the notion of cause. In his early notebooks he did not subscribe to the extreme empirical view that a cause only involves invariable succession. He pointed out that night's following day does not give rise to the notion of cause. There is more to necessary connection than mere succession; forces must be taken into consideration, such as mental force where effort is felt.³⁹

Herschel and Whewell influenced Darwin's conception of the methodology of science and his notion of a "true cause" (*vera causa*), a common notion at the time, which Herschel says Newton applied to proximate or intermediate causes.⁴⁰ Herschel described *verae causae* in science as laws that exist and act in nature and that can be arrived at by direct induction from experiments purposely contrived.⁴¹ Contrary to the positivist Auguste Comte, Herschel regarded science as a search for causes of this sort, which are found especially in forces of nature.⁴²

³⁸ *Metaphysics, Materialism, & the Evolution of Mind. Early Writings of Charles Darwin*, xix. This is an edition of the two notebooks "M" and "N," known as the *Metaphysical Notebooks*. The statement of L. Robert Stevens (*Charles Darwin*, 108): "[A]lthough [Darwin] was a metaphysician of mixed quality, he was better than he generally claimed to be" is exaggerated. Better balanced is the view of Manier (*The Young Darwin*, 3): "The young Darwin was a powerfully original and creative scientist, sensitive to methodological, metaphysical and moral issues." Janet Browne (*Darwin* 1:439) writes of his giving close attention to metaphysical questions. The Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart, a contemporary of Darwin, called him a metaphysical romancer because he regarded ideas as material things, such as vibrations of the brain. See Dugald Stewart, *Philosophical Essays, Collected Works*, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Constable, 1855), 5:144.

³⁹ Darwin, "N Notebook," ed. Paul H. Barrett, *Metaphysics, Materialism, & the Evolution of Mind*, 81 n. 60; see the commentary by Howard E. Gruber, *ibid.*, 113–14. See also Manier, *The Young Darwin*, 125.

⁴⁰ "To such causes [namely proximate causes] Newton has applied the term *verae causae*; that is, causes recognized as having a real existence in nature, and not being mere hypotheses or figments of the mind"; John F. W. Herschel, *A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987: facsimile of the 1830 edition), 144. The term *causae verae* occurs in Newton's *Regulae philosophandi*, 1 (which is a form of Ockham's razor): "Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quam quae & verae sint & earum phaenomenis explicandis sufficient"; Isaac Newton, *Principia*, ed. Alexandre Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 2:550.

⁴¹ Herschel, *A Preliminary Discourse*, 144–8, 197. See Edward Manier, *The Young Darwin*, 47–51; Michael Ruse, "Darwin's Debt to Philosophy," 113–14; "Darwin and Herschel," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 9 (1978): 323–31.

⁴² See Michael Ruse, "Darwin's Debt to Philosophy," 159–81; "Darwin and Herschel," 323–31.

Darwin's concept of natural law seems at first to be at variance with Herschel's realism. In *The Origin* he describes laws as "the sequence of events as ascertained by us," and Nature as "only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws." He had no intention of personifying the word "Nature" or using the expression "natural selection" in the literal sense for there is no selector in nature as there is in domestic breeding. "Natural selection" would be a false term if taken literally.⁴³

Darwin is closer to Herschel, however, when he portrays another facet of the meaning of natural law. Speculating about the meaning of laws of nature, he sometimes speaks of them metaphysically as "laws impressed on matter by the Creator." In science, however, he regards them as tentative and fallible understandings of these laws. Hence scientific laws, like Darwin's own law of natural selection, would not be real but a construct that more or less approaches reality.⁴⁴ In this regard it should be noted that *The Origin* speaks of natural laws simply as "the sequence of events *as ascertained by us*." On the other hand, Darwin also seems to have thought of the laws of nature, like natural selection, as *verae causae*. In a letter of 1863 to George Bentham (botanist and nephew of Jeremy Bentham) Darwin says that the first distinguishing feature of natural selection is to be a *vera causa*, implying that it exists and acts in nature.⁴⁵

In the light of Darwin's preoccupation with philosophical and metaphysical notions, especially in his early years while preparing to write *The Origin of Species*, perhaps it is not so remarkable to find in it the ideas of a creator and secondary causes. He was the originator

⁴³ *The Origin*, chap. 4, p. 81.

⁴⁴ See Ruse, "Darwin's Debt," 159-81; Gillespie, *Charles Darwin*, 54-5. For the notion of law in Darwin's early writings, see Manier, *The Young Darwin*, 123-5. Manier, however, writes that Darwin "appeared to by-pass Herschel's important distinction of 'empirical laws' and 'laws of nature'"; *ibid.*, 115.

⁴⁵ *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, ed. Francis Darwin (London: Murray, 1887), 3 n. 4, 25. Darwin implies this in the statement: "[S]pecies are produced by slowly acting and still existing causes, and not by miraculous acts of creation"; *The Origin*, 461. See Ruse, "Darwin and Herschel," 327. The American philosopher John Fiske, who traveled to England to meet Darwin, also called natural selection a *vera causa*, "an agency," "a reality." See his *Darwinism and Other Essays*, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885; reprint, New York: Kraus, 1969), 12, 13. "[T]his no one denies" (*ibid.*, 20); "The theory . . . alleges a *vera causa*," 32. However, this seems to be inconsistent with his empirical view of cause on p. 6.

of neither the notion of secondary causes nor the principle that it is better that the creator produce by means of them what he could produce by himself. We have seen that other naturalists at the time were thinking along the same lines. What they lacked, and what Darwin (and Alfred Russel Wallace)⁴⁶ supplied, was the law of natural selection as the secondary cause by which the evolution of species takes place.

II

Francisco Suárez. In the revival of scholasticism from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, the doctrine of secondary causes played a prominent role in commentaries on Aquinas and in treatises like those of Cajetan (1468–1534), Francis de Sylvestris (c. 1474–1528), Dominic Bañez (1528–1604), and John of St. Thomas (John Poinset) (1589–1644). But by far the most important source of the notion in early modern thought was the *Metaphysical Disputations* of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617).⁴⁷ He also seems to be the source of the notion of a “true cause” (*vera causa*), well-known to nineteenth-century naturalists. Published in 1597, this work was the first major systematic treatise in metaphysics in the Western world, and its success was phenomenal; it was a best seller in its day, and its ideas were widely disseminated. There is no evidence that Darwin read any of its pages, but through his contemporaries he could have been indirectly influenced by Suárez’s work. St. George Mivart was acquainted with it, and Thomas Huxley dipped into it to find out what Catholics like Mivart held in philosophy.⁴⁸ Very likely Descartes was introduced to metaphysics by Suárez’s *Disputationes*. Leibniz boasted that as a youth he had read the work “like a novel,” and Schopenhauer valued it as “a true compendium of Scholasticism.” It was widely used as a textbook in German Protestant universities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For Heidegger,

⁴⁶ For Wallace’s contribution to the notion of evolution by natural selection, see Desmond and Moore, *Darwin*, 468–9, 521–3.

⁴⁷ Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae. Opera Omnia*, editio nova (hereafter, “DM”), ed. D. M. André, 26 vols. (Paris: Vivès, 1856–77), 25–6.

⁴⁸ *Darwin. A Norton Critical Edition*, ed. Philip Appleman (New York: Norton, 1970), 438–43.

it was the principal medium by which Greek ontology passed from the Middle Ages to modern times.⁴⁹

In his *Disputations* Suárez treats at length of efficient causality in general and in particular of the division into primary and secondary causes. A cause, in the broad sense, he defines as anything that answers to the question, "why?" In the strict sense, "a true cause (*vera causa*) for the 'moderns' is that on which another essentially (*per se*) depends; or better (remembering Thomas Aquinas), it is a principle that essentially (*per se*) infuses being (*esse*) into something else." A false definition of a cause is "that at which something else follows."⁵⁰

Suárez defines a primary cause as entirely independent in its operation, whereas a secondary cause is dependent on the primary cause even though it acts through its own principal and proportionate power. The latter stipulation distinguishes a secondary cause from one that is purely instrumental, which lacks such a power.⁵¹ An example of an instrumental cause is a pen used by a writer; a team of horses driven by a man would be a true secondary cause. To the question whether creatures produce anything as secondary causes, he answers in the affirmative.⁵² The objection is raised that if creatures are truly causes of some effects, this would take away from God's causality for then he would not be the cause of everything. To this, Suárez replies that God is indeed the cause of everything as their primary and principal cause, though some effects are produced by creatures acting as secondary causes. Far from derogating from the divine efficacy, this enhances and reveals it by showing that God can communicate his power and goodness to creatures.⁵³

Suárez offers several arguments to prove that creatures are indeed efficacious causes. The first appeals to the evidence of the senses. What is clearer to the senses, he asks, than that the sun illuminates, fire heats, and water cools? To deny such data of experience is

⁴⁹ For Suárez's wide influence see John P. Doyle's Introduction to his translation of Suárez, *On Beings of Reason. Metaphysical Disputation LIV* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 12–14; also Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, pt. 2, "The Revival of Platonism to Suárez" (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1963), 199–200.

⁵⁰ Suárez, *DM*, disp. 12, sec. 2, n. 3–5, 25:384–5. For Aquinas, "[H]oc vero nomen Causa importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati"; *In Metaph.*, bk. 5, lect. 1, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, 208 n. 751.

⁵¹ Suárez, *DM*, disp. 17, sec. 2, n. 17–8, pp. 590–1.

⁵² *Ibid.*, disp. 18, sec. 1, n. 5, p. 594.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, n. 9, pp. 595–600.

to destroy the force of all philosophical reasoning. Could it be that fire has no power of heating but its presence is only the occasion for God to exercise his causality? All causality would then be centered in God, and creatures would be only occasions of his acting. But Suárez rejected occasionalism because it denies that things have natures which are natural sources of action and efficacy. A final argument, which Suárez calls *a priori*, contends that it is consonant with a creature's perfection that it have an active power as a secondary cause: "There is no contradiction in created things having the power of acting; on the contrary it is very consistent with their perfection. Hence, since God created everything perfect in nature, we should not deny that he created such things that have a connatural power of acting."⁵⁴

Suárez was not an evolutionist. He interpreted Genesis literally, as teaching that God created plants, animals, and humans on distinct days in their perfect state in distinct individuals or species.⁵⁵ Because the works of God are perfect, as Scripture says (Deuteronomy 32:4), they are endowed with the power of acting as secondary causes in dependence on the creator as the primary cause.

Suárez here implies the principle that it is better for God the creator to do by means of secondary causes what he could do by himself. By endowing his creatures with active powers and giving them the perfection and dignity of secondary causes, both the creator and the creature are dignified: the creator because he is shown to be good and powerful, the creature because it is not inactive and purely passive but endowed with its own proportional active power.

As we have seen, Darwin also implies this principle in his arguments analyzed above, suggesting that it is preferable to view the production and extinction of individuals and species as the result of secondary causes and not of an independent creation. Species are not "special creations"; they spring up and disappear as a consequence of secondary causes in accordance with the laws of nature. Suárez also gave a prominent role to secondary causes in the ordering and governing of the universe; but he never suspected that one of their most important roles might be the production of species in a universe in which species are not static and fixed but progressive and self-developing.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 8, p. 595.

⁵⁵ Suárez, *De opere sex dierum, Opera Omnia* 3, lib. 2, chaps. 7–10, pp. 139–65.

III

Thomas Aquinas. The search for the origin of the notion of secondary causes leads to the schoolmen of the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, especially Francisco Suárez, beyond them to the schoolmen of the thirteenth century, and even further to the short seminal treatise called *The Book of Causes* (*Liber de causis*). It is a remarkable fact that the Western world, up to and including the naturalists discussed above, and beyond, owes to this small book the notions of primary and secondary causes. The work of an unknown author (probably Arab), it became known to the Latin West at the end of the twelfth century through a Latin translation probably from the Arabic. It may have come from the vicinity of Baghdad around 850. At first it circulated in the medieval universities as a work of Aristotle; but when the *Elements of Theology* of the Neoplatonist Proclus (410–85) was translated into Latin in 1268, Thomas Aquinas at once recognized it as derived from the Neoplatonic work.⁵⁶ A prescribed text of philosophy in the University of Paris in the thirteenth century, *The Book of Causes* was widely read and commented on several times, notably by Albert the Great and his pupil Thomas Aquinas.⁵⁷ It became a major influence on Aquinas's conception of primary and secondary causes and their relations.

The Book of Causes, like Proclus's work, consists of a series of propositions, each followed by a brief commentary. Its first proposition strikes the keynote of the whole book, stating that a primary cause has a greater impact on its effect than a secondary cause.⁵⁸ Commenting on this proposition, Thomas shows that this is true of the first cause or God in the causation of being (*esse*).⁵⁹ Since the first

⁵⁶ Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), 235–7. The Latin text of the *Liber de causis* was published by Adriaan Pattin in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966): 90–203; also in a separate publication: Louvain: Editions du "Tijdschrift voor Filosofie," n.d. [1966]. English: *The Book of Causes*, trans. with an Introduction by Dennis J. Brand (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984).

⁵⁷ Albert the Great, *Liber de causis et de processu universitatis*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1890–99), 10. *Sancti Thomae de Aquino super Librum de Causis expositio*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey (Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1954). *St. Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Book of Causes*, translated and annotated by Vincent A. Guagliardo et al. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

⁵⁸ "Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda"; *Liber de causis*, prop. 1, p. 134 (in Pattin).

cause is pure being (*esse tantum*), his proper effect is the being of things. As *The Book of Causes* says, "The first of created things is being."⁶⁰ The first cause alone causes things to be, purely and simply, which is another way of saying that he creates them. He is the universal cause of all being, presupposing no subject on which he acts. In other words, he brings things into being from nothing (*ex nihilo*).⁶¹

Since they are true causes, secondary causes also give their effects being, not purely and simply but limited being, and they do this not through their own power but through the power of the primary cause.⁶² Their distinctive role as causes is to particularize and specify, so to speak, the effect of the first cause, not making it simply to be but to be such and such a being, for example, human or white.⁶³

As a consequence, Aquinas viewed the action of God as reaching more deeply into a thing than that of a secondary cause. Because *esse* is God's distinctive effect and *esse* is innermost in everything, God is present in everything at its core or center, at once giving it being and preserving it in being. The proper effects of secondary causes, such as humanity or whiteness, which specify being, are perfections less deeply rooted in a thing than its *esse*.⁶⁴ These causes give their effects being through participating in the divine power, and they cause specific perfections acting through their own power. Thus, their causality

⁶⁰ For Thomas's doctrine of primary and secondary causes see Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Scribners, 1940), 128–47; idem, *Thomism. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), 210–18; these pages correspond to pp. 178–86 of Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Laurence K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956). Oliva Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe according to Aquinas* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 149–54, 161–81. Rudi A. Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 160–83.

⁶¹ "Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsam creatum aliud"; *Liber de causis*, prop. 4, p. 142.

⁶² *ST I*, q. 45, a. 2.

⁶³ "Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei; et omnia quae dant esse, hoc habent in quantum agunt in virtute Dei"; *Summa contra gentiles* (hereafter, "SCG"), bk. 3, chap. 66, par. 4.

⁶⁴ "Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse"; *Ibid.*, par. 6. "[Deus] est dans esse rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinantes illud esse"; *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*. (hereafter, "In Sent"), bk. 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 2:25.

⁶⁵ *In Sent* 2:25–6.

converges with that of the first cause, so that the same effect is immediately produced by God and also by the secondary cause, although in different ways.⁶⁵ This can be illustrated very imperfectly by an instrumental cause like a pen, which causes a written word not by its own power but by being moved by a writer. Both the writer and the pen immediately cause the whole word, each in its own way. The writer is obviously not superfluous for the movement of the instrument depends on him. Neither is the primary cause superfluous in the case of a true secondary cause (as Darwin thought in later life) for it gives the secondary cause both its substance and causality.

Aquinas's ascribing a true active power and causality to creatures was not acceptable to all philosophers in the Middle Ages. Like Malebranche, the tenth-century Muslim Ash'arite school of theology, in deep agreement with the Koranic conception of God, emptied the universe of all causality save that of God. Aquinas knew of the Ash'arite doctrine through Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), and he argued against it with his own metaphysical principles.⁶⁶

At first sight it might seem reasonable that God should be the only efficient cause for he is all-powerful and the most perfect cause, and as such he has no need of an intermediary to carry out his works. But Aquinas protests that it is not out of weakness that God gives creatures the power of secondary causes but out of his goodness, which prompts him to confer upon them the dignity of being causes.⁶⁷ Etienne Gilson expresses this well: "The urge by which certain philosophers are driven to take everything from nature in order to glorify the creator is inspired by a good intention, but a blind one. In fact, to

⁶⁵ "[N]on est inconveniens quod producatetur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet alio et alio modo. . . . Patet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum: sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus"; *SCG*, bk. 3, chap. 70, pars. 5, 8.

⁶⁶ For the Ash'arite doctrine see Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 184–5; idem, "Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1 (1926): 5–127. Thomas argues against the opinion of those who would take away natural things' own actions in *SCG*, bk. 3, chap. 69; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

⁶⁷ "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est ex indigentia Dei quod causis aliis indiget ad creandum, sed ex bonitate ipsius, qui etiam dignitatem causandi aliis conferre voluit"; *In Sent.*, bk. 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, 2:26 (in Mandonnet).

deprive things of actions of their own is to belittle God's goodness."⁶⁸ It is also to belittle his perfection and power for it amounts to saying that he is not perfect or powerful enough to give creatures their own actions and causality.⁶⁹ On the other hand, to uphold the efficacy of secondary causes is to enhance both the creator and his creatures; it gives greater dignity to them and glory to the creator.⁷⁰

In Aquinas's own day there were theologians, such as Bonaventure and some of his followers, who thought that Aquinas exaggerated the active power and causality of creatures, thereby diminishing the glory of God. Taking their cue from Augustine, they did not deny the efficacy of secondary causes but reduced it to the point of insufficiency. As examples of this tendency, Aquinas cites the doctrines of seminal powers (*rationes seminales*), of truth, and of virtue. The Augustinians of his day thought that the powers of nature are such that of themselves they cannot produce a new effect but only awaken the seeds or latent virtualities that God created in matter from the beginning. Similarly, they thought that the human mind cannot know the truth with certainty without a special or quasi-special illumination by God; nor can human beings do good without a corresponding moral illumination. In defense of the natural efficacy of secondary causes, Aquinas contended that created beings by their own powers—presupposing the action of the first cause—do produce new substances; that by the light of the mind human beings do reach some truths with certainty, and that by their natural virtues they can attain moral goodness.⁷¹

In his solutions of these three philosophical problems, Thomas Aquinas introduced a new notion of the relations between the first cause and secondary created causes. Gilson clearly expressed this innovation as follows: "In St Thomas man receives from God everything he receives from Him in St Augustine, but not in the same way. In St Augustine God delegates his gifts in such a way that the very

⁶⁸ Gilson, *Thomism. The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*, 213; corresponding to pp. 181–2 of *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. See SCG, bk. 3, chap. 69, par. 16.

⁶⁹ SCG, par. 15.

⁷⁰ "[P]rima causa ex eminentia bonitatis suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint, sed etiam quod causae sint"; *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 1. SCG, bk. 3, chap. 69, par. 16.

⁷¹ *De veritate*, q. 11, a. 1; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7. Gilson draws upon these sources in his *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, chap. 7 ("The Glory of God"), 128–47.

insufficiency of nature constrains it to return toward him; in St Thomas God delegates His gifts through the mediacy of a stable nature which contains in itself—divine subsistence being taken for granted—the sufficient reason of all its operations.”⁷² In considering the above philosophical problems, Thomas opts for solutions that in his view give greater glory to God and more dignity and perfection to creatures, implying the principle that it is better for God to produce by secondary causes what he could produce by himself.

Like other medieval schoolmen, Aquinas knew nothing of a theory of the evolution of species in the modern sense. Apart from exceptional cases, like species produced by spontaneous generation or a mule begotten by a donkey and a horse, he thought that species were not produced by secondary causes but by creation. In the creation of a species of living things, God created the first individual substances in the species, such as a human being and a lion (male and female), and he gave them powers to give birth to other individuals with the same form or essence, thus belonging to the same species.⁷³ In this process the role of secondary efficient causes is not to produce the form or essence as such but to beget individuals, similar to themselves in species, by bringing to actuality the forms of the individuals existing potentially in matter.⁷⁴

Aquinas hesitated as to whether all species were created at once or successively in time. The fathers of the Church were divided on the subject, and he considered both theories equally plausible and in conformity with Scripture.⁷⁵ He was sensitive to the possibility of the emergence of new species after the six days of creation, but he be-

⁷² Etienne Gilson, in notes for a seminar in the École Pratique des Hautes Études, the University of Paris in 1921, printed as an Appendix in Laurence K. Shook, *Etienne Gilson* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), 397.

⁷³ *In Sent.*, bk. 2, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, 2:25 (in Mandonnet).

⁷⁴ Aquinas did not think a created secondary cause could produce a substantial form as such because, following Aristotle (*Physics* 1.9.192a16), a form is “something divine” (*divinum quiddam*). *SCG*, bk. 3., chap. 69, par. 27. All the secondary cause can do is to bring the form from the potentiality of matter to actuality. The same exalted notion of form is operative in Augustine’s doctrine of *rationes seminales*. Forms are already present in seminal reasons; “the creature does little more than put into play and utilize God’s creative efficacy”; Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 207.

⁷⁵ See the long debate over these two opinions of creation in *De potentia*, q. 4, a. 2.

lieved that if they did come to exist they preexisted in the active powers of the heavenly bodies and the four elements.⁷⁶

IV

Jacques Maritain. It was left to followers of Aquinas to disengage his philosophical principles from his outmoded physics and to apply them to a philosophy of evolution. One of the most noteworthy attempts in this direction is Jacques Maritain's essay, "Toward a Thomistic Idea of Evolution."⁷⁷ As to be expected, Maritain approaches the subject of evolution not as a biologist or paleontologist but as a philosopher and a metaphysician. He accepts the scientific data upon which biologists base their theory of evolution, but he looks at the data from a Thomistic point of view. Moreover, he cautions his reader that his reflections on the subject should not be taken as definitive but as tentative and very imperfect.⁷⁸

The secondary causality of created being is at the heart of Maritain's reflections on the evolution of species. He points out that Aquinas, following Aristotle, ascribed to living things an immanent or self-perfecting activity, and it is precisely this activity that gives living things an active role in evolution. Maritain finds this to be "in accord with the general principle, dear to St. Thomas, that God has given to created beings the dignity of being causes themselves, under the movement of the primary Causality."⁷⁹

At this point Maritain goes beyond Aquinas and makes a distinction in the living being's powers of immanent or self-perfecting activity. In the first place there are powers that enable the living being to exercise its specific functions of governing itself and perpetuating its species. These powers are on the level of the living being's actual species; they do not extend beyond those species to higher ones. Biologists are concerned with these powers of living things when they

⁷⁶ ST I, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3. For a discussion of this subject see Oliva Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe*, 149–54.

⁷⁷ "Vers une idée thomiste de l'évolution," in Jacques Maritain, *Approches sans entraves* (Paris: Fayard, 1973), 6:105–62. This book is translated by Bernard Doering as *Untrammelled Approaches* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). Citations are to the French edition. See Dennis Bonnette, *Origin of Human Species* (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2001), 142–3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 1:105.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 5.19:143.

study the vital functions of species that are stable and fixed for a long period of time. In the second place, living things have a self-regulating biological power of a different order. This power, unlike the first, does not appear on the surface for the biologists' scrutiny; it only appears when the tendency of matter to acquire higher forms comes into play under the super-elevating and super-forming creative action of God. Acting along evolutionary lines, it makes—or made—living things better than they are or have been.⁸⁰

Maritain is here ascribing to God the primary causality in the evolutionary process but not to the exclusion of the secondary agency of creatures. The latter are real active causes in evolution that “invent” something new, at first in their own organisms and then through their genes passing it on to their descendants. To cite Maritain: “The immense adventure of evolution, which is now finished, presupposed at one and the same time *the super-elevating and super-forming movement of God, and in the living being the corresponding awakening of the transnatural aspirations of matter.*”⁸¹

For Maritain, Thomas Aquinas's notion of matter as a potentiality or “appetite” for forms of ascending perfection is the key to the philosophical understanding of evolution. Primitive or primal matter tends toward the actuality of form. This dynamic “urge” of matter toward a more perfect degree of actuality, and finally to the form of the human soul, is a tendency toward an ever greater participation in the supreme actuality of God.

Citing Thomas Aquinas, Maritain spells out the ascending levels of forms toward which primal matter is potential. It is first potential to the forms of the elements. Existing under these forms, it is potential to the forms of mixed or composite bodies. Considered under the form of mixed bodies, it is in potency to the vegetative souls of plant life, which are potential to the sensitive souls of animals, and which are finally potential to the intellectual souls of human beings. Thus matter tends toward the human soul as toward its ultimate form.⁸² According to Maritain, each stage in this evolution is prepared by an “ultimate disposition” of matter that calls for the emergence of a higher form, up to the form of the human intellectual soul. This form, however, being spiritual, is not drawn from the potentiality of matter,

⁸⁰ *Untrammelled Approaches* 5.19:142–3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 19:145 n. 29 (Maritain's emphasis).

⁸² *Ibid.* 1.3:109–10. *SCG*, bk. 3, chap. 22, par. 7.

as are the plant and animal forms, but is created by God and infused into the well-disposed organism, rendering it formally or actually human.⁸³ Maritain emphasizes that there is nothing extraordinary or miraculous about this. At a given moment it is demanded and called for by matter, and it happens according to a metaphysical law included in the creation of humankind.⁸⁴

For our present purpose it is not necessary to explore all aspects of Maritain's approach to the philosophy of evolution. What is of central concern from the viewpoint of this essay is his acceptance and use of the principle "dear to St. Thomas, that God has given to the beings created by him the dignity of being causes themselves, under the motion of the first Causality."⁸⁵ What are these causes but secondary causes active under the impulse and direction of the primary cause or God?

This essay neither presumes to judge the scientific merits of the Darwinian theory of evolution nor aims to settle any of the philosophical and religious issues occasioned by the theory. Its purpose is historical, namely, to trace the notion of secondary causes operative in Darwin's argument for evolution in the conclusion of *The Origin of Species* to Suárez and the medieval schoolmen, especially to Thomas Aquinas, and beyond them to the Neoplatonic *Liber de causis*. The argument is not scientific but philosophical and even metaphysical, aimed at persuading naturalists with religious interests, who did not accept Darwin's theory, that it includes at least as noble—if not a nobler—conception of God as the belief that he independently created each species. It has the twofold merit of showing that God's greatness is not diminished by the Darwinian theory and that creatures are ennobled as secondary causes of their self-development.

The success of Darwin's *Origin* was immense both in his own day and in years following. He reported that before the first edition of *The Origin* appeared, "he spoke to very many naturalists on the subject of evolution and never once met with any sympathetic agreement. It is probable that some did then believe in evolution, but they were either silent, or expressed themselves so ambiguously that it was not easy to understand their meaning. Now things are wholly changed, and almost every naturalist admits the great principle of evolution."⁸⁶

⁸³ Ibid. 3.14:130.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 15:132.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 19:143.

⁸⁶ *The Origin*, 457.

It must have been especially heartening to Darwin that his good friend Charles Lyell, the founder of modern geology and a giant in nineteenth-century science, who at first was repelled by the notion of an evolution of species, after the publication of *The Origin* fully accepted evolution by natural selection and used it in his geological theories.

This essay considers Darwin's views on evolution at a time when he confidently believed in a creator and secondary causes as the creator's means of producing new species. But this confidence waned, and in later life Darwin became (though not always) an agnostic. Then he was inclined to doubt the existence of a creator or the very notion of secondary causes. What remained was "life with its several powers" but no longer distinguished as primary and secondary.

For the theist, however, who is trying to reconcile the evolution of species with religion, the way pointed out by Darwin in *The Origin of Species* and developed with a more profound notion of primary and secondary causality by Thomists like Jacques Maritain remains persuasive. Darwin received a letter asking if he thought a person could believe in God and be an evolutionist. He replied that one could undoubtedly be an ardent theist and an evolutionist, and he pointed to Charles Kingsley and Asa Gray as examples.⁸⁷ But he did not have to go abroad for an example; he could have referred his correspondent to the conclusion of his own *Origin of Species*.

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⁸⁷ Cited by Carl Zimmer, *Evolution. The Triumph of an Idea*, 343; also by Desmond and Moore, *Charles Darwin*, 636.

ARISTOTLE'S AGATHON

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THERE ARE ANY NUMBER OF REASONS for wanting to know what Aristotle means by "good" (ἀγαθός). For students of Aristotle, understanding his conception of goodness would provide an authentic Nicomachean metaethics, so to speak, a clearer view of his natural teleology, and a great deal of help in making sense of his cosmology and his metaphysics, especially the theological bits. For the less historically minded, the rebirth of virtue ethics makes the relation between nature and norm an important problem, with implications not only for ethics proper but also for social philosophy and the foundations of the social sciences. Epistemology and the philosophy of science finally have begun to take questions of value more seriously, and therefore they ought also to be interested in possible connections between knowledge of nature and the apprehension of value. Aristotle's conception of goodness is relevant to all these questions.

In the following pages I shall sketch, therefore, as concisely as possible while staying close to the texts, the most prominent outlines of Aristotle's understanding of goodness. My conclusion is that goodness for Aristotle is simply actuality, considered as a standard and goal for all being. Although I am not aware of any careful argument for this thesis, I should note that it was suggested in passing by Allan Gotthelf in an essay published almost fifteen years ago.¹ More recently, Edward Halper has implied the same conclusion by using the account of substance in *Metaphysics* 7–8, together with the distinction between first and second actuality, to illuminate Aristotle's account of the good for individuals and states.² Moving back a few

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¹ Allan Gotthelf, "The Place of the Good in Aristotle's Natural Teleology" (hereafter, "Place of the Good"), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1988): 130–1.

² Edward Halper, "The Substance of Aristotle's Ethics," in *The Crossroads of Norm and Nature: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics*, ed. May Sim (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 3–28. Unlike

centuries, Thomas Aquinas was clearly aware that Aristotle identified goodness with actuality, a position that he himself also adopted.³ In any case, a more thorough and systematic investigation will improve not only the evidence in hand that this is, indeed, Aristotle's view, but also our understanding of the view itself.

My argument proceeds in four stages. In section 1, I shall consider Aristotle's identification of the good with that for the sake of which. By the end of this section, we shall already have reason to think that Aristotle understands goodness in terms of actuality. In section 2, in order to enrich the conception of goodness with which the previous section leaves us, I shall turn briefly to the relations between goodness, beauty, order, and nature. Then, resuming in section 3 the main thread of the argument, we shall consider the texts in which Aristotle associates goodness with being. Finally, in section 4 we shall see that the identification of goodness with actuality gives us a unified account of Aristotle's claims about what counts as good and why. Through the use of *pros hen* homonymy and analogy, the various senses of "good" are united around a core meaning in typically Aristotelian fashion.

I

Many of Aristotle's best known statements concerning the good have to do with its causal role in nature as that for the sake of which (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα). In *Metaphysics* 12.10, criticizing previous treatments of the good's causal role, he indicates how seriously he takes this identification of end and good—not just in human action, as in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1, but across the board: "In all things the good, especially, is a principle."⁴ In the following paragraphs I shall examine the

Gotthelf's brief comments (see n. 1), Halper's arguments concerning ethical and political goodness do not include an explicit claim that Aristotle identifies goodness and actuality in general. However, his more focused discussion shows how the general account of goodness with which I am concerned can be used to understand the goodness of two particular entities, human individuals and states.

³ Thomas Aquinas, *In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 11–12; compare *Summa theologiae* I, q. 5, a. 1.

⁴ *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a37. All translations of Aristotle are mine; I have tried to be as literal as possible. I have occasionally consulted the Loeb and revised Oxford translations of the various texts.

good as a causal principle, beginning by considering it as an end or that for the sake of which. Because Aristotle holds that end and form often coincide, we shall next consider his identification of the good, in many cases at least, with form. Finally, returning to the good as that for the sake of which, we shall look at cases in which the good is something other than form by examining Aristotle's endorsement in *Ethics* 1.1 of the adage that "the good is that at which all things aim."⁵ By the end of this section we shall have on the table, ready for further discussion, the thesis that Aristotle understands goodness in terms of actuality.

Aristotle clearly holds that in a given motion or change, being "best" with respect to the preceding and following states is a necessary condition of being an end.⁶ Thus, in his first discussion of the four causes he writes, "For not everything that is last claims to be an end, but the best."⁷ When he recapitulates this discussion in 2.7, he refers to explanation in terms of an end by saying, "and because it is better thus, not simply but as regards the substance of each."⁸ Conversely, in *Metaphysics* 3.2 he states, "everything that is good in itself and by its own nature is an end, and thus a cause for the sake of which other things come to be and exist."⁹ In 2.2, moreover, he has already said that those who assert change to be unlimited, denying the

⁵ *NE* 1.1.1094a3.

⁶ This does not mean that we cannot understand Aristotle's teleology without explicit reference to the good. Rather, the concept of actuality undergirds both Aristotle's teleology and his understanding of goodness (compare Gotthelf, "Place of the Good," 130–1).

⁷ *Physics* 2.2.194a32–3; compare *Politics* 1.2.1253a1–2. The statement from *Physics* 2.2 follows Aristotle's well-known denial that death is an end (τέλος), despite the fact that it is obviously last (ἔσχατον). In a related passage from *Metaphysics* 5.16, he states more fully that death, and in general the outcome of passing away, can be called an end only metaphorically (1021b23–30).

⁸ *Physics* 2.7.198b5–9.

⁹ *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a23–7. This assertion occurs in the course of an aporia that is raised again in 11.1 (1059a34–8). It is risky to attribute to Aristotle claims that occur in the statement of an aporia. However, this particular puzzle turns out to be caused not by the premise quoted but by the erroneous equation of πρόξις—with which goodness and thus that for the sake of which are correlative (see the clear statement at 13.3.1078a31–2)—with motion. In 9.6, Aristotle argues that πρόξεις must be distinguished into κινήσεις (motions, or actions that involve motion) and ἐνέργεια (actualities, or activities that do not involve motion) (1048b18–30). This distinction helps him to retain the connection between the good and that for the sake of which, while also holding that not every good thing is subject to change.

existence of that for the sake of which, "remove the nature of the good unawares."¹⁰ His strongest identification of the good with that for the sake of which, however, comes in *Metaphysics* 1.7, where he asserts that by making the good an origin of motion, his predecessors had identified only an incidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) role thereof. The good as such (ἀπλῶς) is not an origin of motion but that for the sake of which things come to be and exist.¹¹ In other words, to be an end or that for the sake of which is a function of the good as good.

A possible objection to identifying the good with τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, or that for the sake of which, is that according to many contemporary authors, Aristotle's teleology is operative only in the world of living things.¹² If that were the case, then to claim that every good is an end and every end a good would be to make goodness a biological concept, and to say the least, this would be a striking contention. It is worth pointing out, therefore, that in none of the texts just cited does the goal-directedness proper to living things play a noticeable role. The *Metaphysics* as a whole, moreover, makes it clear that Aristotle counts the good as a highly general, and perhaps even universally applicable, causal principle.¹³ This point alone is enough to call into question the biological reading of his teleology. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, a careful reading of Aristotle's nonbiological works reveals both teleological claims and attributions of goodness regarding the elements and their inanimate compounds.¹⁴ In fact, Aristotle holds that goal-directedness is a basic feature of natural existence and activity.¹⁵ By identifying the good with that for the sake of which,

¹⁰ *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b9–13.

¹¹ *Metaphysics* 1.7.988b6–16.

¹² The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204–42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1988): 1–53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1 (1984): 133–46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 791–825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in *Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs.*, ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71–82.

¹³ See *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a19–b10, 1.3.984b8–22, 2.2.994b9–16, 12.7, 12.10, 13.3.1078a31–b5.

therefore, Aristotle is actually implying that nature as a whole is suffused with value.

Just as well-known as Aristotle's identification of the good with that for the sake of which is his claim that often, that for the sake of which coincides with form. An especially helpful statement of this thesis comes in *Parts of Animals* 1.1, when Aristotle writes that his predecessors failed to make use of teleological explanation because they had no clear notion of "what it was to be, of definition with respect to substance."¹⁶ The terms τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία, which Aristotle uses here to signify the form of a matter-form composite, are important in that they call to mind his emphasis on form as the actual being of the composite, a point to which we shall return later. In any case, Aristotle reiterates the relation between form and end, with respect at least to the generation of substances, in just about every possible way: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα is identified with form (εἶδος),¹⁷ nature (φύσις),¹⁸ account (λόγος),¹⁹ and substance (οὐσία)—which last, he adds, is in all things the "cause of being" (αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι).²⁰

In addition to these statements associating form with that for the sake of which, and thus indirectly with the good, there are others directly linking form with the good. In *Generation and Corruption* 2.6, for example, Aristotle writes that being in a certain state (τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν)—in other words, the nature of each thing—is the well and the good.²¹ In *Physics* 1.9, quarrelling with the Platonists regarding first

¹⁴ This argument can be found in my dissertation: "Teleology in *Generation and Corruption* and the *Meteorology*," chap. 1 in "Aristotle's Teleology and Modern Mechanics" (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004). I focus on these two works, as opposed to *De caelo*, because although it is generally acknowledged that for Aristotle the cosmos as a whole is goal-directed, this direction is sometimes considered too closely related, or at least too strongly analogous, to that found in the biology for it to conflict with the biological interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. The main texts that I examine are *GC* 1.7.324b14–20, *GC* 2.6.333b5–20, *GC* 2.9, *Meteorology* 4.2.379b18–80a1, and *Meteorology* 4.12.

¹⁵ For nature and that for the sake of which, see chapter 3 of my dissertation, "Teleology and Continuous Change," which addresses Aristotle's views on what sorts of change are for the sake of their outcomes.

¹⁶ *PA* 1.1.642a25–7. The context makes clear that Aristotle is referring primarily, at least, to the early naturalists, whom he thinks routinely failed to recognize the actual ontological structure of living substances and thus misinterpreted the phenomena of their coming to be.

¹⁷ *Physics* 2.7.198a24–7.

¹⁸ *Physics* 2.2.194a27–b9.

¹⁹ *PA* 1.1.639b15–17.

²⁰ *De anima* 2.4.415b10–22.

²¹ *GC* 2.6.333b16–19.

principles, he states that form is “divine, good, and desirable,” and that matter, in itself, is such as to desire it.²² These texts have the same implication as the former: at least with regard to substances and their coming to be, what is good is form. Moreover, although we shall not consider until section 4 the precise sense in which nonsubstances can be called good, Aristotle’s discussion of change in *Physics* 1 is about change in general, not just about substantial change. Therefore, the text from chapter 9 suggests that just as the form by which a substance exists is good with respect to its matter, so its secondary attributes are goods insofar as the substance itself is fully determined and actualized by them. This point will reappear immediately below, as we broaden our discussion to include not only form but also activity.²³

A moment’s reflection, in fact, is enough to realize that Aristotle cannot identify the good with form, even if substantial form is the central case of actuality in his metaphysics. This is because he also holds that mere existence is not the best state in which a substance can be. In the case of living things, to start with the easiest case, simply to live is not enough: complete goodness is attained only in activity. Aristotle applies this observation to humans in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7²⁴ and to animals more generally in *De somno* 3.²⁵ The basic idea, expressed in the well-known “function argument” of *Ethics* 1.7, is that to each nature there pertain capacities (*δυνάμεις*) for certain typical activities (*πράξεις* or *ἔργα*), and that complete goodness for a substance consists in the exercise of these capacities with excellence (*ἀρετή*).²⁶ Moreover, if we focus on the capacity and the corresponding activity rather than on the intermediate “state” (*ἕξις*—for example, *ἀρετή*) that disposes a subject to act well or poorly, this model of complete goodness would seem to apply to inanimate substances as well. Nonliving bodies may not have *ἀρεταί*, as do animals and plants, but in *Ethics* 6.2 Aristotle points out that the excellence (*ἀρετή*) of a given capacity is relative to the corresponding activity or task (*ἢ δ’ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκείον*).²⁷ Thus it is the activity, not the state, that is conceptually and ontologically central. Because Aristotle also holds that even the elements and the mixed bodies must be understood in terms of their *ἔργα*,²⁸ we may conclude that goodness attaches to these activities as well.²⁹

²² *Physics* 1.9.192a16–25.

In addition to the texts just mentioned, there are several passages in which Aristotle explicitly states that all things, through the activities (πράξεις) proper to their nature, seek their own good. In an extended passage in *De caelo* 2.12, for example, he makes clear that every substance, whether its activities are one or many, tends through them to achieve its proper good, and that in possessing this good it

²³ Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth noting here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things.

First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (*Physics* 2.7.198a35–b5; *Physics* 5.1.224a34–b13; *De anima* 3.10.433b13–16; *Metaphysics* 11.11.1067b7–12; *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b1–3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033a24–b19; 8.3.1043b15–18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong.

Second, in his discussion of unity in *Metaphysics* 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls “wholes” (ὅλοι), explaining that there is a sense of “one” that applies only to what has a single form (εἶδος), and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11–17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27–8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing (ἐν τι). In chapter 27, on “mutilation,” it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (*Metaphysics* 5.27.1024a11–28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In *De iuventute*, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible “the greatest possible unity,” as he puts it (*Iuv.* 2.468b9–13). He refers to the latter also as “best constituted” (ἀρίστα συνεστηκότα), and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.

²⁴ *NE* 1.7.1098a5–7, 1098b32–9a3.

²⁵ *De somno* 3.455b13–28.

²⁶ *NE* 1.7.1097b22–8a18.

²⁷ *NE* 6.2.1139a16–17.

²⁸ See *Meteorology* 4.12.

²⁹ This goodness would, of course, be not absolute goodness but goodness relative to the natural capacities of the substance in question: see *Physics* 2.7.198b5–9.

comes as near the final end of the cosmos as its share in the divine principle permits.³⁰ Likewise, in *De anima* 2.4 he states that living things (aside from those spontaneously generated) produce individuals the same in εἶδος as themselves in order to participate in the eternal and divine. To support this claim, he asserts that such participation is that toward which all things strive and for the sake of which they carry out their natural activities.³¹ In short, we should take Aristotle at his word when he says, in the second sentence of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "It is well said that the good is that at which all things aim."³²

What we have seen so far is that Aristotle identifies the basic good of a substance, and correspondingly of its coming to be, with its form. A substance is fully good, however, only through the activity that corresponds to this form—and, if that activity can be performed more or less well, through its performance with excellence. These two claims about goodness bring us directly to the thesis at which I have been aiming, because Aristotle's preferred way of expressing the relation between form and activity is through the concept of actuality. In *De anima* 2.1, after beginning his attempt to define the soul by distinguishing matter and form, he points out that form (εἶδος) is the actuality (ἐντελέχεια) of a composite substance. To avoid confusion, however, he explains that the term ἐντελέχεια can be used in two ways.³³ Using the example of our capacity for knowledge, he points out that both habitual knowledge and active reflection are actualities corresponding to this capacity. The soul, he continues, like habitual knowledge, is an actuality that leaves room for a further actuality, namely, the activities of the living thing. There is thus a definite progression from potentiality to first actuality, as Aristotle calls it, and then to second actuality. In the case of a substance, these three "levels" of being correspond to matter, form, and activity.

Aristotle's distinction between first and second actuality enables us to see that in connecting the good with form, on the one hand, and activity, on the other, Aristotle is identifying goodness with actuality. Actual being thus also serves as that for the sake of which natural substances come to be, exist, and act. In section 3, we shall consider Aristotle's explicit statements about the connection between good-

³⁰ *De caelo* 2.12.292a19–b25.

³¹ *De anima* 2.4.415a27–b8.

³² *NE* 1.1.1094a3.

³³ *De anima* 2.1.412a20–9.

ness and being. First, however, we can enrich our understanding of his conception of goodness by considering its relation to some other important concepts.

II

In the following paragraphs, I shall briefly consider Aristotle's concepts of order, beauty, and nature in relation to his conception of goodness. First, I shall link the discussion of these concepts to the previous section by considering order as a kind of form. Next we shall consider beauty, contrasting it with goodness in order to shed light on the latter. Finally, we shall turn to the relation among order, beauty, goodness, and nature.

As I have just suggested, Aristotle's concept of order (τάξις) is not unrelated to his concept of form. In *Physics* 1.7, for example, he uses the term "order" to signify the form by which bronze or another material constitutes a statue.³⁴ This order is, of course, the arrangements of parts whereby the bronze has one shape rather than another.³⁵ Because a statue is not a natural substance, the order by which it exists is not a substantial form in the strict sense. In *Metaphysics* 8.2, however, Aristotle gives a general account of actual being according to which the actuality of any composite is the formal principle that, whether or not it is an οὐσία strictly speaking, is analogous to the οὐσία found in natural substances.³⁶ Thus, when we find him associating order with goodness, as below, it is reasonable to assume that the goodness in question is that of a principle of actuality, analogous to the οὐσία of a natural substance, by which the things ordered constitute more than a random assembly.

Another concept that Aristotle frequently relates to goodness is, not surprisingly, beauty (τὸ καλόν).³⁷ The basic distinction he makes between goodness and beauty is that the former is always associated with ποῦξις, whereas the latter is found also in motionless things.³⁸ The language here is not exact, however, because in *Metaphysics* 9.6

³⁴ *Physics* 1.7.190b28.

³⁵ Given the context, it seems possible that Aristotle borrows this concept of order from Democritus. See *Physics* 1.5.188a24.

³⁶ *Metaphysics* 8.2, esp. 1043a4–9.

³⁷ In other contexts the term καλός is sometimes translated "noble" or "fine," but for present purposes "beauty" is clearly correct.

³⁸ *Metaphysics* 13.3.1078a31–2.

he explains that not every *πρᾶξις* involves motion: some are *ἐνέργειαι*, activities that do not strictly speaking involve any motion.³⁹ The exact distinction between goodness and beauty, therefore, seems to be that “good” applies whenever we can speak of actuality or fulfillment, as opposed to potentiality. Beauty, on the other hand, applies when these categories are not operative, as in the objects of mathematics.⁴⁰ The chief forms of beauty, Aristotle continues, are order (*τάξις*), symmetry (*συμμετρία*), and the definite (*τὸ ὁρισμένον*).⁴¹ At least two of these three are directly relevant to goodness as well: an animal’s form, for example, involves both order and definiteness.

Because beauty is a broader concept than goodness, it is not surprising that Aristotle writes of the beautiful as well as the good in relation to form and that for the sake of which. In *Parts of Animals* 1.5, for example, he states that in the works of nature, “the end for the sake of which they are constituted or come to be has the place of the beautiful.”⁴² Likewise, in *Metaphysics* 1.3, that for the sake of which, as opposed to spontaneity or chance, is what causes things to come to be and exist well and beautifully (*τοῦ γὰρ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι*). In other words, he adds, *τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα* is the cause of the cosmos and of all order (*τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης*).⁴³ Within nature, therefore, goodness, order, beauty, and so forth are all intimately tied up with each other—and, when it comes to causes, with that for the sake of which.

The concepts of beauty and especially of order are important not only for the light they shed on Aristotle’s conception of goodness, but also for the strong connection they provide between goodness and nature. For example, in a passage concerning the heavens in *Parts of Animals* 1.1, he notes that the signs of action for the sake of something are order and definiteness (*τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ὁρισμένον*)—two of the forms of beauty we just noted—as opposed to randomness,

³⁹ See n. 9.

⁴⁰ In fact, Aristotle’s comments about goodness and beauty in *Metaphysics* 13 are made with a view to the place of beauty in mathematics. He wants to deny the contention that the good cannot be a universal principle because it is not found in mathematical objects (see the *aporia* posed in *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a21–b1). In his response he suggests that beauty, rather than goodness in the strict sense, will do.

⁴¹ *Metaphysics* 13.3.1078a36–b5.

⁴² *PA* 1.5.45a25–7.

⁴³ *Metaphysics* 1.3.984b11–18. With regard to the cosmos as a whole, this passage is echoed in terms of goodness and order in *Physics* 2.4.196a24–b5 and *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11–25.

chance, and disorder (τὸ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὥς ἐτυχε).⁴⁴ Likewise, in *Generation of Animals* 5.1, he states that explanation in terms of an end is required whenever we are dealing with the ordered and definite works of nature (τεταγμένα καὶ ὠρισμένα ἔργα τῆς φύσεως). The reason he gives brings us back to form and to being: we need explanation in terms of an end because coming to be (γένεσις) follows upon and is for the sake of being (οὐσία) rather than vice versa.⁴⁵

In fact, Aristotle is quite clear that order is involved in the very existence of nature. In *De caelo* 3.2, he argues that any world containing a finite number of types (γένη) of cause will display order. Because causes are differentiated by their natural (typical) effects, this is simply to say that if there is natural movement, then there is orderly movement, because, as he puts it, a thing's nature is nothing other than the order proper to it.⁴⁶ The same point is clearly reflected in the opening statements of the *Meteorology*: natural phenomena are those that display a certain degree of order.⁴⁷ The phenomena of nature, then, are intrinsically ordered, and as we have already seen, the order and definiteness that they display constitute them as beautiful. Finally, because this beauty is bound up with the activities (πράξεις) of natural substances, it also qualifies as goodness. Nature as such, in short, is suffused with goodness.

The foregoing discussion of order, beauty, and nature in relation to goodness has been far too brief to count as a discussion of these concepts in their own right. It is, however, enough to establish a strong and interesting connection between Aristotle's concept of nature and his concept of goodness. Although I shall not comment further on this connection, it is worth keeping in mind as we proceed.

III

In *Metaphysics* 1.2, Aristotle concludes that wisdom or first philosophy is the knowledge of first causes.⁴⁸ This leads to an aporia that is especially interesting for our purposes.⁴⁹ Aristotle is convinced that

⁴⁴ PA 1.1.641b16–24.

⁴⁵ GA 5.1.778b2–7.

⁴⁶ *De caelo* 3.2.300b32–301a12.

⁴⁷ *Meteorology* 1.1.338b20–2.

⁴⁸ *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a19–b10.

⁴⁹ *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a21–9; 11.1.1059a34–8.

there is at least one immaterial and immovable substance and that this substance, God, is the first and most universal cause of the phenomena of nature. Moreover, it would be perverse, he thinks, to deny that this first cause is good, especially given that in all things, as we have seen, the good above all is a principle. On the other hand, goodness is intrinsically linked to action and movement. How, then, can an immovable cause be good? The solution to this aporia (see below, also note 9) reveals the deeply metaphysical character of Aristotle's analysis of goodness by connecting goodness with the core topic of his first philosophy, being as such (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὅν).

There are at least two passages in which Aristotle writes explicitly that being is better than nonbeing. The first appears in *Generation and Corruption* 2.10, where he explains the “eminently reasonable” phenomenon—εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν, he says—of eternal coming to be. The argument runs thus:⁵⁰

- (a) Nature always aims at what is best.
- (b) Being (in the various recognized senses of this term) is better than not being.
- (c) Not everything can exist eternally.
- (d) So, aiming for the best involves stringing being together as well as can be managed (μάλιστα συνείροιτο τὸ εἶναι).
- (e) God therefore completed the cosmos by making coming to be uninterrupted.

The starkness with which the principles of this argument are set forth is remarkable, even for Aristotle. We are simply told, as something presumably obvious, that being is better than not being (βέλτιον δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι) and referred “elsewhere” (ἐν ἄλλοις) for the various senses of “being.”⁵¹ Because this passage gives us no basis for expanding on the claim that interests us, we may turn immediately to the next.

⁵⁰ *GC* 2.10, 336b25–7a1.

⁵¹ Michael Loux has suggested in conversation that Aristotle's phrase πολλαχῶς λέγειν—literally, “to say (something) in many ways”—should not be taken to imply that the term in question has several senses, but rather that it is true, in a single sense, of things that share no common nature, such as items from different categories (see *De sophisticis elenchis* 11.172a36–7, for possible textual support). If this is the case, then the claims I make here and in section 4 about the senses of “being” and “good” may be restated as claims about the kinds of things of which “being” and “good” are said.

In *Generation of Animals* 2.1, Aristotle gives an argument from final causality for the separation of the sexes observed in many animals. Once again, it will be helpful to analyze the complete argument:⁵²

- (a) To admit of both being and nonbeing is opposed to being eternal (αἰδία) and divine (θεῖα).
- (b) What is not eternal admits of being and not being, and so of better and worse.
- (c) The cause of the better in what admits of better and worse is always, by its own nature, the noble (καλόν) and divine.
- (d) Soul is better than body.
- (e) The ensouled is better, because of its soul, than the soulless.
- (f) Being is better than not being, and living than not living.
- (g) The nature of an animal prevents it from being eternal as an individual.
- (h) It can, however, be eternal in εἶδος.
- (i) Through their coming to be, therefore, living things attain the only kind of eternity possible for them.
- (j) The proximate moving cause, insofar as λόγος and εἶδος belong to it, is better and more divine than the matter.
- (k) In generation the male is a principle of motion, whereas the female provides the matter.⁵³
- (l) It is better that the superior be separated from the inferior.
- (m) Therefore, when and insofar as is possible, male and female are separate.

This argument tells us considerably more than the previous about the relation between goodness and being. Let us examine the relevant claims.

Aristotle's first premise, that eternal being is better than contingent and temporary being, is a straightforward consequence of the central claim that being is better than nonbeing. For if being, as such

⁵² GA 2.1.731b24–2a10.

⁵³ Unfortunately, Aristotle's account of sexual generation provides one of the clearest examples of how an individual's or culture's understanding of gender can influence scientific theory.

and as opposed to nonbeing, carries value, then necessary and eternal being is obviously better than the alternative. Premise (b) also follows immediately from the central claim: being is better, and nonbeing is worse. Premise (c), however is highly interesting. Aristotle is claiming not only that being is better than nonbeing, but that when being (and hence goodness) requires a cause—the substance in question also admitting of not being—then this cause is somehow to be found in that which has being necessarily and eternally. That which possesses being and goodness, in other words, tends to transmit it to things that do not exist but can. A corollary to this claim is found in (j): a proximate moving cause is better than the matter on which it acts. This follows, of course, because the moving cause exceeds the matter in being: it is capable of acting because it has the λόγος, or οὐσία, that matter lacks.⁵⁴

In addition to these claims about the causal capacities, as it were, of being and goodness, Aristotle makes several related claims about the relation between better and worse within that which admits of being and nonbeing. First, (d) soul is better than body. This, of course, we already know from our discussion of form as that for the sake of which. However, the present context leads us to focus on soul not as form (εἶδος) but as actuality (ἐντελέχεια, οὐσία). Soul is better than body because it is the actuality of the body and the cause of the composite's being.⁵⁵ Aristotle's next claim goes even further: (e) not only is soul better than the body whose actuality it is, but in general, what has soul is better than what does not. In other words, the presence of soul brings a new and superior level of actuality or being, one that is not found among nonliving things. As Aristotle goes on to say, therefore, (f) the superiority of being to nonbeing has as a corollary that the living is better than the nonliving.

Clearly, the thread that unites Aristotle's claims about goodness in this argument is their relation to his views concerning being, potentiality, and actuality. The relation between goodness and actuality is something that we have already seen, first in the goodness of form and activity, in section 1, and then in the distinction between goodness and beauty, which we examined in section 2. In the argument that we have just considered, Aristotle does not explicitly mention either δύναμις or ἐνέργεια; these are metaphysical concepts, and in his

⁵⁴The argument for this claim, along with possible qualifications to it, is found in *Metaphysics* 7.7–9.

⁵⁵See *De anima* 2.4.415b10–22.

works of natural science he generally prefers terms drawn from the study of nature. Nevertheless, the claims about “better and worse” that we find in this argument map neatly onto the conclusions about potency and act that Aristotle reaches in *Metaphysics* 9. In section 4, I shall show how a simple schema laying out Aristotle’s views about being, potency, and actuality easily makes sense of everything that he says about goodness. First, however, we should look at a few more texts on the relation between being and goodness.

We have just noticed in *Generation of Animals* Aristotle’s view that eternal being is superior to contingent and temporary being. This claim is spelled out in other texts, using a variety of terms and concepts. In *Parts of Animals* 1.5, for example, we read that substances by nature ungenerated (ἀγενήτους), indestructible (ἀφθάρτους), and eternal (αἰῶνα) are more excellent (τιμίας) and divine (θείας) than those lacking these attributes.⁵⁶ In *Metaphysics* 12.7, it is the property of existing necessarily—which for Aristotle coincides with being eternal⁵⁷—that is highlighted.⁵⁸ Here we find that precisely insofar as the first mover is necessary, it exists nobly or beautifully (καλῶς) and so is a first principle. Moreover, Aristotle explicitly states in this passage that God’s divinity and goodness amount to his being an eternal actuality. This actuality qualifies as life, a life that is best (ἀρίστη) and eternal. Later in the *Metaphysics*, we find the converse inference: it is precisely as something good, or as being in a good state (εὖ ἔχει), that the primary and eternal being is indestructible (ἀφθαρτον) and possesses self-sufficiency (τὸ αὐταρκές) and security (σωτηρία).⁵⁹

In short, Aristotle does not stop with the simple claim that being is better than not being. Rather, by using his concept of actuality to illuminate the notion of being, he expands on this basic assertion in a number of directions: the notion of being, and therefore of goodness, is verified most perfectly in what not only exists but exists without even the possibility of not being; which neither can nor needs to strive for fulfillment but possesses its activity so perfectly as simply to be that activity; which is, therefore, perfectly self-sufficient and secure in its being; and which, necessarily, is the cause of being and therefore of goodness in such beings as possess these only contingently and

⁵⁶ PA 1.5.644b22–6.

⁵⁷ See GC 2.11.337b35–8a4.

⁵⁸ *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b10–30.

⁵⁹ *Metaphysics* 14.4.1091b16–21; on self-sufficiency as characteristic of “the end and the best,” see also *Politics* 1.2.1253a1–2.

temporarily. In general, therefore, from the divine substance on down, the degree of goodness found in any substance depends on the way in which it has being.

In section 1, we saw that Aristotle finds a close connection between goodness, on the one hand, and both form and activity, on the other. The fact that he elsewhere characterizes form and activity as first and second actuality led to the conclusion that the central concept in his account of goodness is actuality or actual being. Thus, after a brief consideration in section 2 of how he understands order, beauty, and nature in relation to goodness, we have discussed in section 3 what he has to say explicitly about goodness and being. In doing so, we have seen how a number of attributes that Aristotle associates with goodness, such as form, life, activity, agency, eternity, necessity, self-sufficiency, and security, are all ways of spelling out his basic assertion that being—and in particular actual being—is better than nonbeing. In the following section, drawing on what we have already seen, I shall conclude by presenting a synthetic account of Aristotle's notion of goodness in terms of his concept of actuality.

IV

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6, Aristotle observes that the term "good" is applied properly to things in each of the categories. Priority, however, goes to what is good in the category of substance. Our concluding discussion of goodness and actuality, therefore, must begin with goodness among substances. I shall start, in particular, with goodness among destructible natural substances, because it is to the ontological structure of these that Aristotle devotes most of his efforts. I shall then briefly consider indestructible substances, and finally turn to some peculiarities of living substances in the sublunary realm. This will lead to a discussion of goodness in the other categories. I shall try to keep my comments brief, although much could be said on each of the topics just mentioned. Throughout, my focus will be on the relation between goodness and actuality.

First, then, in substances that come to be and pass away—those composed of matter and form—what is good is the form. Form is, universally, that for the sake of which these substances come to be and exist; hence it is the good of each thing. From the metaphysical point of view, form is that in virtue of which each thing exists as itself;

it is the substance's actuality.⁶⁰ Indeed, as we saw in *Generation of Animals* 5.1, the status of form as that for the sake of which depends on its status as actuality or substance (οὐσία). Correlatively, it is as actuality that form is the good of a composite: being is better than not being.⁶¹ In *Metaphysics* 9.8, finally, a text that we have not yet considered, Aristotle explicitly states that actuality, as opposed to potentiality, has the character of an end and that for the sake of which.⁶² Because only what is best qualifies as an end, this statement implies that actuality as such, by contrast with potentiality, is good.⁶³

However, as we saw in section 1, a substance does not possess its complete goodness simply by existing. A thing's nature is only fully revealed, and its complete actuality attained, when it passes from the first actuality of simple being to the second actuality of its natural activity.⁶⁴ From a theoretical point of view, this claim is sufficiently established by the text just cited from *Metaphysics* 9.8: nature, though an actuality itself, is also a potentiality for activity in the broad sense of potentiality (δύναμις) at work in 9.8.⁶⁵ Thus, like all potentialities, it is acquired and exists for the sake of the corresponding actuality.⁶⁶ In other words, Aristotle does indeed think that fire actually heating is superior, as fire, to fire only potentially heating, because the capacity to heat has come to be for the sake of heating, and this capacity is the very nature of fire.

Once we have the goodness of form and of activity firmly in place, little work is required to add the habitual goodness that, as we have

⁶⁰ See, for example, *De anima* 2.1.412a6–10.

⁶¹ See the above discussions of *GC* 2.10.336b25–7a1, and *GA* 2.1.731b24–732a10.

⁶² Actuality is prior to potentiality “also in substance (οὐσία), first because things later in coming to be are prior in form and in substance, as man is to child and human being to seed, for the former has the form already whereas the latter does not; and second because everything coming to be proceeds to a principle and an end (for that for the sake of which is a principle, and coming to be is for the sake of the end), and the actuality (ἐνέργεια) is an end, and the potentiality is received for the sake of (χάριν) this” (*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4–10).

⁶³ Not that potentiality is bad, but its goodness depends on that of the corresponding actuality. Compare *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4–b1, on the ontological priority of actuality to potentiality, as well as 9.9.1051a4–21, on the superiority of good actuality to good potentiality.

⁶⁴ Once again, see *NE* 1.7.1098a5–7, 1098b32–9a3; *De somno* 3.455b13–28.

⁶⁵ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b5–10.

⁶⁶ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4–10.

seen, Aristotle calls ἀρετή.⁶⁷ What we need first are substances whose typical activities can be done well or poorly. This condition is clearly instantiated in the case of sight, for example, and even more in the case of practical reason. Some kinds of animals see better than others, and within the same species some individuals see better than others. Among humans, practical reasoning will be more or less excellent from one individual to the next. Second, the capacity for the activity in question must admit of an intermediate state, by which the subject of the capacity is disposed more or less well with respect to the activity in question. Health in the eye, physical strength, practical wisdom, and the moral virtues are all examples of such states, and they are all good because they dispose their subjects to actualize fully their natural potentialities for sight, for bodily activity, and for activity in accord with reason.

It is true, of course, that actions and states are not, strictly speaking, in the category of substance. Nevertheless, they must be discussed in relation to substance, because they have being and thus—as we shall see—goodness only as modifications of substance. Before dealing with goodness in the other categories as such, however, we should look briefly at two types of substance that require additional comment: the living and the eternal.

The being of an eternal substance might seem to create a difficulty for the idea that goodness is actuality. On the one hand, Aristotle thinks that eternal substances have a greater goodness than those that are not eternal. On the other hand, eternal substances have no matter for coming to be; their substantial being, therefore, is not the actuality of any potentiality. How, then, can goodness be always associated with actuality? The answer is straightforward. Because actuality is prior in substance (οὐσολα) to potentiality, not only in particular cases but generally and as such, we can legitimately speak of being in actuality even where there is no corresponding potentiality. This is, in fact, what Aristotle does in *Metaphysics* 9.8. In his last argument that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality, he writes that “the eternal are prior in substance to the destructible, and nothing eternal is in potentiality.”⁶⁸ Eternal substances, in other words, are always and necessarily actual.

⁶⁷ See *NE* 1.7; 2.5; 6.2.1139a16–17; compare also *Metaphysics* 5.14.1020b13–25.

⁶⁸ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6–8.

With regard to animals and plants, Aristotle holds that these substances can suffer a kind of harm that others cannot, namely, mutilation.⁶⁹ This point suggests in turn that living substances possess their good in a unique way, and this is not hard to see. The actuality of a living body, Aristotle tells us in *De anima* 2.1, is distinguished in that it is the actuality of an organic body, one whose parts differ in their qualities and thus, like so many tools (ὄργανα), contribute in different ways to the being and activity of the whole.⁷⁰ Each part has its own activity, and the complexity of activities mirrors the complexity of parts.⁷¹ This means that living things are characterized by obvious means-to-end relations among their activities and their parts. It is therefore, as Aristotle himself explains, much easier to distinguish matter (the parts as bodily) from form (the capacities for activity) among living things than among the nonorganic substances of which they are composed.⁷² Given this complexity of activities, each clearly distinct from the corresponding potentiality and from the part that embodies this potentiality, and each, moreover, playing a definite and discernible role within the life of the animal or plant, it is not surprising if we recognize order, beauty, and goodness most readily in the phenomena of life.

Finally, then, we come to the attribution of goodness in categories other than substance. This final step in the argument is an important one, because it leads us straight to a discussion of the ways in which “good” is predicated of various good things. By bringing our discussion of Aristotle’s conception of goodness down to the different types of things that can be called good, and by noting how the term “good” is predicated of each of them, we can further validate the conclusions we have reached so far. The text for our discussion is, of course, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6. In this chapter, addressing the Platonists, Aristotle considers in what way we can speak of a “universal good.” To argue that the notion of a single “form” or “idea” of the good is incoherent, he focuses on the different ways in which the term “good” is predicated.

Aristotle’s first objection to the notion of a universal good is that things are called good both in the category of substance and in the

⁶⁹ See n. 23.

⁷⁰ *De anima* 2.1.412a28–b6.

⁷¹ See *PA* 1.5.645b15–6a2; 2.1, 646a12–7a3.

⁷² *Meteorology* 4.12.

other categories.⁷³ Items in the categories other than substance, however, are essentially posterior to substance; they are like “offshoots” or accidents of substance and exist only with respect to (πρός) it. Therefore, any good found in these categories is dependent on substance in such a way that it cannot be called good in the same sense as can substances. The next objection is closely related to the first: things are called good in as many ways as they are said to be, and so, once again, there can be no single account of goodness.⁷⁴ Together, these related objections bring us to a first point about the predication of “good.”

In the course of his second objection, Aristotle gives examples of goods found in the various categories. His examples in the category of substance, God and νοῦς, provide no new insights. When it comes to the accidents, however, it is clear that what he attributes to his examples is goodness with respect to some substance that possesses or makes use of them. For the most part, the accidents he mentions are not even good as secondary actualities of substances, but rather as means to their successful activity. Thus, for quality he mentions the virtues, for quantity what is moderate, for relation the useful, for time the opportune, and for place an appropriate environment. Each of these attributions of goodness makes sense only relative to the goal-directed activity of substances; in other words, predication of goodness across the categories seems to be an instance of homonymy *pros hen*. This conclusion is supported by the fact that being, and therefore actuality, is also predicated *pros hen* across the categories, insofar as everything other than substance exists in relation to substance.⁷⁵ It seems, therefore, that for Aristotle there are as many ways of being good as there are substances, on the one hand, and ways of contributing to the complete actuality of those substances, on the other.

Later in the chapter, Aristotle explicitly raises the question of how “good” is predicated of various things.⁷⁶ After distinguishing between things good in themselves and those that are good as means, he points out that even goods in themselves—such as honor, wisdom, and pleasure—taken precisely as good, have different accounts. At

⁷³ NE 1.6.1096a17–24.

⁷⁴ NE 1.6.1096a24–9.

⁷⁵ See above, as well as *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003a33–b10, 6.1.1028a10–21, 8.1.1045b27–32.

⁷⁶ NE 1.6.1096b13–30.

the same time, the attribution of goodness to all these things does not seem to be an instance of homonymy pure and simple. This leaves two options: the various goods in themselves are good either by homonymy *pros hen* or by analogy. Aristotle does not comment on the first option. After raising the second, however, he adds, "for as sight is in the body, so is understanding (νοῦς) in the soul, and another indeed in another."⁷⁷ At this point, he remarks that such abstract considerations are inappropriate to a work on ethics, and moves on.

In fact, it would seem that both homonymy *pros hen* and analogy are at work in the predication of "good." With regard to the *pros hen*, we have already suggested that this is operative in the predication of goodness across categories. Even within a given category, moreover, it is surely complete actuality, whether form or activity, that is good in the primary sense. What can we say, therefore, about capacities and incomplete actualities, such as motions or states? Unless we want to say that these are not good at all or good only instrumentally, then we must conclude that they are good in virtue of their relation to complete actuality. Although Aristotle does not explicitly say that either goodness or being is predicated *pros hen* of potentiality and actuality, this mode of predication seems more accurate than either analogy or unqualified homonymy, and it fits his conclusions in *Metaphysics* 9.8 about the priority of actuality to potentiality. We may safely conclude, I think, that capacities, motions, and states can be called good because they are capacities for, motions toward, or states that conduce to the corresponding good actuality.

Finally, Aristotle's remark about sight and understanding makes it clear that "good" is predicated not only *pros hen*, but also by analogy. Because the various senses of "good" correspond to the senses of "being" and hence to those of "actuality," this conclusion also follows from the fact that the predication of "actuality" is itself analogical. As we read in *Metaphysics* 9.6, "Not all things are said to be actually in the same sense, but proportionately: as this is in this or to this, that is in that or to that."⁷⁸ Even in its primary or focal meaning, therefore, which we might render as "complete actuality in the category of substance," the term "good" is predicated not univocally but analogically.

To conclude, we have seen in last few paragraphs how recognizing the connection between goodness and actuality enables us to see,

⁷⁷ *NE* 1.6.1096a29–30.

⁷⁸ *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b6–9.

first, how items in all the categories can be called good with reference to substance, and second, how goodness can be predicated without equivocation of beings that do not share any categorical attributes. The use of analogy and *pros hen* homonymy thus enables us to arrange the various possible uses of “good” around the central case in which it signifies actuality in the category of substance. This central case, as we have seen, includes both first and second actuality. Because Aristotelian natures are defined in terms of their characteristic δυνάμεις, moreover, and because these δυνάμεις are for the sake of and therefore ontologically posterior to the corresponding activities, Aristotle’s focal meaning of goodness applies not to any existing substance, but only to the fully actualized specimen. The good substance in general, like the good human of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is indeed the measure.

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THE PLACE OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE ACCORDING TO MAIMONIDES

LEO STRAUSS

translated by GABRIEL BARTLETT and SVETOZAR MINKOV

[93]* **I**N THE *GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED*, Maimonides does not treat the doctrine of divine omniscience and divine providence in a strictly theological context. He arrives at this subject for the first time in the third section of the *Guide*, after he has concluded the thematic treatment of at least the following themes: (1) the names and attributes of God (I 1–70); (2) the proof of the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God (I 71–II 1); (3) the separate intelligences and the order of the world (II 2–12); (4) the creation of the world (II 13¹–31); and (5) prophecy (II 32–48). Directly following the discussion of prophecy is the thematic interpretation of *ma'aseh merkabah**—Ezekiel 1 and 10—(III 1–7). This interpretation concludes with the remark that while all of the preceding “up to this chapter,” that is, I 1–III 7, is indispensable for the understanding of *ma'aseh merkabah*, the discussion

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¹ See II 11 end.

*Translators' note: This Hebrew term means “Account of the Chariot.” The other Hebrew term, so important for Maimonides in the *Guide*, is *ma'aseh bereshit*, which means “Account of the Beginning.” We follow Strauss in transliterating these Hebrew terms, although the reader may find it important to note that in his later work on the *Guide* in English, “How to Begin to Study *The Guide of the Perplexed*,” Strauss simply translates these Hebrew terms directly.

"after this chapter," that is, from III 8 to the end, will in no way—neither in a detailed manner nor in the form of hints—involve "this subject," namely *ma'aseh merkabah*. Accordingly, Maimonides immediately turns to "other subjects."² Now, for Maimonides *ma'aseh merkabah* is identical with metaphysics (theology as a philosophic discipline).³ The closing remark at the end of *Guide* III 7 means, then, that while all preceding discussions (I 1–III 7) are of a metaphysical character, the following discussions will not belong to metaphysics. The subjects of the nonmetaphysical section of the *Guide* are: (1) divine providence (and the questions which belong most closely together with the question of providence, those concerning the origin and kinds of evil as well as divine omniscience) (III 8–24); and (2) the purpose of the Torah in general and of its arrangements in particular (III 25–50). Whatever else may be the case with regard to the plan of the *Guide*, it is certain that Maimonides, through precisely this plan, excludes the question of divine omniscience and of divine providence from the subject matter of metaphysics.⁴

(*This conclusion requires four additions in order to be precise.

(1) The first section of the *Guide* (I 1–III 7), which we have provision-

² III 7 end. Compare I 70 end.

³ "The Account of the Beginning is identical with natural science and the Account of the Chariot with divine science," I Introd. (Munk [*Le Guide des Égarés*, 3 vols., Paris, 1856–66], 3b), [6]. [Translators' note: All direct quotations from the *Guide* in this translation are from Shlomo Pines's translation of the *Guide: The Guide of the Perplexed* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963). Where pages from the Munk edition are given by Strauss, we have supplied in brackets the page numbers from Shlomo Pines's translation as well. In the original article, Strauss quotes from the *Guide* in the original Judeo-Arabic]. The restrictions to which this identification is subject (see II 2 end) can only be treated adequately within the framework of an examination of the structure and the secret teaching of the *Guide*. We content ourselves with saying that these restrictions may be neglected in an introductory consideration since Maimonides himself sets forth the unconditional identification of *ma'aseh merkabah* with metaphysics in *Sefer ha-Madda'* (*The Book of Knowledge*). I refer provisionally to what the hidden structure of the *Guide* involves in footnote 35.

⁴ A further piece of evidence for this is supplied by the remark in III 23 (50b) [496] that the sublunar things and "nothing else" are to be taken into account in proving the true doctrine of providence in the Book of Job, and that, therefore, this proof, that is, the only possible proof, is not of a metaphysical character. See also the beginning words in III 8.

*Translators' note: We have put this paragraph in parentheses to indicate its supplementary character, which in the original is suggested by the use of a smaller font.

ally characterized as metaphysical, treats not only themes of metaphysics as *theologia naturalis* but also such themes as one would have to—in the sense of Maimonides or at any rate [95] in the sense of his exoteric teaching—attribute to *theologia revelata* (especially the doctrine of the creation of the world). The division of the subjects of the *Guide* into metaphysical and nonmetaphysical therefore in no way follows from the distinction between natural and revealed theology.⁵ The exclusion of the doctrine of providence from the realm of metaphysics, then, is not identical with an attribution of this doctrine to a *theologia revelata*. (2) Physics finds its proper place within the first section of the *Guide*. The discussion of physics—through the thematic interpretation of *ma'aseh bereshit*—is concluded in a similar manner,⁶ just as the comprehensive metaphysical discussion is later concluded through the thematic interpretation of *ma'aseh merkabah*. Therefore, the topics of the second, nonmetaphysical section of the *Guide* belong just as little to physics as they do to metaphysics. Physics and metaphysics form together with mathematics the whole of theoretical philosophy.⁷ Since the subjects of the nonmetaphysical section of the *Guide* are clearly not of a mathematical character, Maimonides, insofar as he treats these subjects for the first time after the formal conclusion of both physics and metaphysics, expresses the view that the same subjects should be altogether excluded from the realm of theoretical philosophy. (3) Maimonides already treats providence in the theoretical section of the *Guide* (most importantly in II 10).⁸ The discussion that appears in this context admittedly concerns general providence alone, that is, the intelligent and artful direction of the whole world. Therefore, Maimonides withdraws only the question of particular providence from theoretical philosophy.⁹ Accordingly,

⁵ Compare III 21 end, with II 16 and following.

⁶ In II 30. Compare II 29 (65b) [346] and footnote 3.

⁷ Maimonides, *Millot ha-Higgayon* [*Treatise on the Art of Logic*], chap. 14.

⁸ I of course leave out here the numerous, occasional mentions of providence.

⁹ Maimonides characterizes the providence of which he speaks in the first section of the *Guide* as *tadbîr* (*hanhaga*) [governance], the providence of which he speaks in the second section as *'inâya* (*hashgacha*) [supervision]; compare especially the indication of the respective themes at the beginning of II 10, on the one hand, and at the end of III 16 and the beginning of 17, on the other. Even though he in no way pedantically adheres to this terminological distinction—he mostly uses both expressions synonymously—it is nevertheless striking that in the relevant chapters of the first section (I 72 and II 4–11) he prefers to speak of *tadbîr* [governance], whereas in the relevant chapters of the second major division (III 16–24) he prefers to speak

Maimonides treats [96] divine knowledge within the theoretical section, namely to show that the attribution of knowledge to God does not contradict the absolute unity of God; it is the question of divine omniscience alone, which is reasonable and necessary only on the basis of the question of particular providence, that belongs to the non-theoretical section. (4) Philosophy as a whole is divided—if one abstracts from logic, which is merely an instrument—into theoretical philosophy, on the one hand, and practical or human or political philosophy, on the other.¹⁰ This is to say that the exclusion of the doctrine of divine omniscience and of divine (particular) providence from theoretical philosophy amounts to the attribution of this doctrine to practical or political philosophy. What seems to speak against this is that Maimonides remarks on one occasion—in the context of an explanation that is certainly meant to prepare the treatment of the question of providence—that the treatment of “ethical topics” does not belong to the subject matter of the *Guide*.¹¹ For it is precisely in this manner that he especially appears to deny that the second section of the *Guide* (III 8 to the end) belongs to practical philosophy. Against this objection, one must note that ethics is in Maimonides’s view only a part, and indeed in no way the central part, of practical or political philosophy: the understanding of the essence of happiness and what leads to it is not the business of ethics but of politics in the true sense (the doctrine of the governance of the city).¹² The upshot of this is that Maimonides can very well deny that the second section of the *Guide* belongs to ethics without thereby in the least having to deny that this section belongs to practical or political philosophy.)

of *‘ināya* [supervision]. One should refer also to I 35 (42a) [80] where he says: “the character of His governance of the world, the ‘how’ of His providence with respect to what is other than He” (Pines’s translation). The origin of this distinction would require an investigation. Munk perhaps supplies a pointer (*Le Guide des Égarés* III 111 n. 2) with which one should compare Julius Guttmann, “Das Problem der Willensfreiheit . . .,” in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut* (New York: The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1935), 346–9. The distinction mentioned agrees in part in its result, though in no way in its intention, with the distinction between *‘ināya naw’iyya* (general providence) and *‘ināya shakhsiyya* (particular providence), which occurs in III 17 (36b [472] and 37a [473]) and 18 (39a [476]).

¹⁰ *Millot ha-Higgayon* [*Treatise on the Art of Logic*], chap. 14.

¹¹ *Guide* III 8 end. [Translators’ note: What Strauss, quoting from the *Guide* in this context, calls “ethischer Gegenstände,” and we, translating directly from the German, have rendered as “ethical topics,” Pines translates as “moral . . . matters” (436).]

Maimonides thus excludes, through the plan of the *Guide*, the question of particular providence (and the essentially related question of divine omniscience) from the realm of theoretical philosophy and does so, in particular, in such a way that this exclusion amounts in no way to the attribution of this question to revealed theology but to politics. The implied characterization of the above-mentioned question would appear strange to the historian of philosophy. Indeed, in the Western, Latin tradition from which the history of philosophy is derived, the view that prevailed, at any rate, [97] was that precisely this question was a theme of natural theology and thus of theoretical philosophy.¹²

In order to understand Maimonides's initially strange view, one must distinguish two moments in it. It is characteristic of this view that (1) the doctrine of providence is treated at a much later point, that is, after the doctrines of God's unity, of creation, and of prophecy; and (2) this late treatment implies the attribution of the doctrine of providence to politics.

As regards the late treatment of the question of providence as such, one encounters it in the beginnings of medieval Jewish philosophy, with Saadia. In his *Emunot ve-Deot* [*Book of Beliefs and Opinions*], the question of providence comes up for discussion for the first time from the fifth treatise on, or after creation, the unity of God, law and prophecy, and the freedom of the will have been treated in the preceding treatises. While Saadia begins to discuss the doctrine of the

¹² Millot *ha-Higgayon* [*Treatise on the Art of Logic*], chap. 14. For an interpretation compare *REJ* [*Revue des Etudes Juives*, "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maïmonide et de Farabi"] 1936, 7–12 and 15 [Translators' note: Professor Robert Bartlett of Emory College translated this article of Strauss's from the French. It appeared as "Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi," in *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 18, no. 1 (Fall 1990). Pages 7–12 in the original article correspond to pages 7–10 in Bartlett's translation; page 15 in the original corresponds to pages 11–12. Hereafter the corresponding page numbers in Bartlett's translation will be given in brackets].

¹³ It should not therefore be contested that this view is also encountered within Islamic–Jewish philosophy. I refer to Avicenna's *Great Metaphysics* and to his *Compendium of Metaphysics*, to Averroes' *Compendium of Metaphysics*, to Gersonides's *Milchamot ha-Shem* [*The Wars of the Lord*] and to Crescas's *Or ha-Shem* [*The Light of the Lord*]. Albo follows the older tradition, represented by Saadia and Maimonides, even though the leading thought of this tradition has become incomprehensible to him (see *Ikkarim* [*Book of Roots*] III beginning).

Law (third treatise: *Of Commandments and Prohibitions*) before the doctrine of providence—and with a sharpness that Maimonides lacks in the *Guide*, at least at first glance—he reveals the original reason for the late treatment of the doctrine of providence, which is also significant for Maimonides: Providence means justice in reward and punishment, and it presupposes precisely a law, the fulfillment of which is rewarded and the violation of which is punished.¹⁴ Now, since the doctrine of the Law presupposes the doctrine of prophecy, which in turn presupposes the doctrine of the angels (the separate intelligences), and which itself finally presupposes the doctrine of God,¹⁵ there arises a necessity (which Maimonides has especially taken into account in the *Guide* as well) [98] to present the doctrine of providence for the first time only after the treatment of each of the four preceding doctrines. In the structure of his above-mentioned work, Saadia, for his part, follows the *Mu'tazilite kalâm*. The Islamic-Jewish *kalâm* tradition, however, prescribed not only the late treatment of the doctrine of providence but also, and at the same time, the formal division of the entire matter of discussion into two parts (doctrine of the unity of God and doctrine of God's justice), in accordance with which the doctrine of providence—just as already the doctrine of law and prophecy earlier—belonged to the second part.¹⁶ Thus, the arrangement deriving from this tradition is always, within certain limits, acknowledged by Maimonides,¹⁷ even in his philosophical explanations. That is to say, this arrangement is a reliable foundation for him, upon which he can build, or rather the exoteric foreground, which requires and at the same time conceals an esoteric background. For the attribution of the doctrine of providence to the doctrine of the justice of God is one thing, the attribution of that doctrine to political science is another. In other words, the conception of the doctrine of providence as a theme of politics does not go back to the Islamic-Jewish *kalâm* tradition but to a genuine philosophic tradition. [99]

The doctrine of providence becomes, then, a theme of politics when the preceding doctrines of prophecy and law are attributed to politics. This last attribution is found from the beginning in the

¹⁴ Compare *Guide* III 17 (34b–35a) [468–9] with the 11th Article of Faith in the *Commentary on the Mishnah* (*Sanhedrin* X).

¹⁵ *Guide* III 45 (98b–99a) [576].

¹⁶ See Jacob Guttman, "Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia," *Göttingen* 1882, 131, and S. Pines, *OLZ* [*Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*], 1935, col. 623.

falāsifa, the so-called Islamic Aristotelians. They understand the prophet, the prophetic lawgiver, as a philosopher-king in the Platonic sense, as a founder of an ideal, Platonic city¹⁸ (either in the sense of the *Republic* or in the sense of the *Laws*). That the doctrine of providence is also and at the same time handed over to politics¹⁹ does not follow, then, simply from the adherence to a traditional order ("providence after law and prophecy") but also directly from the transformation, or reformation, of the doctrine of providence itself, which necessarily takes place with the turn to philosophy. Maimonides carries out this transformation in the *Guide* in the manner in which he expressly

¹⁷ How much Maimonides is indebted to this tradition, one recognizes if one (radicalizing the suggestion of Pines, *OLZ*, 1935, col. 623) compares the structure of the *Emunot ve-Deot* [*Book of Beliefs and Opinions*] with the corresponding arrangements in Maimonides: (1) The enumeration of the "Articles of Faith" in the *Commentary on the Mishnah*, (2) the parallels (which are also in agreement with *Sanhedrin* X) in *H. Teshuvah* III 6–8, (3) the structure of the *Sefer ha-Madda* [*Book of Knowledge*] and of the *Mishneh Torah* as a whole, (4) the structure of the *Guide*. It must be stressed in our context that in all four arrangements Maimonides brings up providence *after* he brings up prophecy in general and the prophecy of Moses in particular. The comparison teaches above all that the "Articles of Faith" concerning the Law (the 8th and 9th) find their counterpart in *Guide* II 39–40, not in III 25–50—as I had mistakenly assumed in *REJ*, 1936, 15 [Bartlett, 12]—and that therefore in the *Guide* also the doctrine of the Law (II 39–40) precedes the doctrine of providence (III 8–24). Compare especially the reference to Deuteronomy 29:28 and 30:12 on the duration of the Torah provided in II 39 (84b) [380] with *Yesodei ha-Torah* IX 1.

¹⁸ Averroes states this in his paraphrase of the *Republic*: "Quae omnia, ut a Platone de . . . optima Republica, deque optimo . . . viro dicta sunt, videre est in antiqua illa Arabum Reipublicae administratione, quae haud dubie optimam Platonis Rempublicam imitari putabat"; *Opp. Aristot.*, Venet. 1550, III, fol 188a, col. 2, l. 33–50. ["You may understand what Plato says concerning . . . the virtuous governance . . . and . . . the virtuous individual . . . from the case of the governance of the Arabs in early times, for they were used to imitate the virtuous governance." *Averroes on Plato's "Republic"*, trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 121.]—The Platonic-political origin of Maimonides's prophetology is usually not appreciated. One is led to the origin of this failure of appreciation if one considers the way in which that prophetology was received in Christian Scholasticism: Thomas Aquinas completely separates the doctrine of prophecy from the doctrine of divine Law; he treats the divine Law in the general section on morality (*Summa Theologica* I-II, q. 91 and following); prophecy, however, in the specific section, namely in the discussion of those *virtutes, quae specialiter ad aliquos homines pertinent* (II-II, q. 171 *in princ.*) ["virtues, which apply in particular to certain men"].

¹⁹ That this handing-over is not carried out everywhere by the later *falāsifa* has been made clear in footnote 13.

distinguishes between the doctrine of providence “of our Law” and the right doctrine of providence, which he himself follows.²⁰ Through this [100] distinction, as goes without saying, he does not give expression to a rebellion against the Law—rather, he finds also his own doc-

²⁰ Compare III 23 (49b) [493] with 17 (34b and 35b) [468 and 470]. In order to assess the meaning and importance of this distinction, one must consider that Maimonides (1) does not make such a distinction in the two other enumerations that occur in the *Guide* (the opinions on creation and on prophecy), and (2) that he elaborates that distinction in a covert manner. In order merely to “hint at” his view, he enumerates twice the different views on providence (of which there are five): in III 17, that is, the chapter with which the doctrine of providence formally begins, and in III 23, that is, in the interpretation of the Book of Job, with which the teaching on providence formally ends. In III 17: the opinions of Epicurus, Aristotle, the Asharites, the Mu’tazilites, and of “our Law”; in III 23: the opinions of Aristotle, “our Law,” the Mu’tazilites, the Asharites, and the right opinion (Elihu’s opinion in the Book of Job, or Job’s own opinion after the final revelation). The two enumerations are distinguished by two seemingly minor, but in truth decisive, moments: (1) Whereas in the first, initial, and provisional enumeration the traditional Jewish opinion and the right opinion (Maimonides’s own opinion) seem to be subordinate to the opinion of “our Law,” in the second, concluding, and authoritative enumeration, the opinion of “our Law” is explicitly distinguished from the right opinion (see also the sharp break after the discussion of the traditional Jewish opinion in the first enumeration: III 17; (35a–b) [469–70]); (2) the opinion of Epicurus is explicitly mentioned in the first enumeration, but shortly thereafter (III 17; 34a and 35b) [468 and 470] it is silently dropped as not worth mentioning, whereas in the enumerations of the opinions on creation and prophecy Epicurus’ opinion was explicitly dropped as not worth mentioning (II 13; 29a, [284] and II 32; 72b [360]). Epicurus’ opinion is not mentioned at all in the second enumeration of the opinions on providence: in the first enumeration it was mentioned only so that the external correspondence between the two enumerations (they both concern five opinions) can conceal their internal discrepancy. Maimonides himself finds the principle of repeating the vulgar (initial) view with apparently minor, but in truth decisive, deviations to be at work in the procedure of Elihu, the representative of the right view (III 23; 50a [494]); this remark on Elihu’s way of presentation conveys an authentic indication of Maimonides’s own way of presentation. To be explained in a corresponding way, is the fact that Maimonides claims at first (III 17; 35b [470]) with complete explicitness that the right view is based primarily not on the insight of understanding but on Scripture, whereas at the end (III 23; 48b [492]) Job’s conversion to right opinion is traced back to the fact that Job, who initially has at his disposal only traditional, that is, vulgar, knowledge of God, is at the end led to true (that is, philosophical) knowledge of God: Maimonides lets his reader repeat Job’s path. The decisive rationalism of Maimonides thus shows itself only *at the end*—which, as may be parenthetically remarked, distinguishes him from modern rationalism—and it is in fact not shown openly in Maimonides’s presentation of his own teaching (in III 17), but only in his interpretation of the Book of Job.

trine of providence in the Law²¹—but merely to the view according to which the doctrine found in the foreground of the Law, and which [101] characterizes the Law as such, is simply of an exoteric character. The Law teaches that everything good (bad) that befalls men is reward (punishment) for their good (bad) *actions*.²² Maimonides's own teaching, which thus coincides with the esoteric teaching of the Law, states that "providence is consequent upon the *intellect*."²³ The decisive difference between the two teachings consists in the following: the exoteric teaching asserts the *correspondence* between moral virtue and external happiness; the esoteric teaching, on the other hand, asserts the *identity* of true happiness with knowledge of God. Accordingly, the esoteric doctrine of providence coincides with the understanding of the essence of happiness, with the fundamental and logically necessary distinction between true and merely supposed happiness.²⁴ Now, the teaching on happiness belongs essentially to political science, as Maimonides²⁵ contends in unison with Farabi.²⁶ On the other hand, what concerns the exoteric doctrine of providence—the doctrine of divine reward and punishment—also belongs, and as exoteric doctrine indeed as such, to politics. For what are exoteric doctrines other than such doctrines of faith that are not true but "whose acceptance is necessary for the health of the affairs of the city"?²⁷ And in conceiving the doctrine of divine reward and

²¹ III 17 (36a and 37b) [471 and 474].

²² III 17 (34a–35b) [468–70] and 23 (49a) [492].

²³ III 17 (37b) [474].

²⁴ Compare III 23 (48b) [492] with 22 (45b) [487].

²⁵ See above p. 96 [in the original].

²⁶ Compare the so-to-speak programmatic definitions in *Ihsâ al-'ulûm* [*The Enumeration of the Sciences*; this is available in English translation in *Alfarabi, the Political Writings: "Selected Aphorisms" and Other Texts*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001)], chap. 5, and *k. tahsîl al-sa'âda* [*The Attainment of Happiness*], Hyderabad, 1345, 16 [available in English translation as the first chapter of *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002)] with the structure of the *Political Regime* (*Hathchalot hanimzaot*) and the so-called *Musterstaat* ["ideal city"]; in the *Musterstaat* the doctrine of happiness is treated only *after* the doctrine of the "first leader" and of the "perfect city"; the doctrine of "providence," which is found in the theoretical sections of both of Farabi's theological-political works, coincides with the doctrine of general providence, which occurs in the theoretical section of the *Guide*; compare p. 95 [in the original] above.

²⁷ III 28 (61a) [512]. Compare I Introd. (7a) [12].

punishment as an exoteric doctrine, [102] Maimonides is also in agreement with Farabi.²⁸ This conception is an essential component of Platonic politics: inasmuch as Maimonides, just like Farabi and the other *falāsifa*, adopts Platonic politics, he at the same time makes the doctrine of providence of the *Laws*, in the sense of the *Laws*, his own.²⁹

[103] The preceding explanation is confirmed by the structure of the *Sefer ha-Madda'* [*Book of Knowledge*], the first and most philosophic part of the *Mishneh Torah*. There Maimonides first treats metaphysics (*H. Yesodei ha-Torah* [*The Laws (which are) the Foundations of the Torah*] I–II), then physics (ibid. III–IV), and then—only after the formal conclusion of metaphysics and physics, that is, after the formal conclusion of theoretical philosophy—prophecy and the Law (ibid. VII–X). Prophecy and law are themes, not of theoretical philosophy, but of politics. The discussion of the scientific foundations of the Torah, of the four fundamental doctrines susceptible of proof ([*arâ' usuliyya*]) concludes thus: God, angels, prophecy, and Law.³⁰ Only after this, that is, more particularly, after politics, does Maimonides treat ethics (*H. Deot* [*Laws Concerning Character Traits*]),³¹ which is of a lower scientific dignity.³² The doctrine of providence is found in full at the conclusion of the *Sefer ha-Madda'* [*Book of Knowledge*]: Maimonides discusses the compatibility of divine omniscience and omnipotence with human free will in the fifth and sixth chapter of *H. Teshuvah* [*Laws of Repentance*]; reward and

²⁸ That Farabi regards this teaching as exoteric is already shown by the fact that it occurs in neither of his two main theological-political works. It is found, however, in his "Harmonization of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle" (*Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ed. Dieterici, 32 and following), an exoteric work that is dedicated to the defense of philosophy (that is, Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy), especially against an orthodox attacker [Translators' note: an English translation of this work is available as "The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle," in *Alfarabi, the Political Writings*, 115–67]. According to Ibn Sina, the teaching of reward and punishment after death, and especially of bodily resurrection, belongs not to the "roots," but to the "branches" of metaphysics (compare Avicennae, *De anima etc.*, ab. A. Alpago . . . in latinum versa, Venet. 1546, fol. 144, or Falakera, *Reshit Hokhmah*, ed. David, 55). What is meant by that is shown by Maimonides's remark in the *M. Techiat ha-Metim* [*Treatise on Resurrection*]: his opponent quotes positions from Ibn Sina's treatise on retaliation and regards them as philosophical remarks! In the third chapter of his *k. al-ma'ad* (Alpagues, fol. 48f) [*The Destination = The State of the Human Soul*], Ibn Sina says that the doctrine of resurrection is not actually true but is necessary for the essential, practical accomplishment of the goals of the Law's will.

punishment in the world to come in the eighth chapter; reward and punishment in this world or the messianic age in the ninth chapter; the true happiness in the tenth chapter, with which the *Sefer ha-Madda'* [*Book of Knowledge*] concludes. Maimonides, in bringing forward the doctrine of providence in the context of an explanation of the commandment to conversion, that is, in an edifying context and not in a discussion of the (philosophic) foundations of the Torah, shows that he is guided by the view that this teaching is a necessary supplement

²⁹ The doctrine of providence in the *Laws* was perhaps known to Maimonides through Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Providentia* (compare *REJ*, 1936, 32 and following [Bartlett, 22]). Otherwise, the fact that the doctrine of providence belongs to politics could be understood from Galen, who explicitly relies on Plato for his overall view. He asserts: the question of providence is actually in opposition to the genuine metaphysical questions (concerning the nature of the gods and of the soul, the having-come-into-being and the not-having-come-into-being [Translators' note: *Gewordenheit* as a noun formed from the verb *werden*, "to become," literally means "having-become-ness," *Ungewordenheit*, "un-having-become-ness"] of the universe, the immortality of the soul, and so on), while it is of the utmost importance for "ethical and political philosophy" and soluble by scientific means; compare in particular, *De plac. Hipp. et Pl.* [*De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis libri novem*] IX (V 780 and following and 791 and following pages, Kühn) [Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, ed. Phillip de Lacy, 2d part; bks. 6–9 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1980), 588 and following and 598 and following] and *De subst. facult. natur.* [*On the Natural Faculties*] (IV 764 Kühn). That Maimonides had Galen's statements of this kind in front of him as he wrote the *Guide* is shown by II 15 (33b) [292]. The fact that in "middle Platonism," the genuine Platonic view concerning the place of the doctrine of providence is not fully superseded by the Stoic view, according to which the doctrine of providence belongs to physics or theology (compare Cicero, *De natura deorum* [*On the Nature of the Gods*], II 1, 3 and 65, 164 and following, as well as Diogenes Laertius VII 149 and 151), is shown also by Diogenes Laertius' report of the Platonic teaching (III 67–80). In that account, which is structured according to the scheme physics (theology)–ethics–dialectics, divine supervision of the human things is not spoken of in the presentation of physics and theology (67–77) but only in the presentation of ethics (78), and divine punitive justice is mentioned only after dialectics (in 79–80), that is, at the very end and indeed with the clear indication of the exoteric character of that teaching. Above all, however, one should recall Cicero, who, perhaps under the influence of his platonizing teacher, took a similar position, as a comparison of *De republica* [*The Republic*] and *De legibus* [*The Laws*], on the one hand, and of *De natura deorum* [*On the Nature of the Gods*] and *De divinatione* [*On Divination*], on the other, brings out.

³⁰ Compare III 35 beginning and 36 beginning with 45 (98b–99a) [575–7].

³¹ The sequence politics–ethics(–economics) is commonly found in the time of Maimonides; see *REJ*, 1936, 11 n. 5 [Bartlett, 10–11].

³² I 2 (14a) [24]. Compare p. 96 [in the original] above.

to politics. For edification is nothing other than didactic politics, and for Maimonides there is [104] no politics that is not primarily didactic that would be primarily "Realpolitik."

The structure of the *Guide* is less transparent because in fact in this work the political doctrine of prophecy and Law appears to be classified under metaphysics. This deviation from the most obvious arrangement is not explained solely by the fact that prophetology is indispensable for the interpretation of the *ma'aseh merkabah*,³³ but also, and above all, it is explained by the fundamental character of the *Guide*. This work intends, as Maimonides explains at the beginning, to offer nothing other than the "science of the Law."³⁴ The Law—which, according to both the usual view and the one accepted by Maimonides, is only one among many philosophic themes, a theme of only one philosophic discipline among others, namely, political science—is the only theme in the *Guide*: It is because and only because the *Guide* is not less "political" but more "political" than, for example, Ibn Sina's *Metaphysics*, that Maimonides can treat prophecy in the *Guide* apparently within the framework of metaphysics, whereas Ibn Sina treats it within the framework of politics. For it is because the *Guide* is entirely devoted to the science of the Law that its structure is not arranged according to the order of the philosophic [105] disciplines, but according to the order of the Law itself.³⁵ According to this order, the doctrine of prophecy and law as a true and demonstrable

³³ See, for example, II 43 end.

³⁴ I Introd. (3a) [5]. It is perhaps with a view to this position that in his autobiography (Berlin 1793, II, 15), S. Maimon has entitled the first chapter of his lecture on the *Guide* as follows: "*Moreh Nebuchim* [*The Guide of the Perplexed*], its plan, goal, and method is *Theologia politica*." Maimon quotes the above-mentioned passage from the Introduction to the *Guide* and then has the following comment: The *Guide* "should simply lay the foundation for the science of lawgiving (the wisdom of the Laws)" (ibid., 20).

³⁵ The Law serves two purposes: the health of the soul and the health of the body; the health of the soul is attained through true *opinions*, the health of the body through the political order, which is based on the rightness of *actions*. The true opinions, whose goal is the *love* of God, lead back to the four fundamental doctrines susceptible of proof (concerning God, angels, prophecy, and Law); those in the *Mishneh Torah* in the *H. Yesodei ha-Torah* are explained by Maimonides in the first section of the *Guide* (I 1–III 7); that the deepest break in the *Guide* is found at the end of III 7, has been shown at the beginning of the present essay. The right actions, which as such lead to the *fear* of God, are called forth (1) through opinions which are not true but are necessary for the sake of the political order (to these opinions belongs above

fundamental doctrine belongs to the first part, which is devoted to the explanation of those fundamental doctrines, whereas the doctrine of providence as an edifying doctrine belongs to the first subdivision of the second part, which treats the “necessary” doctrines.

In this early work of Maimonides, Strauss scrupulously reassembles some of the scattered “chapter headings” in the *Guide of the Perplexed*. He is thus able to uncover Maimonides’s “decisive rationalism (p. 832 n. 20) and to show strikingly that for Maimonides the question of (particular) providence is a theme of political philosophy in accord with “a genuine philosophic tradition” (pp. 828–9, 831). This article plays a notable role, among Strauss’s eleven essays and chapters on Maimonides published over forty years, in elucidating why for Strauss, as he puts it elsewhere, Maimonides was “the truly natural model, the standard that must be guarded against every distortion, and the stumbling-block on which modern rationalism falls” (*Philosophy and Law*, opening paragraph).—S. M.

all the opinion that one must *fear* God, along with the corollary that He has pity), and (2) through all the commandments and prohibitions. Accordingly, the second section of the *Guide* is divided into two subsections: (1) an explanation of the “necessary” opinions (that is, the most important of these opinions, the doctrine of divine reward and punishment) = III 8–24, and (2) an explanation of all commandments and prohibitions = III 25–50. Maimonides’s explicit division of the Law is found in III 27–8 and 52 (130a bottom–end) [629]. For the division of “religion” into opinions and actions, compare Farabi, *Ihsâ al-‘ulûm* [*The Enumeration of the Sciences*], chap. 5 (or Falakera, *Reshit Hokhmah*, 59, 9). Note the first word of III 25.

FROM THE WORK OF ART TO ABSOLUTE REASON: SCHELLING'S JOURNEY TOWARD ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

ANTOON BRAECKMAN

ONE OF THE MOST INTRIGUING EPISODES in Schelling's philosophical development is the transition from the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800) to the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801), the starting point of the identity system. Looking back on that latter text, Schelling in 1805 declares that "then to me the light went on in philosophy."¹ This sounds as if the preceding years of philosophical investigation, including the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* that was written one year earlier, had to be considered merely propaedeutic and that the *Darstellung* was his real entry into philosophy. Schelling maintained this view of his philosophical development and in the contemporary *Schelling-Forschung* scholars widely agree that the *Darstellung*, being the outset of the identity system, marks the birthplace of so-called absolute idealism—to which Hegel's system of philosophy probably still is the most spectacular and successful heir. But if this common interpretation is true—and I would not deny it in the generality in which it is stated—then the question inevitably arises: what happened in the transition from the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* to the *Darstellung*, and above all, what made this transition possible? What, in other words, caused the constitution of absolute idealism?

It is my conviction that this transition is the result of the transposition of the inner structure of the work of art, as it is conceived in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, to the inner structure of absolute reason in the *Darstellung*. In the *Darstellung*, the features that until then privileged the work of art are now ascribed to absolute reason. This, I would like to argue below, is a major shift in Schelling's philosophical appreciation of the capacity of human reason to gain

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¹ Horst Fuhrmans, *F. W. J. Schelling. Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 3 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), 222.

absolute self-knowledge. It documents the passage in the history of German idealism from what I would call romantic idealism to absolute idealism.

The key texts at stake here are, on the one hand, the famous chapter on the work of art in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, in which art and the meaning of the work of art are still conceived from the romantic point of view, and, on the other hand, the initial sections from the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, in which Schelling defines the concept of absolute reason. Again, the essence of the whole argument is to point to the remarkable affinity between the romantic concept of the work of art and the concept of absolute reason as it is articulated in the *Darstellung*. Absolute reason is endowed with an aesthetic capacity that was restricted to art one year earlier, that is, to the artistic genius and its product, the work of art.

I

In the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* the subject is striving after an adequate self-consciousness which is only reached, in the end, through aesthetic intuition, that is, through the intuition of a work of art.² This work of art is an external object that has the structure of an absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity, that is, of nature and freedom, as Schelling would put it.³ The adequate self-consciousness aimed at is realized because the subject finally recognizes its own foundation and condition of possibility in the work of art. Put more precisely: in the subject-object identity of the work of art, the subject recognizes the revelation of its "primordial self."⁴

This suggests that in order to realize adequate self-consciousness, the subject must rely on or is dependent on an aesthetic object

² Schelling's philosophical concern with art was only granted a short life. By and large this period begins with his participation in the Jenaer Romantic Circle (1798), and it ends with the closing of his teaching commitment in Würzburg (1806). Before that period, one can hardly find any reference to art in his work, except once in his *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus* (1795). The only lecture on art he gave afterward goes back to the time of his appointment as secretary-general of the *Akademie der bildenden Künste* in Munich: "Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zur Natur" (1807). The core of his work on the philosophy of art thus dates from the time he lived in Jena (1798–1803). The major text from that period is the *Philosophy of Art* (1802–05).

outside itself. The features of that aesthetic object are: (1) it is an objective phenomenon, (2) that as such transcends the subject, (3) but in which the subject recognizes its own essence. (4) This essence transcends the subject not only because it appears in an external object but also because it represents precisely what the subject, by itself, is unable to bring to consciousness: the absolute identity of the "primordial self" (*das Urself*) as its most inner essence.

Less than one year later, in the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, the idea of art as an external, objective device that mediates the constitution of an adequate self-consciousness has vanished. The intuition of reason (*Vernunftanschauung*) now realizes what, according to the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, could only

³ Dieter Jähnig, *Schelling. Die Kunst in der Philosophie*, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), is still widely regarded as the most important and comprehensive interpretation of Schelling's philosophy of art. Other main sources are Manfred Frank, *Der kommende Gott. Vorlesungen über die Neue Mythologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), that broadens the scope to the larger German romantic tradition, as does his still invaluable *Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989). An interesting discussion of Schelling's view on art in English is to be found in Joseph P. Lawrence, "Art and Philosophy in Schelling," *The Owl of Minerva* 20, no. 1 (1998): 5–19. For recent studies in English of Schelling's philosophy of art, and especially of his theory of art as spelled out in the *System of transcendental Idealism*, I refer to James Dodd, "Philosophy and Art in Schelling's *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 52, no. 1 (September 1998): 51–85, who relies more or less substantially on the presentations in Jähnig and Frank, and to Richard L. Velkley, "Realizing Nature in the Self: Schelling on Art and Intellectual Intuition in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*," in *Figuring the Self. Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German Philosophy*, ed. David E. Klemm and Günter Zöller (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 149–68, who comments on Schelling's position from an Hegelian point of view. In comparison with the aforementioned studies of Schelling's view on art, the originality of my own approach in the present essay is located in its attempt to lay bare the constitutive role of the concept of art (as defined in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*) for the construction of the idea of absolute reason in the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801).

⁴ *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, in *Schellings Werke* (hereafter, "SW," followed by the volume number) vol. 2, ed. Manfred Schroeter (Munich: Beck, 1927), 615. All translations are mine, except the quotations from *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* and *Philosophie der Kunst. Allgemeiner und Besonderer Teil*. These quotations are—unless otherwise stated—borrowed from the English translations: F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978) and F. W. J. Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, ed. and trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). For reasons of uniformity, all references are made to the Schroeter edition of Schelling's texts.

be realized by an aesthetic intuition: representation of the absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity.⁵ In other words, in the *Darstellung*, by the intuition of reason the subject seems to realize what self-consciousness in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* could not achieve except by recourse to the externality of the work of art. How is this possible? How can we understand that art, which in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* is still called "the only and eternal revelation" of the absolute, is no longer needed? How can we understand that this mediating agent has suddenly become superfluous?

II

According to Schelling, the task of transcendental philosophy is to search for "the identity of the conscious and the unconscious in the self and for the consciousness of this identity."⁶ This identity he calls the absolute, or the "primordial self":⁷ for in the final analysis it comes down to the ultimate unity of subject and object, being the condition of possibility for self-consciousness. This identity of subjectivity and objectivity within the I is grasped at the outset by intellectual intuition. But what is absent in this grasping is a definite consciousness of that identity⁸—a curious idea that sheds light on the strange capacity of the intellectual intuition to grasp the absolute apart from any act of reflexive consciousness. Yet this is what Schelling has in mind: the intellectual intuition is not a reflexive or thetical knowledge. In the intellectual intuition the subject is immediately present to its own essence in a nonthetical way. It is an intimacy with oneself: an immedi-

⁵ Schelling, *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie*, in *SWE* 1:413.

⁶ *SW* 2:612.

⁷ *SW* 2:615: "This unknown, however, whereby the objective and the conscious activities are here brought into unexpected harmony, is none other than that absolute [the primordial self] which contains the common ground of the preestablished harmony between the conscious and the unconscious." In the original text the addition between brackets: "the primordial self" (*das Urself*) is given in a footnote.

⁸ With reference to Wolfgang Hogebe's terminology I would characterize intellectual intuition as a prepredicative or prereflexive kind of "knowing" or "grasping" of the identity mentioned above; Wolfgang Hogebe, *Prädikation und Genesis. Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings "Die Weltalter"* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 58, 65–6.

ate intimacy with one's own subjectivity, without knowing oneself as a subject. Thus, what is grasped by intellectual intuition is the primordial self (*das Urselfst*), the ultimate unity of subject and object within the I. The purpose of the system now is that this identity of subjectivity and objectivity *within* the I, which is grasped by means of the intellectual intuition, in the end is consciously grasped *by* the I as well. Therefore, the object of the intellectual intuition must somehow appear as something objective. If not, consciousness would be impossible anyway. But the primordial self, the absolute cannot appear as something objective for it is the absolutely identical (*das absolut Identische*).⁹ In other words, Schelling needs to (1) invoke an objective reality that (2) in one way or another represents the absolute, (3) without giving up the essential nonrepresentability of the absolute. This problem, according to Schelling, cannot be solved except by invoking an objective reality that symbolically refers to the absolute. This objective reality is the aesthetic intuition: the intellectual intuition becoming objective, or the work of art.¹⁰ "The work of art," Schelling states,

merely reflects to me what is otherwise not reflected by anything, namely that absolutely identical which has already divided itself even in the self. Hence, that which the philosopher allows to be divided even in the primary act of consciousness, and which would otherwise be inaccessible to any intuition, comes, through the miracle of art, to be radiated back from the products thereof.¹¹

From this may be concluded, he continues,

⁹ SW 2:624.

¹⁰ SW 2:625: "This universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity of intellectual intuition is art itself. For aesthetic intuition simply is intellectual intuition become objective." In Schelling's copy these original sentences are replaced by the following passage that synthesizes the whole argument: "The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, as the absolute principle, is also at the same time the absolutely identical. An absolutely simple and identical cannot be grasped or communicated through description, nor through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all philosophy. But this intuition, which is an intellectual rather than a sensory one, and has as its object neither the objective nor the subjective, but the absolutely identical, is itself merely an internal one, which cannot in turn become objective for itself: it can become objective only through a second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic."

¹¹ SW 2:625.

that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form.¹²

Meanwhile it may have become clear that art is the “document” of philosophy for art represents both symbolically and objectively the absolutely identical (*das absolut Identische*) for which the philosopher is searching. But in what sense can art be considered the organ, that is, the instrument and method of philosophy? Because there is a resemblance between the creative process that generates the work of art and the procedure of transcendental philosophy. The transcendental philosopher, starting from the identity of subjectivity and objectivity within the I, tries to reconstruct the schematism that is behind the constitution of objectivity as such, so that, in the end, the initial identity of subjectivity and objectivity within the I *objectively* shows up before the I, that is, before consciousness. This is precisely what happens in the creation of a work of art. The artist, part consciously, part unconsciously, produces the work of art, in which he recognizes himself afterward and thus becomes aware of his own creative power.

One should realize, however, that the work of art is never the objectification of the absolute. It symbolizes the absolute. As a symbol, the work of art refers to what necessarily remains unrepresentable. The same holds for the relationship between the artist and the work of art. The work of art is not the objectification of the artist for the artist does not know precisely how the work of art originated. Behind this “how” hides the genius which is essentially beyond the reach of the artist himself. The genius manifests itself in the work of art, but it does not exhaust itself in it. In this sense, the genius is the artistic counterpart of the primordial self, which manifests itself in the work of art without ever being objectified by it. Schelling puts it this way:

Hence, if this absolute is reflected from out of the product, it will appear to the intelligence as something lying above the latter . . . a *phenomenon* which although incomprehensible [from the standpoint of mere reflection],¹³ yet cannot be denied; and art, therefore, is the one everlasting revelation which exists, and the marvel which, had it existed but once only, would necessarily have convinced us of the absolute reality of that supreme [identity].¹⁴

¹² SW 2:627.

¹³ In the original text the addition between brackets is given in a footnote (see SW 2:617).

As its organ, art is not an object but a part of philosophy; as the revelation of the absolute it is the only document that verifies the validity and truth of philosophical discourse. Therefore philosophy and art relate in a special way:

For though science at its highest level has one and the same business as art, this business, owing to the manner of effecting it, is an endless one for science, so that one may say that art constitutes the ideal of science, and where art is, science has yet to attain to.¹⁴

In Schelling's *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, art thus has a specific epistemological function. It mediates an adequate self-consciousness. Such a self-consciousness implies a becoming aware of the ultimate identity underlying all reflexivity, that is, the structure of subject-object differentiation that underlies all consciousness and all thinking. Indeed, the objectivity of the work of art makes it possible to break the circle of reflexivity. Without the intuition of a work of art, consciousness would never become aware of the transcendence of its own ground, and thus it would stay caught in reflexivity. In this sense, art is both the limitation and fulfillment of knowledge. It is the limitation of knowledge in the way that it refers to what cannot be thought or known and with the result that knowledge is relativized as

¹⁴ Schelling, *SW* 2:615, 617–18. The above text is a slight adaption of the English translation that runs as follows: “and art, therefore is the one everlasting revelation which *yields that concurrence*, and the marvel which, had it existed but once only, would necessarily have convinced us of the absolute reality of that supreme *event*”; F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 223; the adapted parts are italicized. Although this translation might be justifiable grammatically, it obfuscates Schelling's point. For it suggests somehow tautologically that the work of art reveals the possibility of the concurrence of the free and conscious and the necessary and unconscious activity within the artist, whereas, in my interpretation, the revelatory character of the work of art concerns the condition of possibility of that concurrence, that is, the absolute or the primordial self that, one page before, Schelling calls “the ultimate in man” (*das Letzte in ihm*), “the root of his complete being” (*die Wurzel seines ganzen Daseins*), or still: “the unchanging identical” (*das unveränderlich Identische*). The original version of the quoted text reads as follows: “so ist die Kunst die einzige und ewige Offenbarung, *die es gibt*, und das Wunder, das, wenn es auch nur Einmal existiert hätte, uns von der absolute Realität jenes *Höchsten* überzeugen müsste”; *SW* 2:618 (italics mine).

¹⁵ *SW* 2:623. Although the German text indeed uses the word *Wissenschaft*, it is obvious that throughout the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* Schelling by this notion refers to philosophy and not to one or the total set of the sciences. In this respect, Schelling's use of the term *Wissenschaft* is akin to Hegel's at that time. See, for example, the preface of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*: “Vom wissenschaftlichen Erkennen.”

being unable to recover conceptually its own foundation. It is also the fulfillment of knowledge in the sense that the subject, due to this experience, becomes aware—*ex negativo*—of its relativity. The “ecstatic” experience of intuiting a work of art, though, is not a farewell to reflection but rather its intensification. For in this experience, the subject reflects its insurmountable finitude.

The intuition of the work of art, furthermore, has a doubly ironic effect. In the first place, the work of art, as the revelation of the absolute, both discloses the deepest essence of the subject and does not. It discloses the essence of the subject in the sense that in the work of art the absolute becomes visible and gives itself away; yet it does not disclose its essence in the sense that the work of art is not the absolute. As a revelation of the absolute the work of art at the same time reveals and conceals the connection between self-consciousness and its absolute origin.¹⁶ But there is another, even more fundamental kind of irony.¹⁷ This irony consists in the fact that the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* somehow results in its own negation. As transcendental philosophy it will demonstrate how every objectivity is constituted by the I. But at the very moment that it has to accomplish its ultimate task, that is, to demonstrate that the origin of the I too is “posited” (*gesetzt*) by the I, it fails. The I now suddenly and unexpectedly appears to be unable to recover its origin by a mere reflection on its own activity. On the contrary: in order to reflect this origin, it is referred to an intuition (that is not a thinking) of an object (that is not its own subjectivity) outside itself. Although the I realizes in the wake of this its highest consciousness, it is made ironic by the heteronomous point of support to which it has to appeal in order to reach this summit of consciousness.¹⁸ What the Baron von

¹⁶ Dieter Jähnig specifies the distinction between objectification and revelation as follows: in the case of objectification, the subject exteriorizes itself into the objectivity of a product; revelation, on the contrary, consists in a dialectic of recognizability (objectivity) as to form and negation of objectivity as to content. See Jähnig, *Die Kunst in der Philosophie* 1:102, 106. By “revelation” he understands “epiphany”: an objectivity that somehow becomes transparent and by this transparency makes the subjective—which is beyond it—visible qua subjectivity.

¹⁷ For Schelling’s concept of irony, see among others Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst. Besonderer Teil*, in *SWE* 3:326: “since irony is the only form in which that which goes out from the subject—or must go out—can detach itself from him most distinctly and become objective.” The situation of the I vis-à-vis the work of art, described above, yields a perfect example of this irony.

Münchhausen once did—to pull himself up by his own hair out of a swamp—now appears to be impossible. In the end, objectivity and not the self-conscious subject has the last word in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*.

The question remains, how then do art and philosophy relate to one another in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*? Which of the two takes priority? As the revelation of the absolute, art unmistakably takes priority; as a kind of knowledge, the philosophy of art takes priority because art is not itself a kind of knowledge. Art thus takes priority—from the perspective of philosophy. Yet Schelling states that “where art is, science has yet to attain to.” Philosophy, it is said, should become art. At least in the end, that is beyond modernity.¹⁹ During the modern era, philosophical knowledge inevitably must be reflexive.

III

In the *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* the essential features of the concept of art as developed in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* are transferred to the concept of reason. As

¹⁸ See Dodd, “Philosophy and Art,” 80. Dodd offers a similar analysis but with a somewhat different conclusion. In his view, the “ultimate irony of transcendental philosophy” comes down to the proclamation of the artist as the highest expression of human self-consciousness—“the philosopher being at best its witness.” In my interpretation, the artist lacks a proper understanding of (the revelatory character of) his own product and therefore he should appeal to the philosopher to get it right. Ontologically the work of art indeed transcends philosophy, but epistemologically, philosophy presides over art.

¹⁹ This is the way I would interpret the famous passage at the end of the chapter on art: “But now if it is art alone which can succeed in objectifying with universal validity what the philosopher is able to present in a merely subjective fashion, there is one more conclusion yet to be drawn. Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge, and with it, all those sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source. Nor is it in general difficult to say what the medium for this return of science to poetry will be; for in mythology such a medium existed, before the occurrence of a breach now seemingly beyond repair. But how a new mythology is itself to arise, which shall be the creation, not of some individual author, but of a new race, personifying, as it were, one single poet—that is a problem whose solution can be looked for only in the future destinies of the world, and in the course of history to come”; *SW* 2:629.

a result, the *Darstellung* introduces an aesthetic concept of absolute reason, which marks the decisive shift from romantic to absolute idealism.

Arguments for this view may be found by comparing the position of the intellectual intuition in the *Darstellung* with that in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. In the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, the object of intellectual intuition is the so-called primordial self (*das Urselfst*); in the *Darstellung*, that object has become reason (*die Vernunft*). In the *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie* (1802), Schelling therefore calls intellectual intuition "the intuition of reason" (*Vernunftanschauung*). Furthermore, this intuition of reason no longer has its counterpart in an aesthetic intuition, as was still the case in the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*. There the aesthetic intuition was needed to verify the postulated object of the intellectual intuition (that is, *das Urselfst*). Because of the fallout of this verifying device, the postulatory character of the intuition of reason too appears to be abandoned.²⁰ The intuition of reason therefore receives the status of a truly (absolute) principle in which something is definitely known, and it is understood as some sort of immediate, absolute knowledge. In the *Darstellung*, the intuition of reason thus seems to combine the distinctive functions of the intellectual and the aesthetic intuitions of the transcendental system. Considered from the viewpoint of the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, this would mean that in some way or other the aesthetic intuition has been internalized. For the object of aesthetic intuition is an external object, namely, the work of art, whereas the object of the intuition of reason is reason itself. The external, aesthetic intuition of the transcendental system thus seems to be internalized and replaced by a complex intuition within knowledge itself. This would imply furthermore that reason, being the object of the combined intellectual and aesthetic intuition, at the same time has to be understood as the former primordial self: the absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity (that is, the object of intellectual intuition) and as the work of art (that is, the object of aesthetic intuition) which mediates absolute knowledge. Thus, in the *Darstellung*, reason would at the same time occupy the role of the mediator of absolute knowledge and the role of the absolute itself. Put schematically: the triad I—the work of art (mediation)—primor-

²⁰ SWE 1:413.

dial self (*das Urselbst* or the absolute) of the transcendental system would be replaced in the *Darstellung* by the triad I—reason (mediation)—reason (the absolute). Comparing both schemata, two elements strike us: first, the fact that the notion of reason has a double meaning and therefore is not entirely unequivocal, and second, that reason as mediating absolute knowledge now occupies the position that was still reserved for the work of art in the transcendental system.

As for the ambiguity of the notion of reason, this is confirmed thoroughly by Schelling's text. In the *Darstellung* he distinguishes between the essence (*das Wesen*) and the form (*die Form*) of the absolute. By the essence of the absolute he means the *an-sich* (or "in itself") of the absolute. By the form he means the absolute insofar as it "is" or "is thought of." For in accordance with the best idealistic tradition Schelling maintains that the absolute can only be said to be insofar as it is thought of:

The absolute identity cannot be thought of except by the proposition $A=A$, but (at the same time) by that very proposition it is posited as *being* [*seyend*]. As a consequence, the absolute identity *is* because it is thought of.²¹

This thinking is tied—as is all thinking—to the structure of judgment and is thus incapable of expressing the absolute in its absoluteness:

What is posited together with the form of the proposition $A=A$, is also immediately posited with the being of the absolute identity, but this does not belong to its essence, it only belongs to its form or to its way of being.²²

So the form concerns the knowledge (and the being) of the identity and is distinct from its essence:

The absolute identity is unable to know itself in an infinite way without positing itself infinitely as subject and object. . . . It is one and the same absolute identity that qua form of being is posited as subject and object, albeit not qua essence.²³

This infinite knowledge, this absolute identity being posited as subject and object, is reason. As (its) form it is distinct from the essence of the absolute identity. But again, not altogether: "Reason . . . also is

²¹ Schelling, *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, in *SW* 3:14; see also *SW* 3:16–18 (emphasis in original).

²² *SW* 3:16; see also *SW* 3:16–17.

²³ *SW* 3:18; see also *SW* 3:17.

one with the absolute identity."²⁴ For, he explains, the difference between essence and form is only valid from the point of view of the form. From the viewpoint of the essence, even this difference does not hold. For the absolute is absolute identity. From the standpoint of the essence the difference between essence and form must be abandoned, and it should be stated that the form, as the knowing of the absolute, *eo ipso* is one with its essence.²⁵ So the *Darstellung* does indeed operate with an equivocal concept of reason: reason as form, in which the absolute is known, and reason as essence, which from the perspective of the form, is different from that form.

If we now return to the triadic schema of the *Darstellung*, the I—reason (as mediation)—reason (as the absolute), then reason as form appears to be the mediating factor whereas reason as essence appears to be the absolute itself. When we compare this schema with that of the transcendental system (the I—the work of art—the primordial self), then the former mediating position of the work of art is now shown to be taken by reason as form. This would indicate that the form in the *Darstellung* fulfills the epistemological and systematic function that was initially fulfilled by the work of art. So the form would be within knowledge the internalized work of art; an internalization by which the knowledge of the form (*genitivus subjectivus*) becomes itself some sort of work of art.

The similarities between reason as form in the *Darstellung* and the work of art in the transcendental system are striking indeed, both in terms of structure and function. Reason as form, it is said in the *Darstellung*, is the self-knowing of the absolute. Just like the work of art, it is the locus where the absolute becomes knowable. This locus, however, does not coincide with the absolute. The work of art and the form may represent the absolute, but they are different from it; the absolute as such remains basically ineffable. But then again the structure of the form and the work of art resemble the absolute. In both cases there is an identity of subjectivity and objectivity—a structure that can only be disclosed by an intuition: an aesthetic intuition in the case of the work of art, an intuition of reason (*Vernunftanschauung*) in the case of the form. This structure of identity reveals in both cases a kind of knowledge that supersedes reflection by denying and founding it at the same time. Access to this knowledge presupposes that

²⁴ *SW* 3:14.

²⁵ *SWE* 1:420; see also *SWE* 1:422, 432.

the subject renounces its own subjectivity and is receptive to a rationality that transcends it. This is exactly what was intended by aesthetic intuition in the transcendental system; in the *Darstellung* this “decentering” of the subject is part and parcel of the intuition of reason:

to reach the standpoint that I urge, one must abstract from the one who thinks. For those who do so, reason immediately stops being something subjective.²⁸

This indicates that reason as form functions, as did the work of art before, as the organ, that is, as the instrument and method of philosophy. For philosophical discourse remains a discourse proceeding from the identity of subjectivity and objectivity and aiming at thinking this identity within differentiation. But whereas in the transcendental system this identity is revealed by the work of art, it is now disclosed in and through reason itself. In accordance with the shift of the organ-function of the work of art to reason as form, philosophy is no longer defined as the conceptual expression of what happens in art but as the expression of the structure of identity of the form.

The internalization of the work of art within knowledge also points to some interesting differences between the transcendental system and the *Darstellung*. The locus where the absolute becomes knowable is no longer the external, objective work of art but the form, that is, the basic structure of knowledge itself. Knowledge in the *Darstellung* seems to be self-sufficient to generate absolute knowledge. By this tacit affirmation of the autonomy of philosophical knowledge, art is no longer the exclusive revelation of the absolute. The absolute need not be shown first in the work of art before philosophy is capable of gaining adequate knowledge of it. To know the absolute, philosophy has only to intuit the basic structure of its own knowing. Philosophical knowledge has an immediate access to the absolute on its own. The ironical, heteronomous element in the constitution of absolute knowledge has vanished.

In this way, philosophy has taken over the privileged affinity of art with the absolute. Yet philosophy is only able to do so by conceiving of the element of its own discourse, that is, the form, as an aesthetic activity and, in line with this view, by conceiving of itself as a work of art. As to this strong affinity between art and philosophy, it

²⁸ SW 3:10–11.

suffices to refer to the key function of the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) in the identity system. For according to Schelling it is indeed the imagination, this creative faculty *par excellence*, that is at work within absolute knowledge. Therefore absolute knowledge and poetry are related. Absolute knowledge is a creative knowledge, a productive knowledge, that understands the differentiated objects of knowledge proceeding from the identity structure of reason as form while imagining (*einbilden*) them as manifestations of this identity. Whereas in the transcendental system, Schelling primarily conceives of philosophical rationality as a higher reflexivity, he now explicitly ascribes to it a unifying, and thus productive, imaginative or poetic capacity. Thinking becomes poetry, philosophy becomes an art-product. In the identity system, philosophical discourse expresses conceptually what hitherto could only be revealed by art. From now on, art and philosophy are each other's mirror image.²⁷ Put differently, in the *Darstellung* one witnesses the transferral of the aesthetic structure of the romantic absolute to the structure of rationality itself.²⁸ Until then—that is, throughout romantic idealism—the highest principle of unification had been located in different instances such as beauty, freedom, being, love, or life (see in this respect the work of Hölderlin, the writings of the young Hegel, or even Schelling's own early writings) but never within thought itself. This happens for the first time in the *Darstellung*—a text about which Schelling in 1805 declares that “then, to me the light went on in philosophy.”²⁹

What is the effect of dropping the nonreducible objectivity of the work of art in the constitution of absolute knowledge? What does it mean that philosophy can do without the revelatory function of art in bringing the absolute as such before consciousness? It means that philosophy understands itself as absolute idealism. The heart of absolute idealism is the idea that philosophical knowledge can, by itself,

²⁷ Fuhrmans, *F. W. J. Schelling* 3:222; see also Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, in *SW* 3:370.

²⁸ Despite the difference in argument, this conclusion comes close to Wolfgang Schneider's in *Ästhetische Ontologie. Schellings Weg des Denkens zur Identitätsphilosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983), 505: “Darin wird deutlich, dass Kunst und insofern das Phänomen des Ästhetischen eben nicht nur Bindeglied und Vermittlungsinstanz ist, um das sich selbst reflektierende Denken von ausserhalb seiner ganz zu sich zu bringen, sondern das gedankliche Fundament sowohl der Transzendental- wie auch der Identitätsphilosophie selber.”

²⁹ Fuhrmans, *F. W. J. Schelling* 3:222.

suspend its subjectivity and elevate itself to the level of the absolute, as the only viewpoint from which reality is to be thought of truthfully. The result of this is the implosion of reality within thinking: the reduction of all reality to a reality that is thought or conceived of. Considered from the romantic perspective, it implies that philosophy no longer recognizes the "fictitiousness" of knowledge.³⁰ Every knowledge that no longer feels the need to test itself against the revelation of any transcendence whatsoever has dropped its relativity. Yet in Schelling, this dropping of the fictitiousness of knowledge again remains ambiguous. First, because it is unclear what kind of (nonreflexive) knowledge the intuition of reason is supposed to yield; second, as a result of his continually oscillating between the affirmation of the identity of form and essence and the confirmation of their difference. According to the text, the absolute at the same time is the identity of subject and object as form and the condition of possibility of this form. As the essence (*das Wesen*) the absolute conditions its own form, but at the same time it denies this form as an adequate expression of itself. Hence, even in the *Darstellung* the intuition is upheld that the definition of the absolute according to the logic of identity remains deficient with respect to the absolute as such because it always is a kind of knowledge anyway.

IV

Philosophical knowledge is aesthetic knowledge. It is a unifying activity that relies on the faculty of the imagination. Philosophy realizes within the ideal what art accomplishes within the real: the absolute unification of identity and difference. With these words one could formulate the affinity between philosophy and art in the identity system. It is time now to check the validity of this view by turning to Schelling's philosophy of art.

³⁰ I borrow the notion of the "fictitiousness of knowledge" (*die Fiktivität des Wissens*) from Panajotis Kondylis, *Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 619. Through this expression Kondylis points to the romantic view that all knowledge is bound to the differentiation between subject and object and therefore is unable to grasp the unity (or undifferentiated ground) of reality. In other words: all knowledge is conditioned by the subject-object differentiation as its form, and therefore it can never be regarded as an adequate representation of the reality it intends to grasp.

The assertion that philosophical knowledge is aesthetic knowledge is based on the assumption that the former relies on the imagination. This transcendental faculty, which according to Kant plays a major role in the mediation of the (cognitive) faculties of the mind and sensory experience, was ontologized by the romantics—including Schelling—and was understood as a unifying power in a metaphysical sense. As early as Novalis, imagination is identified as the creative and productive power as such—an activity that manifests itself in nature, art, and human knowledge—whenever these exhibit forms of creativity. Schelling's *Philosophie der Kunst* maintains that perspective: art and philosophy have imagination in common.³¹ It is their capacity to represent the infinite in the finite in such a way that the finite becomes the symbol of the infinite.³² The indistinctiveness of the universal and the particular which is realized in that way constitutes the representation of the absolute within the finite. Schelling specifies:

Particular things, to the extent they are absolute in that particularity, and thus to the extent they as particulars are simultaneously universes, are called ideas. . . . What ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for art.³³

Philosophical construction and artistic creation thus result in a similar product. In philosophy this product is contemplated ideally, as ideas, whereas in art it is contemplated really, as gods. Both represent the identity of the universal and the particular within the particular.³⁴ This identity of universality and particularity is the essence of beauty:

³¹ Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst. Allgemeiner Teil*, in *SW* 3:406; see also *SW* 1:475.

³² *SW* 3:427; see also *SWE* 3:205–6.

³³ *SW* 3:410–11; see also *SW* 3:390.

³⁴ An idea is a particular that realizes the universality of its predicate and so becomes a primordial image (or archetype) of its own finite appearance. Such an identity of particularity (subject) and universality (predicate) is naturally realized within the absolute identity (*A is A*). But this is also the case in the work of art. Particularity and universality at least are not differentiated in the work of art. For the work of art cannot have a different concept, cannot have a different predicate but the one it has indeed. The work of art, therefore, realizes what philosophy brings about ideally: ideas (*SWE* 3:152). The ideas insofar as they are contemplated really are gods: as particular subjects they coincide with the universality of their concept. *Aphrodite is fertility; Athena is wisdom.*

Beauty is posited wherever the particular (real) is so commensurate with its concept that the latter itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited *in concreto*.³⁵

So, strictly speaking, only ideas are beautiful; or again: philosophy and art, truth and beauty are one, for they are the different products of one and the same aesthetic or poetic creative activity.

The difference between philosophy and art only concerns the domain in which they are producing. In the world of thinking, philosophy is as much a kind of art as art is a kind of philosophy in the world of the sensual.³⁶ Schelling expressed this mirroring of art and philosophy as follows:

Art . . . as a representation of the infinite stands on the same level with philosophy: just as philosophy presents the absolute in the *archetype* [*das Urbild*], so also does art present the absolute in a *reflex* or *reflected image* [*das Gegenbild*].³⁷

Art and philosophy mirror one another not only because they both represent the absolute but also because they both do so in the same, aesthetic way. Therefore, the representation of the absolute is, in both cases, inevitably symbolic.³⁸

However, it is not only interesting to see how the inner structure and makeup of art and philosophy are geared to one another; it is symptomatic that even the idea of autonomy, which at the end of the eighteenth century was still exclusively attributed to art, is now completely transferred to philosophy. "Fine Art," Schelling states, "is absolute in itself, and thus without any external purpose; it is not a matter of need."³⁹ In the identity system, this far-reaching, autonomous status of art is also the status of philosophy: "Philosophy is unconditional through and through, without any purpose outside itself."⁴⁰ Yet it should be noted that Schelling does not confirm the autonomy of philosophy because he endorses the modernization process (Weber), that is, the process whereby art, morality, and science (philosophy) gain independence. On the contrary, in the affirmation of the autonomy of a "higher" rationality, Schelling sees the only remaining hope for an agency which would be capable of keeping together those

³⁵ SW 3:402; see also SW 3:418.

³⁶ SW, 3:401–3; see also SW 3:426.

³⁷ SW 3:389 (emphasis in original).

³⁸ For the distinction in Schelling among schema, allegory, and symbol, see SW 3:426–7.

³⁹ SWE 3:225–6.

⁴⁰ SW 3:372.

domains of art, morality, and science which at that very moment were differentiating rapidly. Put differently, in Schelling's view philosophy does not owe its autonomy to its difference but to its unity with art and morality.

V

The shift from the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* to the *Darstellung*, so it is argued, marks the distinction between romantic and absolute idealism. Romantic idealism holds on to the irrecoverableness of the absolute, to the essential "nonidentity" of the object of thought, moral action, and art. This irrecoverableness is an idea that is kept vivid by the use of irony. In Schelling, this irony is preserved in the role of art in the transcendental system. The subject, which has recovered almost the whole domain of objectivity from nature up to history, is at the very last moment referred to something outside itself that discloses the true essence of the subject. The irony here is that self-consciousness appears to have an irrecoverable blind spot. In the end this blind spot is remedied by the revelatory intuition of the work of art, although the mechanism by which the work of art is produced remains irrecoverable; it is the work of genius within the artist. In absolute idealism this susceptibility is given up. The external character of the work of art, under the name of reason, is smuggled into knowledge itself. This reason is now conceived of in an aesthetic sense as the unifying principle *par excellence*. The way in which reasonable knowledge proceeds is modeled after the artistic creative process. Philosophy, which has the task of expressing the absolute identity of reason (*Vernunftidentität*), now becomes an aesthetic construction that in every respect resembles the work of art not only with respect to its inner structure but also with respect to its status as an autonomous piece of work. Only the ambiguous distinction between essence and form of the absolute still reminds one of the former irrecoverability of the absolute. From the perspective of romantic idealism, the internalization of the aesthetic activity, and hence of the work of art, within the field of knowledge embodied by a unifying reason, is a seizure of knowledge. The result for art is, on the one hand, that it loses its exclusive epistemological significance; its transformation into the identity-theoretical paradigm of rationality, on the other hand, gives aesthetics an unseen philosophical strength.

Aesthetics's capacity for unification, which had been attributed to it ever since Kant, now receives an additional qualitative label of "higher" rationality and of ontological logic of identity *par excellence*.

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AN EXEMPLARY LIFE: THE CASE OF RENÉ DESCARTES

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I

IT IS A TRUTH UNIVERSALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT René Descartes is the founder of modern philosophy.¹ There is far less consensus on the question of what his modernity means. The majority of Descartes's readers have focused on the *cogito*, the "I think" that is the *fons et origo* of all knowledge. The method of doubt and the famous rules of evidence have played a crucial role in the formation of a distinctively modern search for foundations of truth.² Political theorists have frequently treated Descartes as the harbinger of a new age, but there is widespread disagreement over precisely what this means. Tocqueville regarded the Cartesian method as ideally suited to the new democratic age. "The philosophical method established by Descartes," he wrote, "is not only French but democratic, which explains why it was so easily accepted in all of Europe, whose face it has contributed so much to changing."³ For Michael Oakeshott, Descartes, along with

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¹David Lachterman, *The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: Free Press, 1990); John Cottingham, "A New Start? Cartesian Metaphysics and the Emergence of Modern Philosophy," in *The Rise of Modern Philosophy: The Tensions between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz*, ed. Tom Sorrell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 145–66.

²Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 136–7: "Descartes's invention of the mind . . . gave philosophers new ground to stand on . . . it provided a field within which *certainly*, as opposed to mere *opinion*, was possible." For the Cartesian aspiration toward a unified science, see Thomas Spragens, *The Irony of Liberal Reason* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 35–40; see also Edwin Curley, *Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 4–6.

³Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 405; likewise, Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter

Bacon, created a new aggressive form of rationalism summarized in his expression "the sovereignty of technique."⁴ For Sheldon Wolin, Descartes inaugurated a new form of "methodism" in the study of politics that became the forerunner of modern behavioral social science.⁵ More recently, feminist theorists have chastised Cartesian epistemology with its mind-body distinction for contributing to the myth of the "Man of Reason."⁶

Even more prominently, Descartes has become the universal whipping boy for postmodernists who regard his thought as being at the core of two distinctively modern pathologies: subjectivity and aggressiveness. The Cartesian paradigm of the solitary thinker, it is alleged, was said to make the monadic subject the sole basis for truth. Likewise, it was the very rootlessness of the Cartesian subject, unmoored from the restraining bonds of tradition, custom, and history, that has authorized a domineering and controlling posture toward nature and the environment. According to no less an authority than Martin Heidegger, Cartesianism carries the seed of totalitarianism characterized by the techniques of mastering nature and the full-scale domination of society. He has become a virtual poster child for every evil from genetic engineering to environmental devastation.⁷

Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), aph. 191, p. 104, calls Descartes "the father of rationalism," adding parenthetically, "and hence the grandfather of the Revolution."

⁴ Michael Oakshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991), 22. For Descartes as a source of "liberal rationalism," see Spragens, *The Irony of Liberal Reason*, 18–23.

⁵ Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," in *Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought*, ed. Martin Fleisher (New York: Atheneum, 1972), 23–75. For the image of Descartes as "the value-free scientist who lives apart from the world he studies," see William Bluhm, *Force or Freedom? The Paradox of Modern Political Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 34.

⁶ Genevieve Lloyd, "Reason as Attainment," in *Feminist Interpretations of Descartes*, ed. Susan Bordo (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 70–81.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 4, *Nihilism*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Krell, and Frank Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper's, 1991), 28: "Modern metaphysics first comes to the full and final determination of its essence in the doctrine of the Overman, the doctrine of man's absolute preeminence among beings. In that doctrine, Descartes celebrates his supreme triumph." The thesis that early modernity is the bearer of totalitarianism is given even more exaggerated expression in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1972); the debates over the reputed overcoming of Descartes are surveyed in *Who Comes After the Subject?* ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991).

It is not just that the postmodern reading of Descartes borders on caricature (of course it does). Rather, the caricature depends on a specific misreading of Descartes as a thinker concerned with purely metaphysical and epistemological problems (what can I know?) at the expense of moral and ethical ones (what should I do?). A close reading of the *Discourse on Method* shows that the book is not about the creation of some anonymous epistemological subject called *ego cogitans* but is the autobiography of one real, historical individual, René Descartes.⁸ The *Discourse* was published in 1637, when Descartes was 41 years of age. Here he tells the story of his background and education at the Jesuit college of La Flèche ("one of the most famous schools in Europe"); his disillusionment with his teachers and the books of ancient and modern philosophy on which he had been brought up; his discovery of his famous rules of method during a day-long confinement in a stove-heated room after having been called by the war then raging in Germany (the Thirty Years War); his elucidation of a "provisional moral code" by which to conduct himself during this period of intellectual experimentation; and his continued wanderings that led him finally to settle in Holland ("amidst this great mass of busy people who are more concerned with their own affairs than curious about those of others").⁹

The *Discourse* was not published as a stand-alone text but as an introduction to three essays on physical subjects including his treatise on optics. It has become common to view the work as a response to the crisis of skepticism provoked by the rehabilitation of ancient Pyrrhonism. Descartes was but the best known of the figures who were attached to the group around Marin Mersenne that included not only Gassendi but Hobbes. The "Mersenne Circle" was deeply concerned with the creation of a new science that could answer the skeptical challenge of the Pyrrhonists. Descartes's famous method of "hyperbolic doubt" took the skepticism of thinkers like Charron and Montaigne to a whole new level, but he then added his own escape clause to it. The *cogito ergo sum* was hoped to provide a platform for

⁸ References to Descartes will be given to both the Charles Adam and Paul Tannery edition of the *Oeuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Vrin, 1974–86) (hereafter, "AT," followed by volume and page number), and to the *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) (hereafter, "CSM," followed by volume and page number).

⁹ AT 6:5, 31; CSM 1:113, 126.

absolute certainty (I cannot doubt that I think without falling into self-contradiction) that could in turn serve as the foundation for the new science of knowledge.¹⁰

Descartes's answer to the problem of skepticism has proven contentious, to say the least. But while the epistemology of the *Discourse* has been the subject of extensive study, what goes frequently unacknowledged is the moral import of the work. Descartes is perhaps the greatest philosopher never to have written a systematic work on ethical or political matters.¹¹ While the discussion of Descartes's ethical theory has focused mainly on the *morale par provision* from part 3 of the *Discourse*, this ethic suggests, as the term implies, that it is merely provisional. That it is not Descartes's final word on the subject is clear from the letter to the Abbé Claude Picot that prefaces the French edition of the *Principles of Philosophy* (1647), where he uses the metaphor of the tree of knowledge to explicate his moral views: "The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely, medicine, mechanics, and morals." By morality, he understands "the highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is *the ultimate level of wisdom*."¹²

The program for a completed moral system was never finished, but it is at least arguable that the sketch for such a system is already present in the *Discourse*. The question rarely asked about the book is why Descartes chose to present his work in the form of an autobiography. What is the connection between ethics and autobiography? The *Discourse* seems to have been a long-delayed response to a request from Guez de Balzac in a letter from 1628 for Descartes to write an "Histoire de votre esprit."¹³ In acceding to Balzac's request for an intellectual and spiritual autobiography, Descartes produced a modern

¹⁰ For Descartes's answer to *la crise pyrrhonnienne*, see Richard Popkin, *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 143–57; Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 284–94; see also Bernard Williams, "Descartes's Use of Skepticism," in *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 337–52.

¹¹ The obvious exceptions here are Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

¹² AT 9b:14; CSM 1:186 (emphasis added).

¹³ AT 1:570.

variant of the genre of exemplary history recently recovered by Renaissance historiographers.¹⁴ This kind of exemplary history, as Reinhart Koselleck has reminded us, “existed in the context of a rhetorical principle that only the orator was capable of lending immortality to a history that was instructive of life, of rendering perennial its store of experience.”¹⁵ In the case of Descartes, however, the history he sets out to immortalize is his own.

Descartes is the inheritor of the humanistic formula *historia magistra vitae*, or that history is a teacher of life.¹⁶ The *Discourse* is offered in the first instance as “a history or, if you prefer, a fable” in which the center of the story is Descartes himself.¹⁷ He offers his life as both a singular achievement but also something supremely “worthy of imitation.” At the core of Descartes’s life story is his search for a vocation. His quest is not merely epistemological but moral. He asks not just what can I know but what should I do. It is this search for a vocation, or something to do with his life, that makes his a supremely modern tale of a piece with those other great adventurers of modern self-discovery, Don Quixote, Robinson Crusoe, and Emma Bovary.¹⁸

It is easy to reduce Descartes’s story to a few simple clichés about clear and distinct ideas, the dualism between the mind and body, and the myth of the “ghost in the machine.”¹⁹ This, however, entirely abstracts from the profound picture of the individual to which Descartes is struggling to give voice. The *Discourse* is, above all, a *Bildungsroman*, a novel of self-discovery.²⁰ It tells the story of the shaping of a self. The story of Descartes’s life is not extraneous to his

¹⁴ For the genre of exemplary history, see Timothy Hampton, *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Descartes’s use of the method of *exempla* is treated in Lachterman, *The Ethics of Geometry*, 131–4.

¹⁵ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 23.

¹⁶ Cicero, *De Oratore*, bk. 2, chap. 9, sec. 36.

¹⁷ AT 6:4; CSM 1:112.

¹⁸ See Stephen L. Gardner, *Myths of Freedom: Equality, Modern Thought, and Philosophical Radicalism* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 55; Karl Joachim Weintraub, *The Value of the Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 194–5; Ian Watt, *Myths of Modern Individualism: Faust, Don Quixote, Don Juan, Robinson Crusoe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 237.

¹⁹ Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Hutchinson, 1949), 15–18.

²⁰ See John J. Blom, “Introduction,” in *Descartes: His Moral Philosophy and Psychology* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 41–2.

philosophy; it is constitutive of it. The *Discourse* is the story of an exemplary life. In developing the contours of the self, he clearly draws on the personal style of Montaigne's *Essays*, but just as importantly anticipates the great philosophical novels of education of the following centuries, Rousseau's *Emile* and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*.²¹

II

Why did Descartes publish the *Discourse*? As mentioned above, the work was a response to a reader's request for an intellectual autobiography. It also served as a preface to a longer work that included essays on optics, meteorology, and geometry.²² At the beginning of part 6, however, he mentions that it had been three years since he had completed the essays to which the *Discourse* was intended as the introduction. Descartes's decision to delay publication is not without importance for an understanding of the theologico-political context in which the work was written. In particular, Descartes draws attention to the climate of compulsion and necessity that forced him to defer publication of his work.²³

Near the end of the *Discourse* Descartes alludes to, without mentioning, the name of Galileo, whose essay *The Assayer* (*Il Saggiatore*) had been a major influence on the Mersenne Circle. In particular Descartes was fascinated by Galileo's view that the "great book of nature" is written in the language of mathematics.²⁴ The fact that Galileo had been forced to recant his views provided a sobering lesson about the limits of free inquiry. While claiming to have noticed nothing in Galileo's treatise that could be construed as "prejudicial either to reli-

²¹ The sources of Descartes's conception of the self are a subject of controversy; for the Christian and Augustinian sources, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 143–58. For the importance of Montaigne's ethical skepticism for Descartes, see Leon Brunschvicg, *Descartes et Pascal: Lecteurs de Montaigne* (Neuchâtel: Baconnière, 1945); Weintraub, *The Value of the Individual*, 173, 177–8.

²² The full title in French reads: *Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les sciences. Plus la Dioptrique, les Météores et la Géométrie qui sont des essais de cette Méthode*.

²³ For the background of intimidation, see Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 17, 22, 33.

gion or to the state," this nevertheless caused Descartes to delay publishing his own work. Under cover of false modesty he claims that he was forced to withdraw his work lest "there be some mistake in one of my own theories, in spite of the great care I had always taken never to adopt any new opinion for which I had no certain demonstration, and never to write anything that might work to anyone's disadvantage." The reasons he adduces for changing his mind may, he avers, be of some interest to the public.²⁵

For an author who makes "unswerving resolution" a necessary component of his method, Descartes seems curiously irresolute. After initially deciding not to publish his work, he proceeds to give two reasons for changing his mind again. In the first place if he failed to publish the book, he worries that those who knew of its existence "might suppose that my reasons for not doing so were more discreditable to me than they are." He professes indifference to fame ("I am not excessively fond of glory") but at the same time is concerned that his reputation will suffer for his reluctance to publish.²⁶

The second reason is even more compelling. It is not only for fear of his reputation but from a desire to benefit the public that he has agreed to publish the *Discourse*. He stresses the active humanitarianism underlying his project. "Every man," he says, "is indeed bound to do what he can to procure the good of others."²⁷ This good concerns not only the present generation but extends to posterity. The project is such that it can be carried out not only by Descartes himself but requires the help of others over many generations:

Every day I am becoming more and more aware of the delay which my project of self-instruction is suffering because of the need for innumerable observation which I cannot possibly make without the help of others. Although I do not flatter myself with any expectation that the public will share my interests, yet at the same time I am unwilling to be so

²⁴ See Galilei Galileo, "The Assayer," in *Discoveries and Opinions*, trans. Stillman Drake (New York: Doubleday, 1957), 237–8: "Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth." For Galileo's "book of nature" metaphor, see Hans Blumenberg, *Die Lesbarkeit der Welt* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), 71–80.

²⁵ AT 6:60–1; CSM 1:141–2.

²⁶ AT 6:74; CSM 1:149.

²⁷ AT 6:66; CSM 1:145.

unfaithful to myself as to give those who come after me cause to reproach me some day on the grounds that I could have left them many far better things if I had not been so remiss in making them understand how they could contribute to my projects.²⁸

Like Bacon, Descartes is convinced, or wants to convince others, of his essential humanity and generosity.²⁹ These are the key terms of the new ethic Descartes proposes. There is more than a note of pride or ambition in this ethic when he acknowledges that it will require the work of many future investigators to complete “my projects.” The question is, in what does this ethic consist? From what is it derived? What are the benefits that follow from its use? Before attempting to answer these questions, Descartes feels it necessary to tell his story.

III

Part 1 of the *Discourse* tells the story of the education of a young philosopher. Descartes begins, modestly enough, informing the reader that “the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false” is more or less equal in all men.³⁰ This assertion of intellectual equality dovetails nicely with his claim near the very end of his work that he would prefer to be read not by scholars who judge things by the standards of “the ancients” but by those readers who combine “good sense with application” (*le bon sens avec l'étude*).³¹

The author of the work never claims to possess anything more than an ordinary intelligence and in fact developed his method to compensate for the “mediocrity” of his mind. Despite his profession of intellectual modesty, he cannot refrain from boasting of the education he received from the Jesuit priests at La Flèche, where in addition to the regular curriculum he claims to have “gone through all the books that fell into my hands concerning the subjects that are considered most abstruse and unusual.”³² The result of this education seems

²⁸ AT 6:75; CSM 1:149.

²⁹ For Baconian humanitarianism, see Francis Bacon, *New Organon*, bk. 1, a. 129, in *Selected Philosophical Works*, ed. Rose-Mary Sargent (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 145–7; see also Robert Faulkner, *Francis Bacon and the Project of Progress* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 62–5.

³⁰ AT 6:2; CSM 1:111.

³¹ AT 6:77–8; CSM 1:151.

³² AT 6:5; CSM 1:113.

to have been a kind of Socratic awareness of the limitations or worthlessness of existing knowledge.

Descartes provides a catalogue of the uselessness of existing knowledge, especially the value paid to the study of languages and histories. He appears, ironically, not to notice that the same word ("fable") is used to describe both the useless but charming stories he rejects as well as the *Discourse* that he presents as frank and exemplary. Why refer to his book as "a history or . . . a fable" if such knowledge is considered useless? This must cause the reader to wonder whether the work is being offered as a true account or something like a salutary myth. While recognizing that reading the great books is "like having a conversation with the most distinguished men of past ages," he nevertheless finds this to be little more than a kind of intellectual tourism:

For conversing with those of past centuries is much the same as travelling. It is good to know something of the customs of various peoples, so that we may judge our own more soundly and not think that everything contrary to our ways is ridiculous and irrational. . . . But one who spends too much time travelling eventually becomes a stranger in his own country; and one who is too curious about the practices of past ages usually remains quite ignorant about those of the present.³³

Descartes's warning about the dangers of spending too much time away from one's own country is ironic in light of the extensive role that travel plays in his own intellectual development.

It is ultimately the failure to achieve any sort of agreement or consensus even among the best minds that led Descartes to despair. Learning that does not result in certainty is not worth having. Despite the fact that philosophy has been cultivated for centuries, there is no single proposition that is not disputable and hence subject to doubt. At best one might expect probable knowledge rather than truth. Even mathematics, which "delighted" him because of "the certainty and self-evidence of its reasonings," had failed to discover its "real use." Abandoning study for "the great book of the world" (*le grand livre du monde*), Descartes resolved to spend his time in travel and "mixing with people of diverse temperaments and ranks, gathering various experiences, and testing [himself] in the situations afforded by fortune."³⁴ The result of this immersion in the world of practical experience was a lesson in skepticism, "not to believe too firmly anything of

³³ AT 6:6; CSM 1:113–14.

³⁴ AT 6:9; CSM 1:115.

which I had been persuaded only by example and custom" (*par l'exemple et par la coustume*).

It is only at the end of part 1 that Descartes makes a decisive discovery that determines the rest of the *Discourse*. Finding no satisfactory foundation for knowledge in anything outside himself ("example and custom"), he decides that only what is within himself is reliable: "I resolved one day to undertake studies within myself too and to use all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I should follow."³⁵ The question is what is the nature of interiority, the inner world of human subjectivity that provides a better guide to life than all the experiences of travel or study.

IV

Descartes's proposals for the reform of the understanding grew out of a day-long confinement in a stove-heated room (*poêle*) while returning to the army after attending the coronation of the emperor of Bavaria. He says nothing about why he, a private citizen, was attending the coronation. He reports little about what happened during that day that led to up to his proposals for intellectual reform.³⁶ His first thoughts focused on the nature of beginnings. Just as a building is more perfect the more it is the design of a single architect, so too is this true for all foundings. The Spartan constitution has been widely praised not because each of its laws is admirable, but because they were all the product of a single founder and directed toward the same end.³⁷ What is true of buildings and constitutions is also true for knowledge. The fact that the existing sciences have often grown up piecemeal with no uniform plan explains why they are nothing but a patchwork of opinion and mere probable reasoning.

Descartes denies that his plan to undertake the reform of knowledge has a revolutionary design. It would be unwise, he believes, to undertake the reform of a state or education by undertaking it from

³⁵ AT 6:10; CSM 1:116.

³⁶ The story of Descartes's remarkable illumination is told by Adrien Baillet, *La Vie de M. Des-Cartes* (1691; reprint, New York: Garland, 1987), 1:77–86; John R. Cole, *The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of René Descartes* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 61–77; Genèvieve Rodis-Lewis, *Descartes: His Life and Thought*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 33–44.

³⁷ AT 6:12; CSM 1:117.

the ground up. However, regarding his own opinions and beliefs, it would be preferable “to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace them afterward with better ones.”³⁸ He appears not to notice the improbability of getting rid of all one’s opinions at a single stroke. How is this possible? What will he replace his former opinions with? Nonetheless, he insists that his proposals concern himself alone and are not intended as a guide to anyone else (“My plan has never gone beyond trying to reform my own thoughts”). He excoriates all reformers (“those meddlesome and restless characters”) who undertake to overhaul public institutions.³⁹

Descartes situates himself as a mean between two types of persons. There are those on whom “God has bestowed more of his favors” and will no doubt see his plans for self-improvement as too cautious. Then there are others who are content to follow existing opinion and practice as the only reliable guide. Descartes tells the reader that he would have included himself in this second class had he not early on come upon a discovery, namely, that there is no opinion or custom so strange that it has not been held or practiced by someone somewhere. His travels merely confirmed to him that custom is variable and that we hold the opinions we do purely as a matter of chance. “I have recognized through my travels,” he writes in a sentence that could have come directly out of Montaigne, “that those with views quite contrary to ours are not on that account barbarians or savages, but that many of them make use of reason as much or more than we do.”⁴⁰ The result is that he has found it necessary to be his own guide.

The enumeration of the four rules of method follows from Descartes’s desire to find a secure ground for knowledge. The advantage of these rules is their relative simplicity provided the user has made “a strong and unswerving resolution never to fail to observe them.”⁴¹ These rules of method are not themselves a form of knowledge, but a means for determining what is to count as knowledge, of winnowing truth from opinion. Because of his view that all

³⁸ AT 6:13; CSM 1:117.

³⁹ AT 6:14, 15; CSM 1:119.

⁴⁰ AT 6:16; CSM 1:119; see also, Michel de Montaigne, “Of Cannibals,” in *The Complete Essays*, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 152: “I think there is nothing barbarous and savage in that nation, from what I have been told, except that each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice.”

⁴¹ AT 6:18; CSM 1:120.

knowledge is interconnected, these rules of method should be potentially applicable to every human endeavor. Descartes's confidence in his method is such that after only "two or three months" problems that had previously seemed difficult had been solved, and for others it was at least possible to determine whether they admit of a solution. His main fear seems to be that the possession of this method will make him appear "too arrogant," although he boldly asserts that "since there is only one truth concerning any matter, whoever discovers this truth knows as much about it as can be known."⁴²

V

It is in the third part of the *Discourse* that Descartes considers the practical consequences of adopting his rules of method. As the example of Galileo had already demonstrated, the implications of the new science were widely believed to have unsettling implications for the conduct of moral and religious life. Accordingly, he felt compelled to address the concerns of critics (or potential critics) who saw the new method as subversive of existing modes and orders. While Descartes attempted to protect himself from the charges of unbelief by appending an argument for the existence of God along with his rules of *évidence*, he clearly knew he was skating on thin ice and took pains to protect himself from a plunge.

Descartes's answer to these critics is provided in the "provisional moral code" (*morale par provision*) that is adopted as a guide to conduct, at least until such time as the fruits of the method have begun to pay off.⁴³ The question asked by Descartes here is, "how can the skeptic live his beliefs?", that is, after submitting all his previous beliefs to systematic doubt, how is it possible to live in the world?⁴⁴ In answer-

⁴² AT 6:21; CSM 1:121.

⁴³ Descartes's *morale par provision* has often been translated as "provisional morality" (*morale provisoire*), but it has recently been claimed that *par provision* is only misleadingly rendered as "provisional"; see John Marshall, *Descartes's Moral Theory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 16–17. I agree with the question of translation but still believe that the *morale par provision* is adopted by Descartes as a temporary stop gap during periods of sustained moral doubt and uncertainty rather than a developed moral theory. See also Pierre Mesnard, *Essai sur la Morale de Descartes* (Paris: Boivin, 1936), 46–66; Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, *La Morale de Descartes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), 9–23.

ing this question Descartes went out of his way to try to assuage critics by affirming the broadly “conservative” nature of his moral teachings. As we shall see, his avowals of obedience to the established laws and religion are but a thinly veiled disguise to be adopted until the new or definitive moral teaching can be revealed. Descartes is nothing if not a master of the double-teaching.⁴⁵

The provisional or exoteric character of Descartes’s morality is revealed in his effort to use it as a kind of prophylactic to protect the inquirer from the destabilizing effects of systematic doubt. Imagining himself in the situation of an architect building a new house who must arrange for some temporary accommodations, Descartes elaborates a scheme to “live as happily as I could” while waiting for the new dwelling to be constructed. The *morale par provision* consists of “three or four maxims” that he knows to be “imperfect,” but which must be followed until the better one comes along. The first of these maxims states the following:

The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding constantly to the religion in which by God’s grace I had been instructed from my childhood, and governing myself in all other matters according to the most moderate and least extreme opinions—the opinions commonly accepted in practice by the most sensible of those with whom I should have to life.⁴⁶

After having previously repudiated custom and opinion as guides to truth, Descartes here adopts their guidance as authoritative. The decision to live not just according to opinion but to the “least extreme” and “most moderate” opinions is intended as a hedge against the disorienting effects of radical doubt. The exemption of public institutions from methodical doubt has often made Descartes seem, at

⁴⁴ For a more general treatment of this problem, see Myles Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?” in *The Skeptical Tradition*, 117–48.

⁴⁵ Descartes provides internal evidence for doubting the sincerity of his ethics. In conversation he is reported to have said: “The author does not like writing on ethics, but he is *compelled* to include these rules [of the *morale par provision*] because of people like the Schoolmen; otherwise, they would have said that he was a man without any religion and faith and that he intended to use his method to subvert them”; *Descartes’ Conversation with Burman*, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 49. The issue of Descartes’s sincerity has been investigated by Hiram Caton, “The Problem of Descartes’s Sincerity,” *Philosophical Forum* 2, no. 3 (1971): 355–70; see also Bluhm, *Force or Freedom*, 311–13.

⁴⁶ AT 6:23; CSM 1:122.

least to some, cautious and fearful of change.⁴⁷ His statements that “these large bodies are too difficult to raise up once overthrown, or even to hold up once they begin to totter,” and that “it is almost always easier to put up with their imperfections than to change them,” suggest an external conservatism that belies the internal radicalism of Cartesian doubt.⁴⁸ Apparently the rules of method are to be applied only to matters of theory or science rather than practice. The principle of this rule seems to be internal freedom and external conformity.⁴⁹

It is deeply misleading to think of Descartes as a conservative moralist content to live by prevailing laws and customs alone. It may be more accurate to say of him what Macaulay said of Bacon, that his philosophical temperament revealed “a singular union of audacity and sobriety.”⁵⁰ This becomes especially apparent in the second maxim of the provisional morality that exhorts a kind of single-mindedness and resoluteness. This maxim “was to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to follow even the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, with no less constancy than if they had been quite certain.”⁵¹ Here Descartes compares himself to a traveler lost in the forest who determines to keep walking straight in one direction to avoid going in circles. This suggests an attitude of firmness or resoluteness that is important to adopt even in the absence of reliable information. Only by adopting a course of action forcefully and decisively is it possible to avoid “all the regrets and remorse which usually trouble the consciences of those weak and faltering spirits.”⁵² In short, he who hesitates is lost.

⁴⁷ Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” 38–9; Raymond Polin, “Descartes et la Philosophie Politique,” in *Mélanges Alexandre Koyré* (Paris: Hermann, 1964), 388, speaks of the “reticence” of Descartes and the “conservatism” of the *Discourse*. Likewise Spragens, *The Irony of Liberal Reason*, 70–2, regards Descartes’s moral science as “a logically unstable mixture of old and new ideas” and regards him as “very orthodox and subservient to authority” in religious matters.

⁴⁸ AT 6:14; CSM 1:118.

⁴⁹ Montaigne, “Of the Art of Discussion,” in *Essays*, 714: “My reason is not trained to bend and bow, it is my knees.” See also Tvetan Todorov, *Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism*, trans. Carol Cosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 56–7.

⁵⁰ Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay, “Lord Bacon,” in *Literary Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review* (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), 399.

⁵¹ AT 6:24; CSM 1:123.

⁵² AT 6:25; CSM 1:123.

Descartes's third maxim provides evidence for the Stoic influences on his thought. "My third maxim," he writes, "was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world."⁵³ The essence of this third maxim is the virtue of self-control. Although he will later boast that the use of the rules of method will make us "masters and possessors of nature," he here wishes to appear far more modest as he asserts only that "nothing lies entirely within our power except our thoughts." Powerless to control fortune, we can at least try to control our thoughts and desires. We should learn to desire only what it is in our power to obtain. If we could but teach ourselves to regard all "external goods" as beyond our power, we would be spared frustration and unhappiness. This sounds like generally good advice, although the examples he uses are startling: a person should not desire to be healthy when he is sick nor free when imprisoned, although Descartes admits that it takes "long practice and repeated meditation to become accustomed to seeing everything in this light."⁵⁴

The adoption of this moral code is only complete with Descartes's decision "to review the various occupations which men have in this life, in order to try to choose the best."⁵⁵ On the basis of this comparison of lives he professes contentment with his own self-chosen occupation as a searcher for knowledge. He affirms this choice again at the end of the *Discourse*, when he asserts that "I have resolved to devote the rest of my life to nothing other than trying to acquire some knowledge of nature from which we may derive rules in medicine which are more reliable than those we have had up till now."⁵⁶ Descartes gives us no reason for claiming his way is best, but only that he could find nothing better left to do. His question seems to be not the ancient one, "which way of life is best?" but the existential dilemma, "what should I do with my life?"

It could be wondered whether the rules of Descartes's *morale par provision* constitute a coherent ethic at all or merely a set of prudential guidelines for action to be adopted as a matter of convenience.⁵⁷ If the latter, one might legitimately wonder whether there is anything distinctively ethical about these provisions at all. In point of fact,

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ AT 6:26; CSM 1:124.

⁵⁵ AT 6:27; CSM 1:124.

⁵⁶ AT 6:78; CSM 1:151.

⁵⁷ Marshall, *Descartes's Moral Theory*, 18–19.

however, Descartes purposely describes these rules as *par provision*, thus indicating that they are to be in place only until the rules of his definitive morality can be safely enumerated. *Par provision* means exactly what the name implies, temporary or opportunistic. Its principles are like ammunition or supplies stockpiled in order to withstand a siege. The morality by provision is, then, to be viewed as a security blanket to be adopted until such time as it can be replaced by the higher or more complete morality, but by no means Descartes's final statement on the subject. The complete or definitive morality will take the form of "the highest and most perfect moral system" that we have seen alluded to in the letter preface to the *Principles of Philosophy*.⁵⁸ The adoption of this morality *par provision*, it would seem, is connected not to any Stoic vision of rest or *ataraxia*, but to a period of frenzied motion and self-exploration.⁵⁹

It was only after his survey of the various occupations, Descartes tells the reader, that he was induced to leave his stove-heated room and set out on a series of travels that lasted nine years, where he says, "I did nothing but roam about in the world trying to be a spectator rather than an actor in all the comedies that are played out there."⁶⁰ While he had earlier complained that too much travel makes one a stranger in one's own country, he here emphasizes his deliberate separation from any of the customs or habits that could properly be called a home, viewing the world through the lenses of a detached ironist. Like the biblical Cain, Descartes seems compelled to roam the earth until finally taking up residence in a modern day land of Nod.⁶¹

The result of Descartes's adventures, however, was to lead to a most peculiar, hermetic way of life:

Exactly eight years ago this desire made me resolve to move away from any place where I might have acquaintances and retire to this country [Holland], where the long duration of the war has led to the establishment of such order that the armies maintained here seem to serve only to make the enjoyment of the fruits of peace all the more secure. Living here, amidst this great mass of busy people who are more concerned with their own affairs than curious about those of others, I have been able to lead a life as solitary and withdrawn as if I were in the most re-

⁵⁸ AT 9b:14; CSM 1:186.

⁵⁹ For the limits of Descartes's stoicism, see Rodis-Lewis, *La Morale de Descartes*, 21–2.

⁶⁰ AT 6:28; CSM 1:125.

⁶¹ Genesis 4:16.

mote desert, while lacking none of the comforts found in the most populous cities.⁶²

It is fitting that Descartes's peregrinations brought him to Holland, the commercial capital *par excellence* of Europe. It is here that Descartes is able to live as a stranger and private individual but among all the conveniences of life. "I take a walk each day amid the bustle of the crowd with as much freedom and repose as you could obtain in your leafy groves, and I pay no more attention to the people I meet than I would to the trees in your woods or the animals that browse there," he writes in a letter to Balzac.⁶³ A generation after the publication of the *Discourse* Spinoza could laud this regime as a place where you can think what you like and say what you think. "For in this most flourishing republic," Spinoza wrote, "this most outstanding city, all men of whatever nation or sect, live in the greatest harmony."⁶⁴ It is the toleration of the Dutch Republic that extended to men like Descartes and Spinoza at least a temporary place of refuge where they could freely pursue their chosen way of life.

This, of course, raises the profound question about the relation between Descartes's chosen way of life and his adopted home.⁶⁵ What is the connection, if any, between the commercial republic and the *morale par provision*? In what respects is the practice of his method ideally suited to a commercial society like Holland, where even armies and wars are intended only "to make the enjoyment of the fruits of peace all the more secure?" Does the method of Descartes portend the commercial ethic of Benjamin Franklin and Adam Smith? In what respect is the solitude of Descartes connected to his stated desire to bring aid and comfort to mankind? These questions can only be answered in considering Descartes's definitive morality alluded to in part 6 of the *Discourse*.

⁶² AT 6:31; CSM 1:126.

⁶³ AT 1:203; CSM 3:31.

⁶⁴ Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 228.

⁶⁵ Descartes's attachment to any particular place may be doubted. See his letter to the Princess Elizabeth, June/July 1648: "Staying as I am, one foot in one country and the other in another, I find my condition very happy, in that it is free"; quoted in Todorov, *Imperfect Garden*, 55.

VI

In the next two sections of the *Discourse* Descartes takes the reader on a brief tour of his metaphysics and physics respectively. The picture of the self to emerge here is that of a thinking substance—the famous *cogito ergo sum*—I think, therefore I am. In order to arrive at this conception, however, Descartes feels it necessary to engage in his project of systematic doubt. Because our senses may sometimes deceive us, he goes on to draw the conclusion that “all the things that had ever entered my mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams.”⁶⁶ The only ground for certainty in a world where everything can be doubted is the experience of thinking itself. The fact that we cannot doubt that we think gives Descartes a platform from which to arrive at truth.

What, then, is the self behind this paranoid vision of a world in which nothing is certain and where everything appears as if in a dream? Descartes answers as follows:

I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this “I”—that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist.⁶⁷

This strange conception of the I “entirely distinct from the body” is joined with a materialistic physics of bodies in motion. It is here that Descartes references his earlier treatise on *The World* (*Le Monde*), written between 1629 and 1635 but only published posthumously in 1664. In this work of which he gives only the barest summary, Descartes sets out to rewrite the biblical account of creation in Genesis beginning with the problem of light. It was due, however, to the troubles encountered by Galileo that he decided to forego publication of the work and focus instead on the discussion of human creation.⁶⁸ The human world, we are told, consists of various “automa-

⁶⁶ AT 6:32; CSM 1:127.

⁶⁷ AT 6:33; CSM 1:127.

⁶⁸ Descartes expressed such alarm at the case of Galileo that he told Mersenne that he burned some of his papers and hid others for “I did not want to publish a discourse in which a single word could be found that the Church would have disapproved of; so I preferred to suppress it rather than to publish it in a mutilated form”; Letter to Mersenne, late November, 1633 (AT 1:271; CSM 3:41).

tons" and other mechanical bodies. Anticipating later debates over the possibility of artificial intelligence, Descartes even wonders whether there could ever be a human machine and how we could distinguish a robot from a person.⁶⁹

Whatever similarities there may be between a robot and a person, Descartes maintains that there are "two very certain means" for distinguishing between them. The first derives from the nature of language. Although we can imagine a machine that could make simple preprogrammed responses to particular situations, "it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as even the dumbest of men can do."⁷⁰ The second characteristic distinctive of human nature is reason that confers a latitude, an openness in our ability to act not open to any machine. Reason is a "universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations" that not even the best made machine can duplicate. It is "for all practical purposes impossible" that a robot could ever achieve the ability "to act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act."⁷¹

The question is, what is the connection between this thinking substance that is the mind and the extended substance that is the body? Descartes seems aware that he has provided an extremely awkward conception of a human being composed of an interior world of reason, feeling, and belief and an exterior world of bodies in motion. Having once affirmed the independence of the soul from the body, he now seems concerned to reunite them:

And I showed how it is not sufficient for it [the soul] to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship, except perhaps to move its limbs, but that it must be more closely joined and united with the body in order to have, besides the power of movements, feelings, and appetites like ours and so constitute a real man (*un vrai homme*).⁷²

Descartes's use of the term "a real man" in this passage is not just epistemological but ethical. He seems intent on putting the *vir* (to say nothing of the *vrai*) back in virtue. Virtue here implies notions of authenticity, individuality, and ethical agency. His conception of the self is that of a sovereign, autonomous, self-legislating agent. The

⁶⁹ AT 6:55–6; CSM 1:139.

⁷⁰ AT 6:56–7; CSM 1:140.

⁷¹ AT 6:57; CSM 1:140.

⁷² AT 6:59; CSM 1:141.

autonomy of reason is expressed not only in the realm of knowledge but in a new kind of moral idealism and cosmopolitanism found in Descartes's ethic of generosity and humanity. This is not an ethic for citizens, but for individuals of a particular kind, those whose very independence from all particular attachments to homeland and country makes it possible for them to consider the well-being of humanity as a whole. It is, above all, *humanité* that Descartes hopes to serve.

VII

The final section of the *Discourse* provides an intimation of Descartes's definitive ethic of generosity. Despite his professed aversion to publication, it is an ethic of humanitarianism that compels him to make his work public. "I believed I could not keep them secret without sinning gravely against the law which obliges us to do all in our power to secure the general welfare of mankind."⁷³ Descartes does not indicate the source of this law or tell why after three years of waiting he suddenly feels its force. He goes on, as Bacon before him, to distinguish the useful or philanthropic character of his philosophy from the purely "speculative philosophy" of the schools.

It is here where Descartes for the first time spells out the larger aim and purpose of his investigations:

Through this philosophy we could know the power and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens and all the other bodies in our environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans; and we could use this knowledge—as the artisans use theirs—for the purposes for which it is appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and possessors of nature.⁷⁴

The benefits of Descartes's science of mastery will be in the first instance "innumerable devices" that make possible increased comfort and convenience. But Cartesian science is concerned above all with matters of health ("undoubtedly the chief good and the foundation of all the other goods in this life"). He holds out the possibility that future advances in the science of medicine will indefinitely extend the scope of life:

All we know in medicine is almost nothing in comparison with what remains to be known, and that we might free ourselves from innumerable

⁷³ AT 6:61; CSM 1:142.

⁷⁴ AT 6:62; CSM 1:142–3.

diseases, both of the body and of the mind, and perhaps even from the infirmity of old age, if we had sufficient knowledge of their causes and of all the remedies that nature has provided.⁷⁵

Descartes's ethics is intended to enhance and secure health and material well-being, a task that will not be achieved in a day, but will require the cooperation and collaboration of generations of research scientists. He presents himself, modestly, as simply adding one block to the edifice of science: "By building upon the work of our predecessors and combining the lives and labors of many, we might make much greater progress working together than anyone could make on his own."⁷⁶

It has been common to treat Descartes's reference to the mastery and possession of nature as the harbinger of a completely administered technological society and other utopian visions of a rational social order. His hope that we may one day overcome "the infirmity of old age" has suggested to Leon Kass a dangerous attempt to transform the human condition not only through the indefinite prolongation of life but by impiously extending our biblically allotted three score year and ten.⁷⁷ Descartes appears to Joseph Cropsey like the biblical serpent, who holds out the possibility of a "philanthropic Eden" in which mankind will enjoy all things previously prohibited, including the fruit of the tree of knowledge.⁷⁸

The image of Descartes as a serpentine tempter is only a part of the story. Although Descartes, like Bacon, makes allusion to the practical benefits to be achieved by science, there is an important moral dimension to this project that is often overlooked by those bedazzled by his promise of material benefits alone. The *Discourse* makes repeated references to the public good and the spirit of generosity that underlies the new science. This is, again, not the ethic of a citizen tied to the good of one's own country but of a benefactor of humanity freed from all particular obligations and attachments. Descartes may have begun his work by enjoining obedience to "the laws and customs" of one's own country, but he ends by assuming the mantle of a spokesman for

⁷⁵ AT 6:62; CSM 1:143.

⁷⁶ AT 6:63; CSM 1:143.

⁷⁷ Leon Kass, "Mortality and Morality: The Virtues of Finitude," in *Toward a More Natural Science* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), 299–317.

⁷⁸ Joseph Cropsey, "On Descartes' 'Discourse on Method,'" in *Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 289.

humanity. His new ethic, like his new science, has as its object not just the technological but the moral mastery of human nature.

VIII

Descartes never wrote a single treatise spelling out the ethical implications of his promise to make us the "masters and possessors of nature" only briefly touched upon at the end of the *Discourse*. This phrase appears just once in his entire collected work, although it remains one of his most readily identifiable themes.⁷⁹ Despite Descartes's professed abhorrence of Machiavelli, there are strong Machiavellian overtones to his conception of mastery. His repudiation of Machiavelli is undertaken on grounds that are prepared by Machiavelli. His conception of *un vrai homme* suggests Machiavellian qualities of manliness and audacity. While in the *Prince* Machiavelli had suggested that it was possible for a prince to best *fortuna* at most half the time, Descartes implies that with the proper resoluteness of will, we may become entirely the masters of our own fate. His goal seems to be to overcome entirely the role of chance as a controlling factor in life. The Cartesian aspiration to autonomy and self-sufficiency is a fitting analogue to the Machiavellian politics of princely self-creation.⁸⁰

The ethic of mastery, only briefly suggested at the end of the *Discourse*, represents a prolegomenon to the finished or definitive ethic of generosity announced in Descartes's last published work, the *Passions of the Soul* (1649). Here Descartes addresses his readers not as an orator or a moralist but *en physicien*, that is, as a scientist or physiologist of the passions whose aim is to understand their causes and effects.⁸¹ This work fills out and completes the *morale par provision* of the *Discourse* by offering its own ethic based on a supposedly scientific or medical understanding of the passions. It is in the area of moral psychology that Descartes claims to depart most dramatically from the work of his predecessors:

The defects of the sciences we have from the ancients are nowhere more apparent than in their writings on the passions. . . . I cannot hope to approach the truth except by departing from the paths they have fol-

⁷⁹ The best treatment of this theme remains Richard Kennington, "Descartes and the Mastery of Nature," in *Organism, Medicine, and Metaphysics*, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), 201–23.

lowed. That is why I shall be obliged to write just as if I were considering a topic that no one had dealt with before me.⁸²

Although he does not mention the Stoics by name, it seems clear that theirs is the ancient doctrine to which he is referring. Rather than trying to repress the passions, the aim of the new science is to redirect them to nobler ends.

The new morality announced at the beginning of *Passions* is only brought to fruition at the end of the work which proposes *générosité* as the crown of the virtues ("the key to all the other virtues and a general remedy for every disorder of the passions").⁸³ Generosity, he tells the reader, consists of two parts. The first consists in the knowledge that nothing truly belongs to us but the freedom of volition, and that no one should be praised or blamed for anything but using the free will for good or ill. The second consists of "his feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it [the will] well—that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be

⁸⁰ The "Machiavellianism" of Descartes is a subject little discussed in the English language literature. The principal evidence is the letter to Elizabeth of September 1646 where he offers a commentary on the *Prince*, a work he deems "excellent" and a second letter of October/November 1646 where he refers to Machiavelli as the "Physician of Princes" and says that "I have recently read his discourse on Livy and found nothing bad (*mauvais*) in it" (AT 4:486, 531; CSM 3:292, 297). The fullest treatment of the subject is perhaps Mesnard's, *Essai sur la Morale de Descartes*, 190–212, that speaks of "le prétendu machiavélisme de Descartes." Polin, "Descartes et la Philosophie Politique," 394–5, stresses Descartes's anti-Machiavellianism and his indebtedness to the classical political theories of Plato and Aristotle. See also Richard Kennington, "René Descartes," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Joseph Cropsey and Leo Strauss (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 395–6; Bluhm, *Force or Freedom*, 33; Rodis-Lewis, *La Morale de Descartes*, 102–5. At several points Descartes excuses himself from offering political advice on the grounds that his private manner of life makes him an inappropriate guide to public responsibilities. See the letter to Elizabeth of May 1646: "I lead such a retired life, and have always been so far from the conduct of affairs, that I would be no less impudent than the philosopher who wished to lecture on the duties of a general in the presence of Hannibal if I took it on me to enumerate here the maxims one should observe in a life of public service" (AT 4:412; CSM 3:287–8).

⁸¹ AT 11:326; CSM 1:327.

⁸² AT 11:327–8; CSM 1:327.

⁸³ AT 11:454; CSM 1:388. For the role of generosity in Descartes's ethical thought, see Kennington, "Descartes," 406–8; Marshall, *Descartes's Moral Theory*, 148–66; Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, "Le dernier fruit de la métaphysique Cartésienne: La générosité," *Les études Philosophiques* 1 (1987): 43–54.

best." To undertake both of these capacities is "to pursue virtue in a perfect manner."⁸⁴

In adopting the term *générosité* Descartes was self-consciously appropriating an aristocratic ideal that had begun to make a reappearance in the second half of the seventeenth century in the dramas of Corneille such as *Horace* and *Le Cid*.⁸⁵ The use of the term, ironically, recalls an ideal that long preceded Descartes's final study of the physiology of the passions. The term itself recalls the exploits of heroes from the past (Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar), the very stuff of history and poetry that Descartes had ostensibly repudiated in the *Discourse*. The ideal of *l'homme généreux* is tied to the classical ideal of the gentleman, the Aristotelian *megalopsychos* or great-souled man who gets much because he deserves much. But Descartes also modifies the heroic ethic of *générosité de l'esprit* in important ways. The Cartesian ethic is less suited for achieving military and political purposes than for the private ends of self-mastery and control of the passions. He purposefully distinguishes his understanding of virtue from the Roman and scholastic concept of *magnanimitas*.⁸⁶ Unlike ancient virtue ethics, Descartes emphasizes that his is not an ethic for warriors and statesmen, but is intended to be far more egalitarian and inclusive in scope. It can be acquired by anyone with a sufficiently firm and resolute act of will.⁸⁷

Cartesian generosity suggests, then, an ethic of moral inwardness connected to the rational mastery of the passions and strength of will. It is preeminently a private struggle with the individual over himself. It is this mastery of the self that provides the true ground of moral autonomy and individual accountability that would later be given more notable expression by Kant. Thus generous persons never show contempt for others and attribute wrongdoing more to bad judgment than to bad will.⁸⁸ Generosity provides protection against feelings of disdain and inferiority. Generous persons never feel belittled, whatever disadvantages they may suffer in terms of wealth, honor, beauty, and intelligence. Rather, they feel a sense of confidence and self-assurance that comes from the knowledge that virtue is dependent on the

⁸⁴ AT 11:446; CSM 1:384.

⁸⁵ Ernst Cassirer, *Descartes, Corneille, Christine de Suède*, trans. Madeleine Francès and Paul Schrecker (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), 101–21.

⁸⁶ AT 11:453; CSM 1:388.

⁸⁷ Cassirer, *Descartes, Corneille, Christine de Suède*, 72–5; Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 153.

⁸⁸ AT 11:446; CSM 1:384.

will alone. What is more, generosity consists in power over the passions of hatred, fear, anger, and envy because such emotions show an unworthy dependence on the opinions of others.⁸⁹

The science of heroic self-mastery is, however, only half of the story. Cartesian generosity is not just a recipe for the control of the passions, but is harnessed to a powerful philanthropic vision that could be called the relief of man's estate. The ideal of generosity informs his interest in medicine and the higher mathematics as the branches of knowledge most capable of benefiting humanity. It combines elements of the heroic ideal of greatness of soul with the modern democratic passion to be of service to mankind. Generosity has a public dimension expressed in terms of large-scale actions undertaken for the sake of the public good:

Those who are generous in this way are naturally led to do great deeds, and at the same time not to undertake anything of which they do not feel themselves capable. And because they esteem nothing more highly than doing good to others and disregarding their own self-interest, they are always courteous, gracious, and obliging to everyone.⁹⁰

It is impossible to read these references to "great deeds" and "doing good to others" without thinking that this represents Descartes's final reflection on his chosen way of life. It is his answer to the search for an ethical vocation. Descartes's ethic of generosity is not simply an addendum to the *Discourse*. It is, as one of his principal biographers has put it, the "fruit of his metaphysics."⁹¹ No longer cautious and conservative, his ethic has become bold and assertive. He is the hero of his own story. Cartesian generosity is concerned not so much with the improvement of souls—it is not a form of Christian *caritas*—but with acts of public philanthropy and the worldly betterment of mankind.⁹² Descartes clearly regards himself as a benefactor of humanity and the scope of his benefactions as potentially universal and cosmopolitan. Generosity, understood as the duty to help mankind, is the moral core of Descartes's scientific project.

⁸⁹ AT 11:448; CSM 1:385.

⁹⁰ AT 11:447–8; CSM 1:385.

⁹¹ Rodis-Lewis, "La générosité," 43–54.

⁹² On the differences between Christian charity and Cartesian generosity, see Rodis-Lewis, *La morale de Descartes*, 95–7.

IX

"Descartes has long been celebrated as 'the founder of modern philosophy,' but never of modern political philosophy," Richard Kennington has written.⁸³ Descartes may have been the least directly political of all the great philosophers, but this has not prevented readers of his work from associating his name with a host of modern ideologies and social movements, from democracy to technology to patriarchy. He or his influence has been castigated by critics as the cause of a range of modern ills and pathologies. For some, he has been alleged to stand at the beginning of a peculiarly rootless, deracinated conception of the self said to be characteristic of modern liberal political philosophy; for others, his subjectivism is thought to be responsible for a hubristic attitude toward nature and the desire to extend a kind of technological domination of the earth; while for others still, his ethic of generosity is seen to portend a syrupy morality of compassion and humanitarianism.

In this paper I have tried to show that the *Discourse on Method* is not just an epistemological or methodological introduction to the modern sciences, as it has been taken by most readers. Nor is it simply a "postskeptical" response to the crisis engendered by sixteenth-century Pyrrhonism.⁸⁴ Descartes's concerns were as much moral as epistemological. The fact that he refers to morality as "the ultimate level of wisdom" suggests that he regarded his scientific endeavors as in the service of a moral and political teaching. The *Discourse* is an ethical autobiography concerned, above all, with the question of how one ought to live one's life. It offers a powerful exemplary vision that grew out its author's highly personal, even existential, search for a vocation or plan of life. The *Discourse* is less a scientific work than a novel of self-discovery, part of the Renaissance literature of exemplarity that puts the creation of the self at the center of the text.

Descartes may not have written a political philosophy, but he understood his philosophy in political terms. Along with Machiavelli, Montaigne, Hobbes, and Spinoza, Descartes helped to provide a sense of idealism and high moral purpose that went together with their constructivist images of politics and the state as the creation of free human will and choice. The aim of this ethic is misunderstood if we read it as concerned only with the technological mastery of external

⁸³ Kennington, "Descartes," 395.

⁸⁴ Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*, 285.

nature. Descartes is as much, if not more, concerned with the ethical mastery of our inner life as with control over the environment. His emphasis on qualities such as firmness and resoluteness of will speaks to the power of the individual to take control over fortune or providence and accept responsibility for his own actions. As much as anything, his work is a tribute to the autonomy and dignity of the individual. Generosity, the virtue that the ancients termed *megalopsychia*, is addressed to strong or great souls who carry something of an aristocratic code of honor into the beginnings of bourgeois modernity.⁹⁶

Most importantly, the vocation of Descartes is connected to his plan for the improvement of humanity. This improvement is intended for societies that are open to the possibility of science and hence of public enlightenment. Amsterdam was Descartes's model for such a regime, but he clearly intended his method to have broader cosmopolitan purposes. It would be almost exactly two centuries later that Tocqueville would declare America to be the first truly Cartesian nation. Conditions of social equality and the absence of a hereditary aristocracy made it the ideal climate for the acceptance of Cartesian principles despite the fact that there were very few readers of Descartes. "There is no country in the civilized world," he writes, "where they are less occupied with philosophy than in the United States."⁹⁶ Yet so well were Descartes's lessons learned, by osmosis as it were, that in the time separating the publication of the *Discourse* from Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, the influence of the teacher had been almost completely erased. "America is the one country in the world where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best followed." "That," he adds, "should not be surprising."⁹⁷

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⁹⁶ This aristocratic code can be seen also in Spinoza, *Ethics*, bk. 3, prop. 59s: "All actions that follow from affects related to the Mind insofar as it understands I relate to strength of character (*fortitudo*), which I divide into tenacity (*animositas*) and nobility (*generositas*)." See *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, trans. and ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 529. See also Steven B. Smith, *Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the 'Ethics'* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

⁹⁶ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 403.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

AQUINAS, St. Thomas. *On Evil*. Edited by Brian Davies, and translated by Richard Regan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xviii + 535 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$24.95; AQUINAS, St. Thomas. *On Evil*. Translated by John A. Oesterle and Jean T. Oesterle. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. xxii + 547 pp. Paper (2001), \$28.00—The *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* are a neglected masterpiece. Composed around 1270, these sixteen questions show Thomas Aquinas at his very best, arguing in careful and extended detail for a wide range of theses surrounding the ethical questions that he cared so deeply about. As the title suggests, the questions are all clustered around the nature of the bad (*malum*), particularly moral badness. To my mind, the *De malo* is Aquinas's finest work in moral philosophy.

After an initial, highly difficult question (q. 1) on the metaphysics of the bad (it is, in short, a privation), Aquinas turns his attention to bad action (*peccatum*), and then very quickly turns to focus on the sort of bad actions most relevant to theology: voluntary bad action (*culpa*). At this point we are squarely in the moral domain, and so we might as well speak (as both translations do) of bad actions as *sins*. In question 2, Aquinas takes up questions regarding the character of sin, assessing the way in which intentions, actions, objects, and circumstances contribute to the moral status of an action, and exploring questions about omissions and neutral actions. (He covers similar ground in *Summa theologiae* I-II, qq. 18–20, but the discussion here in *De malo* is much more clear and expansive, offering many illuminating examples.) In question 3, he takes up the causes of sin, distinguishing among temptation, ignorance, weakness, and malice. Questions 4–5 turn to original sin; question 6 contains his most extensive and sophisticated treatment of free will; question 7 discusses venial sins (a more philosophically interesting topic than one might suppose); questions 8–15 discuss the seven deadly sins (or “capital sins,” as he calls them); finally, question 16 rounds out the volume with a fascinating discussion of the psychology of devils, and their relationship to us.

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

Ten years ago, there were no published English translations of the *De malo*; now, suddenly, we have two. The main thing to report about these two volumes is that, unsurprisingly, each is perfectly solid and dependable, but neither is ideal. Regan's volume has the immediate advantage of Oxford's elegant design and typesetting, which in comparison makes the efforts of Notre Dame appear even clumsier than usual. But if one manages to get past the appearances, one finds that each volume has its advantages. For instance, although both volumes are based on the 1982 Leonine edition, Jean Oesterle has gone to the trouble of translating the Leonine source apparatus word-for-word, while Regan has supplied only the basic references. Although I myself would have followed Regan's approach, assuming that readers interested in the fine scholarly details would have the Leonine edition in front of them anyway, there will no doubt be some who are glad to have Oesterle's more detailed notes. The Oesterles further supply a very detailed appendix of English translations for all the sources that are cited. Regan does not give us that, but he does supply a brief biography for each of Aquinas's many sources, as well as an index, a glossary of terms, and a fairly extensive bibliography (all lacking in the Oesterle volume). Moreover, Regan has the very good fortune of being able to include a 53-page introduction by his colleague Brian Davies. John Oesterle's introduction, in contrast, is best skipped, not least because its information about the dating of the *De malo* is badly obsolete.

As for the translations themselves, they are generally quite reliable. A close reading of several dozen pages from each volume against the Latin turned up only a handful of outright mistranslations. The Oesterle volume seemed to have somewhat fewer of the slips and omissions that plague all translations, but these were few enough even in the Regan volume. The Oesterle volume, however, has the annoying habit of occasionally inserting explanatory phrases into the text without marking them as editorial insertions. Moreover, the Oesterles seem to have only a dim sense of where Latin stops and English begins. Their version contains the rather amusing claim, for instance, that "Sin consists in affection (*affectu*)," and speaks of "deordination (*inordinatio*) in the flesh" and "opinionable matters" (*opinabilia*)—all within question 3, article 3. Regan, in contrast, gives us "sin consists of desire," "disorder in the flesh," and "probable things." But Regan's translation is not always superior. For instance, the long series of initial objections often note and then reply to preliminary responses, using the phrase, "Sed dicebat quod . . . Sed contra . . ." (for example, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 6–7). Regan renders this as, "People have said . . . But . . ."—which entirely obscures what is happening. The Oesterles get this right with the phrases, "But it was argued . . . But counter to this . . ."

What tips the scale toward the Regan volume is the notably superior quality of its prose. Whereas the Oesterles tend to follow Aquinas's word order quite closely, Regan takes great pains to produce something that sounds like English. (This is his best feature as a translator.) Consider this passage from question 3, article 1, corpus:

Peccatum enim communiter dictum secundum quod in rebus naturalibus et artificialibus invenitur, ex eo provenit quod aliquis in agendo non

attingit ad finem propter quem agit. Quod contingit ex defectu activi principii; sicut si grammaticus non recte scribat, contingit ex defectu artis, si tamen recte scribere intendit; et quod natura peccat in formatione animalis, sicut contingit in partibus monstruosis, contingit ex defectu activae virtutis in semine.

Here are the Oesterles:

For sin commonly so called as it is found in the things of nature and of art arises from this that someone in acting does not attain the end for which he acts. Which occurs from a defect of the active principle; for example, if a grammarian writes incorrectly, it happens from a deficiency of the art, at least if he intended to write correctly; and that nature sins, that is, fails in the formation of an animal, as occurs in the birth of monstrosities, happens from a defect in the active power of the seed.

The problem with this translation is not that the Oesterles have a poor grasp of Latin, but that they have a poor grasp of English. Regan does much better:

For sin in the general sense, as found in things of nature and artifacts, comes about because persons' actions do not attain the ends as they intend. And this happens because of a deficiency in the causal source. For example, a grammarian's poor composition, if he intends to write well, comes about because of his deficient skill. And nature's sin in forming animals, as happens in the birth of monsters, comes about because of the deficient causal power of semen.

It should be noted that both translations obscure the meaning of the passage by translating *peccatum* as sin, when in this context it has the general meaning of *defective action*. There is perhaps no good solution to that problem in English, other than to supply a note—but neither translation provides clarifying footnotes of this sort (and Regan's glossary oddly omits "sin"). The Oesterles' strategy of adding the phrase "that is, fails" is surely an unhappy solution.

Ultimately, both translations are quite serviceable in most respects. What a close comparison of the two reveals, more than anything, is just how important it is to read Aquinas in the original Latin.—Robert Pasnau, *University of Colorado*.

BARACCHI, Claudia. *Of Myth, Life, and War in Plato's Republic*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002. ix + 249 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$24.95.—This is the feast promised by Baracchi's contribution to Russon and Sallis, *Retracing the Platonic Text* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000). Again, she whets our appetite for more. Her

work is not exegesis but a beautifully playful provocative reading of the *Republic* that brings to mind Rorty's celebration of deconstruction: "This playfulness is the . . . ability to appreciate the power of redescribing—the power of language to make new and different things possible and important— . . . which becomes possible only when one's aim becomes an expanding repertoire of alternative descriptions rather than The One Right description" (*Contingency Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39–40). Whatever your judgment of her likely success in taking this approach to the *Republic*, Baracchi shows it is a worthy project.

She presents Plato as alarmed by the mimetic potency of his mythic text, and driven to apologize for it, but without recanting either the text or the apology. He apologizes for the perils of text as he regenerates it. She invites us to listen with premodern ears to the *Republic's* text through its echos in her postmodern sensibility.

Baracchi is, of course, selective in her listening. Plato's good (too reminiscent of "The One Right" thing perhaps) is acknowledged early in the book, but (true to Plato himself?) it remains outside her direct attention until the end where she "can hardly avoid mentioning" it. But it remains too distractingly peripheral to her project. She might have reduced the distraction a little without compromising her approach if she had more fully taken Aristotle's lead on *mythos* and the good by treating *mythos* as the measure or "plot" that "more or less" integrates the Platonic/Heraclitean motion it accommodates.

Generation is where she begins and ends her study, divided into two movements. The first redescribes Socrates' dramatic descent to the Piraeus and his enforced confinement there which, in Baracchi's telling, introduces the *Republic* both as art and as "war," as an actual field of animating political conflict and (re)generation.

The four themes of the second movement play out on the field where Er fights, dies, and is reborn. It reenacts the vital battle between poetic production and generation, the plot that poetry hides in the shadows of whatever its constructions reveal. The reversal is presented as an "apology," Socrates' name for an account, including his myth, that struggles to speak the truth.

The first theme is *mimesis*. All tokens—words, children, even Socrates' own story—conceal their origins. But Baracchi insists that *mimesis* is at work not only in the work of art but in the artistic working, the "comportment," of the artist. That comportment is explored through the second theme, "war" as the ultimate test of the truth of any imitation.

The final two themes, "Vision" and "Rebirth," explore Er's battlefield as a place of self-reflecting iteration. She portrays myth as more than a re-enactment or transposition. "It shows the law of movement . . . the source and bestowal of order are revealed . . . in a broader . . . polyphony" (Baracchi's emphasis). But that is where she seems content to leave the matter: at the intersection of the two key questions about the good that we have been asking since Plato: first, "how that which would . . . defy showing, imaging, . . . imitation . . . can be shown"; and second,

"whether such law, and the unity it grants, could be said otherwise than mythically . . . could be said at all and not, at most, shown or sung" (p.189).

Plato does not leave it there. "Showing" is not the task assigned the messenger/philosopher, as Socrates demonstrates in his choices, both of companions and of death. The philosopher's choices of what and how to show and sing are themselves subject to "*the law* of movement." Plato's philosopher ends showy texts and draws idle talking to its proper close in dialectically chosen acts. Plato's philosopher is not a "show-and-tell artist," but an escape artist who, by disappearing, reveals and occasions (re)birth to whatever "Necessity" (p. 189) originated the philosopher's image and its movements. This is the plot Plato invites us to share, as Baracchi concludes (p. 203). But this is not a matter of showing. It is sung as Heraclitus' singers follow and lead each other in the song to which they all wisely listen in order to be attuned and harmonized (fragment 50).

Claudia Baracchi's book is an important step forward in reshaping how contemporary philosophy takes account of its origins and project. It is not an easy read but, like any really good book, it demands and rewards rereading. It sharpens philosophical attention and practice.—John A. Scott, *Memorial University, Newfoundland*.

BENNETT, Jonathan. *Learning From Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume*, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Cloth, \$45.00—Claiming to learn something from a philosopher can be fraught with difficulty. I may dispute your claim that Descartes taught you the tenability of voluntarism because I dispute the tenability of Descartes's voluntarism: I just don't think it is there to be learned. The idea of learning from a philosopher becomes even more charged given that what one learns is in some sense relative to what one already holds true. What Jonathan Bennett learns (or claims is to be learned) from Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and from the empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, is often relative to his functionalist leanings (on certain subjects, at least). Obviously, if functionalism is the standard of truth by which learning is judged, nonfunctionalists may well not buy those lessons. As for Jonathan Bennett's brand of history of philosophy, he agrees with Robert Sleigh that it "is not necessary to study the history of a philosophical problem in order to make a fundamental contribution toward the understanding, perhaps even the solution, of that problem" (vol. 1, p. 3). He and Sleigh may be right, though this does not mean that one's understanding of a problem is not altered by knowledge of its history, or that a contribution or solution to it would not be different if conditioned by such knowledge. Bluntly put, built into philosophical ideas are further ideas reflecting the times and constituting part of the issue in question; so while in the process of bending an idea one need not expose its historical fibers, those fibers are there for consideration as part

and parcel of philosophical analysis generally. It is not clear, however, that Bennett fully accepts this point about the historical nature of ideas, for in his recommendation that "[e]arly modern studies would be healthier, more muscular, if every practitioner also sometimes did work that was purely philosophical and in no way historical" (vol. 1, p. 2) is a distinction between muscle-building "pure philosophy" and history of philosophy. Clearly he rejects the idea that early modernists can get fit for their subject at home rather than in the "pure philosophy" gym.

Mostly what Bennett learns from these six philosophers is not their positive doctrines. Rather, his learning takes the form of reconstruction and analysis of what he deems to be otherwise incorrect views. A good example is found in his treatment of Berkeley's attack on the conceptual defects of materialism. On Bennett's analysis Berkeley's case rests on a flawed theory of representation, but Bennett sticks with Berkeley nonetheless. We see the same kind of learning in his excellent chapter 29 on the reasons behind Berkeley's mistaken reading of Locke, as well as in his discussion of the nature of and reasons for phenomenalism in Berkeley's work. Incidentally, many scholars will take exception to Bennett's (to my mind strained) argument that Berkeley's assurances that idealism squares with commonsense materialism are merely rhetorical. Throughout his study Bennett readily and generously acknowledges debts for insights he has received from other interpreters of these six great philosophers, insights which often cause him to revise or recant some of his own earlier views. For instance, a big climbdown is found in his assessment that the doctrine of tropes, which he once dismissed as nonsense but now accepts, does not bear negatively upon the notion of bodies as modes in Spinoza's monist philosophy. Again, Bennett revises his earlier views on Locke's two-faced attitude toward substance, as something both indispensable and "intellectually disgraceful," and shows it to be a case of "genius in a bind."

Bennett considers most of the main areas of early modern epistemology and metaphysics: the nature of knowledge, truth, modality, belief, ideas, images, sensation, abstraction; the nature of substance, mind, identity, matter, space, time, and causation. A few points of note for this reviewer were Bennett's discussion of the Cartesian view of space; the seriousness with which he regards defenses of Descartes against the charge of circularity in the *Meditations*; and especially the sustained focus on the theories of substance and identity, particularly as they appear in the writings of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. Students of Spinoza's philosophy will be interested in Bennett's (to my mind convincing) replies to the doyen of Spinoza studies, Edwin Curley, on the question of motion in Spinoza's philosophy. The analysis of Spinoza's treatment of teleology is of interest, as is the argument that Spinoza is an attribute-dualist. In my view Bennett is most incisive in his explanation of Spinoza's parallelism.

Obviously, however, a work of this breadth is bound to ignite debate. Two of the arguments that caught my attention concern respectively, Descartes's voluntarism and Galen Strawson's 1989 attempt to mitigate Hume's skepticism about causation. Drawing from an earlier (1994) paper on Descartes's voluntarism, Bennett claims that Descartes's big insight is that "a proposition's modal status is not a monadic property, but

rather a relation that it has to human intellectual capacities" (vol. 2, p. 62). However, this seems to miss the point, essential to Descartes's voluntaristic refusal to place limits on what is possible or impossible absolutely speaking, that human intellectual faculties are themselves constructed through and thus relative to the will of God. This means that far from the "philosophical core of the doctrine [having] nothing to do with God" (vol. 2, p. 62), it has everything to do with God. As for Bennett's treatment of Strawson's mitigated Humean skepticism, he convincingly demonstrates that Strawson fails "to learn from Hume the best things that he [that is, Hume] has to teach" (vol. 2, p. 281). His analysis goes awry, however, when he attempts to recast the Humean texts that really do support Strawson's interpretation. Where Strawson has legitimate grounds for seeing Hume as referring to "unknowable causes lying deeper than any regularities," that is, metaphysical entities, Bennett reads Hume simply as demanding "deeper physics." But this seems to forget the very antimetaphysical lesson of Hume's analysis that Bennett claims to learn, namely, that there is no such thing as "deeper" physics: we only ever operate at the surface level of things where all physics ever amounts to is the identification of ever widening regularities.

From whom among these six great philosophers has Bennett learned the most? It is difficult to say, since the central doctrines of all six of the philosophers in question provide grist for his philosophy mill. Still, I would guess that Hume has taught him the most. No less than others is Hume subject to Bennett's critical dissection, but much more than others does he provide Bennett with insights into issues of current concern. In one sense this should not surprise, since by most accounts Hume is the father of modern analytic philosophy. On this latter score Bennett carefully sets the record straight about why Hume occupies this hallowed position (vol. 2, p. 244). By his practice throughout this study Bennett makes a strong case for the contemporary relevance of the six great philosophers from whom he has learned. You too will learn much from the philosophers treated in this study, and from Bennett himself.—David Scott, *University of Victoria*.

BLANCHETTE, Oliva. *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003. xxiii + 563 pp. Cloth, \$59.95; paper, \$39.95—Taking Heidegger seriously can nevertheless mean coming to the conclusion that Heidegger was a dead end for metaphysics. Like a driver who has tried valiantly to follow what seems to be a promising road but who must eventually give up on trying to get anywhere by that route and start again differently, Blanchette has made his decision.

Having declared that metaphysics had come to its demise in the technologized sciences, Heidegger tried a new way to reopen the question of being. For Blanchette, that Heidegger never got beyond the analysis of

Dasein to such an ambitious project is not merely the result of the distractions of other career requirements at the university or of other entanglements along his life's path. The problem was that the road he took was a road to nowhere, metaphysically speaking.

What the present volume offers is not only a serious critique of Heidegger's project of deconstructing metaphysics, and of Kant's before him, but (as the subtitle suggests) a systematic essay in metaphysics itself. Blanchette argues for a Thomistically inspired metaphysics as a science of being as being. He does so not as a historical account, for instance by using the texts of Aquinas, but (with appropriate historical engagement) by working topically according to the demands of the subject. The opening chapters on the proper subject matter of this science and on the method proper to such a comprehensive project recount with great sophistication the junctions where much of modern philosophy lost track of the quest for being as being and tried to make ontology just one more particularized discipline among others. The section on how Suarez in particular erred and set the stage for Kant is especially telling. Having been trained in Transcendental Thomism, Blanchette shows forcefully what its attractions are, yet moves determinedly back to the project of metaphysics as traditionally conceived in Thomism, the quest for being as being. He refuses to settle for any surrogates, such as a phenomenological account of the conditions of the possibility of awareness of being as an object of consciousness, important as these concerns are for other purposes.

Reflecting on the meaning of being, Blanchette argues that it is something that we can only approach analogically and never by a univocal concept, as if it were something we could abstract and express conceptually in terms of one of the categories. After clarifying what it is that he thinks to be inadequate in principle about categorical thinking for the effort to understand being as being (with an occasional jab at Heidegger's medieval source, Duns Scotus), Blanchette enters into the heart of this book by doing metaphysics through the transcendental properties of being. These considerations are essential, he thinks, to prevent the inquirer from being locked into essentialism, whether of the analytic or phenomenological variety. His chapters on being as one, as true, and as good are substantial and traditional. More surprising is the presence of chapters on "being as active" and "being as universe," as is the absence of a chapter on "being as beautiful" (for which omission he offers only a brief and inadequate defense). "Being as active" refers, of course, to the self-disclosure that marks every being as being (still true even of the most shy and recalcitrant about self-disclosure). "Being as universe" (thankfully) is not some new transcendental property, but a way to express the unity of being in its diversity. Perhaps because Blanchette has already written on the topic of the perfection of the universe elsewhere, this section is disappointingly brief. The initially astonishing claim that human being is at the center of the universe turns out (again, thankfully) not to mean that humans are at the zenith of being or count as the norm of truth and goodness, but only that we stand at a crucial point of juncture, the first level of being able to reflect metaphysically and survey all that is below, even while remaining mindful of what is infinitely above.

The lengthy sections on the structures of being (on such topics as form and matter), the communication of being (on causality and the question of the one and the many), and the summit of being (on divine transcendence) carry this reconstructive project in metaphysics to completion. The chapter on substance as "being-in-itself in becoming," for example, handles well the many questions raised by process thought and field theory. The chapter on "substantial form as principle of determination" brings to mind the crucial importance of form as the principle for the limitation of matter's potency that has been so important to the development of twentieth-century Thomism's Platonic side and the recovery of a strong sense of the doctrine of participation by thinkers like Geiger and Fabro.

This reviewer found himself wishing that the section on divine transcendence were not quite so apophatic, given all that he accomplishes in this book. But clearly Blanchette has skirted the dead end that blocked Heidegger. The journey he takes instead is long, but the destination is highly worthy. We can be glad that he was driving.—Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., *Fordham University*.

BRANCACCI, Aldo, editor. *Antichi e moderni nella filosofia di età imperiale: Atti del II colloquio internazionale, Roma, 21–23 settembre 2000*. Elenchos, vol. 34. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2001. 390 pp. Paper, €35.00—This volume contains the proceedings of a conference held in Rome, on September 21–23, 2000, which was the sequel to a first conference, also in Rome, on June 17–19, 1999. The objective of both conferences, which were sponsored by the Italian Research Council and the University of Rome Tor Vergata, was to offer a comprehensive view of the currents of philosophical thought that cross the Imperial age, which began with the rise of Octavianus Augustus and ended with the fall of the Roman Empire. While the first conference was dedicated to the recognition of the philosophical schools and traditions, the second one delves into the philosophical, historiographical, and exegetical relationships of continuity or discontinuities (sometimes even breaches) among Imperial, Hellenistic, and eventually going backward to Classical philosophy.

One can say, then, that Imperial philosophers look at themselves in the same way that we (referring to a question formulated by Humanist scholars, and first and foremost by Francesco Petrarca) call "modern," when they study the "ancients," from which they depend and from which they come from. In fact, beginning with the first century A.D. the followers of long-standing philosophical traditions start feeling the novelty, and thus the modernity, of the issues that were raised by their own age. Of course, traditions of Hellenistic philosophy such as cynicism, stoicism, skepticism, and empirical medicine continue to flourish during the Imperial Age, while keeping a strong tie with their philosophical heritage. Most remarkable is the great season of Neoplatonism, which notwithstanding its roots lying beyond Hellenistic philosophy, namely in

Classical philosophy, marks an epochal breach in the history of thought. The volume begins with a contribution on doxography by Jaap Mansfeld who wrote on Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and Thales and his followers "On Causes" as related by Psuedo-Plutarchus and Stobaeus (pp. 17–68). Two papers on cynicism and stoicism follow by Aldo Brancacci on Oenomaus of Gadara (pp. 71–110) and Francesca Alesse on Marcus Aurelius (pp. 111–34). Plotinus commanded the attention of the conference participants for a full day: Daniela Taormina spoke on Plotinus' reading of Plato's early dialogues (pp. 137–96), Margherita Isnardi Parente on his reading of Plato's *Letters* (pp. 197–211), and Alessandro Linguiti on the happiness of the non-descended soul (pp. 213–36). Aristotelianism was considered in a paper by Mario Mignucci on Alexander of Aphrodisias's interpretation of Aristotle's modal logic (pp. 239–63). Finally, empirical medicine and skepticism were the focus of Lorenzo Perilli's paper on Menodotus of Nicomedia's collation of the principles of empirical medicine (pp. 267–97) and of Carlos Lévy's paper on the issue of the historical legitimacy of skepticism, namely on the way Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus looked at Pyrrho (pp. 299–329). All contributors wrote in Italian, with the exception of Mansfeld, who wrote in English, and of Levy, who wrote in French. Quite commendable are the extensive, very up-to-date bibliography (pp. 331–51), and the list of the passages referred to together with the index of names (pp. 355–90).—Riccardo Pozzo, *The University of Verona*.

CALTON, Patricia Marie. *Hegel's Metaphysics of God: the Ontological Proof of a Trinitarian Divine Ontology*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. vii + 131 pp. Cloth, \$59.95—In recent years the dominant interpretation has seen Hegel as essentially continuing Kant's critical project. There has been a concerted effort to shift the debate from understanding Hegel as essentially concerned with a grand metaphysical project in which Spirit, conceived as a monistic god, comes to knowledge of itself through the reflective practices of self-conscious subjects. At the core of this revised reading of Hegel, which is inadequately described as nonmetaphysical, is the rejection of the idea of any notion of the given. While this book makes no effort at all to situate itself in relation to these central debates in German idealism, it can be understood, in contrast to the most important scholarship in the last twenty-five years, as essentially presenting Hegel as a pre-Kantian metaphysician. In Calton's reading of Hegel the central question he confronts is the quest to discover the eternal truth of god. What philosophy brings to this quest is "to develop a scientific cognition of this truth" (p. 2).

The argument of the book develops through four chapters, all of which are heavily reliant on Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. There is little engagement with Hegel's systematic works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*. Instead, Hegel's thought of god and religion is determined almost entirely by his lectures on reli-

gion, and the argument is largely constructed through a detailed use of quotations from these lectures. The first chapter is concerned to position Hegel in relation to the traditional defenses (Anselm) and critiques (Kant) of the ontological proof of god's existence. Calton argues that Hegel agrees with many of Kant's criticisms of the ontological proof, though he transforms them to give his own critique of Anselm's ontological proof, all of which is leading to his own formulation of the ontological proof, which is outlined in chapter 2. The form that this proof takes is the development of "a self-grounding concept of god" (p. 35), which would demonstrate that being is necessarily entailed by the concept of god. What distinguishes Hegel's ontological proof from earlier attempts is the development of an objective concept of god. The concept of an objective god entails being as our knowledge of the world is in fact knowledge of a "creative and self-communicating mind of which the world is an expression" (p. 57). Being is a type of consciousness writ large of which we have experience and knowledge because we are participants in it. The next two chapters illustrate the nature of that participation. In the third chapter Calton argues that this ontology shows itself to have a Trinitarian structure, as only such a structure allows for knowledge of god, a knowledge which god's self-expression requires. The fourth chapter discusses various forms of community required for such a knowledge and the developmental stages of human history required for this knowledge and ultimately for the reconciliation of humans with god.

The book gives a good summary of many of the theological issues and problems that emerge in the wake of the Enlightenment. There is no doubt that Hegel did engage with these debates, and his various lectures on the philosophy of religion are where his view of the development of various notions of god and religion is expressed, but this does not make Hegel a metaphysician of the type presented in this book, nor can we say that he has a metaphysics of god. There is no doubt that the concept of god in Hegel's case involves some sense of being; this is completely consistent with what his project sets out to achieve: collapsing the central dualisms in the philosophical tradition (one of the ways the spirit of the critical philosophy was to continue), but that does not mean a metaphysics of god somehow underlies his project. Religion, along with art, science, and philosophy, is one of the ways in which cultures have traditionally thought about their relation among themselves and the world and each other. It is true that Hegel thought the Enlightenment, in its quest to throw everything under the eye of reason, ignored much of the richness and subtlety that religion could bring to human self-understanding. Nevertheless, Hegel's examination of god has to be understood as just one of the ways, admittedly a very sophisticated one, in which our thinking about ourselves and the world develops. If this view of Hegel's account of religion is to be contested—and this book most certainly does contest it—then a strong argument has to be made to show his thought does not simply see religion as an inadequate form of self-understanding, which seems to me to be the clear conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—but there is no such justification in this work. However, perhaps the more important question to be asked is

that even if we assumed that Calton's view of Hegel is correct, that Hegel does have a metaphysics of god, in which we are part of a creative and self-expressive mind, is such a fixed theological-metaphysical view worthy of any serious reconsideration? Because there is no attempt to position his view of god and religion in relation to Hegel's systematic thought and to argue for the importance of this against current interpretations, this book, while it gives a great many accounts of Hegel's engagement with historical problems in the philosophy of religion, remains unconvincing.—Simon Lumsden, *University of Sydney*.

CASEY, Edward. *Representing Place: Landscape Painting and Maps*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. xx + 366 pp. Cloth, \$82.95; paper \$29.95—Over the last decade Edward Casey has produced a series of books which trace the meaning and fortune of place in the history of thought, in the world, and in our lives. *Representing Place* is the latest and most visually oriented of these contributions (the first two were *Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World*, Indiana University Press, 1993, and *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, University of California Press, 1997). All three works follow the significance and career of "place" as over against (the closely related) "space," "site," and "location," ideas which gain in precision where they lose in richness, fullness, and embodiment when disconnected from place. *Representing Place*, true to its title, explores how landscape paintings and maps allow place, as it were, to express its rootedness in life and the body through taking on representation for those who live in it.

The book has three main parts. Part 1, "Painting the Land" (chapters 1–6), opens by considering the emergence of landscape painting in the West from decorative pictures ("landskips") and then displays the possibilities for the sublime which were opened up when landscape painting *per se* had finally emerged. The painters who receive the most detailed discussion are Fitz Hugh Lane (chapter 2), Thomas Cole (chapter 4), and John Constable (chapter 5). Casey notes that the recent appearance of landscape painting in Western culture is a local phenomenon, and accordingly ends part 1 with a comparatively brief—but necessary and illuminating—treatment of Northern Sung landscape works from the tenth to twelfth centuries A.D. (chapter 6). The main philosophical concern of part 1 is to make clear what it is that representations of landscapes do (how they transpose and transform, but also respect and communicate place), and how the task of relocating the all-encompassing landscape in a restricted representational space navigates among the decorative, the painterly, and the topographic.

After an excursus on the material conditions of representing landscapes (the ways in which the exhibition space, the canvas, and the frame all directly restrict or empower the capacities of the landscape painting), part 2, "Mapping the Land" (chapters 7–11), considers how maps represent the land and the sea in their own way, a balancing act

between cartography (the geometric or isometric transference of spatial relations onto a plane) and chorography (involving what might be termed more realistic pictures, depictions which capture the quality or experience of a place, including the aggressively three-dimensional topography of mountains, hills, and valleys). These two were kept apart in the great American land-surveys for the cartographic dominion of the United States (chapter 11), where the attempt was made to capture geographic truth in a perfectly flat, rigid grid (the plane was bound to collide not only with the peaks of the western mountains but also with the sphere of the earth in a land as large as United States, though Casey's account of the great land-surveys focuses on topography). That this parting of ways is not necessary, and indeed that cartography and chorography can be united in fruitful ways, is the main thrust of part 2, given vivid support through the cases of portolan maps, that is, charts for navigating the coastline which were knitted together from oral reports of trips from port to port (chapter 9) and the gridded maps of ancient China, which came to their apogee long before the Cartesian grid, when European map-making was still plotting theological relations (chapter 10). This is, of course, a cartographic precedent in the East which parallels China's precedence over the West in landscape painting—as Casey puts it, though “Phei Hsui [is] often considered the ‘Ptolemy of Chinese cartography’ . . . perhaps we should say rather that Ptolemy was ‘the Phei Hsui of Greek cartography’” (p. 200).

Part 3, “Re-Implacement in Mapping and Painting” (chapter 12), makes a final synthesis, looking at cases of convergence between landscape painting and map-making, two fields generally kept separate in the earlier discussion. The epilogue draws out the mutual relations among geography, history, cartography, landscape, and, of course, place.

The lavish illustrations in *Representing Place* admittedly make it difficult to stop browsing and start reading. An especially striking full-color plate (plate 12) shows a seventeenth-century painting, *View of Amsterdam*, by Jan Christaenszoon Micker, which, due to the shadows of clouds depicted falling across the city of Amsterdam from far above, seems to have been painted from an airplane window. Once one does begin to read, one is treated to exuberant (and occasionally poetic) philosophical writing in which one feels throughout Casey's joy and excitement in exploring the many inlets along the coast which even the restricted focus of his book provides. Though the book abounds in artistic and cartographic oddities, it cannot be reduced to a cabinet of curiosities, and Casey does not indulge in speculating on what philosophical ideas painted images could be said to symbolize—instead, his concern is always to reveal what it is that paintings and maps are doing when they represent place. The fact that his discussion always returns to particular cases makes it an especially well-grounded one. It is difficult, if not impossible, to summarize his explorations in a short review precisely because of their special attention to complexity and specificity. *Representing Place* provides an engaging panoramic view of landscape painting and the lay of the land in maps—not the panoramic view of the bird's eye far above, however, but the detailed and immersing panorama that

slowly unrolls as we travel down the curves of a river with an experienced helmsman.—C. E. Emmer, *Miami University, Oxford, Ohio*.

CHALIER, Catherine. *What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas*. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 208 pp. Cloth, \$45.00; paper, \$17.95—Chalier's stated goal is to show, against various contemporary tendencies of thought, that a philosophy of the subject is possible and necessary if we are to retain ideas of good, evil, freedom, and responsibility in a modern context. Her models for such an approach are Kant and Levinas, philosophers of the subject united by their "critique of intellectualism" and their efforts to conceive of "a moral obligation beyond any possible theoretical knowledge" (hence the book's more appropriate original title, *Pour une morale au-delà du savoir: Kant et Levinas*).

Once these similarities are delineated—that both philosophers are for the subject and against knowledge—Chalier's central preoccupation is to analyze and assess differences. Central among them is Kant's rejection of heteronomy and Levinas's wholehearted acceptance of it. In this, Levinas proceeds similarly to Heidegger and many ancient Greek philosophers, but with a difference that Chalier highlights: Levinas, like Kant, does not seek to ground morality in a knowable order external to the subject such as the cosmos, being, nature, or society. Kant seeks an internal disposition, the good will, and an internal categorical principle. This makes the principle of his ethics outside of knowledge but internal to the subject. Levinas, by contrast, seeks an "anarchic" ethics—anarchic, according to Chalier, because its *arche* or principle is outside the subject and outside of knowledge. Chalier describes, then, two very different philosophies of the subject beyond knowledge, one in which the subject is utterly autonomous and morality stems not from will in accord with a knowable order but from good will; another in which the origin of the subject and of moral obligation is unknowable but outside the subject.

Another difference Chalier highlights is between respect for universal humanity and response to persons understood as singularities. The difference, she maintains, is in where the philosophers begin. Kant begins with universality. Levinas begins with singularity and moves to universality. The "access route" to morality is different in each case. Moreover, Kant's beginning point is cruel preference for universal principles over concern for each human person, while Levinas's starting point elucidates how concern for singular persons actually originates.

Another difference is that Levinas, unlike Kant, distinguishes autonomy and freedom. Autonomy understood as finding justification in oneself is arbitrary and violent. It is to be contrasted with response to a weak singular other. Such response delays self-reflection and, as a result, frees one up from the constraints of identity to emerge as a singular subject. Subjectivity, for Levinas, is not self-reference but singularity. Singularity results from heteronomous freedom.

Sensibility is central to but plays a different role in each philosopher's ethics. For Kant, to respond to urgent appeal from an other is to stray from self-reflection on universal principle. For Levinas, sensibility is exposure to the other and thus is the very source of subjectivity and morality.

The philosophers' views on love and sublimity reflect their different evaluations of the role of sensibility in morality. For Kant, erotic love is pleasure-seeking pathos and thus egoistic rather than moral. Love must be subjected to self-given principle. For Levinas, love without pathos is fusion or communion and points to dread of and desire to eliminate the otherness of the other. Love at its best is not fusion but desire for what is always inaccessible in the other. It is not fusion but proximity where proximity is desire for the otherness of the other.

For Kant, the sense of the sublime resulting from experience of boundless magnitude—for example, the starry heavens—makes us aware of what exceeds sensibility and thus of our own supersensible, moral nature. Levinas turns for sublimity not to experience of boundless supersensible magnitude but to encounter with the inaccessible singular other who, due to vulnerability, resists, solicits, and, in general, affects us.

Chalier's accounts of Levinas's views draw on extensive knowledge of his works as a whole and are often exciting in scope and detail. Her discussion of Kant is more one-sided, lacking much attention to his application of universals to particulars in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Showing that and how the application is unsuccessful would clarify Chalier's critique of Kant and her understanding of Levinas. Similarly, the book's original standpoint—for the subject and against contemporary critics of it—needs justification since Chalier claims that the origin of the subject for Levinas is in something external to us and this could make Levinas's views similar to those of the critics. Still, if you have wondered whether Levinas is a Kantian, you will find Chalier's knowledgeable book helpful for reflection on the question—as much for the few themes discussed in this review as for the many important ones inevitably left out.—Deborah Achtenberg, *University of Nevada, Reno*.

CONANT, James and Urszula M. ZEGLEN, editors. *Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism*. New York: Routledge, 2002. 242 pp. Cloth, \$80.00—This pricey collection of essays, with replies by Putnam, "was directly inspired by" a conference on Putnam and American Neopragmatism held in Poland in 1998. It evidently consists entirely of papers from that conference. Thus, for example, Putnam often refers to the authors in the second person and with other informalities appropriate to remarks and replies at a conference. He also refers (pp. 80, 84) to a paper by Habermas apparently presented at the conference but not included in this collection (there should be an explanation). Of the two editors, only Zeglen has written the introductory material.

The book is divided into two parts: Pragmatism and Realism, with brief introductions to each. In the Pragmatism section, the authors include Hilary Putnam himself, who gave the conference keynote address, Ruth Ann Putnam, Richard Warner, Robert Brandom, and Nicholas Rescher. The Realism section includes John Haldane, Tadeusz Szubka, John Heil, Wolfgang Künne, Gary Ebbs, and Charles Travis. Putnam replies, sometimes at length, to each one, and this is one of the more valuable features of the collection. The paper by Putnam summarizes his current views and his latest version of realism. Missing in action, but discussed briefly by Putnam (for example, p. 16) and some contributors, Richard Rorty has written quite a bit about Putnam, Putnam not as much on Rorty, and as these two eminent philosophers approach the end of their extensive careers, this would have been an excellent occasion for them to comment on their similarities and differences. Is Rorty really "the Evil Putnam"? Further, because Putnam has always been interested in the history and philosophy of science, it is ironic and regrettable that Kuhn gets only one brief mention, by Putnam (p. 82) in his reply to Rescher. He believes that Kuhn misinterprets "the significance of paradigm-change in a relativistic way," and of course such a comment deserves defense. Both Kuhn and Rorty are directly relevant to Putnam's arguments about the disconnect between metaphysics and physical law (all three in some form of agreement on this) and it would good to have a more detailed account of his views on their historicism and "relativism."

Of the debates themselves, the sharpest exchange occurs between Putnam and Brandom. Brandom distinguishes among methodological, semantic, instrumental, fundamental ("linguistic"), and classical pragmatism, all of which in some way depend on what Brandom takes to be the instrumentalist core of pragmatism, which he narrowly understands as "a philosophical school of thought centered on evaluating beliefs by their tendency to promote success at the satisfaction of wants" (p. 40). Putnam strenuously, and rightly, disagrees, and indeed, despite Brandom's qualifications and his argument that it implies a Myth of the Given, so much is left out that it is like describing the essence of Cartesianism as the feeling of certainty one (ideally) gets from applying the method of doubt. The main point for Putnam is that classical pragmatism does not assume a narrower instrumental pragmatism (as the subtle Brandom must surely admit), and he finds lots of support for this in Dewey, Peirce, and James. Aside from these issues, any remnants of "givens" would be fatal to pragmatism, and this claim needs more attention.

The discussions of realism focus on Putnam's evolving critique of the correspondence theory, his (related) attempts at a naturalistic account of truth (what now he calls "natural realism"), and the debate about how deflationary an account of truth can be. In his reply to Ebbs, for example, Putnam reasserts (what he defends elsewhere) that sentential content cannot be given a purely behaviorist (or reductionist) account. But one might indeed invent a behavioristic-reductionist account and claim it not to be eliminative. If there is no transcendental line between them and if Putnam wants not to be, like Quine, an eliminativist on the content/truth relation, where is the line to be drawn between the two, and if

it cannot be drawn, whither truth beyond warranted acceptability? This point tangentially recurs in the exchange with Travis who, writes a paper that connects logical systems, Wittgensteinian language games, with the pragmatic (and fallibilist) sense that should be given to "conceptual necessity," and concludes that "truths of logic, insofar as there are such, do not confront experience in just the same way as, say, truths of physics, or even truths of geometry. [Putnam's] view carves out a restricted space in which it is not guaranteed that logic should not prove mistaken" (p. 208). Putnam comes close to agreement with Rorty in his reply to Travis that "there is no such thing as a metaphysical guarantee that we will never find a sense in which a principle is false, or a guarantee that such a sense will not come to seem to us the one we must attach to our words if we want to remain true to the scientific (or other) enterprise" (p. 210).—John Tietz, *Simon Fraser University*.

DE ANNA, Gabriele. *Realismo metafísico e rappresentazione mentale: Un'indagine tra Tommaso d'Aquino e Hilary Putnam*. Percorsi della scienza, vol. 13. Padua: il Poligrafo, 2001. 319 pp. Paper, €23.24—This volume on "Analytical Thomism" (for the origin of the term see John Haldane's preface to the special issue of *The Monist* 80 [1997]: 485–6) originates from an M.A. thesis written at St. Andrews under the direction of John Haldane and from a Ph.D. dissertation defended at Padua under the direction of Enrico Berti. The English-speaking reader might be interested to know that De Anna has published in English two specimens of his arguments (see "Mind-World Identity Theory and Semantic Realism: Haldane and Boulter on Aquinas," *Philosophical Quarterly* 50 [2000]: 82–7; and "Aquinas on Sensible Forms and Semimaterialism," *Review of Metaphysics* 51 [2000]: 43–63).

De Anna's book rotates around two notions, the ones of metaphysical realism and mental representation, and around two thinkers, Hilary Putnam (with his own development from pragmatism to realism), and John Haldane. De Anna's background is always and only Aquinas, however, and he keeps reconstructing the issues by means of Thomistic arguments with the same tenacity shown by Brian Shanley in his famous paper he dedicated to Haldane (see "Analytical Thomism," *The Thomist* 63 [1999]: 123–37). In the first chapter De Anna shows that the conjunction of metaphysical realism and naturalism brings about a form of semantic realism (pp. 47–99), in the second chapter he reviews the arguments set forth by Putnam to refute semantic realism and *per modum tollentem* also the conjunction of metaphysical realism and naturalism (pp. 101–48). The third chapter is dedicated to Putnam's interest for the interpretation of Aristotelian psychology advanced by Martha Nussbaum (pp. 151–200), the fourth to Haldane's response to Putnam (pp. 201–43), and the fifth recapitulates the whole discussion by going back to what Aquinas says on the reception of sensible forms (pp. 247–302). For long years, naturalism seemed the inevitable consequence of

metaphysical realism. To renounce naturalism would have meant to accept "magical theories" of reference and mental representation like the one proposed by Brentano. In the early 1990s (more precisely since the fall of 1991, which Putnam spent at St. Andrews to give the Gifford Lectures and stood in close dialogue with Haldane), however, Putnam realizes that intentionality is a property of human beings that cannot be reduced to a natural context. Also for Haldane, of course, intentionality is an irreducible property, but this does not bring him to accept either a panpsychist understanding of matter or the dubious thesis that mental properties are added to inert matter in a way that Putnam would have called magic (see Haldane's seminal paper, which first appeared in Italian, "San Tommaso e Putnam: Realismo metafisico e realismo epistemologico," *Intersezioni* 8 [1988]: 171–88). Haldane goes back to Aquinas's position that not only do concepts have a necessary connection with their extension, they also find their explanation as intellectual dispositions, habits, which are used when we state judgments, and De Anna does indeed a great job at clarifying this important discussion.—Riccardo Pozzo, *The University of Verona*.

DESMOND, William. *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003. x + 208 pp. Cloth, \$84.95; paper, \$29.95—In *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* William Desmond criticizes Hegel for claiming that there is not, ultimately, a real difference between humanity and divinity. Desmond's introduction frames Hegel's treatment of the question of the finality of God's transcendence over and against human nature as the book's fundamental issue, followed by eight chapters in which Desmond approaches this core issue from a variety of relevant angles. For example, Desmond analyzes and attacks Hegel's thoughts on all of the following: the possibility and nature of human fulfillment, the antimony of divine transcendence and human freedom (self-determination), the Trinity, creation (of the world and humans), evil, the importance of history, and the criticality of community. The happy result of Desmond's work is not only that he details (for the rest of us) that which is essential to Hegel's unique and complex view of the divine, but also that, in the process of critiquing Hegel's conception of God, Desmond advances his own alternative view of what God might be.

The figure of the unhappy consciousness animates Hegel's philosophical treatment of religion. Consciousness despairs and is unhappy because it cannot deal with the demands of its existence. Human beings are by their very nature agents who seek out the truth, yet the anguished plight of the unhappy consciousness consists in the fact that truth cannot be had; at this stage of the dialectic, truth and authority seem to be beyond human consciousness. "What makes the unhappy consciousness unhappy is that, in its thinking about itself and the ultimate, it cannot get over an asymmetry that always must exceed its own self-mediation" (p. 50). For Hegel, religion is humankind's creative attempt to

overcome this unfulfilled longing for truth. Religion is a reflective practice in which representational forms are used to make the divine, the seat of universal value and authority, present to human thinking. Thus for Hegel, fully to overcome despair religion must disavow the ontological asymmetry mentioned by Desmond, thereby implicitly acknowledging that humanity and divinity are but two sides of the same coin.

For Hegel, then, Christianity is “the consummate religion” because through the symbolic representations used in its imagery, stories, and rituals, Christianity is able to make present to consciousness in an immediate, intuitive form the notion that the divine is nothing outside the human community (p. 67). (In Christ, human and divine nature meet in one being, and in the Holy Spirit’s entrance into all human consciousnesses, the universality of the absolute spirit is implicit.) The next step, then, for Hegel is to make explicit what he takes to be implicit in Christianity, that is, that the divine, universal subject (God) is neither any single individual nor anything outside of the human community, but rather the interrelation of the whole human community engaged in rational argumentation and reflection. Indeed, it is this human community’s thinking that is Hegel’s absolute spirit, and it is this absolute spirit (God) that determines for itself what is authoritative and valuable. For Hegel, then, the real truth of religion lies in the unity of subjective and objective conceptual content that is implicit in it.

Although Desmond levels many criticisms against this Hegelian view of God, the fundamental crux of the dispute is that Hegel and Desmond hold views of God that are incompatible with one another. For Desmond, God is irreducibly distinct from humans and infinitely determined in all (or in an infinity of) directions; further, as God is always-already-over-determined (and over-fulfilled) there is no need for God’s self-realization, and human freedom (and fulfillment) consists in accepting this ontological difference and in sharing in God’s agape, that is, the hyperbolic (or over-spilling) love that God has both within Himself and for humans. Desmond asserts that Hegel myopically ignores the reality of the human ability to experience God’s agape and instead only considers the erotic, which always entails an intense lack of fullness, when discussing the paradigm love that God has both within Himself and for humans.

Because Hegel takes religion so seriously and yet ultimately denies God’s transcendence, Hegel’s religious thinking is an excellent place for atheists, agnostics, and believers to look so as to make dialogical headway about religious matters. Desmond’s *Hegel’s God* will thus serve us well as a frame of reference for discussions about what God might be. And this, as Hegel scholars know, is a very good thing, for continually engaging in intersubjective communication is a necessary prerequisite to one’s reaching the fullest possible truth.—David Bachyrycz, Billy Lauinger, and Wilfried Ver Eecke, *Georgetown University*.

HANEWALD, Christian. *Apperzeption und Einbildungskraft: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der theoretischen Philosophie Kants in Fichtes frühes Wissenschaftslehre*. Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol. 55. New York: De Gruyter, 2001. 297 p. Cloth, \$109.20—This volume is a revised version of a dissertation defended at the University of Cologne in the winter term of 1999/2000 under the direction of Klaus Düsing. It is divided into two parts, respectively on the first version of Fichte's *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794) and on its second version, the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* (1798/1799). It works thus on a small scope, since it concentrates on the years Fichte spent in Jena and leaves out his later development. This decision is methodically impeccable, because the choice of a small number of seminal texts makes the carrying out of sound research so much easier. Hanewald offers important insights that bear on (a) the systematic interpretation of certain passages of Fichte's two books; (b) the localization of Fichte's sources, first and foremost in Kant's theoretical philosophy, namely in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Judgment* (in itself, this is an original approach, given that all literature has been led, or misled, by Fichte's remark that he had been awakened to philosophy by the *Critique of Practical Reason*); and finally (c) the laying out of the philosophical problem of the role played by the procedure of apperception and the faculty of imagination in constituting transcendental idealism.

Hanewald questions three main interpretations of Fichte's relation to Kant, namely, (1) that the *Wissenschaftslehre* illegally trespasses the limits by the critique of reason, (2) that Fichte is the one who brought Kant's transcendental philosophy to its completion by finding out and by remediating Kant's systematic loophole, and finally (3) that Fichte's correction to Kant does not go far enough and has to wait for its completion through Hegel. There is something true in these mainstream interpretations, and something that needs to be corrected, says Hanewald. In order to reconstruct in the most exact way where Fichte stands with regard to Kant, the first thing to do is to put into brackets what Fichte himself says about the primacy of practical philosophy, for instance in the detailed stances on Kant from the *Erste und Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*, which do not represent anymore the stand of the first *Wissenschaftslehre* and rather mirror that of the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*, as one can see, for example, as regards the role played by the pure ego as the principle of philosophy. This means that one should rather proceed by directly comparing Kant's and Fichte's argument and look for agreements and disagreements, which is what Hanewald effectively does. For example, while for Kant the unity of manifold representation must precede the identical self-reference of identity, for Fichte the contrary is the case, namely, that identical self-reference is the presupposition of all synthesis. Besides, Fichte explores other forms of self-referential ego, from which he deduces among others the relation of subjects and accidents. In this case Kant cannot obviously be counted among Fichte's sources, because for Kant the category of substance is tied up with what is permanent in the flux of the accidents, which is something that finds expression in the schema of the permanence of time. Among the merits of Hanewald's book is that it

shows that the role played by the intellectual intuition in the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* marks a significant development from the first *Wissenschaftslehre* and at the same time a significant distance from Kant's theoretical philosophy.—Riccardo Pozzo, *The University of Verona*.

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. xi + 160pp. Cloth, \$37.95—Heidegger's *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* presents a phenomenological examination of philosophy's emergence from what Heidegger calls "factual life." The recently translated 1921–22 lecture course is less a treatment of Aristotle than of the necessary groundwork for such interpretation. Philosophy originally stems from life's tendency to reflect itself in, and lend structure to, the world from and in which it lives, akin to what Husserl called, on the side of consciousness, "constitution"; its interpretation stems from a countermovement toward clarifying the origins of objectivity. For Heidegger philosophy arises from a questionability inherent in factual life, linked to life's possibility of not being, and thus to existential concern. And if "philosophizing," as in the Continental tradition, involves a continual reappropriation (Heidegger speaks of destruction, but also, importantly, of composition) of the Western philosophical heritage, this too has its roots in tendencies of factual life. Factual life is the origin of philosophy, and its own inherent resistance is also what obfuscates attempts to grasp it originally. Such resistance relates the subject-matter here to Heidegger's later work, providing a template for the existential ontology of *Being and Time*.

What is factual life, and what sort of philosophical approach is needed to grasp it? Life is for Heidegger a basic phenomenon. Because factual life is immensely rich, evasive, manifold, fluid, and dynamic, one cannot hope to grasp it in static definitions which aim to exhaust its object, to take it as an immediate given. The importance of tailoring one's mode of access to the subject matter is certainly an Aristotelian insight, but Heidegger conceives it as a question of phenomenological authenticity. Perhaps the most important contribution is the treatment of the formal indication, which appears often in Heidegger's early writings, but is given a significant clarification here. Heidegger devises the notion of a formal indication as an alternative to traditional philosophical definition, the latter of which also arises from tendencies of life to grasp reality in static presence. Formal indication remains empty as to its content, but draws out a formal structure through which the categorical movements of life become visible from a certain preserved distance. Despite their formal qualification, it is clear that Heidegger's interpretation of these movements is existentially oriented, their currents tending toward lostness from which life must be turned around. As in *Being and Time*, care (*das Besorgen*) is identified as life's relational sense,

which manifests four categorical directions: inclination, a pull toward something (world); distance, or rather, the tendency to abolish the distance between itself and the things which stand before it; sequestration, wherein life avoids itself, looking away from itself, attempting to escape its worriedness about itself; and the "easy," where life seeks to lose itself in mundane difficulties and/or carefreeness. Readers of *Being and Time* will notice characteristics of fallenness (*Verfallenheit*), Dasein's inauthentic self-forgetfulness due to insatiable absorption in the world.

Heidegger understands these directions of life as primary; thus the way in which factual life is immediately encountered is inauthentic, because it is already reflected and prestructured according to these basic tendencies. Life loses itself in the world, builds up a world through its projections; and because its directions are reluctant, or reflexive, it tends to seek itself out in terms of worldly things. Life has, according to Heidegger, a tendency to secure itself, and as such a vital encounter with its own insecurity—with the possibility of nothingness—necessary for existential authenticity, is lost. This becoming lost, or ossification, Heidegger calls "ruinane." While Heidegger does not conceive this in terms of religion, his analysis here is strikingly similar to that he provided the previous year in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. The appendix of loose pages verifies Heidegger's occupation with religious sources—Kierkegaard's *Exercises in Christianity*, Luther's writings on Paul, Augustine, and the New Testament—and suggests that this book is a link between the phenomenology of religion and *Being and Time*.

The notion of ruinane or collapse is the source for philosophy's errors, taking life as an immediate given for theoretical knowledge. This necessitates for Heidegger a critique of "life-philosophy" so far attempted, as well as a critique of the "lifeworld" wherein philosophy is said to "live": the university. The university is one situation of access to the world of self, the surrounding world, and the shared world; that it is the focus of Heidegger's later politics—"Self-Assertion of the German University"—renders this treatment noteworthy. Life's self-reflection is also, however, the origin of phenomenology, a countermovement of clarification against ruinane. Rojcewicz rightly chooses "initiation" to translate Heidegger's subtitle, an *Einführung* into phenomenological research; one is initiated into an exploratory method of grasping the most basic, but also most hidden, categories of life which philosophy has, according to Heidegger, heretofore obscured.—Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *The University of Maine*.

HEIL, John. *From an Ontological Point of View*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. xv + 267 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—The central message of this book—"[t]hat honest philosophy requires what the Australians call ontological seriousness" (p. 2)—will hardly shock readers of this journal. But Heil's reputation as a highly respected analytical philosopher is at stake much like an orthodox quantum physicist breaking ranks by announcing the fundamental incoherence of the instrumentalist Copenhagen Interpreta-

tion. With the same candor with which he confronts the inescapability of the ontological project, he challenges contemporary philosophers to face up to the sterility of linguistic approaches or the technically impressive but ultimately unenlightening contributions to the philosophy of mind.

The first thing to note about the present work is that it is divided into twenty short chapters, all of which contain numbered sections averaging two to three pages in length. This organization adds to the concision and clarity of the book and works well with Heil's attempt to present ideas in an unpretentious manner. The dust jacket tells us that the book is written in an accessible, nontechnical style that is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned metaphysicians. But despite the organization and flow of bite-sized nuggets, I doubt anyone with less than graduate training in analytical philosophy will understand the problems and issues. A brief survey of the contemporary philosophers who get the most discussion should confirm the point. This includes: C. B. Martin, D. M. Armstrong, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Sidney Shoemaker, E. J. Lowe, Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam.

Heil's fundamental point of departure, the Problem of Consciousness, he claims, requires an ontology rather than an analysis of concepts. In particular, he believes that an inadequate conception of properties is to blame for much confusion and despair in the philosophy of mind. What we need is something utterly different if we are to have any hope of advance and not, he says, "more epicycles in going theories" (p. 125).

He steers a course between reductionist doctrines that attempt to reduce human knowledge to an all-encompassing superphysics and a hierarchical conception of reality. Reductionism fails because it deprives us of crucial explanatory power and therefore turns out to be impractical. As Heil writes: "Important higher-level patterns and relations are invisible to physics. The result is self-defeating and dehumanizing; we deprive ourselves of perspectives essential to an understanding of our place in the world" (p. 31). But antireductionism, in Heil's view does not imply a commitment to levels of reality. He rejects levels of reality (as opposed to levels of organization or complexity) as "a philosophical artifact spawned by a commitment to the Picture Theory" (p. 73). This is the view that contends, "we must find an object, kind, or property corresponding to every significant predicate" (p. 58), or more simply put, the idea that language mirrors ontology. Heil finds problems with the Picture Theory insurmountable because it cannot account for causal relevance and interlevel relations, and so the hierarchical conception of reality fails as well.

This covers the negative thesis of the book. The positive thesis is Heil's defense of a form of realism that recognizes objects (or substances) and properties. The focus is a conception of properties as both qualitative and dispositional. This view is traced to Plato's Eleatic Stranger in *Sophist* who conceives of real things as nothing but powers. Locke immediately comes to mind as a modern expression of this notion. But Heil credits C. B. Martin with the interesting version he is defending. This is what he calls the identity theory—that a property of a concrete object is simultaneously dispositional and qualitative. He

writes: "The identity theory is to be distinguished from theories according to which the dispositional and the qualitative are 'aspects,' or 'sides,' or higher-order properties of properties. A property's dispositionality and its qualitativity are, as Locke might have put it, the selfsame property differently considered" (p. 112). For example, the quality associated with an electron's mass is strictly identical with the power associated with the electron's mass, or an object's color is strictly identical with its disposition to reflect light in a certain way.

When Heil turns his attention to objects or substances, we find that his analysis echos Locke again. Properties are found in objects; they are particularized ways that objects are. But what are objects exactly? Are they merely substrata for properties or thin particulars? Like Locke, Heil leaves it open as to whether what we ordinarily call objects are objects in a more restricted sense. They might turn out to be thickenings in the fabric of space-time or disturbances in energy fields. This raises the question: pluralism of objects and properties or monism with objects as modes? Heil leans toward the former but does not discount the possibility of the latter (pp. 41–2, 190).

What then is the upshot of the identity theory for understanding consciousness? First, since philosophical theories of mind are often presented as theories of mental properties, getting straight about properties is crucial. Second, acceptance of the identity of dispositionalities and qualities rules out certain theories, such as functionalism. And third, in his attempt to find a place for distinctive mental qualities among those in the material realm, Heil contends "the qualities of conscious experience are perfectly ordinary qualities of brains. . . . Their status is no more remarkable than the status of the qualities like sphericity, liquidity, or warmth" (p. 235). The identity of qualities and dispositions, Heil argues, dissolves much of the mystery of consciousness because our experiences are understood as mutual manifestations of dispositions present in the external world and in our brains (p. 233).

In the final evaluation we might ask a question that Heil himself alluded to in the book: Has he added another epicycle to our misdirected efforts or put us on track for real solutions of lasting value? I would venture the guess that only a truly and profoundly revolutionary theory beyond the Cartesian and Lockean legacy will do the trick and that this would require a fundamental change of paradigm, upsetting presuppositions in our current modes of thought. Only then will we know the answer. Ontological seriousness, however, is certainly a step in the right direction.—Leemon B. McHenry, *California State University, Northridge*.

HOFFMANN, Tobias. *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und Possibilia bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F., vol. 60. Münster: Aschendorff, 2002. iv + 356 pp. Cloth, €46.00—Tobias Hoffmann has written an intelligent and important

book. It is a must-read for scholars of medieval Latin philosophy and an ought-to-read for anyone interested in questions of natural necessity, contingency, or modality. Hoffmann's topic is the web of philosophical issues implicated in considering God's knowledge of creatures—that is, everything but himself—and, at least in principle whether or not there is a God, in determining the character of and basis for possibility. His immediate aim is to investigate these matters as they were treated by the great late-thirteenth-century scholastic, John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). For perspective, he also looks closely into the pertinent works of Scotus's influential forebear, Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), as well as three self-styled Scotists: the fourteenth-century Francis of Meyronnes (d. 1328) and two seventeenth-century neoscholastics, Johannes Poncius (d. 1672/3) and Bartholomäus Mastrius (d. 1673). This is, however, no mere exposition of a Scotist position, even though Hoffmann does try to pin down Scotus's authentic views. For Hoffmann situates his subjects at a critical point historically and theoretically for the philosophy of divine knowledge and of possibility, and he considers his findings relevant to our appreciation of these matters in general.

In Hoffmann's estimation, beginning with Henry of Ghent but only fully with Duns Scotus, a fundamental shift occurred in the Latin scholastic discussion of what had come to be called the "divine ideas." Up to Henry and Scotus, the "common opinion" of scholastics was that divine ideas provided the intellectual vehicle by which God knew things other than himself, and the important problems to be resolved in their regard concerned the mechanics of creation and the vexing question of how to reconcile the multiplicity of what God knew, including the ideas, with divine simplicity. After Scotus, everything changed. Arguing that God alone, without any special enabling vehicle, sufficed to account for his own cognition, Scotus turned to conceiving the ideas as the objective content of God's knowledge of things, irrespective of their existential status in the world. In so doing, he substituted for the old problems of creation and multiplicity within simplicity the new ones of the foundations for possibility and the ontological burdens of intelligibility.

According to Hoffmann, the reasons for the change were, theoretically speaking, Scotus's conviction that God's exclusive eternity needed to be shielded from the competition of even such tenuous entities as his own ideas and his determination to dig deeply into the philosophical underpinnings of possibility. But history is significant for Hoffmann, too, for he believes the shift was also sign of a change in perspective already initiated before Scotus by Henry of Ghent and therefore due in part to forces greater than Scotus's personal philosophical predilections. The result was that Latin scholastics after Scotus increasingly abandoned the old view of God as knowing things reflectively, by considering his own essence according to the ways it could be imitated, and relationally, by making contact with objects insofar as they pointed back to the divine essence itself. Instead, the new standard was to think of God as seizing cognitive objects directly, without regard to his own essence, and absolutely, as intelligible in themselves irrespective of a causal relationship to their creator. Such newly conceived objects are what Hoffmann has in mind with the words of his title, *creatura intellecta*, a

description he says Scotus himself would have recognized as highlighting both the objects' intentional character as other than God and the constitutional fact that they were, as we might say, emergent on reality only as they were known.

The philosophical dividends of the new approach, Hoffmann argues convincingly, were considerable. First of all, it opened a new chapter for epistemology in European—more precisely, Latin scholastic—philosophy by putting the spotlight on the content of knowledge rather than its mechanics or the psychology behind it. Second, and even more important, the shift effectively initiated our modern philosophical investigation of modality. Hoffmann is not alone in describing Antique and pre-Scotist scholastic philosophy as eminently essentialist in a way he associates with the traditional Great Chain of Being, whereby possibility is completely exhausted by a determinate, even if never-ending, reality. With Scotus, and with Henry by anticipation, Hoffmann believes, the way was opened out of such essentialism and the natural necessity associated with it. Possibility became a structure that God conceived without reference to existence or reality and from which he selectively elicited the contours and elements of the real world.

Yet Hoffmann regards as essentialist as well a less radical position wherein the nature of the possible is thought of as determinate somehow on its own, without regard to existence or reality or even a divine power to bring it to mind. By his reading, Scotus was antiessentialist from this perspective, too. Though possibility was for Scotus a structure articulated without regard to divine essence—was in fact equivalent to intelligibility pure and simple—it could not ultimately be divorced from or considered independent (*"unabhängig"*) of God since its very intelligibility arose precisely from the fact that God, as first cause, produced all possibles as cognitive objects. In advancing this interpretation, Hoffmann quite intentionally intervenes on the well-known contemporary debate over the meaning of Scotus's modal philosophy, the two extremes of which are associated with Simo Knuuttila and Calvin Normore. Hoffmann has come down on Normore's side, rejecting Knuuttila's view that for Scotus possibility had to be kept radically separate from God, determined by logic alone and, except for the coincidence that its realization depended on creation, having nothing to do with divine essence, existence, or cognition.

As I said at the beginning, Hoffmann's book is intelligent. His reading of Scotus is wide-ranging and finely textured, and his argument profound. I myself have weighed in on the Knuuttila–Normore debate, and Hoffmann forces me to rethink my views. In particular, the distinction between God's omnipotence as creator, which is irrelevant to the configuration of possibility, and his more restricted power as first intellect, in which Hoffmann sees possibility as having to emerge, has never before been explored with such penetration and nuance. In a literal sense, Hoffmann must be right—that for Scotus possibility and intelligibility in general cannot be divorced from the fact of a divine presence and are ultimately originative in God. Yet Hoffmann intends more than this literal truth. And I am still not convinced that we can say, in Hoffmann's words, that the very intelligible structure (*"eidetische Struktur"*) of possibility should be traced to God as well. Scotus insisted that formally

("formaliter") the contents of possibility derived from the possible objects themselves, all questions of ontological import or divine, "principiative" causation set aside. To my mind, Scotus's "formally" means "structurally," and there is no way around the fact that he was implying a radical disjunction from any reality or power, even God's.

But in the end I am not certain. Many will find Hoffmann's painstaking hermeneutics immune to my doubts. And I must admit that Hoffmann's understanding of Scotus's position on divine illumination of human cognition—which parallels my own—is more immediately consistent with his, not my, reading of Scotus on possibility. My explanation for the discrepancy is circuitous, dependent on setting Scotus in a historical context disruptive of absolute consistency in his thought. Then, too, there are the fine last chapters Hoffmann devotes to the three Scotists looking back on Scotus. For Hoffmann, this section serves primarily for exploring the implications in Scotus himself. But it is surely not inconsequential that all three Scotists interpreted Scotus on possibles effectively as Hoffmann does, even though two of them thought that their master was, on the philosophical merits, wrong. It thus may be Hoffmann, not me, who has the last word. In any event, from now on no one can presume to have considered these weighty issues fully before having read this exquisite book.—Steven P. Marrone, *Tufts University*.

KELLY, Christopher. *Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One's Life to the Truth*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. ix + 209 pp. Paper, \$19.00—*Rousseau as Author* cements its author's reputation as a serious and accomplished Rousseau scholar. Christopher Kelly's previous efforts have resulted in the publication of numerous articles and a book, as well as the meticulously researched and well-translated *Collected Works of Rousseau* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991–, coedited with R. Masters). His encyclopedic knowledge of all Rousseauian texts coupled with his hermeneutical deftness make this book, whose theme is truthtelling, an impressive piece of mature scholarship.

The subtitle of *Rousseau as Author* refers to Rousseau's motto, which elegantly describes the gist of Rousseau's now commonly practiced ideas of authorship and responsibility, and concerns three overlapping issues: Rousseau's well-known truthtelling in matters public and private (the theme, in a way, of Kelly's first book, *Rousseau's Exemplary Life*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), his devotion to a peculiar understanding of philosophy as a way of life, and his singular boldness in making statements that he knew could result in literary and political persecution. As Kelly says, the focus of the book is on the third issue, but ultimately the book's intention is to "show the preconditions" for a "full treatment of Rousseau's understanding of philosophy" (pp. 142, 141).

Kelly summarizes “what could be said to be the central thesis” of his book thusly: for Rousseau, the “activity of authorship is in its essence public, the activity of philosophy is private” (p. 49). This reminds one of a central tenet, often misunderstood, of the thought of Leo Strauss. Unsurprisingly, the paragraph in which Kelly makes this statement—with a certain authorial distance expressed in the grammar of the phrase, to be sure—contains a reference to a rather frank 1947 essay by Strauss on Rousseau’s intention, which ought to be kept in mind as one considers the book as a whole and especially the postscript, the first paragraph of which begins with this pregnant sentence: “The major argument of this book could be viewed as an attempt to follow Rousseau’s development of his criticism of d’Alembert (and others) for failing to see that philosophy and authorship are in large part incompatible activities”; and ends like so: “Rousseau’s authorship is, itself, a model of what he understood good citizenship to be” (p. 172).

However that may be, *Rousseau as Author* consists of six chapters, flanked by an introduction and the aforementioned postscript, followed by an extensive bibliography and a less than complete index. The introduction is notable for its straightforward account of Rousseau’s understanding of his motto. For Rousseau, truthtelling as a way of life consists in taking responsibility in public for what one publishes, and in publishing only that which can be understood as being of public benefit. Telling responsible truths is not the same as simply telling truths. Rousseauian truthtelling involves both “openness” and concealment or “discretion” (p. 2). Truthtelling is never without its moral-political context.

The subject of chapter 1 is authorial responsibility. Rousseau’s contemporaries practiced authorial deception—anonymous publication—in response to a regime that regulated what could be published. For Kelly, Voltaire is the paradigmatic example of the reasoning behind anonymous authorship, which attempts to combine effectiveness of message with safety of messenger. Rousseau, in contrast, self-consciously “made authorship into a public identity and made a willingness to risk punishment for what one published into a crucial part of this identity” (p. 19). Rousseau’s position thus attempts to combine effectiveness of message with responsibility of messenger.

Chapter 2 begins from the argument that authorial irresponsibility is inherent in anonymous publishing and considers the next stage in Rousseau’s position, namely, that the content of irresponsible authors’ books is also inherently different from those who publish responsibly. The frankness of authorial identity on the title page does not translate, necessarily, into frankness beyond it. Prudential restraint guided by privately reasoned truths is the standard by which Rousseau discusses three broad categories of censorship: “(1) the moral consensus underlying any community; (2) [its] fundamental principles, laws and particular policies; and, finally, (3) purely speculative philosophic doctrines” (p. 31). The four chapters that follow discuss each of these in turn.

Chapters three and four discuss Rousseau’s treatment of how citizens are made, first by considering the role of the sciences and the arts in producing a certain type of citizen through the formation of shared identities, and then by examining several texts in which Rousseau illustrates his argument by holding up heroic models to emulate.

The fourth chapter, on heroes, is notable for its discussion of the novel aspects of Rousseau's understanding of human nature, as well as his discussion of the political weight (as well as the unnatural character) of the citizenry's imitating heroes. While virtue has its (ambiguous) place in Rousseau, "what is fundamental [to a correct understanding of his philosophical position] is the experience of feeling one's own existence" (p. 86). Strength of soul, the characteristic his heroes share in abundance, is what permits such men to "maximize the feeling of existence by allowing them to extend it to the maximum degree without falling into the weakness of dependence" (p. 86). The relevance of all this to Rousseau's turn to the novel as a form of political writing is central to Kelly's account, as is his discussion of Rousseau's pessimism concerning the possibilities of genuine citizenship in the modern world, and the sacrifices to a community's strength that accompanies any attempt to legitimize a form of citizenship that does away with the requirements of strength of soul.

Kelly brilliantly presents Rousseau's criticism of the Enlightenment's drive toward aesthetic and epistemological improvement. Rousseau notoriously criticized the sciences and arts on the grounds that intellectual activity, and philosophy in particular, undermine what makes a good society possible, namely, the opinions that keep it together, while the arts—Rousseau's famous example is the theater—precipitate social and political decline by promoting "luxury, inequality and a sense of isolation that divide" the community (p. 30). For Rousseau, censorship in the pursuit of the preservation of morals is a defensible position, for there is an intimate connection between the political health of a community and its underlying shared moral opinions, best discovered by examining the "objects of a community's esteem," as Rousseau says in the *Social Contract*. Morals are not rooted in reason or argument, exactly, but rather in the customs and beliefs about what is publicly deserving of respect.

Chapter 5 concerns Rousseau's practice of citizenship and is prefaced by an account of the behavior of citizens according to Rousseau, including the clearest treatment of the notion of the general will available in the secondary literature as well as a consideration of the permanent contemporaneity and thus insolubility of what Kelly calls "the political problem" (p. 125).

Rousseau as author insists on his identity as citizen. Kelly argues that "the perfect model of Rousseauian citizenship is a particular form of literary activity" practiced by a hermit living outside his *patria* (p. 116). The gist of it is that only a man living outside his community can isolate himself from his community's political factionalism and offer opinions that are contrary to his self-interest narrowly understood, forgetting about himself and remembering or considering only the general will.

Chapter 6 and the postscript consider Rousseau not as citizen but as a "philosopher who is also an author" (p. 139). Kelly considers the consequences of Rousseau's famous statement, found near the beginning of the *Second Discourse*, that he imagined himself in the Lyceum, repeating the lessons of his masters, with Plato and Xenocrates as judges "and the human race for an audience." For Rousseau, it seems to me, the

good is higher than the true, with the beautiful somewhere in the middle (whereas “naturally, the beautiful is reduced to the good, the good is reduced to the pleasant, and the pleasant is reduced to what pleases the senses and knowledge is reduced to knowledge of pleasure and pain,” p. 177).

There is one instance in which Rousseau claimed to address a philosopher: a private letter, addressed to Voltaire, in which Rousseau seeks to teach his contemporary that the doubt that is both the beginning and end point characteristic of metaphysical questions is fundamentally separate from the (healthy) prejudices with which one must begin and end considerations about moral and, secondarily, political questions.

In the postscript, Kelly makes explicit his understanding that for Rousseau, philosophy is both the cure and the cause of the ills both of society and philosophy itself. Philosophy “when understood as the attempt to return to oneself and experience both the feeling of existence and the feeling of the power of one’s own imagination and aesthetic sensibility is the best life available to anyone who has begun to think” (p. 181). Seeking to understand the truth about the nature of things is not inherently choiceworthy and is worthy of pursuit only to the extent that “it can provide the solid basis for nonphilosophic experiences” (p. 181).

Rousseau as Author succeeds as a book worthy of study by those who call themselves philosophers precisely because it calls on them to confront their own understanding of their activity in terms of something that Rousseau considered to be more fundamental, namely, the sentiment of existence. The success of the enterprise should not be measured by the number but rather by the quality of the minds it seems certain to enliven.—Damjan de Krnjevic-Miskovic, *The National Interest*, Washington, D.C.

KOISTINEN, Olli and John BIRO, editors. *Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. x + 255 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—This collection of eleven previously unpublished essays should serve both as a valuable resource for Spinoza studies and as a potent stimulus to them. Throughout, exacting attention is devoted to Spinoza’s writings, and considerable analytical acumen is applied to their explication and assessment. Topics most often addressed include Spinoza’s substance monism, his affiliated conception of finite individuals and things, his treatment of causation, his *conatus* doctrine, and his theory of mind. Most of the essays presuppose some familiarity with Spinoza’s writings, the doctrinal debates to which they contributed, and the interpretative debates that they have engendered. Many incorporate helpful overviews of pertinent controversies. Following is an abbreviated indication of the principal theme and thesis of each essay.

Spinoza’s argument for monism evidently depends upon the counterintuitive claim that there can be no two substances both of which exemplify some one attribute. Michael Della Rocca argues that some of Spinoza’s basic commitments, including especially his ideas about expli-

cability, both support that claim and help to close another important apparent gap in the argument. John Carriero champions a different approach. Spinoza's monism is usually thought to be rooted in ruminations upon the traditional category of substance or in related reflections upon individuation. Carriero argues, instead, that Spinoza's monism is best understood to be based upon reflections concerning the novel conception of specifically material bodies required by Cartesian science.

Richard Mason argues that the *Ethics* undertakes precisely to provide a philosophical grounding for just such a science. Hence, he contends, it suffices for Spinoza to demonstrate the endlessness and connectedness of the causal chains that determine finite things: he neither needs nor seriously propounds a more comprehensive metaphysics, let alone one in which logic subsumes causality. Olli Koistinen also considers causation in Spinoza, arguing that his substance monism grounds a theory of causation that reconciles a commitment to God's omnicausality with the proposition, foundational to the new science, that changes in finite things are caused only by other such changes. Moreover, Koistinen contends, it does so without engendering the difficulties that variously afflict Descartes's, Malebranche's, and Leibniz's alternative accounts.

Don Garrett, too, explores Spinoza's account of the relations between finite things and the omnicausal substance "in" which they exist. Whatever is "in itself" is cause of itself. A finite thing, Garrett proposes, while ultimately existing "in" the one substance, can still be said to be "in itself" in a qualified sense: it exerts its own share of God's power to cause the continuation of its own existence. Garrett interprets Spinoza's *conatus* doctrine thusly and contends that when read along these lines, the argument for that doctrine avoids a number of otherwise apparent equivocations. Steven Barbone takes up a related theme: Spinoza's complicated category of individuals. This concept is crucial not only metaphysically but also ethically and politically: for Spinoza, should the state count as an individual, it would be the bearer of its own *conatus* and would be deemed virtuous to precisely the extent that it exercised power. Barbone argues that for Spinoza the state is not an individual. Also addressing Spinozism's ethical implications, Charles Jarrett argues that good and evil, for Spinoza, can be relative in four distinct senses. Once we have discerned their content and connectedness, we can see that Spinoza's ethical thinking is much more rigorous than references to relativity might suggest—but we can also see, Jarrett argues, that some of his arguments at least appear to involve illegitimate shifts between distinct senses of relativity.

Richard N. Manning argues that Spinoza propounds a teleological account of human behavior—but one which ascribes efficacy to our representations of ends, not to ends *per se*, and which therefore remains consistent with his denials of divine teleology and of final causation. Nonetheless, Manning argues, Spinoza's account of behavior fails on more general grounds, owing to problems bound up with his manner of conceiving of representational states and their contents. Peter Dalton also addresses Spinoza's account of mentality. Interpreted according to the letter of the text, this account has often seemed to be rife with

difficulties. Dalton argues, however, that one can construct a model of mentality that is thoroughly Spinozistic in spirit and that avoids those difficulties. On this model, what Spinoza calls an "idea" (the kind of activity of which human mentality consists) is figured in terms of a complex analogy with the process of mirroring.

The volume also includes two historical pieces. The first, by Charles Huenemann, explores some noteworthy doctrinal differences between Spinoza's *Metaphysical Thoughts*, Descartes's philosophy, and Spinoza's own later, more mature work. The second, by Mark A. Kulstad, considers the role that Tschirnhaus played in mediating Leibniz's early, influential encounters with Spinoza's ideas.—Steven Hoeltzel, *James Madison University*.

KRAMER, Hilton, and Roger KIMBALL, editors. *The Survival of Culture: Permanent Values in a Virtual Age*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002. xi + 258 pp. Cloth, \$28.95—The essays collected in this volume, free of academic impedimenta and aimed at the educated general reader, are in the spirit of the sort of wide-ranging cultural criticism exemplified by the great reviews of the nineteenth century and still alive today in the *New Criterion*, the estimable journal in which they were originally published. Taken together they constitute a literate and insightful survey of the contemporary cultural scene, with a particular emphasis on the political dimensions and implications of each area treated.

The lead-off essay by Kenneth Minogue is an Oakeshottian reflection on the extent to which modern people have become passive spectators of action, detached from traditional loyalties and modes of identity and thus a kind of new Epicurean, shorn of the genuinely contemplative character of the originals. Eric Ormsby follows this with a judicious appraisal of the possibilities and perils for culture associated with the advent of the new information technology. Anthony Daniels provides a similarly sober account of the many consequences and dilemmas of medical technology (and the utilitarianism that typically accompanies it) for the noble Hippocratic art. David Pryce-Jones's essay recounts the antipolitical utopianism of the totalitarian ideologies that shadowed most of the twentieth century and worries about the potentially destructive utopian tendencies in the contemporary project of European integration. Keith Windschuttle surveys the range of ideologies currently deployed in the academy, most of which derive from vulgarizations of Nietzsche (often by way of Foucault). Edward Said's influential body of work comes in for particular scrutiny here. Mark Steyn contributes a discussion of the now all-too-familiar self-hatred of Western intellectuals with the blunt precision and wit so characteristic of his splendid newspaper columns. Martin Greenberg's essay on Burke manages to educe in brief compass the understanding of freedom that is the animating heart of that exemplary statesman's thought and practice. Diana Schaub makes a case for the importance of political philosophy to the practice of modern politics (and to the retrieval of its now obscured

root principles) centered on the statesmanship of Lincoln. Robert Bork's chapter on the "adversary judiciary" limns the extent to which judges have gone from being the guarantors of the rule of law to the most effective antagonists of traditional institutions and values. Finally, Roger Kimball fittingly recalls the original Ciceronian understanding of culture as the development of the mind analogous to the cultivation of the earth, and connects it with the celebrated (and now largely abandoned) program of criticism proposed by Matthew Arnold.

If there is a dominant theme of the collection, it is the *trahison des clercs* that has had such a formative (or rather deformative) impact on contemporary culture. That theme is central to what I take to be the three anchoring essays by Minogue, Steyn, and Kimball. There is also another threat looming over these essays. Most were written soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and carry an urgency deriving from that terrible day. The loss of confidence that has come over the elites of the contemporary West becomes even more striking when not only the political and cultural order but the very physical existence of the West is under attack from an enemy explicitly dedicated to its destruction.

If there is a desideratum in the volume it perhaps is the lack of more treatment of the fine arts, music in particular. Still, much is covered between the covers of the *Survival of Culture* and one of its principle achievements is to show that, as bad as things may be, there are plenty of witnesses who know what the alternatives are and thus can serve as a source of preservation and renewal. Culture survives.—V. Bradley Lewis, *The Catholic University of America*.

LANGE, Marc. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy, and Mass*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. xvii + 320 pp. Cloth, \$64.95; paper, \$29.95—This clear and engaging book, with useful diagrams, sidebars, and discussion questions, can be used as a textbook for philosophy of physics courses. Lange's philosophical topics should be accessible to undergraduates. Nonetheless, even with Lange's explanations, students without a physics background might find the pages of equations daunting. Moreover, the book lacks an introduction and conclusion, and so do most of its chapters. Thus it is not always easy to see how Lange's discussions fit into his unifying theme.

That theme is that effects should be spatiotemporally local to their causes, and so electromagnetic and strong nuclear forces in particular cannot act at a distance. Lange's key step in arguing for spatiotemporal locality is to argue that fields produced by these forces are ontologically real, contacting the objects causing, and affected by, those fields. In the process of his argument, Lange discusses classical, special-relativistic, and quantum mechanics, as well as metaphysical topics such as realism and causality. Lange also provides a sociological critique of the sometimes inconsistent, sometimes dismissive, attitudes of some scientists

and textbooks toward questions of realism. Lange generally succeeds in convincing the reader that such questions are relevant to both philosophy and physics.

Chapter 1 introduces the concept of spatiotemporal locality and attendant metaphysical concepts such as cause, event, and relational and intrinsic properties.

Chapter 2 argues that electric and magnetic interactions obey spatiotemporal locality if electric and magnetic fields are ontologically real. For so understood fields extend from the objects causing, to those affected by, them. Nonetheless Lange explains that fields may be interpreted as nonreal in two senses: mere dispositions, and shorthand for mathematical expressions (compare the nonreality of any specific average American family with 2.1 children). Lange considers whether potentials and lines of force might be interpreted as real, concluding that the reality of fields is the best hope for establishing spatiotemporal locality.

Chapter 3 examines the first nonreal interpretation of fields, namely, as mere dispositions. Lange argues against understanding dispositions as themselves causally efficacious. But then if fields—real or otherwise—are interpretable as causally efficacious (which, *ex hypothesi*, they are), they should not be interpreted as dispositions.

Here Lange might have concluded that fields should be interpreted as either real or nonreal in the sense of being shorthand for mathematical expressions. Instead, chapter 4 asks why one would think action at a distance impossible in the first place. Chapter 5 answers: it seems to violate the laws of energy and momentum conservation. But, Lange claims, energy and momentum might themselves be mere calculational devices that can be added or subtracted from a system to preserve conservation laws. Action at a distance, and so the nonreality of fields, is still possible.

Chapters 6 and 7 are interchapters. Chapter 6 asks whether there might be anything fundamental in the universe *beside* fields; Lange remains agnostic. Chapter 7 explains how special relativity unifies electricity and magnetism.

Chapter 8 argues that according to relativity neither energy nor momentum is real but are different aspects of the same real thing, namely, mass. Lange then discusses how to understand " $E = mc^2$." What does this have to do with establishing spatiotemporal locality via establishing the reality of fields? Lange argues that attributing mass to the strong nuclear force field in an atomic nucleus accounts for discrepancies in mass during atomic decay. But if a field has mass, then that field must be ontologically real. Lange generalizes to cases involving electromagnetic force. And so spatiotemporal locality is preserved in cases concerning either force.

Chapter 9 observes that quantum mechanics poses a different challenge to locality. Lange notes that interpreting quantum mechanics as complete, as the Copenhagen interpretation does, allows it to violate spatiotemporal locality. But Lange also notes that interpreting it as incomplete cannot leave room for hidden variables that might obey locality. For Bell's argument shows that as long as quantum-mechanical predictions match nature, there is no room for hidden variables obeying all of Bell's assumptions, notable among which is spatiotemporal locality.

Lange then offers his own suggestion for preserving spatiotemporal locality, closing with problems to that suggestion. Some conclusion, to the chapter and book, would have been welcomed.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics is a good introduction, as its subtitle suggests, to the concepts of locality, fields, energy, and mass. It is also a good introduction to certain concepts in metaphysics. Nonetheless, unless students have some background in physics, Lange's book requires a good instructor to explain the physics, as well as to highlight how Lange's theme of spatiotemporal locality unifies his book.—Nathaniel Goldberg, *Georgetown University*.

LAWLOR, Leonard. *Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. xii + 286 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$19.95—In "The Original Motivation: Defend the Derridean Faith," which serves as the book's preface, the author openly acknowledges that the book often has "the tone of 'setting the record straight'" (p. 7). Yet Lawlor's aim is not to take sides in a sterile polemic between defenders and critics of Derrida's reading of Husserl. Instead, what he provides is a thoroughly informed reconstruction of the development of Derrida's early thought, much of which, as is well known, took shape through an *Auseinandersetzung* with Husserl.

Despite its title, then, *Derrida and Husserl* is primarily about Derrida, and only secondarily about Husserl. A reader who approaches the book with the hope of gaining some perspective on the Husserl–Derrida debate will come away disappointed: the Husserl one finds is in every case Derrida's Husserl, and no attempt is made to see things through Husserl's eyes. Consequently, where Husserl is concerned, Lawlor's analysis comes off as a something of a broadside. Where Derrida is concerned, on the other hand, the book has much to offer.

The chapters are in effect mini-commentaries on different Derridean texts. After preparing the way for Derrida with a discussion of Eugen Fink, Lawlor turns to an investigation of Derrida's "'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology" (1959). In this essay, he argues, Derrida engages in a "phenomenological critique" of Husserl, that is, a critique that makes use of phenomenology's own "principle of all principles" in order to uncover residual "dogmatisms" in Husserl's thought. Derrida's basic claim is that in seeking the origins or genesis of "the world," Husserl was forced in various ways to transgress his self-imposed restriction to evidential givenness: "genesis overflows phenomenological evidence" (p. 27).

These themes are developed further in Lawlor's investigations of Derrida's *Le Problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl* (1953–54) and *Introduction to Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry"* (1962). After rich examinations of Tran-Duc-Thao and Jean Cavailles, we are told that Derrida wants to "up the ante" on their dialectical

critiques of Husserl by developing a new kind of dialectical critique that neither reduces the ideal to the real (as Thao's does) nor absorbs the real into the ideal (as Cavaillès's does). In *Le Problème de la genèse*, this is accomplished by showing that Husserl could not avoid engaging in metaphysics of the very kind that he proscribed, for "the pursuit of the absolute origin could be achieved only by examining actual genesis" (p. 82). As a result, phenomenology is reduced to being "only a moment of the dialectic between phenomenology and ontology" (p. 83). In the following chapter, Hegel's influence on Derrida comes even more strongly to the fore, this time via Jean Hyppolite, whose famous interpretation of Hegel, we learn, exerted considerable influence on the *Introduction*. Through Hyppolite, Derrida becomes aware for the first time of the problem of the sign, and he is led through a meditation on the dialectics of the "logic of totality" (p. 139) to his concept of *différance*.

When Derrida comes into contact with the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, however, the dialectic between phenomenology and ontology is transformed, with Husserl and Heidegger now placed together in the category of "onto-phenomenology" and opposed to Levinasian "metaphysics." In the 1964 essay "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida argues that Levinas's attempt to think the other falls prey to the very "Greek" ontologizing that he hoped to avoid. The lesson Derrida draws, according to Lawlor, is that "the resources and power of the Greek *logos* cannot be deconstructed" (p. 156). Derrida therefore strives to develop what Lawlor calls "the impossible system," that is, a view that insists on thinking nonpresence, openness to the other, while at the same time recognizing the inescapability of the demand for presence. The solution, apparently, is simply to embrace this contradiction.

This sets the stage for the analyses of *Voice and Phenomenon* (1967), the culminating work of Derrida's early period. For Lawlor, the aim of these analyses is not simply to brand Husserl a metaphysician of presence. Rather, he says, Derrida is trying to lead us to an "experience" in which the most basic question of philosophy—the "unheard-of question"—can be asked. He wants us to enter into a debate between philosophy and nonphilosophy, between presence and alterity, between the Greek *logos* and the "non-Greek non-foundation" (p. 233). Only later would Derrida come to believe that to pose a question—even an "unheard-of question"—in this way is "inadequate to the requirements of ethics and politics" (p. 212).

Derrida's interpretation of Husserl raises many important questions about phenomenology, but a more sympathetic reading of Husserl would take his own attempts at answering those questions seriously, before concluding that they are unavoidably subject to an all-destroying dialectical critique. A leitmotif of the present book, for example, is the claim that the paradoxes and contradictions that Husserl finds himself enmeshed in are the result of his desire to remain within the confines of intuitive description while at the same time engaging in formal analysis. Reconciling these two desiderata is doubtless not a simple proposition, but Husserl was well aware of this problem, and he did much to try to solve it. In short, how one feels about the convincingness of Lawlor's "defense of the Derridean faith" will largely depend on how one ante-

cedently feels about the convincingness of Derrida's own conclusions.—Thane Naberhaus, *Georgetown University*.

LUFT, Sebastian. *"Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie": Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink*. Phaenomenologica, vol. 166. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. xi + 318 pp. Cloth, \$125.00—It has long been known that the two topics that preoccupied Husserl most in his later years were intersubjectivity and the phenomenological reduction. But while the first of these topics has received considerable scholarly attention for at least thirty years now, the latter topic has largely been neglected by Husserl scholars. No longer. With the recent publication of Husserl's late manuscripts on the reduction (Hua 34, edited by Luft), it has become clear just how central the task of devising a systematic presentation of the phenomenological philosophy, anchored in the reduction, was to Husserl's understanding of the "mission" of phenomenology. Moreover, the outstanding scholarship of Ronald Bruzina has revealed the extent to which Husserl's thinking on this topic was influenced by Eugen Fink, his assistant and—as Bruzina shows—close collaborator in his "last decade."

Luft's contribution to this emerging wing of Husserl scholarship lies in the way he forces us to consider the possibility that certain fundamental Husserlian principles—most importantly, the "principle of all principles," that is, the notion that intuitive demonstration is the indispensable bedrock of phenomenological philosophy—must be called into question when one attempts to advance beyond mere phenomenological description and develop a phenomenological system. It is both a basic conviction and a central conclusion of the book that "when one harbors pronounced systematic aspirations, as Husserl does, one cannot dispense with speculative thinking" (p. 306). Drawing on his intimate knowledge of Husserl's late manuscripts on the reduction, Luft attempts to demonstrate this conclusion by contrasting Husserl's approach to the issue of phenomenology's systematic character with Fink's outline of a phenomenological system in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. Fink's "merit," Luft argues, is to have shown that phenomenology "cannot do without reflection on its systematic character" (p. 157). More controversially, however, Fink also claims that such reflection "*cannot itself proceed phenomenologically*—or at least *not only* phenomenologically" (p. 158). Husserl no doubt disagreed, but Luft, following Fink, argues that the systematic character of phenomenology "cannot be analyzed in the 'straightforward' manner" (p. 139) of standard phenomenological analysis.

This is a weighty claim, for if true it implies that one is forced either to give up the aspiration for a phenomenological system or to abandon what heretofore had been understood as that which makes phenomenology distinctive, the latter option giving rise to the worry that

phenomenology could before long become indistinguishable from the great "speculative" systems of German Idealism against which it had always defined itself. The question, then, is whether one can engage in a "phenomenology of phenomenology" in a way that does not require abandoning the recourse to intuitive givenness. Husserl's extensive marginal comments to the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* suggest that he thought this was indeed possible, and although Luft considers many of these comments, he does so mainly only after he has already concluded that reflection on the systematic character of phenomenology requires giving up the principle of all principles.

At the heart of the dispute between Husserl and Fink is the status of the "neutral onlooker," a concept that Fink introduces in order to explain the difference between the "I" that engages in phenomenological reflection and the world-constituting transcendental "I" whose activity is uncovered through the method of epoché and reduction. For Fink, the phenomenologizing onlooker must be made a theme unto itself, and when we do that, he thinks, we necessarily introduce a "rupture" into the transcendental domain which leads not only to a "splitting of the I" (which Husserl himself speaks of in the *Cartesian Meditations*), but also to a "dualism" of "two 'completely different' dimensions" (p. 173). This dualism is central both to Fink's understanding of the problems that need to be addressed by phenomenological method—foremost among them, the problem of "transcendental language," that is, the problem of how the phenomenologist, once he has entered the phenomenological attitude, can communicate his insights to those who have not (yet) done so—and to his proposed solutions to those problems. Fink's approach, according to Luft, leads to an "elitist" (p. 264) view of phenomenology in which the phenomenologist, rather like Kierkegaard's knight of faith, is forever separated by an unbridgeable gap from his fellow human beings. Yet Husserl's "radically Enlightenment-inspired" (p. 292) conception of phenomenology as the culmination and completion of the Western scientific ideal and as charged with the task of overcoming every form of naiveté and thereby "turning all men into philosophers" (p. 294) is, Luft argues, equally problematic.

Luft's analyses are extraordinarily subtle and nuanced (indeed, sometimes rather too much so; one sometimes wishes he would slow down and explain things in less Finkian terminology), and those who think (as this reviewer does) that the issues he discusses are of critical importance for an understanding of the precise nature of a phenomenological philosophy can only rejoice in the fact that he has lavished his considerable interpretive talents on such a difficult group of texts. There is much room for disagreement with his analyses and conclusions; but if progress is to be made on these questions, it will only occur through the efforts of those who, like Luft, are prepared to face squarely the difficulties posed by a "phenomenology of phenomenology." *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie* will no doubt become an indispensable reference point for all further discussions of this topic.—Thane Naberhaus, *Georgetown University*.

MACKEY, Louis. *An Ancient Quarrel Continued: The Troubled Marriage of Philosophy and Literature*. New York: University Press of America, 2002. 283 pp. Paper, \$43.00. SCANLAN, James P. *Dostoevsky the Thinker*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 251 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—The issue of literature versus philosophy dates at least from Plato and Aristotle. Sydney, Kant, and Shelley grappled with it, the discussion was continued during the last two centuries, and we do have currently a respectable society that is devoted to the dialectic between the two fields. Both books discussed here are squarely placed in this particular field.

The book of Mackey is actually a collection of analytical articles framed by a couple of explanatory theoretical essays. He writes with varying degrees of judiciousness about critics like Northrop Frye and I. A. Richards, and writers like Thomas Pynchon and Robert Coover, about science fiction and courtly love. Unfortunately, the foundation of these explorations is less than clear and firm. Mackey is convinced that philosophy at some point supplanted literature by positing a "naturalistic and conceptual" language to the vatic, dissembling, and mythical utterances of traditional narration and subsequently of poetry. He is careful to repeat that he does not aim to "prove" anything (or even less to reach a "total and culminating truth") but just "converge upon a proof" (pp. vi–vii). Curiously, he emphasizes with equal energy that literature is falsehood, in a kind of vulgarization of Platonic arguments.

Fortunately, Scanlan's study is, by contrast, able to show that an approach that works on the interface of philosophy and literature can also produce worthy and interesting results. The merits of his book are not just the outcome of coherence and focus, nor are they the predictable scion of a long prior series of studies on his particular topic: the philosophical dimension of Dostoevsky's chief writings. More important is an issue that Scanlan does not dwell upon, but that he seems to be aware of. The habitual sociopolitical historiography divides intellectual life in nineteenth-century Russia into the large opposed camps of the "Slavophiles" and the "Westernizers." They usually overlook that there was another division, one between the followers of Hegel and those of Schelling: both German philosophers had been absorbed and adopted with tremendous intensity and had become the object of heated polemics in post-1830 Russia, perhaps more than anywhere in Europe. While a very large majority of Hegelians tended to be "Westernizers," the admirers and followers of Schelling were more divided. A good number among these may have also been "Westernizers," except that they liked the values of beauty and of mystical religion, the examination of which abounded in the later work of Schelling. True, Dostoevsky was too much of an individualist to "belong" to any of these groups. Yet he was also too sensitive not to perceive resonances of any and all of these tensions and debates.

Scanlan divides neatly and comprehensively the philosophical concerns of Dostoevsky. He understands perfectly and conveys without hesitation that for the great Russian novelist and thinker the central principle and concern was that spirit has and ought to have priority over matter and material issues. Starting from a grasp of this concept, Scanlan shows how it determines the other preoccupations of

Dostoevsky's thinking. The Russian novelist denies the power of "rational egoism" and raises against it the flag of an "ethic of altruism." He struggles mightily against the numerous foes of the beautiful, in fact he defends and puts forward the proposition that the aesthetic might well have salvational value. Dostoevsky is persuaded that a Christian Utopia is possible and desirable and that one should struggle for it, even if this implies adversities to groups such as the Jews, or whole modes of existence such as Western civilization. What is more, Dostoevsky is ready in his later years to argue that precisely Russia (in its ethnicity, in its traditions, in its potential, in its ways of behavior) can carry out or accomplish this kind of Christian Utopia.

Scanlan describes these things with great clarity and objectivity and ought to be praised and thanked for it. My main reserve is that he does not dwell enough on the techniques used by Dostoevsky in order to enact his thinking and transfer it into fictional prose. The analyses of Bakhtin (a Christian thinker and critic) who did this with great acumen are sparsely mentioned. However even a study of the kind written by Scanlan will prove extremely useful to many readers.—Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

MINER, Robert C. *Vico: Genealogist of Modernity*. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2002. xvi + 215 pp. Cloth, \$37.50—The renaissance of Vico studies that has developed in the last three decades has focused on Vico's revival of the Italian humanist tradition, his conception of imagination (*fantasia*) as a form of knowledge, and his importance for what Isaiah Berlin calls the "critics of the Enlightenment" which include Herder and Hamann. Vico's attack on Descartes together with his anti-Enlightenment, cyclical conception of history has been the basis for the Vichian criticism of modernity. Vico's *New Science* with its emphasis on memory, myth, and metaphysics has come upon the scene of contemporary thought as a lively alternative to the schools of Anglo-American and Continental philosophy. Vico, understood in the above manner, is a presence in the major works of Gadamer, Derrida, Habermas, and MacIntyre.

What might broadly be called the "humanist interpretation" of Vico, ranging from Leon Pompa's rationalistic reading of the *New Science* to Andrea Battistini's, Michael Mooney's, and Donald Phillip Verene's emphasis on its roots in rhetoric and poetic, contrasts with what might be called the "religious interpretation" of Vico. The main exponent of the religious interpretation has been John Milbank. To this approach can now be added the work of Robert Miner. Milbank's endorsement of Miner's book that appears on the jacket concludes: "This book is a winner." In the Italian literature there has long been a Catholic interpretation of Vico that has stood alongside Marxist, Existentialist, Idealist, and other interpretations. Miner has brought the interpretation of Vico as an

orthodox Catholic thinker forward into the English-language interpretation of Vico. The uniqueness of his approach is captured in the two terms of his subtitle.

Miner takes the term "genealogy" from Nietzsche. Miner's connection of Vico's philosophy to genealogy seems quite close to Max Fisch's claim in the preface to the translation of Vico's autobiography that Vico's work "has the unique interest of being the first application of the genetic method by an original thinker to his own writings," although Miner does not mention this observation. Miner emphasizes that Vico is a genealogist in the sense of explaining cultural phenomena through an analysis of their genesis and that this is closely in accord with Vico's principle that doctrines should take their beginnings from the subjects they treat. Vico uses neither the term "genealogy" nor the term "modernity." Vico as "genealogist of modernity" means that we can discover through Vico's principles how modernity arises. What we call modernity, Vico calls "the barbarism of reflection" (*la barbarie della riflessione*) that typifies the final age of Vico's three ages of a cycle of his "ideal eternal history." In this age of "modernity" thought becomes abstract and loses its connection with the poetic sense of the world; society is held together by legalism and procedure instead of custom and religion.

Miner does not accept Vico's barbarism of reflection as a nihilism but sees it as offset by Vico's dedication to Providence as the basis of historical change and to piety and wisdom as necessary virtues. Miner wishes to establish that Vico is not a secular skeptic or cynic but a believer in traditional Christian doctrine. Behind Vico's critique of modernity is the doctrine of Christian hope. Miner finds in his analysis of Vico's *New Science* a new philosophical theology, new hope for modern man, as it were.

In terms of Vico scholarship two aspects of Miner's work make it especially interesting: his thesis that Vico's philosophy is normative and his grounding of Vico's new science in Vico's *Universal Law*. Thinkers like Vico whose main work is essentially metaphysical and historical are often thought not to have an ethics. Although Miner is not unique in this respect, he shows that Vico's science of the nature of nations always has a normative thrust, that there is a divinely created human nature that is the standard for proper human action that exists behind history. The sense in which Vico's *Universal Law* is a first draft of Vico's *New Science* is often passed over by Vico's interpreters, notable exceptions being the works of Verene and Mark Lilla. Vico understands Roman law once it is joined with Christian doctrine to provide the principles of human society; thus Vico formulates in his own terms the meaning for modern society of the first claim of the *Digest*, that "jurisprudence is philosophy."

At the end of his autobiography Vico compares himself to Socrates and says he would be willing to suffer Socrates' fate if he could have his fame. It is a pagan, not a Christian image that Vico uses to imply he is the modern Socrates, perhaps the "true Socrates" parallel to his concept of the "true Homer." Whether Miner has discovered the "true Vico" or whether Vico may escape from his hands, as Socrates tells Crito he may

in the *Phaedo*, the reader must ultimately decide.—Thora Ilin Bayer,
Xavier University of Louisiana, New Orleans.

MODRAK, Deborah K. W. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ix + 302 pp. Cloth, \$70.00—This is a comprehensive and illuminating examination of Aristotle's philosophy of language. Aristotle's brief account of signs in *De Interpretatione* has been dismissed as superficial and inadequate, mainly by commentators who have tended to read it in isolation. Especially cryptic is Aristotle's Likeness Thesis: spoken words are symbols or signs of *pathēmata* (affections) of the soul, which are "likenesses" of things (16a3–8). Modrak argues that this thesis needs to be explicated in terms of Aristotle's other works such as *Posterior Analytics*, *Metaphysics*, and *De Anima*.

Part I deals with language and knowledge. Chapter 1: Plato's *Cratylus* presents two opposing views of meaning—naturalism and conventionalism—and finds both wanting. Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* offers a compromise between these views: the relations between written and spoken words and between spoken words and mental states are conventional, but that between mental states and the objects they represent is natural. Chapter 2: Aristotle holds a correspondence theory of truth, and he treats necessity as a property that a statement has in relation to what it asserts. These are important for his claim that scientific knowledge must be derived from necessarily true first principles. Chapter 3: *Posterior Analytics* argues that the human mind is so related to the world that it is able to grasp the basic categories and kinds existing in reality. Modrak rejects as overly Cartesian the intuitionist interpretation of nondemonstrative knowledge of first principles and universal concepts; instead, she argues, Aristotle is an empiricist and moderate realist: really existing kinds cause humans to know them through sense-experience and induction. But it remains mysterious how they are able to do this. Chapter 4: Aristotle's three types of demonstrative science—mathematics, natural science, and first philosophy—are all empirically based. The method of dialectic employing *endoxa* (reputable beliefs) complements this empirical approach.

Part 2 deals with definition and essence. Chapter 5: In *Metaphysics* VII Modrak sees as fundamental Aristotle's claim that the *logos* (formula) grasped in thought is the same as the form (or essence) of the concrete substance. She views this as the "missing link" needed to explain the mysterious process of nondemonstrative knowledge in the *Posterior Analytics*. Chapter 6: The *Metaphysics* explains the basis for moderate realism: forms exist in the world, make physical substances what they are, and are accessible to human minds. Thus the meaning of a natural kind term, for example, "horse," is the articulation of the species form, for example, horseness, that is realized in substances.

Part 3 deals with cognition and meaning. Chapter 7: In *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*, meaning requires *phantasia* (imagination), the ability to use sensory contents to represent objects, but *phantasia* alone is insufficient to explain reference. Chapter 8: Meaning also requires the cognitive capacity, which involves conceptualizing the content presented in the *phantasma* (image). Modrak now uses the foregoing results to explain *De Interpretatione*'s Likeness Thesis along the following lines: The *pathêma* or mental sign is the *phantasma* used by thought to grasp a *logos*. The *logos* grasped in thought is the same as the *logos* in the external object. Therefore, the *pathêma* qua *phantasma* is like a token of the same type of which the external object is a token. Therefore, the *pathêma* in a sense resembles the external object and is a natural sign of it. Chapter 9 briefly contrasts Aristotle's philosophy of language with modern views.

Modrak's solution depends on a crucial (but implicit in Aristotle) distinction between two kinds of likeness: sensible likeness, for example, as a painted red circle resembles a red apple in a bowl; and intelligible likeness, for example, as a *phantasma* (image) of a round object used to represent a geometrical circle resembles the abstract circle by exhibiting features common to all circles (see p. 259). This "enriched notion of likeness" depends upon moderate realism, that is, his claim that there really exist in the world species forms of which our mental contents can serve as likenesses.

Aside from this distinction some readers will disagree with Modrak on some highly contested interpretative issues concerning *logos*, form, *phantasia*, truth, and so on. Some matters are not covered as thoroughly as one might wish, especially the relation between *phantasia* and thought. Some claims are also questionable, for example her dismissal of Aristotle's distinction between rational and sensory *phantasia* (p. 34). But such disagreements are to be expected. Modrak has provided an original, enlightening, and thought provoking synthesis which will be indispensable for future students of Aristotle's philosophy of language.—Fred Miller, *Bowling Green State University*.

NEIMAN, Susan. *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. xii + 304. Cloth, \$29.95—Neiman's aims in this book are revolutionary: she believes "that, in some form or other, the problem of evil is the root from which modern philosophy springs" and, with this book, she hopes "to reorient the discipline to [this, the] real roots of philosophical questioning" (p. 13). To help achieve this end, she has written an "alternative history" of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy which places the problem of evil at its center. This is possible, she argues, because "eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy was guided by the problem of evil" (p. 7).

Neiman develops this history in three chapters. Like traditional accounts of philosophy in the modern period that divide philosophers into two groups, the rationalists and the empiricists, Neiman divides modern philosophers into two camps, but on her view these camps are distinguished by whether they take evil to be "intelligible" (p. 8) and are therefore willing to write theodicies of one form or another to demonstrate that it is. Among those who do, she counts Leibniz, Pope, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. She devotes her first chapter to a discussion of their views. Among those who do not, she counts Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, Sade, and Schopenhauer. She devotes her second chapter to a discussion of their views. In a third chapter, she brings the historical discussion to an end with separate discussions of the views of Nietzsche and Freud. She then turns in a final chapter to a discussion of the influence of the problem of evil on twentieth-century philosophy. This chapter focuses on the work of Camus, Arendt, the Critical Theorists, and Rawls. There is a great deal of interesting material in these historical sketches. Neiman does a good job in showing how the problem of evil is connected to a number of seemingly unrelated positions taken by these philosophers and she is equally good at tracing certain, somewhat obscure, ideas and topics from one philosopher to another. Her discussions of Rousseau and Kant are particularly good, allowing the reader new insights on the nature of the problems they addressed and the connection between the two. Other sketches, such as those of Nietzsche and Rawls, are, however, less illuminating.

It is doubtful, however, that these sketches amount to "an alternative history of philosophy" or that they show that the problem of evil is "the real root of philosophical questioning." One reason for such doubts can be found in the list of thinkers Neiman discusses. Not only are many of them not philosophers (or are only philosophers of secondary importance), but many important philosophers of the period are not discussed at all. Moreover, although most philosophers of this period wrote about the problem of evil or about topics closely related to this problem, Neiman does not show that this problem lies at the core of their thinking. Hume's empiricism, for example, does not seem to be related to it at all.

Neiman argues that this history has a particular shape in that the problem of evil has undergone a fundamental change during the modern period, a change that is illustrated by the two great paradigms of evil which stand at either end of this period. At the beginning of the modern period, philosophers took the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 as the best example of evil, while today, as Neiman points out, we do not think of earthquakes as evil at all, but instead reserve the word to describe human actions: our paradigmatic evil is Auschwitz. Neiman's history is meant, in part, to explain this change in focus from "natural evil" to "moral evil" (p. 22). In the course of this great change, Neiman suggests, the problem of evil has itself been transformed: what was originally a problem for religion has become a general philosophical problem. Moreover, she argues, this change is connected to various on-going changes in our concept of the self.

Neiman ends her book with a discussion of evil in twentieth-century thought, a discussion that centers on Arendt's writings about Eichmann

and the Holocaust and on her concept of the "banality of evil" (pp. 299–304). Neiman argues that while, during the modern period, the concept of evil was increasingly connected to the concept of intention, in the twentieth century that connection has been severed. What cut that connection, on her view, was not so much the rise of the social sciences (as one might think), but the rise of new social institutions. During this century, that is to say, great evil was done not by men of great evil, but by minor and unremarkable bureaucrats. To understand evil today, therefore, it must be understood as separated from intentionality. Neiman's book, by tracing the history of the problem of evil is intended to prepare us for this new change.—Roger Paden, *George Mason University*.

OBERHAUSEN, Michael and Riccardo POZZO, editors. *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Königsberg (1720 – 1804)*. 2 vols. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friederich Frommann Verlag, 1999. lxvii + 778 pp. Cloth, 548 DM—Contributing to the research on university history, Professors Oberhausen and Pozzo have edited the course announcements at the University of Königsberg, the *Albertina*, and written a valuable introduction with a register of terms and names of authors. The time covered, from 1720 to 1804, embraces the two decades before Immanuel Kant's admission to the university through his years there. In Europe, it was the era of the Enlightenment and the grand French Revolution. The editors' two volumes offer a case of currents in Enlightenment geographies that Jan Golinski maps. The *Albertina* was a mid-size university, enrolling as many as four hundred freshmen in 1717 to 252 in 1732. Located on the eastern periphery of Prussia, Königsberg was distant from the main French current of Enlightenment thought.

Oberhausen and Pozzo concur with Mordechai Feingold's description of the difficulties that face scholars attempting to reconstruct university courses of studies. A discrepancy exists between the prescribed official curriculum and what was actually taught. The editors clarify course offerings by identifying who taught at Königsberg, listing textbooks and their success as indicated by the number of times used, and noting authors or books rarely or not included. Even beyond the university reform of 1771, the *Albertina* had four faculties: the three higher faculties of law and theology followed by medicine, together with the lower faculty of philosophy: essentially, arts and sciences. Philosophy so defined provided preparatory studies for the three higher faculties.

Through the course announcements, the editors show that studies at the *Albertina* were distinctive, differing from courses in leading universities in the West and the work at the science academies in Brunswick, Göttingen, Greifswald, Munich, and especially Berlin, where the new sciences displaced Aristotelian thought. During the eighteenth century, Aristotelian philosophy, particularly as revised in the sciences by Jacopo Zabarella, continued to dominate at the *Albertina*, supplemented by a Platonic renaissance after 1770. Christian Wolff, Alexander

Baumgarten, and Christian Crusius, who combines metaphysics and empiricism, gain attention, while the names of Descartes and Leibniz appear only four times. Not external reactionary forces upon the university, but the triumph of Wolffian philosophy in north German lands around mid-century account for this. Latin is the language of learning with a gradual shift to the vernacular German and new terminology that may be partly traced from Christian Wolff's *Deutscher Logik* of 1713 through Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* of 1781. Still, to the end of the century the faculty emphasize that university students must know Latin.

The courses reveal that the *Albertina* faculty, except for Kant, Knutzen, Schultz, and Teske, was not significantly engaged in original scientific research and that metaphysics remained prominent. As William Clark asserts, in France and the Berlin Academy it was losing to the sciences. Course textbooks show almost an ignorance of eminent names and landmark works in the sciences. Newton's *Opticks* is cited only once and the *Principia mathematica* is absent. Nor is there discussion of the transforming research of Leonhard Euler in mechanics, astronomy, geometric optics, and higher mathematics. Only his *Algebra* is noted in any course. The *Albertina* was a Wolffian stronghold in the mid-eighteenth century succeeded by Kantian dominance. Among the extensively used Wolffian textbooks were the *Auszug aus den Anfangsgründen aller mathematischen Wissenschaften für die Anfänger auf Schulen* of 1717 by Wolff, which received ninety-five citations, Tübingen's Heinrich Clemm's *Erste Gründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften* of 1759, fifty-five, and Königsberger Johann Schultz's *Anfangsgründe der reinen Mathesis* of 1790, thirty.

On the medical faculty, which covered medicine, botany, and chemical research, Hermann Boerhaave of the University of Leiden long remained the model in medicine. In botany Linnaeus's *Philosophia botanica* is cited eight times and his *Systema natura* seven times. Neither the courses nor Kant mention Caspar Friedrich Wolff's *Theoria generationis* of 1759 on epigenesis. Emphasizing pharmacology, chemical work does not move far beyond its state early in the century in German lands. The debate between the Paracelsians and the herbalists continues. The *Albertina* faculty seems to lack knowledge of the findings of Antoine Lavoisier.

Oberhausen and Pozzo provide a crucial source, largely untapped, on the evolution of the network of ideas at the University of Königsberg and its institutional development during the eighteenth century. Their two-volume source work promises to bring out the traditions in the sciences pursued there and to give a fuller account of the evolution of Kant's thought. Studies of the *Albertina* curriculum and those at other regional universities also appear an essential component in understanding the initial advances in German research universities after 1800.—Ronald Calinger, *The Catholic University of America*.

PRICE, Daniel J. *Karl Barth's Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002. v + 322 pp. Paper, \$34.00—In the words of chapter 1, this book addresses the question “What is man?” and what it terms the plight of modern humanity. Price believes that Karl Barth has many of the resources necessary to an understanding of human nature which has been lost in modern culture. He concentrates on Barth's anthropology, in volume 3.2 of the *Church Dogmatics*, which he regards as widely overlooked. Specifically, Price contends that Barth's anthropology bears an important similarity to the findings of object relations psychology. By focusing on this similarity, and thereby avoiding reductionism and traditional mind-body dualism, Price wishes to facilitate a dialogue between the human sciences and Christian anthropology and thus to explore new paths for the healing of “whole persons.”

Space considerations preclude anything but a brief sketch of Price's main concerns. Chapter 2 takes Kant as central to the Enlightenment and indicates problems in Kant's anthropology from Barth's point of view. Among these are Kant's failure to overcome the dualisms of classical anthropologies and the individualist anthropology that results from the role of rationality in Kant's ethics. Against this, Price contends, Barth defends a theology which stands on its own feet in relation to philosophy and sees its point of departure in revelation.

Price's third chapter discusses the “second major foil” to Barth's theology as expressed in the theology of Schleiermacher. Omitting the details of his elaborate discussion, Price once more concludes that there are shortcomings from Barth's own perspective. These include Schleiermacher's resting theology on the subjective expression of human consciousness and his placing humankind at the center of discussions of God and the world.

These initial chapters are followed by three lengthy chapters devoted to Barth's theological anthropology, object relations psychology, and a comparison of the ideas found in each. I shall mention but a few leading themes, remarking first that Price includes a critical analysis of Freud and that his account of object relations psychology is confined chiefly to that of the Scottish psychoanalyst W. Ronald D. Fairbairn (1889–1964).

Very briefly put, then, Price suggests that both Barth and Fairbairn articulate a dynamic concept of the person, in that they deny that the individual person can be defined as a self-contained system. In this way each describes the human being as an indissoluble unity. This holistic focus permits the avoidance of both psychologism and reductionism regarding the psychological self. In object relations theory, the foundational structure of a personality is always shaped within a social matrix. Likewise, Price observes, Barth's dynamic-interpersonal ontology entails that persons are composed of the relations which constitute their personal being. Barth's dynamic anthropology is admittedly trinitarian, and on Price's account our pathway to Godlikeness can thus be effected only by a shared journey with God and others. Obviously no such view is endorsed by object relations psychology per se. But Price maintains that a trinitarian theology does not preclude a dialogue between dogmatics and other sciences if disciplinary boundaries are respected.

Indeed, he suggests, scientific studies of human beings can provide heuristic tools with which the theologian may further explore his or her dogma. The implication is that the human sciences and Christian anthropology may thus combine in the healing of "whole persons" as earlier described.

Despite the book's insightful discussions, Price's title and first chapter may easily mislead. The "plight" to which he initially refers involves issues of liberty, equality, and justice (p. 3). Price seems aware that social and political ethics relate to such concerns (p. 6) and hopes that social scientists may find Barth's anthropology of interest (p. 7). Price's conclusion, it may be added, is that "What is man?" is best answered by asking "Who is God?" (p. 308).

Price's book, however, offers no serious discussion of any social or behavioral science besides psychology. Furthermore, the discussion of modern psychology is confined to psychoanalytic theory, with which it seems occasionally identified (compare p. 292), and the psychoanalytic theory is preeminently that of Fairbairn. Moreover, modern philosophical thought is surely relevant to Price's concerns; and indeed there occur references to philosophy, moral philosophy, and even philosophy of science, if not philosophy of mind. But to give a brief if somewhat random list of philosophers who seem relevant to Price's inquiries but whose ideas go undiscussed, there are, for example, Heidegger, Sartre, Hempel, Wittgenstein, Smart, Armstrong, Grünbaum, Rescher, Jaggard, Harding, Chisholm, Nagel, Putnam, Kripke, Davidson, Dennett, Quine, van Fraassen, Rawls, Nozick, Barry, Hare, Parfit, Plantinga, Alston, Hick, Gale, Rowe, Swinburne, Penelhum, and Wainwright. (In a footnote Price devotes one sentence to abusing Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty.) Price's conspicuous neglect of twentieth century philosophy could partly reflect his unorthodox conception of "modern thought" (p. 22 n.), which may render many of the aforementioned philosophers "postmodern" thinkers.

Price's book is essentially about Barth and Fairbairn, with consideration of Freud, Schleiermacher, Kant, Buber, and a few others. Price is not equipped to establish his conclusion and his study concerns modern thought in only a very narrow sense.—T. M. Reed, *University of Utah*.

REDHEAD, Mark. *Charles Taylor: Thinking and Living Deep Diversity*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. iii + 261 pp. Paper, \$25.95—After highlighting a few significant details of Taylor's Anglo-French background and campaign for public office in Canada, Redhead presents a trenchant analysis of his political theory, with its philosophical underpinnings and Catholic spiritual dimension, in addition to plentiful criticisms by the author and others.

Taylor's dissatisfaction with the current political situation in Canada stems from the failure of the federal government to ratify constitutional accords which he supported, and which would have promoted Quebec as a distinct society and self-rule by the Aborigines. Among the conse-

quences are what Taylor defines as a "rights society" based upon an "atomistic" conception of citizenship which emphasizes conflict via litigation, compounded by domineering mainstream values of English Canada. Taylor prefers a participatory democracy that keeps power at a regional level.

Taylor's main vision of "deep diversity" is that of a decentralized Canada which strives to overcome political fragmentation with multiple ways of belonging. Such a scenario would reconcile the conflicting traditions of Pierre Trudeau's cultivating unity and René Levesque's accommodating difference by engendering a "communitarian" spirit with enduring human attachments and allegiances countering the procedural liberalism of a cold government. To achieve this, Taylor proposes Hegel's ontology of *Sittlichkeit* for perpetuating social practices enabling citizens to flourish as autonomous agents. The solidarity thereby created would banish the dominant instrumental rationality indicted by Habermas. To enlarge self-understanding of others, Taylor endorses Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." Here, recognition of identity is central, but critic Will Kymlicka complains that this offers no prescription for checking the excesses of Quebecois nationalism.

In the chapter on "Self-Interpreting Animals" Redhead recounts how Taylor, influenced by Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, refuses to allow Cartesian epistemology or Rawlsian disengaged vision to command the ontology of self-understanding and shared languages which promote meaningful dialogical exchanges. Strong evaluation entails distinguishing right from wrong, mapping different motivations, and deciding how to use one's talents for life fulfillment, in contrast to the weak evaluation of procedural liberalism, which chooses a utilitarian course in the passion for immediacy. Redhead chides Taylor for allegedly failing to engage values from other languages in reevaluating his own values; on the other hand, he defends Taylor against critic Martha Nussbaum by arguing that moral disputes can be more effectively resolved by input from other cultures rather than the dictates of power. *Pace* Foucault, Taylor insists that only when truth and freedom prevail over power can practical reason achieve cogent reevaluation of values in a deeply diverse federation.

The chapter on Taylor's Catholic modernity shows how Taylor's theistically inspired moral vision creates a tension between openness and commonality. He retrieves modernity historically by means of cultural and acultural models, the former applicable to the rise of new cultures in the modern Western hemisphere, and the latter to the neglect of spiritual vision in the transition from premodernity to modernity in the rest of the world. His distinctive account of modernity centers upon "life goods," which imitate radical reevaluation reminiscent of Nietzsche's "transvaluation of values," including benevolence, respect, justice, self-rule, and avoidance of death and suffering. Life goods often sustain conflicts but may be harmonized by, for example, giving appropriate weight to equality and contribution in the case of distributive justice, or, in the case of universal respect, melding the politics of dignity and difference. Such conflicts give rise to political fragmentation, which can be overcome by acknowledging moral sources of life goods, namely,

"constitutive goods," such as contemplation and prayer. The constitutive goods arose from three historic movements: the Christian, the Enlightenment, and the Romantic. The last precipitated protest against disengaged reason at variance with the love of nature. The Romantic dimension of the modern identity entails exercising the creative imagination to produce an "epiphany," which is of the highest moral and spiritual significance. Taylor sees a link with Nietzsche's overcoming of self and affirmation of all reality but cannot espouse his denial of benevolence because that would cause "spiritual mutilation." For Taylor, Judeo-Christian theism transforms identity by decentering the self in relation to God, thereby transcending the incompleteness of mere human flourishing. This act of renunciation of the temporal generates love and compassion in a state of *agape* embracing God's will toward a beneficent obliteration of Nietzschean negativity. The hope for humanity emanating therefrom shuns the inadequacy of the media-hype, contemptible philanthropy, and vindictiveness, which are the dregs of unbridled secular humanism. The spiritual goods of benevolence, respect, authenticity, justice, freedom, and self-rule, as derived from the Transcendent, provide the context for sharing and commonality, enabling citizens of a deeply diverse democracy to overcome fragmentation and live in harmony.

In the remainder of the book *Redhead* weighs a variety of criticisms, discusses tensions within Taylor's moral thought, and proposes polemical alternatives to many of his subject's key prescriptions. Although fellow Catholic Michael Novak defends Taylor's subversion of modernity with a theological challenge saving it from relativism, critics like Russell Hittinger, Robin W. Lovin, and David Miller claim that Taylor does not apply much of his faith to his views on liberal institutions, and still more liberal critics Judith Shklar and Nussbaum fault his lack of reference to the influence of African, Asian, Latino, and other non-Western traditions. Further, Quentin Skinner and Bernard Williams discount the necessity of faith for Taylor's moral ontology.

In a final chapter, "Thinking Beyond the Limits of Deep Diversity," *Redhead* presents, vis-à-vis Taylor, his notion of "rooted cosmopolitanism," allowing greater freedom and mobility contributing to more malleable belonging, and a "more well-rounded assessment of procedural liberalism," which shows how liberal rights protect the goods of autonomy, equality, and sympathy. In this offering *Redhead* advances a non-ontological approach entailing reinterpretation of self-fulfillment based on needs of the moment and radical reevaluation open to a larger array of moral sources, focusing on practical forms of *agape* rather than the transcendent or biblical image. Such an atmosphere would enable the ethic of benevolence to reduce the tension between Taylor's value pluralism and his theism.

Perusal of this admittedly thoroughly researched oeuvre is a bit of an inconvenience, mainly because of semimicroscopic print throughout and a bewildering assortment of end notes at the end of each of the seven chapters. *Redhead* is ostensibly disingenuous in his concluding prediction that modern democrats will appreciate Taylor's insights with respect to dealing with fragmentation. This surprising optimistic note belies the extent of *Redhead's* criticisms, challenges, and proposed solu-

tions. On the positive side, however, I believe that Taylor's spiritually refreshed prescriptions for openness, identity recognition, and shared social practices are extendible to timely interreligious dialogues, especially between Christians and Muslims.—Vincent W. Franco, *Arlington, Virginia*.

SCHÄFER, Christian. *Unde Malum: Die Frage nach dem Woher des Bösen bei Plotin, Augustinus und Dionysius*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002. 521 pp. Cloth, €51.00—Among the questions most vexing to “heretics and philosophers,” Tertullian writes, was the source and nature of evil: *Unde malum et qua in re? (de Praescriptionibus, §7)*. What thinkers like Marcion and Mani could not fathom was Christianity's insistence on the simultaneous omnipotence and goodness of God when explaining evil in the world. While such heresiarchs would allow Christians to have one or the other—either God is good but not in control or is absolutely powerful with just a hint of puckishness about him—they were unable to see how the early Church could maintain the goodness of God and of creation while at the same time give a rational account of human depravity. In order to provide a coherent account of sin and evil, Christian philosophers of course drew from the Neoplatonic tradition in order to explain evil as a *privatio boni*. Christian Schäfer accordingly brings his readers through the three most important exponents of this classical view: Plotinus, St. Augustine, and Pseudo-Dionysius.

Plotinus knew that evils “wander about mortal nature and this place forever” (I.8[51].6.1–4) and Schäfer begins his analysis of evil in the *Enneads* with a very helpful survey of the philosophical schools and literary tradition of ancient Greece which influenced Plotinus. These opening pages thus treat κακόν as understood by Heraclitus, Plato, and Sophocles. Schäfer stresses the quasi-dualism present in these earlier thinkers in order to show how Plotinus' insistence that all is derived from a single origin, the One, forced him to give a more precise account of evil's origins. He therefore set out to explain how the individuality caused by material substantiation is that which brings about an *Unwissenheit und Harmoniestörung* (p. 35). The human soul becomes enamored by that which is good and an instance of the One-on-a-lower-level; paradoxically, therefore, evil is brought about not by some competing substance of the One but by its own emanated beauty. As the soul freely chooses diversity over unity, it finds itself more and more “fanned out” (*Auffächerung*, p. 154), forgetful of its true origin.

According to Schäfer, it is precisely this knowingly willed turn toward lower goods which most influences Augustine. The majority of this volume (pp. 194–379) takes up Augustine's treatment of evil and the reader is brought through many key texts, especially from *De Natura Boni* and *De Moribus Manichaeorum*. Schäfer's analysis here falls within the customary approaches: in order to save both the intrinsic goodness of

the Creator as well as the participatory goodness of creatures, Augustine places the origin of evil in the free will which chooses lesser goods when Good itself is available. Evil is thus not a thing but an action explainable only through good, albeit misused, beings. Schäfer also offers two illuminating excursions. The first is on the fall of the angels and it is here where we most easily see Plotinus' definition of sin as the prideful soul's turning away from the Good influencing Augustine. The second is on *der Birnendiebstahl* where Schäfer argues that Augustine chooses to recall his stealing of the pears so many years later because the sheer emptiness of such an act best represents the merging of sin as pride (*superbia*), as stifling of the self (*curvatio in se ipsum*), and as infidelity (*fornicatur anima*).

Without any depiction of the fall of Adam or of the *felix culpa* of Pauline theology, the pages of Dionysius the Areopagite do not seem to offer much by way of explaining evil. However, this work concludes (pp. 380–472) by examining the Pseudo's strict hierarchy of being (*Seinshierarchie*) and how evil disrupts the intended order of things. After a brief biography, there is a comprehensive survey of Dionysian scholarship and then Schäfer argues that evil actually plays a more venomousness and paradoxical role in the Pseudo's thought than in Augustine's (p. 423). How so? By working through the second half of *The Divine Names* 4, we see how the Pseudo grants disorder ontological status, a "minimal presence . . . subsisting at the lowest order" (DN 720C) and Schäfer makes sense of statements such as these by concentrating on and explicating other passages defining evil as parasitic. This section ends with a very helpful and welcomed look into Dionysius' understanding of Christian *theosis*, that mystical union in which no defect or lack can take hold.

By way of conclusion, Schäfer could have paid more attention to comparing these three thinkers; he could have also shown a greater appreciation of the scriptural and theological influences on Augustine and Dionysius. As it is, however, this is a very helpful volume, providing key texts and an excellent survey of scholarly treatments; the bibliography itself, naturally drawing from mostly Continental scholarship, runs over twenty pages. Originally begun as a habilitation in philosophy at the University of Regensburg, Schäfer has produced an illuminating analysis of the three main advocates of explaining evil as *privatio boni*.—David V. Meconi, S.J., *University of Innsbruck*.

SCOTT, Gary Alan, editor. *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. ix + 327 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—Since the publication of Gregory Vlastos's influential article, "The Socratic Elenchus" [*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983): 27–58], talk of "the *elenchus*" has dominated scholarship concerned with the nature of Socrates' method. Yet for all the attention it has received, consensus has proven remarkably rare. The broad diversity of scholarly opinion

concerning precisely what Socrates is up to in the dialogues is powerfully reflected in this volume. There are those, like James Leshner and Hayden Ausland, who look to the philosophical and rhetorical tradition to uncover the rich diversity of meanings the term *elenchus* had taken on by the time of Socrates; there are others, like Fransico Gonzalez, François Renaud, John Carvalho and Joanne Waugh, who suggest that the Socratic method is directed toward a far more complex set of problems related to the philosophical life than the focus on the *elenchus* as refutation would lead us to believe; there are even those, like Michelle Carpenter, Ronald Polansky, Thomas Brickhouse, and Nicholas Smith, who suggest either that Socrates has no single method, or indeed, that he has no method at all to guide him through the multifarious and multifaceted conversations in which he engages. The great virtue of this volume is that it brings this polyphony of voices to bear on the central question concerning the nature of the Socratic approach to philosophy.

The book is divided into four sections, each featuring three essays followed by a response that serves as a sort of antistrophe. The first section addresses the historical origins of Socratic method, the second re-examines Vlastos's analysis of "the *Elenchus*"; the third section challenges the assumptions of those who read the dialogues dogmatically by focusing on specific dialogues and highlighting the protreptic and deconstructive dimensions of Socrates' philosophizing; finally, the fourth section offers a set of interpretations of the *elenchus* at work in the *Charmides*. According to Scott, the intention behind this structure is to "offer something of interest to all readers of Plato and students of Socrates" (p.7). While the volume certainly does this, its structure, as Scott himself recognizes, precludes genuine dialogue by granting the last word to the critics. Taken as a whole, however, the volume points to and helps flesh out the tension that has come to underlie Platonic scholarship in the English-speaking world over the past thirty years.

Broadly speaking, this tension concerns precisely how to approach the dialogues themselves. In his response to the three essays that make up the third section of the volume, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out a strong critique of those who approach the dialogues "non-dogmatically." Gerson, who espouses a developmentalist position and claims "that the two fundamental pillars of Plato's speculative or systematic philosophy are the separate existence of Forms and the immortality of the soul" (p. 221), criticizes nondogmatic interpretations for their unwillingness to ascribe definitive doctrines to Plato while simultaneously arguing that the dialogues do teach something. For Gerson, this is tantamount to saying that there is and is not a discernible doctrine in the Platonic corpus. Yet while Gerson suggests that nondogmatists equivocate on the term "non-dogmatic," it seems that he himself has too broad a vision of dogmatism. What many of the so-called nondogmatic interpreters have in common is not the belief that Plato's philosophy teaches nothing, but rather, that there are no definitive doctrines that can be unequivocally ascribed to Plato, that Plato was not a systematic philosopher in the modern sense and that he had profound philosophical reasons for writing dramatic dialogues. Thus, while Gerson is perhaps correct when he writes: "I do not think it is possible to say what any dialogue means without a theory

about Plato's philosophy," it by no means follows that Plato's philosophy was either systematic or intent on firmly establishing a set of determinate doctrines. Plato's philosophy seems to be nondogmatic in the more modern sense of dogmatism as the unwarranted and arrogant positive assertion of opinion, not in the more ancient sense that Plato had no opinions.

The various positions set forth in this volume on the Socratic *elenchus* testify to the great fecundity of the Platonic dialogue as a mode of philosophical expression; for each interpretation find solid justification in the text. The fact that each interpreter is able to lend insight into one or another dimension of Platonic thinking without ever establishing anything like a definitive account of the Socratic method speaks well of both the genius of Plato and the construction of this collection of essays.—Christopher P. Long, *Richard Stockton College of New Jersey*.

SHANLEY, Brian J. *The Thomist Tradition*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. xiv + 289 pp. Cloth, \$90.00—This collection of well-crafted reflections on philosophy of religion places Aquinas in dialogue with his interpreters as well as advocates of differing starting points and philosophical positions. Departing from an overview of twentieth-Century Thomisms, eight topics are comprehensively examined without presenting Aquinas as offering simplistic resolutions to any of them: religious knowledge/faith and reason; religious language; religion and science; evil and suffering; religion and morality; human nature and destiny; conception of the absolute; and religious pluralism.

Close examinations of competing interpretations of Aquinas complement insistence on the profound coherence of Aquinas's reflections without any caricature of his works as a manualist encyclopedia with ready responses to all questions. Yet the author firmly holds that one can adjudicate competing interpretations of major issues and indicates those he considers more certain or correct. Familiarity with virtually all "thomsonian" interpretive genotypes is evidenced.

The careful inventory of last century's diverse Thomisms highlights tensions between prominent figures who tended toward conservative fidelity or innovative dialogue. Opposing positions often centered on the notion of "Christian philosophy," and Shanley establishes why his own analyses are not tainted by such controversies since "metaphysics approaches God as its own *telos*, and that *telos* has nothing to do with providing evidentiary grounds for revelation based theology but rather is meant to satisfy the mind's search for an ultimate causal explanation for the world" (p. 38). Delineation of the profoundly interrelated yet distinct orders of philosophy and revelation is sharpened by affirming that "while it is true to say that analogical predication of divine names is not itself a metaphysical doctrine, it does presuppose a metaphysical foundation" (p. 45). Ultimately, "we can gain no conceptual purchase on the

nature of the utterly simple and infinite *esse* of God" (p. 65). Arguably, such applies as well *sensu stricto* to *esse creaturarum* as proper effect of *Ipsium Esse*.

This seeming paradox permeates the fact that "God is not situated at some spatial limit of the universe, but rather acts directly everywhere within it as undergirding all creaturely exercises of causality" (p. 78). This is why some contend that Aquinas's acknowledgment of primary diverse *viae* by which men validly infer that God exists, whether focused on motion, causality, contingency, perfections, or finality, implicate the metaphysical heart of all explanatory exegesis of the real "*quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae*" (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 4). Nonetheless, Shanley cautions that one should not "read existence where it does not belong." (p. 185 n. 22, against J. Owens)

While "causality of being is not a phenomenal item in the universe and does not factor into scientific accounts of nature," nonetheless it "is operative in all things at all times" (p. 87). Thus reconciliation of science and religion requires "interpreting the latter's claims in such a way as to correlate it with well-established scientific claims," and this "is achieved mainly by interpreting theological claims in metaphysical terms so as to obviate any conflict with an empirically-based science" (p. 91). Such rounds even to considerations of evil, suffering, and irrevocable damnation, since intimacy of the divine will to created effects implies that "God's causality . . . is not that of a competing cause trying to override or co-opt the will by determining it, but rather God is the transcendent creator of the will whose causality is designed to enable the will to be what he creatively intends it to be" (p. 113). Indeed, "God is bound in justice to give what is due to a creature," and in this way God can "be called morally good" (p. 116).

Implications of these conclusions resonate in understanding how morality and religion are related in a moral theory that must remain "true to its theological roots" and not be presented essentially as "being a philosophical ethic" (p. 150). For Aquinas "the human person as *imago dei* is dynamic: we are created with a natural aptitude to know and love God, which is begun but imperfectly realized in this life by that gratuitous sharing in God's own life that is called grace" (p. 152). Every intellectual creature is predestined to one end, though use of free choice that depends on intimate divine causality for the *esse* of its exercise in its own order may preclude said attainment.

Beatitude thus implies intentional cognition of the infinite cause of being, but requires for humans that "this" flesh "be caused and individuated by the same subsisting soul that animates and individuates me now" (p. 161). These englobing correlates serve as a focal reference by which one can discern integrity of doctrinal claims within diverse religions, although often "both inclusivists and pluralists do not take seriously enough the genuine diversity of other religious communities because they assume an *a priori* soteriocentrism" (p. 229).

The range and quality of analyses offered in these fine reflections assuredly merit examination by any who seek that "knowledge that can be had of the highest things" (*ST* I, q. 1, a. 5).—Michael Ewbank, *Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary*.

SHEEHAN, Paul. *Modernism, Narrative and Humanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 234 pp. Cloth, \$60.00. LUDWIG, Sâmi. *Pragmatist Realism: The Cognitive Paradigm in American Realist Texts*. Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 2002. 400 pp. Cloth, \$55.00; paper, \$22.95—Writing about the intersections of literature with philosophy is not as frequent as it ought to be, and perhaps not even as it used to be. The earliest examiners of aesthetics, from Plato and Aristotle on, always asked the fundamental question regarding the connection between the beautiful and knowledge. Later, the cognitive utility of literature and art became a standard issue, albeit a somewhat secondary one, in philosophical aesthetics. Two new books illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of the approach.

Sheehan deals with relatively recent authors—Conrad, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, Beckett. He is critical of humanism, by which he seems to understand a kind of anthropocentric and limitative image of human beings, imposed on the public by narrative, among other things. As against this, he is setting the animal, the mechanical, and the transcendental, but the definition of the latter is, to say the least, bizarre—“the ability to evade compromise and contingency” (p. 178). Reformulating narrativity is, according to Sheehan, the best attempt or search by the moderns to define a new kind of human. His whole project is, to put it bluntly, rather confused. There are some intelligent and original commentaries on Schopenhauer, for instance (pp. 66–72) but Sheehan soon falls back under the spell of Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Terry Eagleton (pp. 188–9) and seems to contribute rather few original comments to the discussion. In a word, this is a good example of how the interface philosophy/literature ought not to be visited.

Fortunately the book of Ludwig is rather different. The author tries in a craftsmanlike way to point out the various manners in which American nineteenth-century literary realists (primarily Twain, Henry James, and Howells) can be seen as collaborators and analogs of their great pragmatist contemporaries, William James and C. S. Pierce.

Thus for instance Howells, as the author himself indicates, deals in a “representation [that] is also cognitive in that it focuses on the dialogic interaction between subjects rather than on one-sided subject-object relationships” (p. 7) and provides frameworks for a pluralism of meanings. This is important for Ludwig in as far as for him pragmatism is endowed with a powerful pluralistic strain. Looking at philosophical pragmatism through the lens of (aesthetic) “representation” allows one, he thinks, to complement cognition with multiplicity and variety, and to cleanse it of any accusation that it is not “multicultural” enough. It is here that Ludwig allows himself to be drawn by enthusiasm toward some dubious speculations on the goodness and desirability of “radical animism” (pp. 213–27), polytheism, and glorification of marginality. These are certainly views that both Howells and Henry James would have dismissed as unacceptable, and probably even Twain would have looked upon ironically. While William James might provide some ammunition here, the attempt to set up an alternative interpretation of C. S. Pierce must be considered one of the book’s failures. Despite such derailments Ludwig seems right in one of his favorite arguments. Literature does provide a complementary cognitive mode and it is able to

bring variety and abundance in our ways of understanding the world and even of uttering philosophical statements. —Virgil Nemoianu, *The Catholic University of America*.

WILLIAMS, Thomas, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xvi + 408 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper \$ 23.00—The editor of this volume in the Cambridge Companion series seems to have aimed at combining two types of essays with two audiences in mind. On the one hand, one finds contributions that expound some of the major themes of Scotus's thought and are intended for readers unfamiliar with the complex thought of this thinker and are in need of some guidance. On the other, the reader will discover essays that are more original in content, either because they treat aspects of Scotus's thought that have not yet received sufficient attention, or because they offer an original reading on already familiar topics.

Peter King's essay on Scotus's metaphysics belongs to the first type. King introduces the reader in a clear and lively manner to some of the major themes of Scotist metaphysics (the categories, the doctrine of distinctions, causality, God's existence, matter, and so on). One may only regret that the Scotist's doctrine of the univocity of being is mentioned all too briefly and that the author does not fully explore the tension it creates with the doctrine of God's transcendence (despite Scotus's claim that the univocal notion of being is an imperfect concept). In "Universal and Individuation" Timothy Noone offers a remarkably clear analysis of this intricate topic and presents Scotus's solution in dialogue with his predecessors and contemporaries. Discussing modal theory, Calvin Normore rightly takes his distance from the possible-world semantic model that has been imposed on Scotus, and he shows that Scotus never completely divorced time and modalities, "retaining a significant distinction between the modal status of the past and that of the future and the use of notions of priority and posteriority modeled on temporal relations in his account of the contingency of the present" (p. 156). Scotus's theology is presented in two essays by James Ross and Todd Bates on "Duns Scotus on Natural Theology" and William Mann's lively discussion of "Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Theology."

To the second category belong Neil Lewis's "Space and Time" and Dominik Perler's "Duns Scotus's Philosophy of Language." Lewis convincingly demonstrates that Scotus's rejection of a flowing now is the result of Scotus's critique of the conception of time as composed of indivisibles, but that it retains the notion of flow as the essential dimension of temporal processes. Perler shows that although Scotus never wrote a grammar or logic handbook, "semantic analysis was not just an instrument for Scotus. It was also an integral part of his philosophical investigations" (p. 187). In "Cognition" Robert Pasnau argues that "Scotus is

the first major philosopher to attempt a naturalistic account of the human cognitive system" (p. 303) and offers a detailed account of his complex (and ultimately unresolved) theory of intuitive cognition.

One of the surprises of this volume concerns the reevaluation of Scotus's ethics. While one would expect an essay on the will (a topic which, of course is not forgotten but appears in more than one essay), Thomas Williams's outstanding contribution chooses rather to evaluate Scotus's ethics against the background of the doctrine of the goodness of being. This approach clearly stresses Scotus's departure from prior medieval ethical theories and focuses in particular on the Scotist divorce between primary goodness and moral goodness; thereby the "connection between our activity and the attainment of happiness is altogether contingent" (p. 337). Williams's discussion certainly does not dismiss the importance of the will, but he helps situate it in its proper ontological context. In a similar vein, Bonnie Kent clearly demonstrates that, despites what has been commonly argued, the medieval doctrine of the virtues does not merely vanish with Scotus in order to be replaced by a doctrine of the will and the commands of the moral and divine law, but rather that it undergoes a profound transformation. One cannot claim that virtue is a sufficient ground for moral goodness without committing a vicious circle. "If virtue is a disposition acquired from morally good acts, it must be possible to perform such acts without a virtue; otherwise, how could one develop the virtue in the first place" (p. 359). Yet, virtue adds promptness, ease, and pleasure in the mode of the action; thereby, the best human act "combines the free choice of the will and the natural causality of disposition" (p. 363).

One will also find an essay by Richard Cross on "Philosophy of Mind" and Hannes Möhle on "Scotus's Theory of Natural Law." Altogether, this is a rich volume (some of these contributions would deserve a review of their own) that will be useful for a large spectrum of readers and is likely to become a basic source of reference for further exploration of Scotus's thought.—Pascal Massie, *Miami University*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

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AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 77, No. 3, Summer 2003

Common Sense, Metaphysics and the Existence of God, JOHN
HALDANE

Being dedicated to the memory of the great Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, who died in the month it was given, this Aquinas lecture begins with some reflections on the relationship between the anti-scientistic, anti-Cartesian position argued for by Anscombe and her teacher Wittgenstein, and the outlook of Thomas Aquinas. It then proceeds to explore the familiar Thomistic idea that philosophical reflection provides the means to establish the existence of God. Drawing in part on Aquinas, but also and perhaps unexpectedly on the idealism of Berkeley and on the semantic intuitionism of Michael Dummett (a former student of Anscombe), the author argues that theism follows both from the assumption of realism and from the assumption of antirealism, and that this fact reveals something of the complexity involved in the claim that God both creates and knows the world. Finally, the author examines the relationship between Aristotelian–Thomistic pluralistic realism and the attempt by John McDowell to fashion a position that lies between Platonism and reductive naturalism.

The Question of Pantheism in the Second Objections to Descartes's Meditations, JULIE R. KLEIN

Through a close analysis of texts from the Second Objections and Replies to the *Meditations*, this article addresses the tension between the pursuit of certainty and the preservation of divine transcendence in Descartes's philosophy. Via a hypothetical "atheist geometer," the Objectors charge Descartes with pantheism. While the Objectors' motivations are not clear, the objection raises provocative questions about the relation of the divine and the human mind and about the being of created or dependent entities in

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

Descartes's metaphysics. Descartes contends that there are real, eternal essences present in the human intellect as innate ideas. The author argues that this claim implicates him in pantheism, not merely univocity. In the course of the analysis, the author considers recent interpretations by Wells, Marion, and Hatfield.

Rachels on Darwinism and Theism, JOHN LEMOS

In his book, *Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism* (1990), James Rachels argues that the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection undermines the view that human beings are made in the image of God. By this he means that Darwinism makes things such that there is no longer any good reason to think that human beings are made in the image of God. Some other widely read and respected authors seem to share this view of the implications of Darwinism, most notably Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett. Unlike Dawkins and Dennett, Rachels gives a detailed argument for this view about the implications of Darwinism. In this article the author explains Rachels's argument and critically engages with it, arguing that he does not sufficiently well consider all of the options that are open to the theist in defending the view that human beings are made in the image of God.

Commitment, Justification and the Rejection of Natural Theology,
BRENDAN SWEETMAN

This paper considers two related claims in the work of D. Z. Phillips: that commitment to God precludes a distinction between the commitment and the grounds for the commitment, and that belief and understanding are the same in religion. Both these claims motivate Phillips's rejection of natural theology. The author examines these claims by analyzing the notion of commitment, discussing what is involved in making a commitment to a worldview, why commitment is necessary at all in religion, levels of commitment, and commitment and justification. The author shows that Phillips fails to distinguish between adopting a hypothesis, where justification would be germane, and committing to the hypothesis after one has adopted it, where justification is not so pressing. This failure fatally undermines his rejection of natural theology.

The Unshredded Scotus: A Response to Thomas Williams, ALLAN B.
WOLTER, O.F.M.

Thomas Williams has developed a radical interpretation of Duns Scotus's voluntarism using an earlier interpretation of the author's as a foil. He argues that the goodness of creatures and the rightness of actions are wholly dependent on the divine will, apart from any reference to the divine intellect, human nature, or any principle other than God's own arbitrary will. The author explains how his interpretation fails to account for the roles that essential goodness and divine justice play in divine volition. The unmitigated voluntarism that Williams develops does not conform to the full range of

authentic Scotistic texts. Despite the interest Williams's voluntarism may have if taken as a theoretical position, it does not do justice to the nuance and speculative depth of Scotus's actual understanding of the divine will, whose creative artistry is repugnant to arbitrary volition. The author is grateful to Williams for the provocation to develop further the richness of Scotus's voluntarism.

Nancy Davis and the Means-End Relation: Toward a Defense of the Doctrine of Double Effect, P. A. WOODWARD

In her paper, "The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation," Nancy Davis attempts to find an interpretation of the means-end relationship that would provide a foundation for the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) and its reliance on the distinction between what an agent intends or brings about intentionally and what that agent merely foresees will result from his action, but does not intend (or bring about intentionally). Davis's inability to find such an interpretation lessens the plausibility of the view that the DDE is an acceptable moral doctrine. In the present paper, it is suggested that Davis's inability to find an interpretation of the means-end relationship that will support the DDE results from her assumption that an agent must intend to produce whatever he produces intentionally. Borrowing an argument from Michael Bratman, this article shows that Davis's assumption is false. That realization paves the way toward a defense of the DDE.

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Problems and Prospects of a History of African Philosophy, J. OBI
OGUEJIOFOR

Although African philosophy has become a part of the world philosophic heritage that can no longer be neglected, no comprehensive history of it is available yet. This lacuna is due to the numerous problems that affect any attempt to outline such a history. Among these problems are those inherent in the historiography of philosophy in general and many others specific to African philosophy. They include the absence of scholarly unanimity over the exact nature of philosophy and, by extension, African philosophy; the dispute over the beginning of philosophy in Ancient Egypt, as well as the Afrocentrist assertion of the origin of Greek philosophy in Egypt; the problem of periodization; the status of ethnophilosophy, and so forth. These difficulties do not make a comprehensive history of African philosophy an impossible or irrelevant task. On the contrary, such a history is a necessity that promises to exert an enormous positive influence on the future development of African philosophy.

An Excursion into Mysticism: Plato and Ibn al-'Arabi on the Knowledge of the Relationship between Sensible Objects and Intelligible Forms, SALMAN BASHIER

This paper draws on the mystical thought of Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240) in order to explicate Plato's account of the relationship between intelligible Forms and sensible objects. The author considers attempts by scholars to solve the difficulties that are inherent in the relationship between sensible objects and their essences, difficulties raised in the *Parmenides*, by reference to the notion of "immanent characters" of the *Phaedo*. He examines Ibn al-'Arabi's notion of "Specific Faces," which in the author's opinion correspond to Plato's immanent characters. Comparing Ibn al-'Arabi's thought with Plato's reflections on the theory of Forms in the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, the author reaches the conclusion that the notion of immanent characters or Specific Faces cannot be offered as a rational account of the relationship.

Ethics and Human Nature, GERARD CASEY

In the debate on the relationship between conceptions of human nature and ethics/politics there are those who view any attempt to ground ethics/politics upon a reasonably "thick" conception of human nature as illegitimate. On the other side of the argument are those who accept the necessity of a theory of human nature for an adequate grounding of ethics and politics, although there may be deep divisions among supporters of this basic position as to what kind of theory best fulfills this grounding role. In this paper the claim is made that an understanding of the concept of human nature is central to the enterprises of ethics and politics because it indicates the effective limits of political and ethical debate and that, despite its centrality in ethics and politics (or perhaps because of it) the notion of human nature is essentially contentious.

The Augustinian Constitution of Heidegger's Being and Time, CRAIG J. N. DE PAULO

By tracing some of the historical and hermeneutical influences of Augustine on Martin Heidegger and his 1927 magnum opus, this article argues that *Being and Time* has an "Augustinian constitution." While Heidegger's philosophical terms are in a certain sense original, many of them have their conceptual origins in Augustine's Christian thought and in his philosophizing from experience. The article systematically revisits all of Heidegger's citations of Augustine, which reveal not only the rhetorical influence of Augustine on the organization of *Being and Time*, but also the fact that the conceptual inspiration of the work and the development of its philosophical terms are significantly indebted to Augustine. Further, an original synthesis of Heidegger's methodology with Augustine's thought on restlessness and conversion is developed in order to demonstrate the philosophical compatibility between Heidegger and Augustine. This synthesis results in what the author considers the foundations for an Augustinian phenomenology.

Intelligent Design and the End of Science, JEFFREY KOPERSKI

In his recent anthology, *Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics*, Robert Pennock continues his attack on what he considers to be the pseudoscience of intelligent design theory. In this critical review, the author discusses the main issues in the debate. Although the volume's rhetoric is often heavy and the articles are intentionally stacked against intelligent design, it touches upon many interesting topics in the philosophy of science. The author concludes that, *contra* Pennock, there is nothing intrinsically unscientific about intelligent design. At this stage, however, it remains more of a provocative idea than a research program. Whether design theorists can bridge this gap is still very much in question. In any case, the debate serves as a case study for such classic problems as the nature of scientific explanations, theory change, the demarcation problem, and the role of metaphysical assumptions in the development of science.

Goodness and Rightness Ten Years Later: A Look Back at James Keenan and His Critics, EDWARD L. KRASEVAC, O.P.

In 1992, James Keenan put forward a renewed interpretation of the development of Aquinas's thought to the effect that he shifted from an intellectual determinism in his early works, to an understanding of the autonomy of the will in the *prima secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae*; this autonomy is the ground for Keenan's (and others') distinction between moral goodness and moral rightness. The present essay analyzes Keenan's interpretation in terms of the body of criticism that it has generated over the past ten years. In particular, it highlights five important implications that Keenan draws from his theory of the will's autonomy: the separation of volition from knowledge in the dynamic of freedom, the virtue of charity as formal and nonspecific, the moral neutrality of the acquired virtues, the two measures of moral action, and sin as moral "badness."

Scientific Content, Testability, and the Vacuity of Intelligent Design Theory, RYAN NICHOLS

Proponents of intelligent design theory seek to ground a scientific research program that appeals to teleology within the context of biological explanation. As such, intelligent design theory must contain principles to guide researchers. The author argues for a disjunction: either Dembski's intelligent design theory lacks content, or it succumbs to the methodological problems associated with creation science, problems that Dembski explicitly attempts to avoid. The only concept of a designer permitted by Dembski's explanatory filter is too weak to give the sorts of explanations which we are entitled to expect from those sciences, such as archeology, that use effect to cause reasoning. The new spin put upon intelligent design theory, that it is best construed as a "metascientific hypothesis," fails for roughly the same reason.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Why is Violence Bad? VITTORIO BUFACCHI

Why is violence bad? What is it about violence that makes it bad? Borrowing from the extensive literature on death, and why death is bad in particular, this article argues that there are extrinsic and intrinsic reasons why violence is bad. Violence is extrinsically bad because of the experience of injury and suffering, although its importance has perhaps been exaggerated in the literature. Apart from the harm of experiencing violence, violence is also intrinsically bad (the social vulnerability factor) to the extent that it makes the victim feel vulnerable and inferior to the perpetrator of violence. Experiencing violence can undermine a victim's self-respect and self-esteem. The social vulnerability factor states that violence exposes the powerlessness of the victim, making the victim vulnerable to the perpetrator of violence. The social vulnerability factor explains why violence is both bad and wrong, and in certain cases even worse than death.

Justice Within a Life, JOSEPH MENDOLA

Prudence may seem obviously rational, while special argument may seem necessary to show that an equal concern with the welfare of others is rational. Sidgwick resisted this distribution of the burden of proof, and Nagel and Parfit argued that the rationality of prudence in fact requires the rationality of generalized benevolence. But while there is a close symmetry between the proper distribution and summation of good or well-being within individual lives and across distinct lives, it is wrong to conclude that we should hence inflate prudential maximization within a life into utilitarian maximization which ignores the differences among lives. Rather, the proper argument runs the other way. The kinds of egalitarian distributional concerns which intuitively engage us when many lives are in question should also play a similar role within lives. Short periods of individual lives should receive the same sort of distributional concern which lives receive in recent discussions.

Superheroes and Their Names, STEFANO PREDELLI

In this paper the author discusses the semantic puzzle generated by simple sentences such as "Superman leapt over tall buildings," and "Kent leapt over tall buildings." He proposes an analysis which assigns distinct truth values to utterances of these sentences, but nevertheless recognizes that "Superman" and "Kent" are coreferential names. He motivates his analysis with independent considerations pertaining to the semantic role played by contexts,

and criticizes alternative solutions, in particular David Pitt's and Joseph Moore's denials of coreferentiality, and Graham Forbes's logophoric approach.

Making Amends, LINDA RADZIK

The literature in ethics is filled with theories of what makes an action wrong, what makes an actor responsible and blameable for his wrongful actions and what we are justified in doing to wrongdoers. (For example, may we punish them? Must we forgive them?) However, there is relatively little discussion of what wrongdoers themselves must do in the aftermath of their wrongful acts. This essay attempts to remedy that problem by critically evaluating some competing accounts of the moral obligations of wrongdoers. It argues for a conception of atonement that highlights the value of reconciliation, as opposed to repentance or self-punishment.

Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival,
MARYA SCHECHTMAN

Psychological continuity theorists of personal identity have had to speak to the fact that psychological continuation does not have the form of an identity relation. One strategy is to switch from the question of personal identity to that of survival. This paper argues that the usual understanding of "survival" does not change the form of the question radically enough. It still views the survival relation as a connection between a presently existing person and a future one. Using the example of amnesia as a case of partial survival, the paper shows that the standard view does not have the resources to express the way in which survival is partial in such a case. A view of survival in terms of the continuation of a life rather than a person is suggested as a better strategy for offering a satisfying account of personal survival.

On the Identity of Concepts and the Compatibility of Externalism and Privileged Access, F. N. C. SPICER

This paper defends the compatibility of privileged self-knowledge of the contents of one's thoughts with externalism about thought-content. Boghossian attempts to show that these are incompatible, because together they imply that a person can come to know empirical facts a priori, by deductive inference from their knowledge of their own thoughts and knowledge of the doctrine of externalism. This paper shows that privileged self-knowledge and externalism do not imply this, by showing that the concepts with which a person classifies his thought-content of self-knowledge differ from those by which he classifies thought-contents in his knowledge of the doctrine of externalism. The conclusion is that because the concepts used to classify content in each item of knowledge are different, the two items of knowledge cannot be combined as premises to deduce the empirical conclusion that Boghossian claims can be deduced a priori. Hence compatibilism stands.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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No Fact of the Matter, HARTRY FIELD

Are there questions for which “there is no determinate fact of the matter” as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the idea and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle, and it investigates the sense of “rejection” that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if we reject excluded middle, with special emphasis on the conditional. There is also discussion of higher order indeterminacy (in several different senses) and of penumbral connections, and there is a suggested definition of determinateness in terms of the conditional and a discussion of the extent to which the notion of determinateness is objective. Finally, there are suggestions about a unified treatment of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.

Analogues of Knowability, DAVID DEVIDI and TIMOTHY KENYON

An interesting recent reply to the paradox of knowability is Neil Tennant’s proposal: to restrict the antirealist’s knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save antirealism from embarrassment. The authors examine Tennant’s argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. They conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the considerations parallel. The failure of Tennant’s argument provides an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the nature of Moore’s paradox and the role of idealization in doxastic logic.

Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil, MICHAEL J. ALMEIDA and GRAHAM OPPY

Skeptical theists, for example William Alston and Michael Bergmann, have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. The authors argue that, if the considerations deployed by skeptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, the authors’ argument suffices to discredit skeptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.

Are All Possible Laws Actual Laws? SIMON BOSTOCK

Suppose it is a law that all Fs are G. Does the law hold in all possible worlds? According to necessitarianism, it holds in at least all those worlds containing F-ness. The author argues that the necessitarian must also take the law to hold in all those possible worlds which do not contain F-ness. Accepting the principle that a law can only hold in a world if it has some ontological grounding in that world, the author argues that necessitarianism is committed to the claim that any law holding in the actual world is grounded in every possible world, and that any law holding in any possible world is grounded in the actual world. In other words, necessitarianism takes all possible laws to be actual.

"Partially Clad" Bare Particulars Exposed, RICHARD BRIAN DAVIS

In a recent series of articles, J. P. Moreland has attempted to revive the idea that bare particulars are indispensable for individuating concrete particulars. The success of the project turns on Moreland's proposal that while bare particulars are indeed "partially clad"—that is, exemplify at least some properties—they are nevertheless "bare" in that they lack internal constituents. The author argues that "partially clad" bare particulars (PCBPs) are impervious not only to traditional objections, but also those recently urged in this journal by D. W. Mertz. The real problem with Moreland's view, the author contends, is that together with his containment model of predication, it leads to the unwanted conclusion that PCBPs actually contain themselves as constituents, thereby ensnaring them in a vicious (individuating) circular.

On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism, JAMES CARGILE

Russell famously argued that resemblance nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads to a new universal of resemblance, and so on. It is argued here that this does not arise for a properly formulated resemblance theory, which only requires one complex relation among the many particulars we deal with, a complex relation which is not multiply instantiated and thus not a universal.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 12, No. 1, April 2004

The Pragmatist Enlightenment (and its Problematic Semantics),
ROBERT B. BRANDOM

Classical American pragmatism can be viewed as a minor, parochial philosophical movement. But it can also be viewed as announcing and pursuing a second Enlightenment. Inspired, as the first one was, by new forms of scientific understanding, pragmatism developed a new synthesis of empiricism and naturalism by taking lessons from the science of the nineteenth century, which was quite different from that of the seventeenth. They looked to Darwin instead of Newton, to statistical thermodynamics rather than rational mechanics, to a methodological holism in place of the earlier atomism. Their key idea was the way order can develop out of chaos through evolution, adaptation, and learning. The author discusses four ways in which the pragmatists' central semantic idea, an instrumentalist approach to the truth of belief through the satisfaction of desires, was nevertheless flawed, and consider what lessons we may still learn from their efforts.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge: A Puzzle in Two Dimensions,
JORDI FERNÁNDEZ

The purpose of this essay is to propose a way of dissolving the puzzle of externalism and self-knowledge. The position defended here is that, properly understood, externalism and privileged access are compatible. The diagnosis of the puzzle that is put forward is that a confusion of two distinct notions of mental content makes privileged access and externalism appear independently compelling and jointly implausible. A main goal of the essay is to reveal that confusion by using a distinction that is present in the literature on two dimensional semantics. The conclusion is that externalism is a metaphysical view about a certain kind of mental content, while privileged access is an epistemological view about a different kind of content and, thus understood, they are compatible. The author offers a response to the two main incompatibilist arguments by Michael McKinsey and Paul Boghossian along these lines.

Hegel's Critique of Pure Mechanism and the Philosophical Appeal of the Logic Project, JAMES KREINES

This paper explains and defends Hegel's argument in the *Science of Logic* against the possibility that mechanistic explanation might be the only legitimate form of explanation, or "absolute." Hegel does not argue, as is often thought, that mechanism fails because it cannot completely explain in a

unified manner the totality of everything. Nearly the opposite is true: we cannot coherently suppose that mechanism alone is explanatory because (Hegel argues) this would be to imagine dissolving everything that is into one single undifferentiated whole, leaving no way to grasp what it would be to explain anything in particular; this would block any possible account of the distinction between explanation and description, rendering "explanation" itself merely an "empty word." Understanding the strengths of this argument can help us to appreciate both the ambitious goals and also the genuine philosophical appeal of Hegel's broader project in the *Science of Logic*.

Horkheimer and Neurath: Restarting a Disrupted Debate, JOHN O'NEILL and THOMAS UEBEL

Horkheimer's "The Latest Attack on Metaphysics" is widely regarded as a decisive critique of positivist philosophy from the standpoint of critical theory. Building on recent research concerning the prehistory of this publication as well as Neurath's unpublished response, the authors argue for a major reevaluation of the outcome of the debate. With Horkheimer's early program for interdisciplinary materialism showing considerable overlap with Neurath's program of encyclopedic physicalism, "The Latest Attack" marks Horkheimer's turning away from that program toward an increasingly pessimistic and eschatological philosophy during World War II, only to retreat from radical engagement afterward. By contrast, Neurath's reply reaffirmed the idea of a critically engaged and empirically informed philosophy of science in the Enlightenment tradition which still manages to engage fruitfully in debate with Horkheimer's heirs, notably Habermas, over the threat of technocratic reason in politics.

Wittgenstein and the Substance of the World, IAN PROOPS

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* contains an argument that there are simple, necessarily existent objects, which, being simple, are suited to be the referents of the names that occur in the final analysis of propositions. The argument is perplexing in its own right, but also for its invocation of the notion of "substance." Offering a novel interpretation of the argument, the author argues that, so long as one takes care to locate Wittgenstein's conception of substance in the Kantian tradition to which it alludes, one can see Wittgenstein's discussion as far more coherent than it might otherwise appear.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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The Art of Living: Pierre Hadot's Rejection of Plotinian Mysticism,
DAVID BLAKELY

This article examines Pierre Hadot's rejection of the "purely spiritual" and "transcendent" philosophy of Plotinus as a viable philosophy of life. Despite an initial attraction to the *Enneads*, Hadot eventually concluded that the mystical quest of Plotinus was unrealistic and unacceptable because it required one to forsake the experience of the spiritual and ineffable in the concrete and the practical. The author argues that Hadot's critical assessment does not adequately appreciate the "descent vector" that is integral to Plotinus's conception of the One. His mysticism requires reference not only to the efficacy of Intellect and the One but also to embodiment and creative participation in the everyday affairs of worldly existence. Plotinus cannot abandon the implications of the bidirectional dynamic of the One as it generates the richly diverse, beautiful cosmos. The profile of proper living extends across the ontological spectrum, observing the demarcations and dynamic affiliations, from the One to concrete materiality.

The Virtues of Authenticity: A Kierkegaardian Essay in Moral Psychology, RICK ANTHONY FURTAK

Discussions of the concept of authenticity often fail to define the conditions of an appropriate emotional orientation toward the world. With a more solid philosophical understanding of emotion, it should be possible to define more precisely the necessary conditions of emotional authenticity. Against this background, the author interprets Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* as a narrative text that suggests a moral psychology of emotion that points toward the development of a better way of thinking about the ethics of authenticity. In the process, the author also engages with the positions of other philosophers, both "existential" and "analytic." The upshot of his argument is that a cognitive phenomenology of emotion can flesh out the ideal of truthfulness as a virtue of character, while forcing moral philosophers to question whether authenticity should be understood as an achievement of the will rather than as a matter of affective receptivity.

Classical Contractarianism: From Absolutism to Constitutionalism, MARTIN HARVERY

The fundamental presupposition of political philosophy is that the legitimate rule of one individual over another requires justification; political power may come out of the barrel of a gun, but political authority does not.

Classically, the philosopher of politics looked to nature. In the seventeenth century, however, the philosophical tide turns in a decidedly different direction, contractarianism. Political society becomes a consensual construct created through the heuristic vehicle of a hypothetical social contract. Simultaneously, within the confines of contractarianism itself, a remarkable transformation occurs. The theory originates in the hands of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf as a justificatory tool for political absolutism and, paradoxically, reaches its zenith in Locke with a firm commitment to constitutionalism. The author explores this transformation in detail, culminating with what he terms the "Lockean Synthesis."

First Philosophy in the Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller,
H. P. McDONALD

During his lifetime, F. C. S. Schiller was viewed as a major figure in the pragmatist movement, but his reputation has faded. This article will challenge the view that he was an unoriginal or less important figure. In particular, the author attempts a reconstruction of Schiller's position on first philosophy, which will examine the differences between Schiller and the other major figures in the pragmatist movement. By using texts from Schiller's writings, the author attempts to create an undistorted reconstruction of what he wrote in order to support this interpretation. He outlines the implicit system contained in Schiller's scattered writings and briefly examines the relation between Schiller's humanism and other forms of pragmatism. The task seems both justified and worthwhile, since his work has been neglected, despite his prominence in the debates over pragmatism that took place when it emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century.

On Being "Other-Minded:" Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Logical Aliens, JOSE MEDINA

This paper discusses fundamental presuppositions underlying our communicative and interpretative practices by exploring the question of whether there can be logical aliens, that is, beings whose actions and utterances are unintelligible to us. The author offers a critique of the dominant view of intelligibility in analytic philosophy that denies the possibility of logical aliens on a priori grounds. His argument tries to show that this transcendental view, one that derives from Davidson's philosophy, rests on cognitivist and objectivist biases that distort communication. Building on a nontranscendental interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the author proposes an alternative view of intelligibility: a contextualist hermeneutics that is action based and socially oriented and that does not impose a priori limitations on what is intelligible for us.

The Moral Self in Confucius and Aristotle, MAY SIM

The author's purpose is to argue the following theses: (1) Habituation into virtue, social relations, and paradigmatic persons are central for both Aristotle and Confucius. Both therefore need a notion of self to support

them. (2) Aristotle's individualistic metaphysics cannot account for the thick relations that this requires. (3) The Confucian self, if entirely relationistic, cannot function as a locus of choice and agency; if fully ritualistic, it cannot function as a source of moral norms that might help assess existing social proprieties. The author suggests that each offers some corrective for the other and urges further dialogue between the friends of Confucius and Aristotle.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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The Scope of Aristotle's Essentialism in the Posterior Analytics,
RICHARD TIERNEY

Aristotle's essentialism distinguishes between what belongs in itself and what belongs accidentally. Yet two distinct kinds of entity belong in itself: those that belong to something in what it is, and those that have what they belong to in the account of what they are; it is not clear in what sense the latter are essential. The author articulates the nature of these entities, and argues that they are indeed essential in that they cannot not belong to their subjects. This is because they are "entrenched" within the generic matter that is "worked up" into the substance that is their subject.

Spinoza and Prime Matter, CHARLES HUENEMANN

Spinoza claims that God is extended and corporeal, but he resists identifying God with the extended, corporeal world. How then are we to understand the relation of God to the physical world? This essay first critically examines interpretations offered by Schmaltz and Woolhouse which claim that Spinoza's God is not actually extended, but a nonextended essence of extension. It is then suggested that Spinoza's God can be understood as something akin to (a modified version of) scholastic prime matter. On this view, Spinoza's God is actually extended, but cannot be identified with the corporeal world, which is changeable and variegated in a way that prime matter is not.

Salomon Maimon and the Rise of Spinozism in German Idealism,
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED

In this paper the author explores one issue in the history of German Idealism which has been widely neglected in the existing literature. He argues that Salomon Maimon was the first to suggest that Spinoza's pantheism was a radical religious (or "acosmistic") view rather than atheism. Following a discussion of the historical context of Maimon's engagement with Spinoza, the author points out the main Spinozistic element of Maimon's philosophy: the

view of God as the material cause of the world, or as the subject in which all things inhere. The author argues that this doctrine was the basis of Maimon's Law of Determinability.

Two Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle,
HANNAH GINSBORG

The author distinguishes two senses in which organisms are mechanically inexplicable for Kant. Mechanical inexplicability in the first sense is shared with artifacts, and consists in their exhibiting regularities irreducible to the regularities of matter. Mechanical inexplicability in the second sense is peculiar to organisms, consisting in the reciprocal causal dependence of an organism's parts. This distinction corresponds to two strands of thought in Aristotle, one supporting a teleological conception of organisms, the other supporting a conception of organisms as natural. Recognizing this distinction helps us to see how a teleological conception of organisms is compatible with recent advances in biology.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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Descartes's Conceptual Distinction and its Ontological Import,
JUSTIN SKIRRY

Descartes's conceptual distinction (or *distinctio rationis*) is commonly understood to be a distinction created by the mind's activity without a foundation *in re*. This paper challenges this understanding partially based on a letter to an unknown correspondent in which Descartes claims not to admit distinctions without a foundation. He goes on to claim that his conceptual distinction is not a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* (as in a distinction of reasoning reason) but is something like a formal distinction or, more precisely, a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* (that is, a distinction of reasoned reason). This remark is then explored through Descartes's other writings and his scholastic intellectual heritage. The author concludes that Descartes's conceptual distinction is just a formal distinction understood as a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* as expressed in the works of Scotus, Suarez, and Eustachius, and so it has a foundation *in re* in very much the same way as a formal distinction.

Bayle and the Case for Actual Parts, THOMAS HOLDEN

Pierre Bayle is the most forthright and systematic early modern proponent of the actual parts doctrine, the period's counterpart to the "doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts" familiar from current analytic mereology and metaphysics. In this paper the author introduces both the actual parts

account of the internal structure of matter and the rival system of potential parts. He then identifies Bayle as the leading advocate of the actual parts doctrine and examines his arguments for this account.

Kant's "Argument from Geometry," LISA SHABEL

Kant's "argument from geometry" is usually interpreted to be a regressive transcendental argument in support of the claim that we have a pure intuition of space. In this paper the author defends an alternative interpretation of this argument according to which it is rather a progressive synthetic argument meant to identify and establish the essential role of pure spatial intuition in geometric cognition. In the course of reinterpreting the "argument from geometry" the author reassesses the arguments of the Aesthetic and illustrates the origin of Kant's view of the role of pure intuition in geometry.

Metaphysics, Mathematics and the Distinction Between the Sensible and the Intelligible in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation, EMILY CARSON

In this paper the author argues that Kant's distinction in the Inaugural Dissertation between the sensible and the intelligible arises in part out of certain open questions left open by his comparison between mathematics and metaphysics in the Prize Essay. This distinction provides a philosophical justification for his distinction between the respective methods of mathematics and metaphysics and his claim that mathematics admits of a greater degree of certainty. More generally, this illustrates the importance of Kant's reflections on mathematics for the development of his critical philosophy.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 100, No. 10, October 2003

Moving beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It Is, CHRIS ELIASMITH

This paper argues that the three prevailing metaphors for mind endorsed by symbolicism (mind as computer), connectionism (mind as brain-like), and dynamicism (mind as Watt governor), should be replaced by a non-metaphorical theory of the representation and dynamics of neurobiological systems (R&D theory). R&D theory is described in terms of three basic, quantified principles. R&D theory relies heavily on modern control theory which, unlike computational theory, centrally incorporates real time dynamics and implementational constraints. R&D theory is compared to each of symbolicism, connectionism, and dynamicism, and shown to be (1) more neurally plausible and as computationally powerful as symbolicism, (2) more integrative of neural and psychological data and more principled than con-

nectionism, and (3) more explanatorily powerful and as temporally sensitive as dynamicism. The consequences of R&D theory for representational content, functionalism, and the relevance of the Turing machine are briefly discussed.

The End of Counterpart Theory, TRENTON MERRICKS

Counterpart theory says roughly that, for any object O and any property F, O is possibly F if and only if O has a counterpart that is F. Moreover, O is essentially F if and only if all of O's counterparts are F. Many find counterpart theory attractive. But most reject David Lewis's modal realism, opting instead for counterparts that are somehow "abstract." It is that sort of counterpart theory, the sort endorsed by virtually every counterpart theorist except for Lewis himself, that this paper argues is untenable. Indeed, it argues that any reduction of modal properties to abstract worlds fails, counterpart-theoretic or otherwise.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 100, No. 11, November 2003

Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism, P. KYLE STANFORD

The explanationist or miracle defense of scientific realism stands challenged most powerfully by the pessimistic induction over the history of science, which points out the long historical parade of scientific theories ultimately rejected despite the dramatic empirical successes each enjoyed in its own day and suggests that we have no reason to doubt that the same fate awaits our own successful theories. Scientific realists have recently offered historically sophisticated responses to this challenge, but here the author argues that the most promising and influential of these efforts (by Clyde Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg, Philip Kitcher, Stathis Psillos, Jarrett Leplin, and John Worrall) offer defenses of the approximate truth of past theories and/or the referential status of their central theoretical terms that are forced to concede to the realist's opponent either just the substantive points that were in dispute between them or everything he needs for a convincing historical case against realism.

The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability and the Special Sciences, CARL GILLET

The "received" view of multiple realizability (henceforth, "MR") and the special sciences themselves was laid out in the seventies in a famous paper by Jerry Fodor. Among a clutch of recent critiques of the received view, Lawrence A. Shapiro's (2000) stands out. For Shapiro defends a precise, and prima facie plausible, criterion for MR that he then uses to critique the

received view of both MR and special sciences themselves. However, like other critics, Shapiro does not offer a precise account of realization and it appears plausible that such an account is a necessary step in any precise understanding of multiple realization. The author's main goal is to argue that this oversight is indeed damaging. He shows that differences over the metaphysics of realization are inextricably bound up with broader disputes over the nature, and extent, of MR. As a result, he argues that although we should endorse Shapiro's important criterion for MR, his criticisms of the received view, and those of another recent critique, plausibly beg the question. His wider conclusion is that work on the metaphysics of realization has a central role to play in the philosophy of psychology.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 100, No. 12, December 2003

The Role of Variables, KIT FINE

The author presents an antinomy concerning the semantic behavior of variables that any adequate account of their semantics should solve. It is argued that standard semantical approaches to quantified logic are unable to solve the antinomy and that its adequate solution calls for a fundamental break with how semantics is traditionally conceived. Instead of assigning semantic values individually to the expressions of the language, semantic connections should be assigned to several expressions at a time. The implications of this departure for logic, linguistics, and the philosophy of language are then briefly considered.

MIND
Vol. 112, No. 448, October 2003

Solving the Riddle of Coherence, LUC BOVENS and STEPHAN HARTMANN

A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of an information set that boosts our confidence that its content is true *ceteris paribus* when we receive information from independent and partially reliable sources. The authors construct a measure c_r that

relies on hypothetical sources with certain idealized characteristics. The authors show that, on their account, the coherence of the story about the world gives us a reason to believe that the story is true and that the coherence of a scientific theory, construed as a set of models, is a proper criterion for theory choice.

A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions, AVIV HOFFMANN

It seems that every singular proposition implies that the object it is singular with respect to exists. It also seems that some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist. The puzzle is that it can be argued that there is contradiction between these two principles. In this paper, the author explains the puzzle and considers some of the ways one might attempt to resolve it. The puzzle is important because it has implications concerning the way we think about the relationship between a proposition and the claim that the proposition is true.

The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction over Accommodation,
ROGER WHITE

According to the thesis of strong predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. The author offers a new defense of strong predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. He concludes by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism.

MIND

Vol. 113, No. 449, January 2004

*Properties and Kinds of Tropes: New Linguistic Facts and Old
Philosophical Insights*, FRIEDERIKE MOLTSMANN

Terms like "wisdom" are commonly held to refer to abstract objects that are properties. On the basis of a greater range of linguistic data and with the support of some ancient and medieval philosophical views, the author argues that such terms do not stand for objects, but rather for kinds of tropes, entities that do not have the status of objects, but only play a role as semantic values of terms and as arguments of predicates. Such "nonobjects" crucially differ from objects in that they are not potential bearers of properties.

The General Propositional Form is a Variable (Tractatus 4.53),
PETER M. SULLIVAN

Wittgenstein presents in the *Tractatus* a variable purporting to capture the general form of a proposition. One understanding of what Wittgenstein is doing there, an understanding in line with the "new" reading of his work championed by Diamond, Conant, and others, sees it as a deflationary or even an implausible move; a move by which a concept sometimes put by philosophers to distinctively metaphysical use is replaced, in a perspicuous notation, by an innocent device of generalization, thereby dispersing the clouds of philosophy that formerly surrounded the concept. By asking how Wittgenstein supposed his variable to work, and what work he imagined it was fit for, the paper questions the adequacy of that understanding.

The Silence of the Senses, CHARLES TRAVIS

There is a view abroad on which a perceptual experience has a representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On this view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so (except insofar as the perceiver represents things to himself as so). In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that.

THE MONIST
Vol. 87, No. 1, January 2004

*Actions versus Functions: A Plea for an Alternative Metaphysics of
Artifacts*, WYBO HOUKES and PIETER E. VERMAAS

In most philosophical analyses of artifacts, functions are taken as the essence of artifacts. It is seldom questioned that an adequate theory of artifacts is primarily a theory of artifact functions. In this paper, the authors argue that, instead, a theory of artifacts should fundamentally be a theory of artifact actions, that is, of using and designing. First, they argue that theories of functions have difficulty accounting for a salient characteristic of the phenomenology of artifact use, the distinction between standard use and alternative or improper use, and they present a theory of artifact use and design that provides an adequate account. Second, the authors show how a theory of artifact functions can be derived from this theory of artifact actions. These two arguments undermine the received view that functions are the essence of artifacts and suggest developing an alternative, action-oriented metaphysics of artifacts.

How to be a Realist about Sui Generis Teleology Yet Feel at Home in the 21st Century, RICHARD CAMERON

The reigning orthodoxy on biological teleology assumes that teleology either must be reduced (or eliminated) or it depends on a supernatural agent. The dominant orthodox sect rejects supernaturalism and eliminativism, and, given the poverty of competing views has been allowed to become complacent about the adequacy of favored reductivist accounts. These are beset by more serious problems than proponents acknowledge. Moreover, the assumption underlying orthodoxy is false; there is an alternative scientifically and philosophically plausible naturalistic account of teleology. We can share reductivists' realism about biological teleology, embrace ontological and epistemological naturalism about science as well as science's ontic authority yet accept *sui generis* teleology conceived along ontologically emergentist lines. The author sketches one such emergentist account, one that deserves serious consideration if supernaturalism and eliminativism are as impoverished as reductionists believe while their own sect has been (allowed to become) too complacent concerning reductionism's alleged success with biological teleology.

Functions, Function Concepts, and Scales, INGVAR JOHANNSON

The concept of function is sometimes said to have two senses, a "cause effect sense" and a "purpose sense." This paper claims there is a "process sense" as well. When a material functional entity is in function, it gives rise to a process which have a four-dimensional shape, a process shape, that cannot be reduced to the underlying causal and/or teleological processes. This paper claims that four things have been overlooked in the philosophy of functions: (1) That there are four-dimensional shapes that are necessary to the functioning of many tools, mechanisms, and bodily organs; (2) That there are internal relations among such shapes; (3) That there is an important similarity between ordinal scales and function concepts; (4) That a functional norm also can function as a prototypical standard unit; when this is the case, there is an important similarity between metrical scales and function concepts.

Functions from Regulation, TIM SCHROEDER

Human design creates functions for the objects designed by people, and natural design creates functions for the objects designed by nature. So, at least, it is alleged (a dissenting view from Davies, 2001 is answered in the paper). Typically, it goes unnoticed that human regulatory processes likewise create functions for the objects they regulate, but there is not much that is controversial in this observation. Completely neglected is the fact that natural regulatory processes also create functions for the objects they regulate, but this is a fact nonetheless, as "Functions from Regulation" argues. These functions from natural regulation do not replace functions from natural design, but supplement them. This view bears particularly upon teleosemantics, for what philosophers of mind such as Dretske (1988, 1995) and Millikan (1984, 1993) need are natural functions that do not depend on history. Functions from natural regulation are such functions.

An Alternative to Conceptual Analysis in the Function Debate,
PETER H. SCHWARTZ

The Modern Resurrection of Teleology, MARC PERLMAN

THE MONIST
Vol. 87, No. 2, April 2004

Being Conscious of Ourselves, DAVID M. ROSENTHAL

The author argues that we can explain how we are conscious of ourselves by appeal to essentially indexical thoughts we have about ourselves, in particular about our own current mental states. The author shows that being conscious of ourselves in that way does not require that we are aware of ourselves in some privileged way that is antecedent to the higher order thoughts we have about our own mental states. The account successfully resists, moreover, challenges based on the so called immunity to error through misidentification. An account based on such higher order thoughts, finally, also does justice to the way we identify and locate ourselves as creatures in the world.

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, URIAH KRIEDEL

What is the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness? In recent philosophy of mind, we are accustomed to underlining their independence. It is often emphasized that a person can be conscious of a host of objects, features, and states of affairs unrelated to her. When a person is conscious of the sky, or consciously experiences the blueness of the sky, he is not attending to himself in the least. That is, he is not self-conscious. Yet he is very clearly conscious. Therefore, consciousness can occur in the absence of self-consciousness. The author thinks there is something amiss in this picture. He argues that consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense that the former cannot occur in the absence of the latter.

Knowing the Reference of the First Person Pronoun, JOHN
CAMPBELL

Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness, TIM BAYNE

In this paper the author examines attempts to account for the unity of consciousness in terms of self-consciousness. He distinguishes different conceptions of both the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, and argues that there is little prospect of accounting for the unity of consciousness in terms of self-consciousness.

Inverted First-Person Authority, COLIN MCGINN*Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege: Response to McGinn*, QUASSIM CASSAM*Skepticism, Deflation and the Rediscovery of the Self*, STEPHEN L. WHITE

Skepticism about the external world, agency, value, and the self have their sources in a Humean conception of perceptual experience. Such a conception is inadequate in failing to meet three criteria: that it ground experience, that it do so subject to Frege's constraint, and that it make our behavior intelligible from the subjective point of view. The constraints are satisfied by a conception according to which we are given sets of basic action possibilities in virtue of what Gibson calls affordances; opportunities for meaningful action in the light of which our behavior makes sense. It is in being given a world of things we can do that we are given ourselves (implicitly) as subjects and agents.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Vol. 54, No. 214, January 2004

Introduction, FRASER MacBRIDE

Frege attempted to provide arithmetic with a foundation in logic. His attempt to do so, however, was confounded by Russell's discovery of paradox at the heart of Frege's system. The papers collected in this special issue contribute to the on-going investigation into the foundations of mathematics and logic. After sketching the historical background, this introduction provides an overview of the papers collected here, tracing some of the themes that connect them.

Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Structure,
STEWART SHAPIRO

Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in set theory, the latter is a foundation for mathematics. Whether set theory, as opposed to any of its rivals, is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is philosophical, to provide the metaphysical basis for mathematics. Another is epistemic, to provide the basis of all mathematical knowledge. Another is to serve mathematics, by lending insight into the various fields. Another is to provide an arena for exploring relations and interactions between mathematical fields, their relative strengths, and so forth. Given the different goals, there is little point in determining a single foundation for all of mathematics.

Quine, Analyticity, and Philosophy of Mathematics, JOHN P.
BURGE

Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. The author argues that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose.

Structuralism and Metaphysics, CHARLES PARSONS

The author considers different versions of a structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which characteristic mathematical objects have no more of a "nature" than is given by the basic relations of a structure in which they reside. The author's own version of such a view is noneliminative in the sense that it does not lead to a program for eliminating reference to mathematical objects. He replies to criticisms of noneliminative structuralism recently advanced by Keränen and Hellman. In replying to the former, he relies on a distinction between "basic" and "constructed" structures. A conclusion is that ideas from the metaphysical tradition can be misleading when applied to the objects of modern mathematics.

The Consistency of the Naïve Theory of Properties, HARTRY FIELD

If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naive theory of properties: for any predicate $\theta(x)$, there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if $\theta(o)$. Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. The author shows that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. The author employs a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the

values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to naive set theory? Probably not, but limiting naive comprehension in set theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property theory used for semantics.

A General Theory of Abstraction Operators, NEIL TENNANT

The author presents a general theory of abstraction operators, which treats them as variable-binding, term-forming operators, and provides a reasonably uniform treatment for definite descriptions, set abstracts, natural number abstraction, and real number abstraction. This minimizing, extensional, and relational theory reveals a striking similarity between definite descriptions and set abstracts, and provides a clear rationale for the claim that there is a logic of sets (which is ontologically noncommittal). The theory also treats both natural and real numbers as answering to a twofold process of abstraction. The first step, of conceptual abstraction, yields the object occupying a particular position within an ordering of a certain kind. The second step, of objectual abstraction, yields the number *sui generis*, as the position itself within any ordering of the kind in question.

On the Sense and Reference of a Logical Constant, HAROLD HODES

Syntax precedes truth-theoretic semantics when it comes to understanding a logical constant. A constant in a language is logical if and only if its sense is entirely constituted by certain deductive rules. To be sense-constitutive, deductive rules governing a constant must meet certain conditions; those that do so are sense-constitutive by virtue of understanders' conditional dispositions to feel compelled to accept certain formulae. Acceptance is a cognitive formula-attitude. Since acceptance requires understanding, and a formula can contain more than one occurrence of logical constants, this account involves a "local holism," but no circularity. The author argues that no logical constant is ambiguous between a classical and a constructive sense; but the author allows that one constant may have distinct classical and constructive "semantic values." A logical constant's sense helps to determine its semantic value, but only together with certain constraints on satisfaction and frustration; it seems that the latter must include convention-T-style schemata.

PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 78, No. 4, October 2003

What Is Natural? And Should We Care? MARY WARNOCK

There is an argument often deployed by those who object to the rapid advances in technology, whether in agriculture and animal husbandry or in

medicine, that some procedure is "unnatural," and therefore should not be actually prohibited. An attempt is made to analyze and appraise the moral force, if any, of the dichotomy natural/unnatural, especially in the area of assisted conception. The emotional resonances of the concept of nature are partially explored, and found to be deep-seated and various, but not of themselves the source of moral imperatives.

Contingent Existents, IAN RUMFITTT

Timothy Williamson has recently put forward a proof that every object exists necessarily. The author shows where the proof fails. His diagnosis also exposes the fallacy in A. N. Prior's argument in favor of his modal logic, Q.

Prospects for an Evolutionary Policy, TIM LEWENS

A small minority of biologists, psychologists, and philosophers have recently tried to show, in various ways, that evolutionary psychology is of relevance to politics and to policy makers. Two widely accepted arguments still suffice (with only a little tweaking) to dismiss such attempts to forge a link between evolution and policy. The first denies the link between adaptation and fixity, the second denies that "adaptive thinking" is of strong heuristic benefit. Finally, the silence of many evolutionary explanations with respect to developmental mechanisms should also make us suspicious of the relevance of evolutionary psychology to matters of policy.

On Equivocation, TOM STONEHAM

Equivocation is often described as a fallacy. In this short note the author argues that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.

PHRONESIS

Vol. 48, No. 3, July 2003

Recollecting Forms in the Phaedo, PANOS DIMAS

According to an interpretation that has dominated the literature, which the author refers to as the traditional interpretation, the recollection argument aims at establishing the thesis that our learning in this life consists in recollecting knowledge the soul acquired before being born into a body, or thesis R, by using the thesis that there exist forms, thesis F, as a premise. These entities, the forms, are incorporeal, immutable, and transcendent in the sense that they exist separately from material perceptibles, which in turn

are related to them through participation and by being caused by them in some sense. The author argues that strong textual and more general exegetical reasons suggest that the traditional interpretation is mistaken. He also presents an alternative account of the argument for R in the *Phaedo* and defends a more general interpretation according to which the metaphysical doctrine Plato offers in the *Phaedo* represents a natural continuation of the philosophical position that stands at the center of the dialectical conversations we find in the shorter Socratic dialogues.

False Pleasures, Appearance and Imagination in the Philebus,
SYLVAIN DELCOMMINETTE

This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the *Philebus* (36c3–44a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and *doxa*. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between *doxa* and pleasure on the one hand and their object on the other, it is argued that, rather, Socrates distinguishes between the mere fact of having a *doxa* or a pleasure, on the one hand, and the content of these acts, on the other. Consequently, the possibility for a pleasure to be false does not concern its relation to an object, but the affective content which defines it.

Τόπο 5 e ίδια nella *Retorica* di Aristotele, SARA RUBINELLI

Plato and Socrates, CHRISTOPHER ROWE

PHRONESIS

Vol. 48, No. 4, August 2003

Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions, DAVID WOLFSDORF

This paper examines the manner in which Socrates pursues definitions in Plato's early definitional dialogues and advances the following claims. Socrates evaluates definitions (proposed by his interlocutors or himself) by considering their consistency with conditions of the identity of *F* (*F*-conditions) to which he is committed. In evaluating proposed definitions, Socrates seeks to determine their truth value. Socrates evaluates the truth value of a proposed definition by considering the consistency of the proposed definition with *F*-conditions that *F* he believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed definition's inconsistency with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the definition is false.) Socrates' belief in the truth of a given *F*-condition to which he is committed may be based on self-evidence, its

endoxic status, experience, or deduction from premises to which he is committed on the basis of any of the previous three. However, Socrates does not consider the epistemological grounds of his commitments to his *F*-conditions. This is part of a general avoidance of metaethical and ethical epistemological issues. Due to his avoidance of these, Socrates' pursuit of true definitions is theoretically naive.

Sextus Empiricus and the Tripartition of Time, JAMES WARREN

A discussion of the arguments against the existence of time based upon its tripartition into past, present, and future found in SE *M* 10.197–202. It uncovers Sextus' major premises and assumptions for these arguments and, in particular, criticises his argument that the past and future do not exist because the former is no longer and the latter is not yet. It also places these arguments within the larger structure of Sextus' arguments on time in SE *M* 10 and considers these arguments as an example of his general strategy for producing *ataraxia* by assembling opposing sets of argument on a given question.

Ancient Automata and Mechanical Explanation, SYLVIA
BERRYMAN

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Rochester announces a call for papers for the Colin and Ailsa Turbayne International Berkeley Essay Prize Competition. For the 2004 competition, submitted papers should address some aspect of Berkeley's philosophy. Essays should be new and unpublished and should be written in English and not exceed 5,000 words in length. All references to Berkeley should be to Luce/Jessop, and a MLA or similar standard for notes should be followed. Submissions will be blind reviewed by members of a review board selected by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rochester. The winner will be announced 1 March 2005 and will receive a prize of \$2,000. Copies of the winning essay will be sent to the George Berkeley Library Study Center located in Berkeley's home in Whitehall, Newport, R. I. The deadline for submitting papers is 1 November 2004, and submissions should be sent to: Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, P. O. Box 270078, Lattimore 532, Rochester, N. Y. 14627-0078.

The Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) is pleased to announce its first annual essay prize of \$500, to be called "The AILACT Essay Prize 2004." The prize is to be awarded to the essay that the Prize Committee judges to be the best submitted essay in the field of informal logic and critical thinking. The Committee is J. Anthony Blair, Chair (University of Windsor), Merrilee Salmon (University of Pittsburgh), and Michael Scriven (University of Auckland). Details are available at <http://ailact.mcmaster.ca>.

The Ninth East-West Philosophers' Conference issues a call for papers for its conference which will take place 29 May–11 June 2005, at the University of Hawaii. The topic of the Conference will be "Educations and Their Purposes: A Philosophical Dialogue among Cultures," a dedication to the singular importance of "educations"—purposely plural—in the shaping of a pluralistic world. Education is the point of departure for the cultivation of human culture in all of its different forms. While there are many contested conceptions of what the curriculum of education might be, no one would challenge the premise that education is a good thing for the future of humanity, and that we should continue to invest heavily in it. In fact, many of us would allow that the only resolution to the many problems that continue to beset the human species is a mutual accommodation of cultures made possible by the dialogue that only education can sustain. The only antidote to violence and injustice is the cultivation of a broad social intelligence.

Some possible area to be covered at the Conference might include: Educating Whole Persons for Whole Lives; The Educated Body; An Epistemology of Feeling; Education and the Emotions; Education and the Visual Arts; Islam, Peace, and Education; Music and Moral Education; Education and Poverty; Education and the State; Civic Education; Academic Standards and the Standardization of the Academy; Education as Activism and Resistance.

Philosophers are invited to propose a paper or a panel that will address these or other themes relevant to the general topic. A short abstract can be sent to the organizing committee by mail (University of Hawaii, 2530 Dole Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2383), fax (808-956-9228), or email (rtames@hawaii.edu). As in the past, the organizers will be preparing a volume with selected papers from the conference.

La Société Philosophique de Louvain announces a cycle of conferences that it has organized for the 2003–2004 academic year, to take place at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. The programs are as follows: 18 February 2004, Ruwen Ogien (CNRS, Paris), “La pornographie est-elle immorale?” with comments from W. Lésch and H. Pourtois; 31 March 2004, Renaud Barbaras (University of Paris, Sorbonne) “Vie et phénoménalité,” with comments from N. Frogneux and R. Gély; 10 May 2004, David Konstan (Brown University), “Aristotle and Greek Friendship Revisited,” with comments from P. Destrée and J. L. Solère. Each meeting will commence at 4:30 pm. Further information is available from Virginie Haulotte (vhaulotte@pops1.isp.ucl.ac.be).

The Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2003), edited by Emeritus Professor Antonio S. Cua of the School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America, has been selected by *Choice* magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title in 2003. *Choice* is a publication of the Association of College and Research Libraries, and its Outstanding Academic Title list reflects the best in scholarly print and electronic titles reviewed in that magazine during the previous calendar year. This prestigious list receives great attention from the academic library community.



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
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
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
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


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
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THE IMPACT OF ARISTOTELIANISM ON MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Edited by Riccardo Pozzo



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THE METAPHYSICAL ROOTS OF ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY

CHRISTOPHER V. MIRUS

IN *GENERATION AND CORRUPTION* 2.9, Aristotle sets out to give an account of “how many and what are the principles of all coming to be are like.”¹ In doing so, he situates the cause “for the sake of which,” τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, within a causal nexus familiar to readers of *Physics* 2. It is constituted by the end—that is, the form produced—by the matter in which it is produced, and by the agent that produces it. In *Meteorology* 4.12, moreover, he explains that form itself must be understood in terms of the species-typical activities that follow upon its presence and for the sake of which the composite substance exists. He thus recognizes two sorts of ends, form and activity, of which the latter seems to be ultimate. Although form is the immediate end of coming to be, a composite substance exists in the last analysis for the sake of its activity.

In the following pages, I argue that the foregoing statements implicitly contain a simple yet complete account of Aristotle's teleology. In *De anima* 2.1, Aristotle states that the term “actuality” (ἐντελέχεια) signifies both form, or first actuality, and activity, or second actuality.² Form is the actuality of a natural body, in other words, but this actuality brings with it a capacity for further actuality—that is, for activity of a certain kind. If, however, both form and activity are ends, then that for the sake of which seems to coincide perfectly with actuality. This conclusion entails that the roots of Aristotle's teleology are not bound up with his biology, as several contemporary writers have suggested.³

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¹ GC 2.9.335a26–7.

² DA 2.1.412a20–9.

³ The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality,” in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology* (hereafter, “Aristotle's Conception”), ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204–42; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1 (1984): 133–46; David

They are not even to be found in his understanding of nature in general, but rather in his first philosophy or metaphysics.

Although I am not primarily concerned with the theological dimensions of Aristotle's teleology, the question of God will appear early in the following discussion and reappear several times, reminding us of the need for a properly metaphysical analysis. As *Metaphysics* 6.1 tells us, it is the existence of an immovable substance or substances that distinguishes the science of nature from first philosophy.⁴ Indeed, Aristotle's theological commitments reveal that an accurate account of his teleology cannot depend on the notion of change, even change for the sake of an end. As we shall see in a moment, he himself highlights the problematic relation between that for the sake of which and change when he asks, in the *Metaphysics*, how final causality can pertain to unchanging substances such as God.

Our immediate point of departure, however, is the claim in *Physics* 2.2 that every outcome of a continuous change, provided that it be "what is best," is an end. In section 1, after briefly introducing this text, I lay out a serious challenge that any interpreter must face. This is Aristotle's suggestion, in the theological aporia just mentioned and in its later resolution, that there cannot be a strong, general connection between τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα and motion or change. This section concludes with a brief clarification of Aristotle's use of the term "motion" (κίνησις), as opposed to "change" (μεταβολή), in the text from *Physics* 2.2.

In section 2, I begin to address the challenge formulated in section one by showing that theology aside, Aristotle's account of natural substances precludes any account of τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα in terms of motion. This is because every composite substance is, simply as such, for the sake of its form. Then, having considered the inadequacy of motion as a context for understanding Aristotle's teleology, we shall turn to the more basic, metaphysical concept of actuality. It is in terms of actuality, I shall argue, that Aristotle provides a unified account of both

Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1988): 1–53; Susan Sauvé Meyer, "Aristotle, Teleology and Reduction," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 791–825; and David Depew, "Etiological Approaches to Biological Aptness in Aristotle and Darwin," in *Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse*, ed. Wolfgang Kullmann and Sabine Föllinger (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), 209–27. For a good review of the recent literature on Aristotle's teleology see Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in *Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs*, ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71–82.

⁴ *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a27–31.

being for the sake of an end, which need not involve motion, and the more familiar coming to be or change for the sake of an end, which obviously does.

In section 3 we shall return to *Physics* 2.2, taking up the seemingly unremarkable characterization of that for the sake of which as an outcome: τὸ ἔσχατον. Locating the metaphysical roots of this temporal "last" in the prior notion of a limit, I go on to show how the concept of a limit applies both to being and to coming to be or change, and to associate it with the concept of actuality. For Aristotle, limit and actuality are distinct aspects of the same metaphysical principle.

I

The passage from *Physics* 2.2 that will serve as our point of departure is one of Aristotle's most helpful and concise statements concerning τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. We should not, however, mistake it for a definition or even for a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. For although Aristotle's programmatic discussions of natural science both in *Physics* 2 and elsewhere contain a number of statements characterizing the "cause as that for the sake of which," none of these statements is intended as a definition in the strict sense. This is not surprising; to expect such a definition would be to assume that Aristotle's teleology can be explicated in terms of more basic, nonteleological notions. However, it seems that nowhere in Aristotle's writings does he give even an informal general explanation of what he means by τέλος or τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. In *Physics* 2 and *Parts of Animals* 1.1, the texts most likely to contain such an explanation, he is fully engaged in a prior debate concerning the very existence of action for an end in nature, and concerning the consequent necessity of explaining natural phenomena teleologically. He therefore tends to focus on the most obvious cases of goal-directed action, and he seems content to provide only sufficient conditions for calling something an end.⁵

In the text now at issue, Aristotle introduces τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα in terms of three criteria. Something is an end if (a) it is last (ἔσχατον)—that

⁵ For this reason, and also because *Physics* 2 has been mined so thoroughly by previous commentators, I have tried to avoid relying too heavily on this book alone for an understanding of Aristotle's teleology. Rather, we shall begin with one of the most helpful texts from *Physics* 2, and then follow the conceptual leads this statement provides to other texts, throughout the corpus, that seem likely to deepen our understanding.

is, is an outcome of some motion; (b) the motion in question is continuous; and (c) the outcome is, as he puts it, the best. Here are his words:

For with respect to things of which—the motion being continuous—there is some end, this last is also that for the sake of which. For this reason also the poet was carried away absurdly in saying, “he has death (τελευτήν), the very thing for the sake of which he came to be.” For not everything that is last claims to be an end, but the best.⁶

In short, the good outcome of a continuous motion is an end and that for the sake of which. Although each of the criteria involved in this description calls for an extended discussion, I shall focus here on condition (a). More particularly, as mentioned above, section 2 is devoted to motion, and moves gradually toward the concept of actuality; whereas section 3 begins with the notion of an outcome (“the last”) and ends with the concept of a limit.⁷

If *Physics* 2.2 is the proper starting point of our discussion, the metaphysical issues with which we shall have to deal are raised forcefully by an aporia that Aristotle poses in *Metaphysics* 3.2 and again in 11.1. The puzzle, which has to do with the very possibility of first philosophy, is this: How can there be a general science of first principles if some types of principle are not found in every realm of being? The offending principle that Aristotle has in mind is the good—which, according to book 1, is one of the central topics of first philosophy. As it seems, however, the good cannot be found among unchanging beings:

Everything that is good in itself and of its own nature is an end, and thus a cause for the sake of which other things come to be and exist, and the end and that for the sake of which is an end of some action, and all actions involve motion.⁸

⁶ *Physics* 2.2.194a29–33. Parallel texts are *Physics* 2.8.199a8–9: “Further, in as many things as have some end, the first and the successive are done for the sake of this”; and *PA* 1.1.641b24–6: “We always say that this is for the sake of that, whenever there is clearly some end at which the motion concludes, should nothing stand in the way.” Similar statements can be found elsewhere (in *Physics* 2.3 and 2.7, for example), but these three are the most complete.

⁷ For condition (c), concerning the relation between τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα and goodness, see my “Aristotle’s *agathon*,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 57, no. 3 (March 2004): 515–36. I have recently completed an essay on condition (b), concerning Aristotle’s concept of continuity and its role in his account of goal-directed change; this will hopefully appear in print soon.

⁸ *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a23–7; compare 11.1.1059a34–8.

In light of this argument, consider Aristotle's first mover or God: on the one hand, God is completely unchanging; he neither comes to be nor passes away. He is not the outcome of any change and so cannot be an end. On the other hand, precisely as eternal and necessary, God is supremely good, so that according to the *aporia* he must be an end, an outcome of change.⁹

It is important to clarify the exact nature of this difficulty. The problem is not that God is the end or good of other substances: to begin with, Aristotle has a perfectly coherent way of asserting this without making God an outcome of change. He makes a first distinction relative to this point in *Metaphysics* 12.7, where the question is, precisely, how God can be "something for the sake of which." An unchanging being cannot, he writes, be an end in the sense of a subject or beneficiary of change (τινὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα), but it can be that toward which the change is directed (τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τινός).¹⁰ As is clear from other passages, however, it is not at God in himself that other substances aim, strictly speaking, but at whatever share in the divine their nature permits.¹¹ After all, the alternative would be to say that natural substances aim at some sort of union with God or even at becoming God. Rather, the immediate end for the sake of which (τινός) things that aim at God come to be and act is either a form or an activity, by which they themselves are constituted or of which they are the subject (τινὶ).¹²

⁹ For God's necessity and goodness see *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b10–30; 14.4.191b16–21.

¹⁰ *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b1–3.

¹¹ See *De caelo* 2.12.292a19–b25; *DA* 2.4.415a27–b8; *Metaphysics* 12.10.

¹² It is not clear whether Aristotle can give any further account of this unique way in which God is an end, or whether he even thinks such an account is required. The notion of sharing in or imitating the divine is involved in a conclusion about natural substances that Aristotle considers necessary on other grounds, and he seems to consider this sufficient justification for it. However, it may be helpful briefly to review this justification. In *Metaphysics* 9.8 and 12, Aristotle argues that absolutely speaking and in the cosmos as a whole, actuality must be prior to potentiality. He takes this conclusion to entail the existence of a substance completely free of potentiality, and therefore not subject to change. Without such a substance, he thinks, one cannot account for the motions (incomplete actualities) by which potentialities in the cosmos are constantly being actualized. In his works of natural science he invokes these conclusions as principles, most explicitly in *De caelo* 2.12.292a19–b25; *GC* 2.10.336b25–337a8, and *DA* 2.4.415a27–b8.

There is another reason, as well, that the aporia of 3.2 cannot be about God as the good of things other than himself. Insofar as God is the end of natural substances, his goodness is goodness for something else. Aristotle's God, however, is supremely self-sufficient (αὐτάρκους); his goodness does not depend on anything outside himself, but is due simply to his own necessary and eternal being.¹³ Thus, according to the aporia God should also be an end simply in himself, without reference to the motions and activities of natural substances; and any motion involved in being an end cannot be located outside him.

Finally, it is important to note that Aristotle himself is clearly committed to the minor premise of the aporetic syllogism, that every good is necessarily an end. In fact, as I have argued at length elsewhere, he considers something an end or that for the sake of which if and only if it is good.¹⁴ The precise problem at hand, therefore, is that if this identification of the good with that for the sake of which is to stand, there must be some sense in which, precisely as an eternal and unchanging being, God is an end and that for the sake of which. Whether these terms apply to God in just the way they apply to the forms and activities of changeable beings is another matter; at least, however, their theological usage must be recognizably related to the sense they have in discourse about nature.

Before beginning to see how Aristotle resolves this aporia, as a final preliminary we need to look briefly at term "motion" itself. In the text quoted above from *Physics* 2.2, Aristotle speaks of ends as outcomes of motion (κίνησις). In his technical usage, however, κίνησις applies only to changes in quality, quantity, and place: it cannot signify the coming to be or passing away of substances.¹⁵ Nevertheless, he also clearly holds that the coming to be of living things, for exam-

¹³ *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b10–30; 14.4.191b16–21.

¹⁴ See especially the following passages, to the effect that (a) every end is good: *Physics* 2.2.194a32–3; compare *Politics* 1.2.1253a1–2; and (b) every good is, as such (ἀπλῶς), a cause for the sake of which: *Metaphysics* 1.7.988b6–16; compare 2.2.994b9–13. For further discussion see my "Aristotle's *agathon*."

¹⁵ *Physics* 5.1.225a34–b3.

ple, takes place for the sake of its outcome. How, then, should we understand his use of κίνησις in *Physics* 2.2? A first point is simply that Aristotle sometimes uses κίνησις in a broader sense, as equivalent to μεταβολή, his term for change in general.¹⁶ Moreover, he does not even introduce the distinction between these two terms until *Physics* 5.1, well after both the passage we are now considering and his well-known definition of motion in *Physics* 3.1. The use of κίνησις in the present passage, therefore, may not be significant.¹⁷

At the same time, Aristotle also seems to allow a sense of κίνησις in which, although not equivalent to μεταβολή, it nevertheless includes the coming to be of natural substances. According to Sarah Broadie, the significance of the distinction between κίνησις and μεταβολή emerges when we consider that whereas the former signifies change as involving a temporally extended process, the latter signifies only the emergence of a new state: change, pure and simple.¹⁸ Now although I do not think this is what Aristotle had in mind when he formulated the distinction, Broadie's claim does point to the fact that the Greek word for coming to be, γένεσις, also has two senses in Aristotle. The sense operative in *Physics* 5.1–2 is metaphysical: it reflects Aristotle's assertion, against Parmenides and the early naturalists, that coming to be and passing away are not illusory. That is, in addition to the motions (κινήσεις) undergone by existing substances, there is also real change (μεταβολή) from nonbeing to being (γένεσις) and from being to nonbeing. Because it is impossible to be more or less a substance, however, this sort of change is necessarily instantaneous and so is not a motion. The second sense of γένεσις appears often in Aristotle's biological works—in the title of *Generation of Animals*, for example. Here it refers to the extended process by which a new organism comes to be and grows to maturity. In many important

¹⁶ See for example *Physics* 2.7.

¹⁷ Because "motion" does not quite work in English, I shall use "change" interchangeably with "motion" whenever it is not necessary to make a clear distinction between Aristotle's κίνησις and μεταβολή; when this distinction is relevant, I shall use the Greek to clarify my English usage.

¹⁸ Sarah Waterlow (Broadie), *Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 95–6.

respects, at least, this process is surely a motion in the sense at work in *Physics* 2.2 and then defined in 3.1.¹⁹

II

We have seen that according to *Physics* 2.2, every good outcome of a continuous motion is an end or that for the sake of which. However, the aporia of *Metaphysics* 3.2 brings to light a serious problem with this formulation, and in particular with its reliance on the concept of motion. A first step in resolving this problem is to point out that there are other, nontheological reasons for questioning any strong connection between that for the sake of which and change. For even aside from the theological case, Aristotle clearly thinks that teleological explanation can and should be invoked not only in cases of goal-directed change but also for certain cases of stable existence. Consider, for example, *Metaphysics* 7.17. In this chapter, he gives a general argument that in composite substances, matter as such is for the sake of form: First, that for the sake of which a composite substance comes to be is its form or essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Second, however, this essence does not lose its causal role when the process

¹⁹ This process certainly involves a coming to be in the metaphysical sense, but it is not so clear how we should map the passage from nonbeing to being onto the developmental process described in *Generation of Animals*. My own suspicion is that for Aristotle, an animal's unqualified coming to be coincides with the formation of the conceptus. At the least, he is quite clear that at this point a new substance exists, which although it depends on the mother as an external source of nourishment, strictly speaking nourishes itself and directs its own development to maturity. Although many of its faculties have not yet "come to be," at no later stage does development involve an unqualified coming to be. It is, rather, a passage from one contrary (immaturity) to another (maturity) through a series of coordinated motions. On the ontological status of the embryo after conception see *GA* 2.4.739b20–740a30, especially 740a24–7. In the latter passage Aristotle is generally translated as saying that an embryo is an animal only potentially. See A. L. Peck's translation (Loeb edition) of the *Generation of Animals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 197; see also A. Platt's translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1148. However, the context suggests that he is actually characterizing the embryo as an animal in capacity: "Since in capacity it is already an animal, though incomplete (δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῶον ἀτελὲς δέ), it must receive nourishment from elsewhere; and so it uses the womb and the mother to take nourishment, as a plant does the earth, until it is completed to the point of being now an animal with the capacity for locomotion (ἤδη ζῶον δυνάμει πορευτικόν)."

of coming to be is finished, but it continues in the composite as the ongoing cause of its being. It follows that the cause for the sake of which—unlike, Aristotle adds, the efficient cause—is sought not only for coming to be but also in the case of being.²⁰

In other texts, as well, it is clear that form remains that for the sake of which in an already existing substance. The most obvious case is that of living things, whose parts, as organs or tools, both come to be and exist for the sake of the whole.²¹ Moreover, it is not only the organs that exist for an end: according to *Parts of Animals* 2.1, within every animal the elements exist for the sake of the homogeneous parts, and these exist for the sake of the heterogeneous.²² In other words, Aristotle takes organs to be only the most obvious instance of the relation between matter and form in general, so that in every actually existing composite substance, matter is for the sake of form.²³ Thus, his teleology must not only account for the coming to be of composite substances, but it must also contribute to explaining their ongoing existence.

We have, therefore, a tension that needs to be resolved. On the one hand, in his theoretical discussions of natural science Aristotle introduces that for the sake of which in relation to motion or change. On the other hand, he also thinks in teleological terms about the being—not just about the coming to be—both of natural bodies and, as we saw above, of God. Now according to some authors, this apparent tension can be resolved by observing that for Aristotle, x exists for the sake of y if and only if x has come to be for the sake of y .²⁴ Thus “coming to be for the sake of” is conceptually prior to “being for the sake of,” and all teleological claims depend on claims about goal-directed processes or activities. Even at first glance, however, there are serious difficulties with this solution. For one thing, it cannot handle the case of God, and for another, it violates Aristotle’s general claim that being is conceptually and ontologically prior to coming to be.²⁵

²⁰ *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a28–32.

²¹ *PA* 2.1; on tools see also *Physics* 2.3.194b32–195a3.

²² *PA* 2.1.646a35–b13.

²³ Or, ultimately, between matter and the substance’s *ἐργον*. However, the intermediate position of form between matter and *ἐργον* ensures that matter will also be for the sake of form.

²⁴ See Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception.”

²⁵ Aristotle holds that coming to be is for the sake of being (see *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a8–10), and this suggests that coming to be for an end is for the sake of being for the sake of that end. Because the end is conceptually prior to that which is for the sake of it, being for the sake of an end turns out to be conceptually prior to coming to be for the sake of an end.

In fact, Aristotle himself clearly holds that the teleological character of coming to be is dependent on, rather than determining, the relation between a composite substance's matter and its form. To see this, we must first remember that in both *Physics* 2.9 and *Parts of Animals* 2.1, the claim that matter is for the sake of form captures a relation that Aristotle also signifies by the phrase "hypothetical necessity," or "necessity on a supposition." As he concludes in the *Physics*, "the necessary is in the matter, that for the sake of which in the account."²⁶ By extending an example that Aristotle himself uses, we can see that this claim is true of coming to be precisely because it is true of being.²⁷ The iron in a saw does not exist for the sake of the blade because it came to be as part of the saw; in fact, the smith probably bought it from a miner whose only intention in producing it was to be paid.²⁸ Iron exists for the sake of the blade only insofar as it is actually part of a saw, or at least is becoming such, because only then does the relation signified by the preposition *ἕνεκα* obtain. In the terms of *Metaphysics* 7.17, the primary cause of a thing's being is its form or essence; it is for this—for the sake of this, we may safely gloss—that the matter is hypothetically necessary. Whether its coming to be is also for the sake of this form, however, is quite another question.

It seems, then, that our opening aporia is of considerably greater scope than it might first have seemed. Like God, natural substances and artifacts involve a *οὗ ἕνεκα*, namely their form, even if we abstract from their coming to be. We therefore need a way to extend Aristotle's teleology from becoming to being, and to show how the two cases are related. Not surprisingly, since Aristotle states his aporiai with a view to solving (or dissolving) them, the theological conundrum with which we opened contains a clue. In the aporetic argument, Aristotle connects that for the sake of which with change through the concept of *πρᾶξις* ("action" or "activity"). In *Metaphysics* 9, however, speaking in his own person, he simply rejects the claim that every activity involves motion. With this claim and its conse-

²⁶ *Physics* 2.9.200a14–15.

²⁷ *Physics* 2.9.200a10–13.

²⁸ The homogeneous bodies provide a similar example in the order of nature as opposed to art: although their matter exists in them for the sake of their form (see *Meteorology* 4.12), we may presume that this matter, namely the elements, usually does not come to be for the sake of this form, but rather through an independent causal process occurring on some prior occasion.

quences in hand, the aporia in all its forms disappears. Our next stop, therefore, is the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*.

In *Metaphysics* 9.6, having completed his discussion of potentiality (δύναμις) in the sense of a capacity for change, Aristotle goes on to introduce, as he says, the more properly metaphysical concepts of actuality and potentiality. These are, of course, the concepts at work whenever he states that being, in whatever category, may be either potential or actual.²⁹ The term that he uses for actuality is ἐνέργεια, which despite its narrower use in other places is obviously meant in this context to include everything that, elsewhere, he sometimes calls ἐντελέχεια.³⁰ At the end of the chapter, turning briefly to the ontological status of πράξις, he concludes that this class includes both ἐνέργειαι, which count as activities or πράξεις in the full sense of that term, and motions (κινήσεις), which are πράξεις in an extended sense. Motions are those activities, such as making something thin, that involve a process; as Aristotle puts it, they aim at an end outside them-

²⁹ For example, *DA* 1.1.402a23–b1; *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a35–b2; 9.1.1045b33–4; 9.10.1051a34–b1.

³⁰ In fact, ἐντελέχεια appears in several of the passages cited in n. 29 as referring to the distinction between actuality and potentiality. Its occurrence is not surprising in *DA* 1.1, given that the being in question is the soul. In *Metaphysics* 5.7, Aristotle uses ἐντελέχεια followed by examples for which ἐνέργεια would have been quite appropriate. In *Metaphysics* 9.1, he observes that being is spoken of both as something and of such a sort and of such a quantity, and “in potentiality and actuality and in work (κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον).” Because he has just been focusing on the fact that all categories other than substance are categories of substance, this last phrase may actually signify a threefold distinction among a substance existing in potentiality, the same substance existing in (first) actuality through its form, and that substance existing in full (second) actuality through the exercise of its typical activity. As soon as he begins to consider potentiality in the sense of an active power, however, he switches to ἐνέργεια, and this remains the primary term for actuality through *Metaphysics* 9. This transition parallels Aristotle’s usage in the *Physics*, where the distinction is between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια until book 3, where halfway through his discussion of motion Aristotle switches without warning from ἐντελέχεια to ἐνέργεια. It seems that Aristotle respects the etymological associations of both terms, which link ἐντελέχεια with form and ἐνέργεια with activity, but also uses them both more broadly to emphasize their conceptual continuity. (Question: the term ἐνέργεια would presumably be used to say that something is actually polka-dotted or upside-down. Could ἐντελέχεια also be used, insofar as for most substances these accidental attributes would count as neither first nor second ἐντελέχεια?)

selves. By contrast, ἐνέργειαι are activities, such as seeing, in which the end is already present.³¹

The distinction between πράξεις that are motions (and are thus πράξεις in an extended sense) and those that are not is already significant for our purposes. Even further, as the definition of motion developed in *Physics* 3.1–3 makes clear, the distinction between ἐνέργειαι and κινήσεις must be taken as applying more broadly than the term πράξις strictly allows. First, we have already seen that there is a sense of γένεσις, coming to be, in which coming to be counts as a motion, and thus as an incomplete actuality. Second, although the corresponding complete actuality—the new substance's first actuality (ἐντελέχεια) or form—does not count as a πράξις, the term ἐνέργεια can be taken in a broad sense to include all actuality.³² Thus the distinction between complete and incomplete actualities applies in the category of substance as well, and so in all the categories in which change is possible.

In *Metaphysics* 9.6, then, Aristotle includes both κινήσεις and ἐνέργειαι under the general concept of πράξις, the concept used in the aporia of 3.2 to connect that for the sake of which with motion. This means that whereas every πράξις does involve an end, not every πράξις, despite the claim made in the aporia, involves motion. Seeing, for example, does not of itself tend to any further end; it simply is the end. Moreover, returning to the priority of being over coming to be, it cannot be said that seeing is an end because it is the outcome of a change from not seeing to seeing,³³ or even because animals come to be for the sake of seeing. This can easily be seen from another example. For Aristotle, the activity of the heavenly bodies is circular motion. This motion is their ἔργον, and they exist for the sake of it. However, they neither come to be for the sake of their motion nor pass from not moving to moving; rather, they both exist and move

³¹ *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b18–30; compare *DA* 2.5; *NE* 10.7. In *Physics* 3.1–3 Aristotle defines motion as an incomplete ἐνέργεια, so that the strict and extended uses of this term parallel those of πράξις. However, as will be noted in a moment, in both senses the former term is broader than the latter.

³² Compare *Metaphysics* 9.6.

³³ In *DA* 2.5 Aristotle states that this change, not being a change between contraries, is not an alteration (and therefore not a motion) in the ordinary sense of this term. It is, however, obviously a change.

eternally.³⁴ Their activity—and thus also seeing, in the case of a sighted animal—counts as an end simply because it is an ἐνέργεια.

Aristotle's discussion of concepts like πρόξις, κίνησις, and ἐνέργεια makes it clear that the concept of that for the sake of which can be separated from that of motion. Whereas the end of a motion is that for the sake of which the motion occurs, a complete activity constitutes an end for its subject simply as such and apart from any motion with which it may be connected. Moreover, because the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις can be applied not only to a substance's activity (ἐνέργεια) but also to its first actuality (ἐντελέχεια), we can safely conclude that, as *Metaphysics* 7.17 suggests, a substance's form counts as that for the sake of which not only as the outcome of its coming to be—of a κίνησις, broadly speaking—but also, and in fact primarily, because it is the form or actuality (ἐντελέχεια) by which the substance actually (ἐνεργείᾳ) exists.³⁵

We began this section by describing that for the sake of which as the good outcome of a continuous change. It now seems, however, that Aristotle's τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα may have more to do with actuality in general than with changes and their outcomes in particular. Given that the initial connection between that for the sake of which and change comes from *Physics* 2, which is generally considered the most important locus for Aristotle's teleology, this is hardly a comfortable conclusion. Whatever else may be said for "actuality" as a replacement for "outcome of change," it leaves us with a good deal of explaining to do. I hope this can be accomplished in the next section, where we shall discuss Aristotle's concept of limit and its place in his teleology.

Before moving on, however, it is interesting to see exactly how Aristotle's solution to our opening aporia applies to the theological version of the problem. First—and this is a point worth keeping in

³⁴ *De caelo* 2.3.286a8–13.

³⁵ Another interesting text from the *Metaphysics* occurs in 13.3, where Aristotle is also clearly responding to our initial aporia by arguing that goodness, or more properly speaking, beauty, is a cause even among the objects of mathematics. He distinguishes goodness from beauty in that the former always involves πρόξις, whereas the latter occurs also in motionless things (1078a31–2). Given that πρόξεις do not always involve motion, I take the distinction to be between those things to which the concept of actuality can properly be applied, whether or not any motion or change is involved, and mathematical objects, with regard to which we cannot properly speak of potentiality and actuality.

mind—in *Metaphysics* 9.9 Aristotle argues that actuality is prior to potentiality both in account (λόγος) and in substance (οὐσία). This conclusion has a number of consequences, of which the most important for present purposes is that to say God exists actually, or even that God simply is actuality, does not include even an implicit reference to potentiality of any sort.³⁶ God does not exist through the actualization of any potentiality; he simply exists. Specifically, the divine substance is an act of understanding that does not differ from its object—so that because the usual distinctions among substance, activity, and object do not apply, there is simply no room for potentiality in God.

By denying any distinction between the divine substance and the activity by which that substance possesses complete actuality, and between the activity of knowing and its object, Aristotle ensures that God does not exist for any end outside himself. This way of being contrasts sharply even with that of the heavenly bodies, whose activity is distinct from their substance, and which exist for the sake of that activity. Nevertheless, it would be odd to say that God is thereby excluded from the sphere of the good and of that for the sake of which. For Aristotle, rather, he exhibits both in a far more perfect manner than do natural substances: he simply is his own good and his own end; he exists for his own sake, resting in himself and transcending any need for change. At the same time, as we have already noted, he serves as that for the sake of which other things come to be, exist, and act.

We now have, therefore, a solution to our theological aporia and its variants. As I have already remarked, though, it is a rather uncomfortable solution. In the case of God, and in the case of natural substances as well, we seem to have a striking separation of teleology from motion, and it would be helpful to have at least an initial indication of how this alleged separation fits the many texts in which these concepts are so closely joined. How, in particular, does it affect our understanding of the claim that every good outcome of a continuous motion is an end? For now I will suggest only that our investigation so far confirms a claim I have already made about the passage from *Physics* 2.2 and others like it: namely, that it should be understood not as an adequate general account of τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, but rather as a set

³⁶ On God as actuality see *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b12–23.

of sufficient conditions for the existence of an end. As such, it is all Aristotle requires to establish the need for teleological explanations in natural science.

In any case, the problems we have encountered thus far make it even clearer that we cannot leave formulations like that of *Physics* 2.2 as they stand. Adequate as they may be for the Aristotelian naturalist, they cannot be fully understood without a much deeper analysis, one that takes place at the metaphysical level. We have already begun such an analysis by connecting Aristotle's concept of κίνησις with the related concepts of προᾶξις, ἐνέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια. In the following section, returning to the conditions laid down in *Physics* 2.2, we shall consider his use of the term "last" (ἔσχατον), tracing the meaning of this term to its metaphysical root in the concept, so important to Greek philosophy, of a limit (πέρας).

III

To get an initial sense of how important Aristotle's notion of a limit is for our study, let us return to a passage we have already mentioned: the last section of *Metaphysics* 9.6, in which Aristotle distinguishes actualities from motions. It reads as follows:

Since of the actions of which there is a limit none is an end, but [they are] of the things that respect the end (like making thin or thinning: the things themselves, when one is making them thin, are therefore in motion, those things not being present for the sake of which the motion is), this is not an action (προᾶξις), or at least not a complete one (τέλεια), for it is not an end (τέλος). But that in which the end is present is indeed an action. . . . But if [it is] not [present], it would have had to stop at some point, just as when it makes thin, but as a matter of fact, it does not, but it lives and has lived. So of these we must call the ones motions, and the others actualities. For every motion is incomplete (ἀτελής): thinning, learning, walking, house-building—these indeed are motions, and incomplete.³⁷

Although the term "limit" appears only once in this text, the corresponding concept obviously plays an important role. Moreover, the definition of motion as an incomplete action—one that has a limit distinct from itself—already suggests that the ἔσχατον of *Physics* 2.2 is an end because it constitutes the limit of the preceding motion. Fi-

³⁷ *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b18–30.

nally, in line with what I have already claimed concerning motion and that for the sake of which, Aristotle recognizes certain actions, which he calls complete, in which there is an end without any preceding motion.³⁸

The connection in *Metaphysics* 9.6 between limits and ends suggests that a further examination of what Aristotle means by “limit” may not only explain the role of the ἔσχατον in *Physics* 2.2, but also shed further light on how there can be a οὐ ἔνεκα that is not, temporally, something last. For if it is now clear that τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα is not necessarily an outcome of change, we are still looking for an explanation of what in fact it is, of its importance in Aristotle’s philosophy, and of the relation between goal-directed change and Aristotelian teleology in general. We can find the initial leads for our investigation in the chapter from Aristotle’s metaphysical lexicon devoted to the concept of limit, *Metaphysics* 5.17. Because the chapter is brief and already quite compressed, I reproduce it here in full:

We call a limit the last of each, and the first outside of which is found nothing, and the first within which all, and whatever may be the form of a magnitude or of what has magnitude, and the end of each, such being that to which is the motion and the action, and not that from which, but sometimes both, namely that from which and that to which and for the sake of which, and the substance of each and what it was to be for each, for this is the limit of knowledge, and if of knowledge, also of the thing. So it is clear that limit is spoken of in as many ways as is principle, and in more still: for the principle is a sort of limit, but not every limit is a principle.³⁹

For present purposes, two points stand out in this chapter. The first is that Aristotle refers to “that to which” not only as a limit but also as that for the sake of which a motion occurs. Even more interesting, however, is his characterization of substance (οὐσία) and what it was to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) as a limit.

In section 2, I concluded that a substance’s form counts as that for the sake of which not only as the outcome of its coming to be, but also, and even primarily, as the actuality by which it exists. In *Meta-*

³⁸ On the complete as that to which the end belongs see *Metaphysics* 5.16.1021b23–30. That Aristotle associates the complete with the bounded or limited, as opposed to the unlimited (ἄπειρον), appears from the fact that he deals with the complete and with limit in consecutive chapters (5.16–7), and characterizes them in similar terms.

³⁹ *Metaphysics* 5.17.1022a4–13.

physics 5.17, we find a striking parallel. Aristotle not only calls the endpoint of a motion its limit; he also characterizes as a limit—the limit of a composite substance—the form or “what it was to be” of that substance. To understand how substance (οὐσία) and what it was to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) enter his discussion of limits, and how such limits are related to the endpoints of motions, we must draw on his account of substance in *Metaphysics* 7–8. I shall not, of course, propose an overall interpretation of these books and their conclusions, but I shall take from them a few helpful points, which I hope are sufficiently uncontroversial not to require an extended defense.

It is well known that Aristotle uses οὐσία in a number of senses, and commentators are divided about exactly where the distinctions and arguments of *Metaphysics* 7–8 leave us. Clearly, however, the sense at work in Aristotle’s discussion of limit is that in which οὐσία signifies a thing’s essence, or in Aristotle’s roundabout phrase, what it was to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) for that thing. Moreover, it is also clear that in the case of matter–form composites, with which Aristotle is directly concerned in *Metaphysics* 7–8, substance in this sense is the composite’s form or actuality,⁴⁰ which he elsewhere says is the cause of its being.⁴¹ Next, the phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι has a number of derivative senses as well: it can be applied to qualities, to quantities, and indeed to anything predicable of a substance, insofar as these are, secondarily, what it was to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) for their subjects.⁴² A final relevant point that becomes clear in *Metaphysics* 7 is that substance, in the above sense, is what we are trying to capture when we define something.⁴³ After all, a definition is meant to answer the question “What is it?” (τί ἐστι), and substance is what it was to be (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) for the object in question. To know something simply speaking, therefore, is to know its substance, which thus constitutes the primary object of knowledge.

In 5.17, it is presumably this last point, concerning substance as an object of knowledge, that Aristotle has in mind when he says that a

⁴⁰ See for example *Metaphysics* 7.6.10–11, 15–17.

⁴¹ *Metaphysics* 5.8.1017b14–16; *DA* 2.4.415b10–22.

⁴² *Metaphysics* 7.1, 4. Correspondingly, Aristotle occasionally uses a broad sense of οὐσία that enables him to ask about the “substance,” or essence, of an item from any of the categories (for example, *Metaphysics* 1.3.983a27; 1.7.988a34–b6).

⁴³ See for example *Metaphysics* 7.4.

thing's οὐσία or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is the limit of knowledge. It is, after all, the object of knowledge that makes an act of knowledge be knowledge of a particular kind, and therefore something definite and limited.⁴⁴ Aristotle goes on to say, however, that if substance is the limit of knowledge (γνώσις), this is only because it plays an analogous role in the thing (πρᾶγμα) itself. Thus the concept of a limit (πέρας) seems to provide him with another perspective on the causal role of a composite's οὐσία, or form. Substance is the cause of a thing's being insofar as—by contrast with matter, the principle of potentiality—it determines or limits what the composite actually is. This same point, in fact, appears in other terms in 8.2, where Aristotle characterizes substance, in the sense of actuality, as a differentia or differentiae of substance in the sense of matter. Finally, if the terms “being” (εἶναι) and “what it was to be” apply in a derivative sense to nonsubstances, it is just as clear that quantities, qualities, and so forth are secondary limits on or determinations of their subjects' being.

Interesting as it may be, however, the foregoing account of substance as limit does not yet shed much light on Aristotle's teleology. What we need now is to connect this notion of a limit of being with the notion of a limit or endpoint of motion, which we found in *Metaphysics* 9.6. As we shall see, the relation between limits of motion and limits of being turns out to correspond perfectly with the relation, which we have already considered, between coming to be for the sake of something and being for the sake of something. This correspondence points to the conclusion that in Aristotle's usage, the terms τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐνέργεια, and πέρασ designate complementary concepts, each of which reveals a different aspect of the same metaphysical principle.

Given what we already know about the place of form in Aristotle's teleology, it should come as no surprise that limit as end and limit as form are indeed closely related. The necessary link appears in any number of passages in which he discusses the various types of cause, both in *Physics* 2 and elsewhere. He repeatedly states that in the central cases of goal-directed change, namely, the coming to be of natural substances, that for the sake of which is nothing other

⁴⁴ Although it would be dangerous to rely on this text, note that in *Categories* 2, being knowledge of *grammar* limits knowledge in the same way that being a horse or a man limits animal.

than the form or substance—τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι—of what comes to be.⁴⁵ Moreover, this is no accidental connection. In *Parts of Animals* 1.1, when he explains why his predecessors failed to make use of teleological explanation, the reason he cites is that they had no clear notion of “what it was to be, of definition with respect to substance.”⁴⁶ The terms he uses are, of course, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία.

Of the various texts in which Aristotle identifies form (the limit of being) with that for the sake of which (the limit of coming to be), it is this remark about the failure of the early naturalists that best reveals the nature of the connection. To explain how a substance is generated, he thinks, is to explain how it comes to be what it is, or in other words, how it comes to have the form that determines or limits it.⁴⁷ By failing to understand that form, rather than matter, is the cause of a substance's actual being, the naturalists missed not just the explanation, but the explanandum itself.⁴⁸ Mistaking the ontological structure of the outcome, they also mistook the structure of the process. Aristotle summarizes the order of inference nicely when he says, in *Generation of Animals* 5.1, that coming to be (γένεσις) follows upon and takes place for the sake of being (οὐσία), rather than vice versa.⁴⁹ Thus we must conclude that οὐσία is the defining limit of coming to be because it is the defining limit of that which is.

Once we understand form as the limit of a composite substance, and therefore as the cause of its being, we can see clearly one reason that Aristotle considers τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα to be a cause of being, and not only of motion or change. By contrast with processes and tools, which are for the sake of an end but cease to be relevant to that end once it is achieved, a substance's matter is necessary for the finished product as well. This is why in *Physics* 2.9, to which I alluded in the previous section, Aristotle can speak indifferently of the relation between matter and form in coming to be, and their relation in being:

⁴⁵ See for example *Physics* 2.2.194a27–b9; 2.7.198a24–7; *GC* 1.7.324b14–20; 2.6.333b5–20; 2.9.335b6–7; *Meteorology* 4.2.379b18–380a1; *DA* 2.4.415b10–22; *PA* 1.1.639b15–7.

⁴⁶ *PA* 1.1.642a25–7.

⁴⁷ At one level of analysis it may be preferable to say that form determines or limits matter—but in so doing, it is the internal principle by which the concrete substance exists actually in a determinate way. Thus either way of speaking is correct.

⁴⁸ Compare Meyer, “Aristotle, Teleology and Reduction,” 820.

⁴⁹ *GA* 5.1.778b6–7; compare *Metaphysics* 9.7

For example, why is the saw such? So that this and for the sake of this. It is impossible, however, that this end come to be unless it be iron; therefore it is necessary that it be iron, if a saw and its task shall be. It is necessary, indeed, on a supposition and not as an end: for the necessary is in the matter, and that for the sake of which in the account (λόγος).⁵⁰

The account, form, or substance is that for the sake of which not only as cause of the saw's coming to be, but also as cause of its being.

The identity of limit as essence with limit as end in the case of natural substances and their coming to be brings us an important step closer to understanding Aristotle's teleology. To take full advantage of this step, however, we need to place it in the context of his general understanding of change. In *Physics* 3.1–3, when Aristotle is developing his definition of motion in the broad sense, or change, his central claim is that change is not a reality over and above the various categories of being. It is, rather, an incomplete actuality corresponding to the potentialities and complete actualities found in the most basic of these categories. To understand the significance of this claim, however, and the role the concept of limit plays in explicating it, we need a minimum of historical context.

One of Aristotle's most important contributions to Greek philosophy is his proposal of a strong competitor to the Parmenidean and Heraclitean understanding of change, which proceeded exclusively by contrasting change with stable being. To many previous thinkers, including Plato, change seemed to be something so indeterminate, so close to nonbeing, that it was almost (or even in fact) illusory—although of course the nature of the “illusion” differed from one thinker to the next. Aristotle, however, by insisting that change be understood in relation to being, concludes that it is not in fact something completely indefinite (ἄόριστον), as these earlier thinkers had alleged.⁵¹ Rather, every motion is, as such, defined by certain limits. Thus at the end of his lengthy discussion of change in *Physics* 5–6, he writes:

No change is unlimited (ἄπειρος), for each was from something to something, both that in a contradiction and that in contraries, so that of those according to contradiction, the affirmation and the negation are a limit, such as being of coming to be, and nonbeing of passing away, and

⁵⁰ *Physics* 2.9.200a10–15.

⁵¹ Compare *Physics* 3.2.201b24–33.

of those in contraries, the contraries. . . . That change, therefore, is not unlimited in such a way that it is not defined by limits, is clear.⁵²

Change between contraries is, as Aristotle has already explained, motion in the strict sense, in quality, quantity, or place.⁵³ Change between contradictories includes the coming to be and passing away of substances, and probably also the transition between activity and inactivity in the case of sight, understanding, and so forth.⁵⁴ In each case, there are limits from which and to which, and these limits account for the definite character of the change.⁵⁵

In many respects, Aristotle's claim that every change is defined by limits is relatively straightforward. However, there are two cases that require special consideration. The first is passing away, the limit of which Aristotle explicitly says is nonbeing (τὸ μὴ ὄν). The difficulty here is that, as we have seen, Aristotle's concept of limit seems intended, in most cases at least, to capture the well-defined or bounded character of actual being—and, derivatively, of change. How, then, can nonbeing serve as a limit? It certainly does not seem to provide the kind of definiteness that Aristotle wants from limits in general. In response to this difficulty, I think Aristotle would simply admit that the limit of passing away is a limit or boundary in an extended sense, which we should think of in the same way as we sometimes think of nonbeing as "something." Moreover, he would be quick to point out that the nonbeing in question is by no means absolute. Rather, each thing passes away into its own proper matter, which is nonbeing only insofar as it now lacks the form it once had. As he puts it in *Metaphysics* 7.10, "some things are from, as principles, these [parts] into which

⁵² *Physics* 6.10.241a26–b12.

⁵³ See *Physics* 5.1.

⁵⁴ See *DA* 2.5.417b2–9, where Aristotle denies that the passage from habitual knowledge to reflection is an alteration in the normal sense of that term.

⁵⁵ Although he admits elsewhere that circular locomotion has no beginning or limit or middle simply speaking (*De caelo* 2.6.288a22–4), Aristotle does not allow in *Physics* 6.10 that it is an exception to his claim that no motion is indefinite in the sense of not being defined by limits. Rather, he contrasts "infinite motion," which has no definite goal, to circular motion, which is quite well defined (241b2–11, 18–20). In *De caelo*, moreover, he states that such motion is complete in a way that rectilinear motion cannot be (1.1.269a19–24). The possible tension among these claims seems to be resolved by the statement of *Physics* 8.8 that in circular motion alone, the starting-point (ἀρχή) and the limit (τέρας) coincide.

they pass away . . . and so the clay statue passes away into clay, the sphere into bronze, and Kallias into flesh and bones."⁵⁶

The second difficult case is one that I have already mentioned, namely, the passage from inactivity to activity. The problem here is that whereas it is not difficult to think of a substance's form as its defining limit, and its nonessential attributes such as place, size, and color as secondary limits, it seems odd to call the activity of seeing, for example, or of building a house, a limit. These activities seem, rather, to be unlimited in precisely the way that motion and coming to be are not. For although both seeing and house-building have their own limits in the object of sight and in the house, they are not clearly secondary limits on the agent. At the least, it seems odd to characterize as a limit the exercise of a thing's natural powers, especially insofar as this exercise appears to be relatively open-ended. This difficulty brings us back to the passage with which we began our study of limits, in which Aristotle distinguishes activity from motion; its solution is implicit in the same text.

In *Metaphysics* 9.6, Aristotle says that ἐνέργεια do not have ends: in such an activity or actuality, the end is already present. The question we must ask ourselves is, of what is such an actuality the end? Aristotle provides the answer two chapters later, when in discussing the ontological priority of actuality to potentiality he states that in general, "actuality is an end, and it is for the sake of this that potentiality is acquired. For animals do not see so as to have sight, but have sight so as to see, and likewise the art of building so as to build, and the habit of contemplation so as to contemplate."⁵⁷ Activity, therefore—as the function argument of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 also makes clear—is the end of a substance's existence; it is for the sake of its complete activity that each thing comes to be and exists. If this is so, however, then clearly this activity is the limit of a substance's being, perhaps even in a stronger sense than is its form. Correspondingly, we now have another sense in which that for the sake of which—in this case the activity—is a cause not only of coming to be but also of the substance's being.

⁵⁶ *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035a24–5, 31–3. In *GC* 2.3, Aristotle articulates the general point that the passing away of one thing is always the coming to be of another (318a24–8). The comment in *Metaphysics* 7.10 reflects his specific account of unqualified passing away.

⁵⁷ *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a9–12.

In the foregoing discussion, we have seen how Aristotle's concept of limit informs and enriches his concept of actuality. By way of concluding this section, I now want to make a similar point about the effect of the latter concept on the former, emphasizing the positive character of Aristotle's πέρας. To this end, a final brief return to his theology may be helpful. If the concept of limit is truly coextensive with that of actuality, it should apply to God as well. As with the concepts of actuality, goodness, and that for the sake of which, however, this application requires a bit of work: in a substance not composed of matter and form, there would seem to be nothing for a limit to limit.

Aristotle's God, we know, is pure intellectual activity (ἐνέργεια), and so the remarks we have just made about activity as limit would seem to be relevant to determining how the concept of limit might apply to him. On the other hand, God is a substance, and this point returns us to our previous discussion of οὐσία as limit. Rather than beginning immediately from either of these points, however, I want to bring in another text, one that highlights the importance of the concept of limit for Aristotle's metaphysics as a whole. It appears in *Metaphysics* 2.2, which argues "that there is a principle (ἀρχή τις), and that the causes of beings are unlimited (ἄπειρα) neither in a straight line nor in kind."⁵⁸ Among the various sorts of indefiniteness or infinity—the appropriate translation depends on the subject matter—that he rules out, it is his discussion of essence, or "what it was to be," that most interests us at the moment.⁵⁹

But indeed neither does what it was to be admit of being reduced to another definition fuller⁶⁰ in account: for it is always rather the prior [that is the definition], whereas the subsequent is not; and where there is no first, there is no next. Moreover, those who speak thus destroy science (ἐπιστασθαι), for to know (εἶδεναι) is nothing but to come to the indi-

⁵⁸ *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1–2.

⁵⁹ His comments on that for the sake of which are also relevant, although they add nothing new to our discussion: "Further, that for the sake of which is an end, and one such that it is not for the sake of another, but the others for that, so that if something such will be last, it will not be unlimited, but if there is nothing such, there will not be that for the sake of which, but those who make it unlimited remove the nature of the good unawares" (*Metaphysics* 2.2.994b9–13).

⁶⁰ The correct translation of πλεονάζοντα is probably more like "going overboard."

visible; and there is no acquaintance (τὸ γινώσκειν) with anything, for how can one think (νοεῖν) things that are thus indefinite?⁶¹

In these lines, Aristotle argues that in order for τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι to serve as a limit of knowledge, it must have a finite number of basic parts or aspects that one can keep in mind and state in a definition. Presumably, he wants to impose the same requirement on τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as a limit of being. Every form, simply as such, must confer a definite character on the substance whose form it is. Otherwise, what we have is not a substance but an indefinite who-knows-what, which requires further determination in order to count as “something.” In short, when Aristotle requires that “what a thing is” not be indefinite (ἄπειρον), he is simply requiring that it really constitute a determinate way of being, providing a complete answer to the question “what.” Only a definite (non-ἄπειρον) essence can be, in turn, a limit for the composite whose essence it is, and for our knowledge of that composite.

Considered in this way, the ontological role of form or actuality as the source of definiteness in a composite—and, conversely, the interpretation of limit as actuality—suggests an important clarification of the concept of limit. In our previous discussion of substance as limit, I focused on the limiting role of form with respect to matter: matter as such is something indefinite and must be further determined to a specific, actual way of being. From this perspective, limit may appear most clearly as a boundary: a limit excludes ways of being that do not pertain to the composite whose limit it is. The text just quoted from the *Metaphysics*, however, reminds us that this exclusion is something secondary. The primary significance of actuality as limit is not the exclusion of other ways of being, but the positive and definite character of what truly is.⁶² This positive character of actuality as limit appears even more clearly if we recall that a substance’s

⁶¹ *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b16–23.

⁶² Aristotle’s most complete discussion of these issues appears, of course, in *Metaphysics* 7.12–8.6. Although I have deliberately passed over the nuances of that discussion, it seems to me that many of Aristotle’s concerns in these chapters and in related texts (for example, *Posterior Analytics* 2.7–10, 13; *PA* 1.2–3) reflect his awareness that to be fully actual (which is clearly something positive) and to be fully determined are correlative rather than conflicting ways of being. I am thinking, for example, of his rejection of universals as substances, his concern with the unity of definitions, and his rejection of negative differentiae.

limit in the most basic sense is not its form, but the complete activity that the form makes possible and in terms of which it must be understood.

Focusing thus on the positive character of limit is helpful in several respects. First, it helps us understand the priority of actuality to potentiality in Aristotle's thought, making clear that this priority includes a priority of the determinate to the indeterminate, of that which has its own definite way of being and so can serve as a principle of being for other things, to that which is undetermined and so stands in need of something outside itself. Second, the positive character of limit sharpens our understanding of the relation between first and second actuality, revealing that first actuality determines a substance's way of being by directing it to the activity that constitutes the ultimate limit, the defining actuality, of its being. Finally—to conclude our theological excursion—it reveals how the concept of limit applies in the case of God, for it is now clear that for Aristotle, what is fully in act is necessarily also fully determinate. It is not that God is limited, but rather that he is fully determinate without need of anything outside himself. Thus also his immutability and necessity, his self-sufficiency and, for Aristotle, his goodness.

Through a series of conceptual simplifications, moving from τέλος to ἔσχατον and from ἔσχατον to πέρας, we have arrived at a concept that is central to Aristotle's understanding of the being and activity of natural substances. The concept of a limit is not just an extra, a useful idea for expressing what Aristotle has other perfectly good ways to say. It is, rather, at the heart of his metaphysics. By directing us from change to the limits of change from becoming to being, and by expressing the well-defined, bounded character in virtue of which that being is a limit not just of change but of the actually existing bodily substance and of our knowledge thereof, the notion of a limit reveals the entire natural world, the Heraclitean and Platonic world of becoming and opinion, as a world of being and understanding.

IV

The importance of the concepts of actuality and limit for Aristotle's teleology should now be obvious. From within the forest of

texts and arguments that have led us to these concepts, however, it may be difficult to see the general account that has gradually emerged. I want to conclude, therefore, with a systematic statement of its most important points.

Aristotle's teleology is firmly grounded in his understanding of being. More specifically, as we have seen, it is rooted in the claim that actuality is prior to potentiality, both in λόγος and in οὐσία. In terms of explanatory practice (λόγος), this means that every potentiality and every incomplete actuality, or motion, must be understood in terms of the corresponding complete actuality. Matter must be understood in terms of form, and form in terms of activity. Although we have not here said as much about motion and agency, it should also be clear that these must be understood in terms of the form that, through the motion it causes, the agent produces in matter.

The general term by which Aristotle expresses the explanatory relation between potentiality and actuality is ἔνεκα, "for the sake of." When τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα, that for the sake of which, is an outcome of motion, he also refers to it as a τέλος, or end. Whenever these terms appear in an explanatory context, that is, they express the explanatory priority of actuality to potentiality, or of complete actuality to incomplete actuality.

Aristotle's explanations, however, are causal, and so he often refers to and makes use of "the cause as that for the sake of which." From the metaphysical point of view, he clearly expresses the causal priority of τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα to that which is ἔνεκα τοῦ by stating that actuality is prior to potentiality not only in λόγος but also in οὐσία. Although this is not the place for a general discussion of Aristotelian first philosophy, it would be hard to underestimate the importance of this term. For Aristotle, the most basic causal regress in nature, and therefore the most basic explanatory regress in natural science, is not toward matter and agency, but toward form and activity.

Aristotle's teleology, then, derives not only from his empirical study of nature, which I have not mentioned here, but also from a metaphysical premise concerning the relation between potentiality and actuality. In *Metaphysics* 9.8, he argues for this premise at some length—but to consider why he thinks it plausible, together with the teleology that goes with it, would go well beyond the scope of this essay.

THE PROBLEM OF ARISTOTLE'S *NOUS POIËTIKOS*

MICHAEL J. WHITE

DESPITE THE WELL-KNOWN historical significance of Aristotle's doctrine of the productive or active intellect (the *nous poiêtikos* or *intellectus agens*) it is not unusual to find contemporary discussions treating the doctrine as an excrescence on the text of the *De anima*, a work, it is frequently nowadays supposed, in which an otherwise securely naturalistic epistemology and rational psychology are developed. Although the doctrine of the *intellectus agens* is found only in one place in Aristotle's extant texts, the third book of the *De anima*, I shall nonetheless maintain that an argument can be ferreted out of Aristotle's discussion that establishes that the doctrine can be seen to follow from principles that are fundamental to Aristotle's thought. I shall call this an "Aristotelian" argument for *nous poiêtikos* because of the fact that the argument obviously is not found, as I state it, on the surface of Aristotle's text. I claim that there is a significant sense in which it is there, but that one must dig for it or, as I just put it, ferret it out. In a schematic form, the Aristotelian argument goes as follows:

- (1) (The potentiality–actuality doctrine) There must be, in the individual person, an intellective soul (*psuchê*) that manifests an acquired state, the *hexis* or developed potentiality for knowing.
- (2) (The causal principle) The preceding *hexis* of passive or receptive intellective *psuchê* must be brought to full occurrent actualization (*energeia*, second entelechy) by something that already possesses this full actuality.
- (3) (Epistemic nonnaturalism thesis) The actualizing cause cannot be external (*exôthen*) to the intellect. In particular, it cannot be resident in the knowing subject's natural environment; in the way, for example, that sensible forms are resident in corporeal objects in the natural environment of the sensing subject.
- (4) The actualizing cause must be either external to intellective soul or internal to intellective soul.

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(5) (Disjunctive syllogism) It follows that there must be a fully actualized state (identified by Aristotle as *nous poiêtikos*) that is “in the soul” (*en têi psuchêi*) and causes the fully actualized, occurrent knowing of a human knower.¹

While the principles on which this argument depends are deeply embedded in Aristotle’s thought, its conclusion may appear to be paradoxical. That is, the conclusion may seem to suggest that the knowledge (in the dispositional sense) that is gained by the knowing subject by his interaction with the natural world (as described, for example, in the *Posterior Analytics*) and that is subsequently rendered occurrent in the actual thinking of the knowing subject somehow already preexists in full actuality in that knowing subject. This is the problem of the title of this essay.

Later in this essay I suggest that there are two rather obvious strategies for attempting to mitigate this problem. One strategy is to distance *nous poiêtikos* (which is identified with fully actualized, occurrent knowledge/knowing) from the individual knowing subject in such a way that, while it is a knowing intellect (*nous poiêtikos*) that is the cause of the occurrent knowing of the human knower, the human knower is not already somehow in possession of the knowledge the acquisition of which Aristotle sets out to explain. The second strategy is to transform the full actuality identified with *nous poiêtikos* into something other than fully actualized, occurrent knowing/knowledge but to keep that something other as a cause of the human knower’s occurrent knowing within the soul of the individual knower. I shall then quite briefly consider some developments of the doctrine of the *intellectus agens* in later ancient, medieval, and renaissance thought as illustrations of these two strategies. First, however, I attempt to flesh in some of the details of the argument itself.

My first premise is the potentiality–actuality doctrine: There must be, in the individual person, an intellective *psuchê* that manifests an acquired *hexis* (or *habitus*, in the later scholastic tradition), which is the developed potentiality for knowing. Within the context of Aristotelian metaphysics this premise seems to be relatively straightforward: in order for an agent to know or to understand, that agent must have a potentiality or *dunamis* for knowing/understanding.

¹ Aristotle, *De anima* (hereafter, “DA”) 3.5.430a13. Throughout this article I use the translation of John Alexander Smith, from *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 1.

Aristotle, of course, frequently speaks of gradations of potentiality and actuality with respect to knowledge. For example, in *DA* 2.5 he notes that:

we can speak of something as a knower (*epistêmon*) either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have knowledge, or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar; each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind of matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect (*theôrein*) when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man who is already reflecting (*theôrôn*)—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A. Both the former and the latter are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite by means of learning, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of arithmetic or grammar to their active exercise.²

Aristotle here clearly distinguishes the potentiality of an uninstructed subject of the right sort to acquire knowledge by learning (*mathêsis*) and the potentiality of the instructed subject who possesses knowledge in a dispositional sense but is not, at the moment, contemplating or reflecting on it. Although a transition of the former sort of potentiality to its corresponding actuality is obviously of great importance in rational psychology, including Aristotle's rational psychology, my argument pertains to the second sort of transition. So, in the first premise the idea of an "intellective soul (*psuchê*) that manifests an acquired state, the *hexis* or developed potentiality for knowing" presupposes that the agent is an instructed agent, one who has already acquired knowledge in some dispositional sense. I follow most commentators in interpreting the *locus classicus* for the *intellectus agens*, *DA* 3.5, as pertaining to the transition from possession of knowledge in this dispositional sense to knowing in the fullest actual, occurrent sense.

My second premise is the causal principle: The preceding *hexis* of passive or receptive intellective *psuchê* must be brought to full occurrent actualization (*energeia*, second entelechy) by something that already possesses this full actuality. Versions of this causal principle—which may be regarded as a causal form of the principle of sufficient reason—are, of course, extremely common not only in Greek natural

² *DA* 2.5.417a22–b2 (this is the Smith translation, except reading, with Ross, *arithmêtikên* for *aisthêsin* at 417a31).

philosophy and metaphysics but in all of what might be termed the Western tradition of philosophical and scientific thought. In a more concrete (and possibly simplistic) form, such a causal principle requires that the effect brought about in the object of causal action (for example, a property that is acquired by that object) be present in the subject of causation and transmitted to the object. In a more abstract (and possibly sophisticated) form, such a principle requires that there be at least as great a degree of reality in the cause as in the effect it produces. Thus, for example, according to Descartes:

now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. For, pray, whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? And in what way can it communicate this reality to it, unless it possessed it itself. And from this it follows, not only that something cannot proceed from nothing, but likewise that what is more perfect—that is to say, which has more reality within itself—cannot proceed from the less perfect.³

Although Aristotle certainly seems to invoke such a principle in his account of the transformation of dispositional knowledge into its fully actualized, occurrent state, it is not clear exactly where his principle fits in the continuum between very concrete and very abstract forms of the causal principle. In *DA* 3.5, he distinguishes a principle, the function of which is to bring dispositional thought to full actualization: *Nous poiêtikos*, as the phrase suggests, is the sort of *nous* that:

makes all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colors.

Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity [*energeia*] (for always the active is superior to the passive factor) the originating force [*archê*] to the matter.

Actual knowledge [*hê kat' energeian epistêmê*] is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior even in time. It does not sometimes know [*noei*] and sometimes not know. When separated it is alone just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impassible, passive thought is perishable); and without this nothing knows.⁴

³ René Descartes, *Meditation* III, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 1:162.

Among the many problems with this famous text is the difficulty of deciding whether *nous poiêtikos*, interpreted as the causal agent that transforms dispositional knowledge into actual, occurrent knowing, is itself an *energeia* in the sense of an occurrent state of knowing. The analogy with light may suggest that it is not. While light supplies the actuality that transforms "potential colours into actual colours," I do not think that the Aristotelian analysis of vision entails that light is itself an actual color (or even a mixture of colors, as a more contemporary analysis might suggest). So it would seem that light causes an actuality but not an actuality that it formally possesses. On the other hand, if the "actual knowledge" (*hê kat' energeian epistêmê*) alluded to at the end of the chapter is identified with *nous poiêtikos*,⁵ it appears that Aristotle's intention is to claim that the sort of actuality possessed by *nous poiêtikos* is indeed the actuality of continuous, occurrent knowing or thinking.

My third premise is the epistemic nonnaturalism thesis: The actualizing cause cannot be external (*exôthen*) to the intellect; in particular it cannot be resident in the knowing subject's natural environment in the way, for example, that sensible forms are resident in corporeal objects in the natural environment of the sensing subject. This key premise is perhaps the most controversial in the argument that I am developing on Aristotle's behalf. There are, I believe, two sorts of argument in support of it that can be gleaned from Aristotle's text.

The first sort of argument is psychological and begins with commonsensical reflection on a dissimilarity between sensing and knowing, both in their fully actualized, occurrent forms. In the case of sensing, when a healthy, normally functioning organism that possesses sense organs of a certain sort encounters in its natural, spatially local environment the right sort of object, sensation occurs without much if any volitional control by the sentient subject. It would seem that simply the presence of sensible forms in a suitable ambient environment and of a sentient subject possessing the appropriate sense organs together provide a sufficient causal explanation of the ensuing *energeia*-episode of occurrent sensing. Aristotle makes this point rather explicitly in *DA* 2.5:

⁴ *DA* 3.5.430a15–25 (translation altered).

⁵ This identification is by no means certain. A tradition extending back at least to Alexander of Aphrodisias interprets *hê kat' energeian epistêmê* as a third *nous*, the result of the action of *nous poiêtikos* on *nous pathêtikos*.

But between the two cases compared [i.e., sensing and knowing] there is a difference; the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge (*epistêmê*) apprehends is universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think (*noêsai*) when he wants to but his sensation does not depend on himself—a sensible object must be there.⁶

It might rightly be objected that the difference between sensation and intellection maintained by Aristotle in this passage requires only that something (not necessarily *nous poiêtikos*) internal to the knowing agent be causally responsible for the episodes of occurrent knowing of that subject. This, in itself, would not be paradoxical. As we shall see, the threat of paradox appears only when the causal principle is combined with another argument for the epistemic nonnaturalism thesis that is suggested by Aristotle's text.

This second argument for the epistemic nonnaturalism thesis is much more deeply metaphysical. It begins by taking quite seriously—and, indeed, literally—a claim that is more than once asserted by Aristotle: “actual knowledge or knowing is identical with its object” (*to d'auto estin hê kat' energeian epistêmê tôi pratmati*).⁷ Or, as Aristotle puts it in *DA* 3.4, “with respect to those things that are without matter, the knowing (*to nooun*) and what is known (*to nooumenon*) are one and the same. For contemplative knowledge (*hê gar epistêmê hê theôrêtikê*) and what is known (*to epistêmon*) are thus one and the same.”⁸ I refer to this as the identity-of-knowing-and-known thesis.⁹

⁶ *DA* 2.5.417b19–26.

⁷ *DA* 3.5.430a19–20 and 3.7.431a1–2.

⁸ *DA* 3.4.430a3–5.

⁹ I follow several recent commentators in adopting a strong version of the identity thesis. See, for example, Michael Frede, “La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect agent,” in *Corps et Ame: Sur le De Anima d'Aristote*, ed. Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1996), 377–90; David Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), especially 129 and following. Other commentators have adopted much weaker (and, in my view, inadequate) interpretations of the thesis. Thus, for example, Ross says that “we must suppose [Aristotle] to mean that when one is really knowing, the nature of that which is being known is exactly reflected in the mind of the knower, his mind exercising no disturbing influence;” Sir David Ross, *Aristotle De Anima* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 295.

The argument that I have in mind is suggested (but, unfortunately, not more than suggested) at the conclusion of *DA* 3.4: "in the case of those things having matter, each of the things known exists only potentially. So that *nous* will not exist in (*huparxei*) these things (for *nous* is a *dunamis* of the sort of thing that is without matter)."¹⁰ In brief, the argument is that the intelligible forms that are objects of knowledge (*ta noêta*), which exist in things in the natural environment of a human organism capable of knowledge, cannot serve as the cause of the full actualization of the potential or dispositional knowledge of that organism. The reason is that the *dunamei* sort of existence of those intelligible forms is not sufficient to cause or effect the *energeia* that is knowing in the fullest, occurrent sense. If such intelligible forms were sufficient to effect such knowing, the identity-of-knowing-and-known thesis would entail that all things known would have to be knowers or knowings in the fullest, occurrent sense as well. The result would be a kind of animism (or possibly vitalism or idealism) that Aristotle seems to reject out of hand.

Thus, although David Charles accepts a strong version of the identity-of-knowing-and-known thesis, I do not believe that he fully appreciates its implications. He claims that "the active intellect just is identical with the set of its objects, the organized and intelligible world"¹¹ and "what it is for a universal to be intelligible will be for it to occupy a given niche in an organized and intelligible order."¹² In summary, he writes:

if this is correct, our minds (passive intellects) will function properly when they receive objects intelligibly organized in a coherent structure of this type. What the passive mind receives will be forms of kinds located in an organized and intelligible world. If so, it will achieve its goal when we think of such objects and kinds as occupying their appropriate place in an objective world order. Further, such objects and kinds will only be known to us because they occupy a place in that order. As in the case of perception, the content of our passive thought will be determined by the causal elements which produce the relevant thoughts (when the thinking faculty is functioning as it should).¹³

The key idea here seems to be the identification of the active or productive intellect, *intellectus agens* or *nous poiêtikos*, with the intelli-

¹⁰ *DA* 3.4.430a6–8.

¹¹ Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning*, 131.

¹² *Ibid.*, 134.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 134–5.

ble structure of the natural environment of human knowers. This intelligible structure can then serve as the causal factor that brings about fully actualized, occurrent knowing in human organisms possessing the requisite dispositions. The problem with this idea, it seems to me, is the following: If the potential objects of human knowledge consist largely or exclusively of the intelligible structure of their natural environment—that is, knowable enmattered natural kinds of things—then this intelligible structure possesses only a *dunamei* sort of existence. It thus does not possess sufficient actuality to effect fully actual, occurrent knowing in human organisms. In order for the intelligible structure of enmattered nature to serve this function, the natural world would itself have to be an actual knower or act of knowing, or to consist of all and only things that are knowers/acts of knowing. So, despite the obvious appeal of Charles's naturalistic account of *nous poiêtikos*, his identification of it with the intelligible structure of what is (capable of being) known by human knowers,¹⁴ I do not think that this interpretation can be sustained.

The following objection might, at this juncture, be made. The identity-of-knowing-and-known thesis implies only that during episodes of fully actual, occurrent knowing, the intellect (or act of intellection) and its object (the intelligible form) are one and the same. Consequently, nothing follows about the intelligible forms prior to their actualization in the human knower's intellectual soul. If one were to suppose that intelligible forms, like sensible forms, exist potentially in material objects and yet are sufficiently actual (prior to the actual, occurrent knowing of them by a given human knower) to bring about such occurrent knowing, then no absurd result would follow. The problem with this objection is that it ignores the implications of

¹⁴ In one place (Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning*, 34 n. 48), Charles seems to allow that Aristotle may indeed hold that universals have "only potential existence outside the mind" and that, when they are said to exist actually, this means that they "exist only in God's mind/the active intellect." This is certainly a traditional Alexandrian doctrine (to be discussed later in this essay). But it seems to me to be a doctrine that is inconsistent with what I take to be Charles's considered naturalistic view, a view which locates the cause of human knowers' occurrent knowing in the intelligible structure of the cosmos as enmattered in the natural environment of human knowers. That enmattered intelligible structure cannot be strictly identical with the structured content of the divine mind (if such a content even has such structure) because in the former case it possesses only potential existence while in the latter case it is fully actual.

the second premise of the argument—that is, the causal principle. An implication of that principle is that the potential-, or *dunamis*-, type existence of intelligible forms in material objects is not, in itself, sufficiently actual to cause the completely actualized or *energeia*-type existence of those intelligible forms in occurrent knowing. The potential existence of the intelligible forms in the material objects of which they are the forms may perhaps be a necessary condition of the fully actualized existence of those forms in fully actual, occurrent knowing; but such intelligible forms *in potentia* do not possess sufficient actuality to serve as a sufficient condition of occurrent knowing as well. Something more is needed. Aristotle evidently claims, moreover, that something more is *nous poiêtikos*, which, by the identity-of-knower-and-known thesis, would appear to be also those very forms in their full actualization. Here is the locus of the very real possibility of absurdity.

My fourth premise is that the actualizing cause must be either external to intellective soul or internal to intellective soul. This premise, which I take to be a logical truth, is supplied in order to make explicit the disjunctive syllogism of my Aristotelian argument. The disjuncts are intended to be both disjoint and exhaustive. However, the second disjunct, as it stands, allows several possibilities. First, the actualizing cause may reside either: (a) in the intellective soul of the human knower whose fully actualized, occurrent knowing it actualizes, or (b) in some other intellective soul. Second, the actualizing cause may be either: (i) fully actualized, occurrent knowing, which (by the identity-of-knower-and-known thesis) is also fully actualized knowledge, in the sense of the content or object of the knowing, or (ii) some other kind of fully actual cause, which, while resident in an intellective soul, is not itself to be identified with fully actualized knowing/knowledge.

My conclusion is reached by a disjunctive syllogism: It follows that there must be a fully actualized state (identified by Aristotle as *nous poiêtikos*) that is “in the soul” (*en têi psuchêi*) and causes the fully actualized, occurrent knowing of a human knower. Now, if the nature of this fully actualized state is that of fully occurrent knowing/knowledge (as in interpretation (i) of the second disjunct of premise (4) above) and if such occurrent knowing/knowledge is resident in the individual human knower whose knowing/knowledge it causes (as in interpretation (a) of premise (4) above), the paradoxical result to which I alluded at the beginning of this essay follows. What comes to

be known, in the fully actual, occurrent sense, by a human organism dispositionally prepared to know already somehow preexists in full actuality in the intellective *psuchê* of that very human organism or knowing subject.

Toward the beginning of this essay, I suggested that there are two rather obvious strategies for attempting to mitigate the problem of Aristotle's *nous poiêtikos*, that is, the paradoxicalness of the conclusion of this argument. One strategy is, in effect, to select interpretation (b) rather than (a) of the second disjunct of premise (4). In other words, it is an attempt to distance *nous poiêtikos* (as identified with fully actualized, occurrent knowing) from the individual human organism, the knowing subject, in such a way that that knower is not already in full possession of the knowledge the acquisition of which Aristotle sets out to explain. Thus, *nous poiêtikos* is not "in the (individual, human) soul" as an essential part or aspect of that soul. *Nous poiêtikos* becomes *nous thurathen* (*nous* from without), which comes to reside in or act upon the individual human soul in its episodes or acts of actual, occurrent knowing. I refer to this sort of strategy as Alexandrian because of the fact that Alexander of Aphrodisias not only develops this sort of response himself but also influences a later tradition of similar interpretation that extends at least to Pietro Pompanazzi (1462–1525).

The other strategy is to adopt interpretation (ii) rather than (i) of the second disjunct of premise (4). In other words, it is to transform the full actuality that Aristotle identifies with *nous poiêtikos* into something other than fully actualized, occurrent knowing/knowledge. Thus, *nous poiêtikos* can remain as an essential part or aspect of the individual human soul. Although it is a principle that actualizes occurrent knowing in that individual human knower, it is not itself actual occurrent knowing. This sort of strategy I term Thomistic because of its particularly clear statement in St. Thomas Aquinas's *Sentencia libri de anima*.

Although there are some significant differences between Alexander's psychology as presented in his *De anima* and in the *De intellectu* (a short treatise usually attributed to Alexander that is included by Bruns in the *Mantissa*), both works attribute a tripartite conception of human *nous* to Aristotle: there is the receptive, potential, or material *nous* of the individual human knower, there is *nous poiêtikos* (or *nous* from without), and there is *nous* in a state of pos-

session, which is characterized in the *De intellectu* as “the material intellect when once it has added a state of actively thinking. Such an intellect is present only in those beings that are more complete, that is, who are thinking.”¹⁵ As the *De intellectu* makes clear, this third *nous*, present in the human knower, is the result of the action of the *nous* from without on the human knower’s material, potential, or receptive *nous*:

that which is intellect by nature and from without becomes co-operative (*sunergos*) with the intellect that is in us, since the other objects of knowledge would not even exist in potentiality unless there were something that is in its own proper nature an object of knowledge. Since it [*nous poiêtikos*] is indeed an object of knowledge in its own nature that comes to be in the one knowing on account of its knowing, the *nous* that has come to be in the knower is from without and knows and is immortal and instills in the material [*nous*] the state [*hexin*] that results in the thinking of a potential object of thought.¹⁶

Alexander identifies *nous poiêtikos*, conceived as *nous* from without, with the Aristotelian divinity, thought thinking itself (or, perhaps better: knowledge knowing itself). Although Themistius, in his paraphrase of *DA*, disapproves of this identification, he still anticipates Averroës in conceiving of *nous poiêtikos* as common to all human knowers and, in that respect, as *nous* from without. Here I agree with the assessment of Todd:

Themistius’ notion of a collective noetic self preserves the essentials of the Alexandrian identification of the productive intellect and God, insofar as that doctrine identifies a form of self-transcendence. He makes the productive intellect in effect a “second God” in contrast with the “first God” (cf. 102.31, 36; 103.10) that he argues cannot be intended by the intellect introduced in *De Anima* 3.5. Its secondary status lies in its association with the potential intellect, and its wider range of concepts. The “first cause” (as Themistius identifies the Aristotelian God at 112.1) is, on the other hand, “not adapted in the slightest to potentiality” (112.4–5).¹⁷

¹⁵ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de anima libri mantissa*, in *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. 1, pt. 1, ed. Ivo Bruns (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887), p. 107, ll. 25–7. The English translation is by Frederic M. Schroeder, in Frederic M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd, *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect* (Toronto: Pontifical Academy of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), 48.

¹⁶ Alexander, *Mantissa*, p. 111, ll. 27–32 (trans. Schroeder, *Two Commentators*, 54–5, altered).

¹⁷ Robert B. Todd, *Two Commentators*, 39.

I conclude my remarks on the Alexandrian response to the paradox with a brief discussion of the issue in the *De immortalitate animae* of the Renaissance Alexandrian, Pietro Pomponazzi. In addition to being a particularly clear and intelligent presentation of the Alexandrian strategy, Pomponazzi's treatment nicely highlights the problems with that strategy. Pomponazzi's position is that the "[*intellectus*] *agens* is truly immortal, since it is one of the intelligences (*una intelligentiarum*); nor is it any part of the human soul, as Themistius and Averroës thought, but only a mover (*tantum motor*)."¹⁸ For Pomponazzi, intelligences or intellects are the movers of the celestial spheres:

for the intelligences, insofar as they actuate celestial bodies, are the acts of a physical, organic body, but not insofar as they are intelligences. Moreover, insofar as they actuate, they receive nothing, but only give.¹⁹

Pomponazzi claims that while the human soul is the form of the body, the intelligences are not the forms of the celestial bodies that they actuate, only their movers. Their knowing is quite unlike and immensely superior to human knowing; in them "neither discursive thought nor composition nor any other motion is lodged."²⁰ In fact, Pomponazzi goes so far as to claim that the intellect as found in humans ought properly to be called *ratio* rather than *intellectus* because it is really only the "vestige and shadow of intellect." Furthermore, knowing or understanding (*intelligere*) "is in the human soul according to the participation of property and not of essence."²¹

According to Pompanazzi's development of the Alexandrian doctrine, there is a rather awkward combination of functions assigned to the *intellectus agens*: (1) It is, most fundamentally, fully actualized knowledge knowing itself in a simple, nondiscursive, nondevelopmental, nontemporal way. (2) It is also, *qua* intelligence, the mover of a celestial sphere—Pomponazzi will countenance no free-floating intellects. (3) Finally, *qua intellectus agens*, it is the causal factor that brings individual human knowers, or their *animae*, to the state of

¹⁸ Pietro Pomponazzi, *Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (*De immortalitate animae*), ed. Burkhard Mojsisch (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), 132 (my translation from the Latin).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 130.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 80.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 98.

fully actual, occurrent knowing or understanding. With respect to the first two functions, Pomponazzi attempts to preserve the self-sufficiency of the *intellectus agens* as an intelligence by denying that it stands in a hylomorphic relation to the celestial body. Consequently, he can maintain that it, qua intelligence, needs and derives nothing from the celestial body it moves. However, the relation between the first and third functions seems to me even more problematic. Since the *intellectus agens*'s mode of knowing is so different from the discursive, temporal, limited mode of knowing of the human knower, in what way could it actuate or serve as cause of that human knowing? Would not its doing so compromise its self-sufficiency as knowledge knowing itself? Themistius evidently thought that it would, and this was one consideration that led him to resist Alexander's identification of *nous poiêtikos* with an Aristotelian first god. A simple multiplication of entities, however, whose essence is to be always knowing or understanding (in the fullest, most actual, occurrent sense) does not solve all philosophical problems of the Alexandrian strategy. In particular, it does not explain the nature of the supposed causal relation between the apparently simple contents and continuous activity of the knowing/understanding of *nous poiêtikos*, on the one hand, and the temporally discontinuous episodes and discursive, multifarious contents of the occurrent knowing/understanding of multiple human knowers, on the other hand.

When we turn to Aquinas's own version of the Thomistic strategy for dealing with our problem, we find a strong disinclination on his part, largely because of textual considerations, to separate the *intellectus agens* from the individual human knower. St. Thomas thinks that Aristotle's *De anima* makes it quite clear that there is an *intellectus agens* that is a part or aspect of each individual human *anima*. The core of Aquinas's interpretation is made particularly clear in a passage from book 3, chapter 4 of his *Sentencia libri de anima*:

Aristotle is led to posit agent intellect in order to rule out Plato's view. Plato claimed that the quiddities of sensible things are separated from matter and actually intelligible; that is why it was not necessary for him to posit agent intellect. But because Aristotle claims that the quiddities of sensible things are in matter and are not actually intelligible, he had to posit an intellect that would abstract them from matter and in that way make them actually intelligible.²²

²² St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia libri de anima*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, vol. 45 (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1984), bk. 3, ch. 4, p. 219, ll. 54–63. This translation is from Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas: A Commentary on Aristotle's De anima* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 366.

Aquinas proceeds to deny that the *intellectus agens* is itself fully actualized, occurrent knowing:

if agent intellect had in itself the determination of all intelligible things, possible intellect would not need the phantasms but would be brought to the actuality of all intelligible things by agent intellect alone. And in that case agent intellect would not be related to intelligible things as maker to thing made, as the Philosopher here says, but as being the intelligible things themselves.²³

In other words, Aquinas recognizes that if the *intellectus agens*, as part of the individual human soul, were itself fully actual in the sense of being actual, occurrent knowing, the other features of Aristotle's mechanism of human cognition would be otiose.

The Thomistic strategy for dealing with the problem of Aristotle's *nous poiêtikos* is not without appeal. I believe most contemporary commentators would award high marks, from a textual perspective, to Aquinas for his refusal to separate the *intellectus agens* from the human soul. He also recognizes that if he retains the *intellectus agens* as an integral part of the individual human soul, it cannot reasonably be the cause of occurrent knowing in that soul by means of being itself occurrent knowing/knowledge. Rather it causes occurrent knowing by abstracting intelligible species from corporeal phantasms supplied by the senses. In effect, Aquinas appeals to what I earlier referred to as an abstract or sophisticated causal version of the principle of sufficient reason. This too seems rather modern. Modern and contemporary conceptions of causation are quite willing to allow that a cause can bring about some effect, for example, something's coming to possess characteristic *X* without itself possessing that characteristic *X*.

However, on the debit side, St. Thomas must allow that the *intellectus agens* sometimes brings about knowing and sometimes does not.²⁴ It thus seems that it could not be fully actual in a sense that implies its continuous functioning. As exegesis of Aristotle's text, this consequence seems problematic: Aristotle does seem to attribute this sort of full and continuous actuality to *nous poiêtikos*. (There is also of course the yet more fundamental fact that in Aristotle's brief discussion of *nous poiêtikos*, there is really no indication of the function

²³ Aquinas, *Sentencia*, bk. 3, ch. 4, p. 221, ll. 148–55. (368 of Pasnau's translation).

²⁴ Aquinas, *Sentencia*, bk. 3, ch. 4, p. 222, ll. 192–7.

Aquinas assigns to the *intellectus agens*: abstracting incorporeal intelligible species from corporeal phantasms.) From a philosophical perspective, Aquinas's conception would seem to introduce an awkward element of potentiality into the *intellectus agens*. If it is not continuously acting, it seems to lack the sort of complete actuality that Aristotle evidently wishes to attribute to it. And, if we take the principle of sufficient reason seriously, we apparently would need to look for another causal principle that activates the *intellectus agens* on those occasions when it is activated.

I believe that my formulation of an Aristotelian argument for the doctrine of *nous poiêtikos* makes it clear why the Alexandrian and Thomistic strategies represent the two most historically prominent strategies, and perhaps the only two really viable strategies, for dealing with the problem of Aristotle's *nous poiêtikos*. However, that does not mean that either of them can be made to work—work, that is, as both a completely satisfying exegesis of Aristotle and a completely coherent and adequate epistemological doctrine within the Aristotelian-scholastic philosophical tradition. My ultimate conclusion, while perhaps rather disappointingly deflationary, might have been anticipated from even a cursory consideration of the long history of the problem. A resolution that is both textually adequate and philosophically satisfying is difficult to find—difficult, I suspect, to the point of being impossible.

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TRUTH VS. NECESSARY TRUTH IN ARISTOTLE'S SCIENCES

THOMAS V. UPTON

AT *POSTERIOR ANALYTICS* (*APo*) 1.1.71b15 AND FOLLOWING, Aristotle identifies six characteristics of the first principles from which demonstrative science (*apodeiktikê epistêmê*) proceeds. These are traditionally grouped into two sets of three: group A: (1) (true) *ex alêthôn*, (2) (primary) *prôtôn*, (3) (immediate) *amêsôn*; group B: (4) (better known than) *gnôrimôterôn*, (5) (prior to) *proterôn*, and (6) (causes of) *aitiôn*.¹ The characteristic, which I believe has been underrated and somewhat misinterpreted by scholars and commentators from Philoponus to the present day, is the characteristic of truth (*alêthê*). In this paper I propose to present a textually based interpretation of truth that shows the following: (1) that truth is necessarily linked to being (*to on*). (2) The example given of nonbeing (*to mê on*), the commensurability of the diagonal with the sides of a square, suggests more than simple truth is required for first principles and premises of demonstrative science; and that Aristotle later in the *APo* changes this characteristic to necessary truth (*ex anankês alêthês*), for he recognizes that truth alone is an insufficient basis for scientific demonstration. (3) The referents of necessary truth are eternal being, and the

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¹ *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*, a revised text with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 50–67. I follow Ross's grouping and translation of the six characteristics. On the six characteristics see also Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, trans. F. R. Larcher (Albany: Magi Books, 1970), 13–19. *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 96–101. John Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora Commentaria*, ed. Maximilian Wallies (Berlin: George Reimer, 1909), 23–7. Richard McKirahan, *Principles and Proofs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 26–35. Terrence H. Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 51–70. Patrick Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 92–102. Michael Ferejohn, *The Origins of Aristotelian Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 16–33.

need for eternal being demands (4) that universals exist extramentally for Aristotle. (5) Finally, one of the important ways that universal genera and species exist for Aristotle are as real, causal principles.

At *APo* 1.1.71b25–6, Aristotle explains that the principles “must be true (*alêthê men oun dei einai*), because it is not possible to know non-being (*hoti ouk esti to mê on epistasthai*); for example, that the diagonal is commensurable [with the side of a square].”²

I

While Aristotle seems to be making a rather straightforward claim, that is, that true scientific premises must refer to real being, commentators differ on the meaning and importance of Aristotle’s text. For example, Ferejohn claims the following, “To begin with, truth, the first condition listed at 71b6, is no more than an *unanalyzable* consequence of Aristotle’s very minimal requirement that a demonstration must constitute a proof (or sound argument) for its conclusion.”³ It is not clear why Ferejohn fails to mention the example of the commensurable diagonal Aristotle presents in his text, nor is it entirely clear why Ferejohn believes truth is an “unanalyzable” condition. I assume that when Ferejohn speaks of a sound argument, he means its form must be valid and its premises true. I believe Ferejohn has grossly underestimated the importance of truth.

Philoponus presents perhaps the most straightforward account of why Aristotle would claim that the premises of scientific demonstrations must be true. As Philoponus explains, while it is possible to get a true conclusion from false premises, a genuine demonstrative syllogism must have true premises. For example, one could argue that “a man is a stone, a stone is a living animal, therefore, a man is an animal.”⁴ Although he does not say this explicitly, what Philoponus

² Throughout this paper the Oxford Classical Texts are used as the source of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* (*APo*), *Metaphysics* (*Meta*), *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*), *De Anima* (*DA*), and *Categories* (*Cat*); the exception is *Generation of Animals* (*Gen An*), which is taken from the Loeb Classical Library Edition. All translations, except of the six characteristics, are my own.

³ Ferejohn, *Origins*, 21 (my emphasis).

⁴ Philoponus, *Commentaria*, 24. I am using my translation of the text of Philoponus.

implies in his example is that a living stone, or a man who is a stone, does not exist and so the premises refer to nonbeing and are false. As Aquinas succinctly summarizes, for Aristotle, "what is not true does not exist, for to be and to be true are convertible. Therefore, anything scientifically known must be true. Consequently, the conclusion of a demonstration which does beget scientific knowing must be true, and a fortiori its premises [must be true]."⁵ In the same vein, Byrne notes that "truth, for Aristotle, is correspondence with what is. . . . [T]he full meanings of syllogistic arguments intend the being of what they state. The whole necessity of the connection between premises and conclusions depends on this. . . . One cannot have scientific knowledge that *a fact cannot be otherwise* if there is no such fact."⁶

II

This last line of Byrne's interpretation implies a problem or limitation of true premises as the bases for necessary conclusions. According to Aristotle's *APo*, we have knowledge (*epistasthai*) of something when we know that it cannot be otherwise [than it is] (*mê endechesthai tout' allôs echein*).⁷ And that which cannot be otherwise is that which is necessary.⁸ However, Aristotle points out, "it is possible for some beings to be true and to be capable of being otherwise" (*esti de tina alêthê men kai onta, endechomena de kai allôs echein*).⁹ For example, as Philoponus explains, "walking is to move by one's legs; Socrates is walking, therefore, Socrates is moving by his legs."¹⁰ While it may be true at one time or another that Socrates is walking and this entails moving his legs, Socrates is not necessarily a thing walking or always a thing walking. Socrates is not essentially a thing walking. In other words, a necessary conclusion, which is the proper object of knowledge, must come from necessary premises.

The need for necessary premises leads us to the apparent need for eternal and necessary subjects of demonstration and back to

⁵ Aquinas, *Commentary*, 17.

⁶ Byrne, *Analysis*, 93 (my emphasis).

⁷ *APo* 1.2.71b9–12.

⁸ *APo* 1.33.88b31–2.

⁹ *APo* 1.33.88b32–3.

¹⁰ Philoponus, *Commentaria*, 84.

Aristotle's example of nonbeing at 71b26: the commensurability of a diagonal with the sides of a square, which commentators like Philoponus take to be an example of the *false* not the *necessarily false*.¹¹ This example, I believe, seems to indicate that Aristotle had more in mind than mere truth and changeable beings when he points out initially that demonstrative premises must be true. At *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b21 and following, Aristotle clearly explains that to say the diagonal is commensurable (*summetron*) with the side "is not only false but necessarily false" (*ou monon pseudos alla kai ex anankês pseudos*). The opposite, then, that the diagonal is incommensurable, is not only true but necessarily true (*ex anankês alêthês; . . . to enantion ou monon alêthês alla kai anankê asummetron einai*). A diagonal commensurable with the sides of a square is an impossible being; it cannot possibly exist. On the other hand, that the diagonal is incommensurable is a necessary being and the referent for a necessary truth. What Aristotle's position seems clearly to lead to, though he himself never explicitly articulates it, is the following definition of necessary truth: to say of what cannot possibly not be what it is, that it is, is necessarily true.

What Aristotle himself clearly does say is that, "while it is possible to reason syllogistically from true premises and not demonstrate something; it is not possible to do anything except demonstrate something [if one reasons] from necessary premises" (*ex alethôn men gar kai mê apodeiknunta syllogisasthai, ex anankaiôn d'ouk estin all' ê apodeiknunta*).¹² Aristotle goes on to explain that necessary premises depend on discovering necessary truths about a subject (*genos*). At 74b22 and following he explains that the first principles and first premises¹³ of demonstrative science are not merely acceptable, reputable opinions (*endoxa*), which are true (*alêthês*). Rather, a genuine demonstrative principle and premise is what is first (*to prôton*) with respect to a genus of being (*tou genous [tou ontos]*). Such appropriate, first truths about an explanatory genus are necessary

¹¹ Compare Philoponus, *Commentaria*, 26–7. Philoponus comments that "to say that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with the side is false (*pseudos*)"; and that "to claim to know non-being (*to mê on*) is not [scientific] knowledge."

¹² *APo* 1.6.74b16 and following.

¹³ Compare *APo* 1.2.72a6 and following.

truths; but not every truth is appropriate to a genus (*kai talêthes ou pan oikeion*).

III

One might be tempted to object at this point that Aristotle's position in *Metaphysics* 5.12 is not to be found in the *APo*. Aristotle's account of the difference between opinion (*doxa*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*) at *APo* 1.33 and of the possibility of having opinion and knowledge of the same object (though not at the same time), in which he uses the example of the commensurability of the diagonal with the sides of a square, makes it clear that Aristotle has the notion of necessary truth and necessary being and impossible truth and impossible being in mind in the *APo*.

However, two more serious objections need to be answered if my interpretation is to prove to be correct. One, the definition of necessary truth, which I propose to be Aristotle's own implicit definition, entails that the objects of necessary truth be eternal. That is to say, that which cannot possibly not be what it is, not only must actually exist but must exist in an eternal and changeless way. Not only must the diagonal of a square always be incommensurable with the sides, or not only must a man always exist as an animal, but diagonals, squares, men and animals must always exist; that is, they must be eternal. According to Aristotle, this means that first premises of demonstrative syllogisms must be universal (*katholou*) in a special sense: they must express *kata pantos* and *kath' hautou* relations. At *APo* 75b21–6, Aristotle himself explains that it is clear that since premises from which demonstrative syllogisms are formed are universal (*katholou*), it is necessary that the conclusion drawn from them be eternal (*aidion*) and imperishable. For a demonstration about perishable things will not be scientific in the strict sense (*haplôs*) but will only be a demonstration accidentally (*kata sumbebêkos*)—that is, that a conclusion is true of a certain subject not universally but at a certain time and in a certain way.

Aristotle presents a rather succinct summary of the proper qualities of appropriate and genuine scientific subjects at *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3.1139b19–24. There he states: “for we accept [or agree] that that which we know (*ho epistametha*) cannot be otherwise (*mêd' en-*

dechesthai allôs echein). And with respect to those things which can be otherwise, when they are outside of our perception, we cannot be sure if they exist or not (*lanthanei ei estin ê mê [estin]*).” The last sentence makes it clear that Aristotle requires eternal objects as the objects of scientific knowledge (*epistêmê*); for we must be sure that what we are scientifically demonstrating about what actually exists and exists in a certain way (for example, man is a kind of animal), and has not perished or radically changed. Only in this way can we be sure that we are demonstrating the truth about something—in the Aristotelian sense of truth.

McKirahan rejects the apparent need for the subjects of necessary truth to exist necessarily. He notes, first of all, that “being necessary is not one of the requirements of principles listed in 1.2.”¹⁴ I have already answered McKirahan’s objection by showing that Aristotle’s example in 1.2, and his subsequent modifications of the characteristic of truth at 1.6.74b15 and following, show that Aristotle does have necessary truth in mind, which would refer to eternal and necessary being, when he speaks of scientific demonstration in the strict sense. McKirahan claims further, however, that, “If the objects of science exist of necessity, then precious few disciplines can qualify as sciences.”¹⁵ He claims that only astronomy and theology will be secure sciences since the stars and god exist eternally and of necessity.¹⁶ He then rightly points out that in a sense species of animals exist eternally and of necessity, though not the individual members of a species as individuals.

I would contend strongly that Aristotle believes species (and genera) are eternal, for at *Generation of Animals* 731b18–732a2 Aristotle explains that being is better (*beltion*) than nonbeing and eternal being is better than the being of things that can either be or not be. However, those beings subject to generation and perishing are eternal (*aidios*) in the manner open to them. Because of this, according to Aristotle, there will always be a class of men, of animals and of plants (*dio genos aei anthrôpôn kai zôôn esti kai phutôn*).

For Aristotle, universal genera and species would be certain kinds of eternally recurring combinations of matter and form ex-

¹⁴ McKirahan, *Principles*, 125.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

pressed in individual substances. Since this is true, geometry and arithmetic are not as problematic as McKirahan claims for there will always be shapes and units that can be separated off eternally recurring kinds of sensible substances by human minds.¹⁷

IV

McKirahan argues specifically against *APo* 1.8.75b21 and following claiming that eternal and imperishable are "meant to hold for conclusions of proofs, not subjects. Similarly, even though much of I 31 applies to universal terms as well as propositions, the examples show again that the universals intended are propositions that can be conclusions of proofs (87b35–36, b39–88a2, 88a14–16)."¹⁸ He concludes by claiming, "the statements that scientific facts are always and eternal do *not* entail that science requires eternally existing *particulars*. Since necessary and eternal scientific facts can apply to non-eternal particulars, there is no need to suppose scientific existence claims to be necessary, and so we may hold that when Aristotle claims that premises and conclusions of demonstration express necessary truths, he intends them to apply only to per se predications, not to existence claims."¹⁹ However, if universal and necessary truths did not refer to real existents, then they would not be true in the Aristotelian sense of truth. Therefore, I believe McKirahan's account is incorrect. In one sense, however, I do agree with McKirahan: science does not require eternally existing particulars as the eternal referents for necessary scientific truths.²⁰

¹⁷ Compare *DA* 3.7.431b12–19; and *Meta* 13.3.1078a23–6 on mathematical and geometrical being. Since man can exist eternally as an eternally recurring combination of matter and form, mathematical and geometricals can exist eternally as dimensions of sensible substances that are "separated off" substances by human minds.

¹⁸ McKirahan, *Principles*, 127.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 131–2 (emphasis added). If eternal and necessary truths apply only to per se predications and not to existence claims, then I do not see how these truths qualify as scientific truths in the Aristotelian sense of referring to real being (*to on*). Moreover, I do not believe McKirahan has existence claims correct for Aristotle for he does not take seriously the possibility that for something to exist for Aristotle, it must exist as something.

²⁰ Compare *APo* 1.24.85b18 and following.

Barnes gives an interpretation similar to McKirahan's. Barnes explains that Aristotle's claim that we can have knowledge of the real (even though everything real is particular and the objects of knowledge are universal) makes sense only in the following way: "knowledge is of universal *propositions*; only particular *objects* are real: universal propositions do not require universal objects as their subject matter."²¹ I believe Barnes's account is also wrong.

Both McKirahan and Barnes adopt an apparently nominalist position: universals exist only in names or concepts. However, Aristotle's characteristic of the truth of first principles and premises (which, I contend, he later specifies as necessary truth), clearly suggests that the premises refer to actually existing beings.²² On the account given by Barnes and McKirahan, the truth of universal propositions used as demonstrative premises must refer either to what the medievals called "beings of the mind" (*entia mentis*), or to perishable particulars, or to both. We have seen, however, at *APo* 1.8.75b21 and following, that demonstrations about particulars as such are only demonstrations in an accidental (*kata sumbebêkos*) sense, that they apply only at a certain time and in a certain way. This clearly implies that when, for example, a particular man dies, the *per se* claim that all men are animals is not true of the deceased individual for he is now nonbeing.²³ If only "scientific facts" expressed in propositions are eternal in some sense, then what happens to the real referents of Aristotle's characteristic of truth?

The answers to the question just raised, to the problem of the necessary truth of scientific principles and premises (which is a genuine problem—*pace* Barnes), and the need for eternal and necessary subjects are to be found, I believe, in determining the ontological status of universals for Aristotle. It seems to me that universals can be real for Aristotle in a number of ways and are not just beings of the mind. As Irwin points out, "Scientific propositions must be true, and known to be true; they therefore correspond to some objective reality. . . . Since a science purports to state truths about universals, not

²¹ *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, 139–40 (emphasis added).

²² Compare *Meta* 4.7.1011b26 and following: "*to de [legein] to on einai kai to mê on mê einai, alêthês.*"

²³ Compare *DA* 2.4.415b13: "*to de zên tois zôsi to einai estin.*" Since "to exist" for animals (including man) is "to live," then when a man or other animal dies, it can be said to no longer exist.

about particulars, *universals* are the primary subjects of which a science predicates properties (*APo.* 77a5–9, 83a30–5, 85b15–18, *Meta.* 1003a14–15, 1059b24–7).²⁴ If truths about universals correspond to some objective reality, universals must exist in some objective way. Aristotle's universals are not Platonic Forms existing independently of particulars;²⁵ but statements about Aristotelian universals are not just about the particulars that manifest them. According to Irwin, "A science is intended to describe a natural, objective kind, not to distinguish kinds whose existence depends on being spoken of or thought."²⁶

Evidence that scientific universals are real is provided, according to Irwin, by the fact that, "In claiming that a science offers *explanations*, Aristotle *assumes* the reality of universals. Since scientific statements explain, they must be about universals, [that is] Aristotle claims that universals are better known by nature than particulars are, and he is justified in so far as propositions referring to universals explain facts about particulars; but he would be completely unjustified if he took a nominalist view of universals or scientific laws."²⁷ If universals only exist in names or concepts, they could not truly explain why certain properties must exist in all particulars of a certain kind of being. There would be no real connection between purportedly explanatory, universal propositions and particular existents. In general, I agree with Irwin's account of the reality of universals for Aristotle.

Moreover, I believe Irwin's account depends on what he calls Aristotle's metaphysical realism (as opposed to the apparently nominalist position of Barnes and McKirahan). As Irwin explains, "In so far as Aristotle claims that objective first principles must be known by nature, he commits himself to a metaphysical realist conception of knowledge and reality. . . . What is 'known by nature' is not something that happens to be adapted to our cognitive capacities, or to play a special role in our theories or beliefs. It is known by nature because it is a primary feature of the world, and it is known to us only if we are in the right cognitive condition to discover what is really there."²⁸ I will not attempt to defend Irwin's account of Aristotle's realism, but in

²⁴ Irwin, *First Principles*, 118.

²⁵ Compare *APo.* 1.10.77a5–9, 1.22.83a22–5

²⁶ Irwin, *First Principles*, 119.

²⁷ *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

general I do agree with it and I believe it hinges on taking the characteristic of *truth* of first principles seriously. However, I do not believe Irwin's account goes far enough in the direction of the need for causal explanation and necessary truth in Aristotelian demonstration.

V

According to Aristotle's *Categories*, substance in the strictest sense is primary substance, examples of which are this particular man and this particular horse (*hoion ho tis hippos*).²⁹ Without the existence of primary substance, Aristotle explains further, nothing else would exist (*mê ousôn oun tôn prôtôn ousiôn adunaton tôn allôn ti einaî*).³⁰ In addition to primary substance there are two secondary substances: species, an example of which is man, and genus, an example of which is animal. Species is said to be more truly substance than genus.³¹ Since primary substance is that upon which all other being depends, and is thus the primary reference point of all being for Aristotle (in the *Categories*), we would expect that true knowledge (*epistêmê alêthê*) (which must refer to real being), should refer to primary substance.

Primary substances, for example, particular men or horses, however, are not the only existents for Aristotle. It would seem that the *Categories*' notion of primary substance is not necessarily what Aristotle regards as primary substance in the *Metaphysics*.³² Of particular importance to my claim is that Aristotle clearly states that secondary substances, that is, species and genus, really exist and exist in one sense dependent on primary substance for they are predicated of primary substance. In order of natural priority, species is better called substance than genus according to Aristotle.³³

In another sense, however, genus is said to be prior to species. At *Categories* 15a5 and following, Aristotle explains that "genera (*ta genê*) are always (*aei*) prior to (*protera*) species. For the order of being cannot be reversed (*ou gar antistrephei kata tên tou einai*

²⁹ *Cat* 5.2a13.

³⁰ *Cat* 5.2b5 and following.

³¹ Compare *Cat* 5.2b7–22.

³² Compare, for example, *Meta* 7.17.1041b7–9.

³³ *Cat* 5.2b7–11.

akolouthêsin). For example, if [the species] aquatic (*enhydrou*) exists, then animal [necessarily] exists, but if animal (genus) exists (*ontos*), aquatic (the species) does not necessarily exist." Since species is composed metaphysically of genus and specific difference, it makes sense that animals can be said in a sense to exist first and then become differentiated into aquatic, terrestrial, and so forth. This does not necessarily mean that genera can exist independently of species and particular members of a genus. Genera and species may exist in a sense in dependence on particular substances, but nonetheless they truly exist and exist in an eternal way.

However, does the apparent temporal, causal priority of genus over species extend to a particular fish, horse, or man? That is, does a particular horse or man first become an animal, then a man, and then Coriscus; so that the genus animal and the species man are stages in the development of, and part of the nature of, a particular man like Coriscus? I believe an examination of Aristotle's texts reveals a "yes" answer to these questions.

At *Generation of Animals* 736a35–736b5, Aristotle explains that, while all living things, including all animals, have nutritive soul (*threpikê psychê*), animals come to acquire, in the course of their development, sentient soul (*aisthetikê psychê*), and then man in particular comes to acquire rational soul (*noetikê psychê*). Aristotle explains further, animals come to acquire sentient soul because "an offspring does not become animal and man or animal and horse at the same time (*ou gar hama ginetai zôon kai anthrôpos oude zôon kai hippos*); for the end (*to telos*) of the process of generation is formed last of all. And that which is peculiar to an individual offspring is the end of the process of generation."

A man comes into being in stages, as it were, because of the movements in the male sperm of the particular individual as father and as male, and of the universals (*tôn katholou*), that is, the movements that belong as a human being (that is, species) and as an animal (that is, genus).³⁴ At 768a12–13, Aristotle states that the movements in the sperm of the father and the universals, that is, species and genus, are actual movements (*energeiai men hai tou gennôntos kai tôn katholou hoion anthrôpou kai zôou*); whereas, the movements of the mother and the grandparents are potential movements (*dunumei de*

³⁴ Compare *Gen An* 4.3.767b25–32.

kai tou thêleos kai tôn progenôn). Because the movements in the sperm of the universal genus and species are actual, not potential movements, the following temporal course of the development of a particular human being is suggested by Aristotle's account. In human embryological development, first generic animal characteristics appear, that is, those common to animals. Next, these generic characteristics are specified further by the movements in the sperm of the species, man, so that the individual manifests human specifications of the generic (animal) characteristics. Lastly, in the best case, at least, the movements in the sperm of the father's form specify the species characteristics even further so that, for example, Coriscus comes to resemble his father.

Scientific demonstration of human essential properties is based on the causal efficacy of the movements in the sperm of the universal genus and universal species. Thus, universal species and universal genera exist in part, at least, precisely as causal principles that produce effects, in a certain temporal sequence and in a certain order of ontological completion (of form informing matter) in the generation of particular individuals of these kinds. It is precisely when the natural process of generation breaks down and relapses to the already present actual movements in the sperm of species and genus that the reality of these universal causes becomes most apparent. That is, Aristotle maintains that there are two types of monsters (*terata*) which result from the failure of the natural process of generation to take place. One type of monster, who resembles none of his forebears, manifests only species characteristics common (*koinon*) to all humans.³⁵ A second type is an offspring who is "most general" (*malista katholou*) in form and manifests only the generic properties common to all animals (*zôon*).³⁶ It is important to note that the causal movements of the universal species and of the universal genus can have manifest effects in an individual substance. This clearly shows that such universal causes are real for Aristotle.³⁷ Because of the universal causes present in the genesis of every human being, it is necessarily true to say that man cannot possibly exist and not exist as an animal.³⁸ Because these universal causes will not cease to exist and

³⁵ Compare *Gen An* 4.3.768b10 and following.

³⁶ Compare *Gen An* 4.3.769a11 and following.

be operative in the ongoing genesis of humans, it is true to say that man and animal are eternal.

In conclusion, Aristotle's characteristic of the truth of first principles, when we are dealing with the first truths of an explanatory *genos*, becomes the characteristic of necessary truth, which requires as its referent eternal and often universal being.³⁷ By recognizing the force of Aristotle's example of nonbeing, the commensurability of a diagonal with the side of a square, we come to expect and find in Aristotle's text the limitation of simple truth and the requirement of necessary truth for the premises of scientific demonstration in the strict sense. Necessary truth requires eternal being, like eternal species and genera, which exist as universal, explanatory kinds of being and as universal causes operative within the genesis of an individual substance. By recognizing the requirement of necessary truth for proper first principles of scientific demonstration, we can come to appreciate the need for really existent universals and eternal being in Aristotle's theory of the particular sciences and in so doing, more accurately appreciate the theory itself.

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³⁷ On the reality of the movements in the sperm of the universal species and universal genus, see John Cooper, "Metaphysics in Aristotle's Embryology," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 214 (1988): 20; and David Balme, "Aristotle's Biology Was Not Essentialist," in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 312. For a more complete analysis of the generation of monsters, see my "Aristotle on Monsters and the Generation of Kinds," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77 (2003): 21–36.

³⁸ For a brief but accurate discussion of "exist" as "exist as" in Aristotle, see David Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73–5, esp. 73 n. 22.

³⁹ Of course, particular sciences are not always concerned with universals; theology—the study of the First Unmoved Mover—would not be concerned with universals in the *APo*'s sense of universals.

FIGURATIVE SYNTHESIS AND SYNTHETIC A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE

YARON M. SENDEROWICZ

KANT'S GOAL IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION was to demonstrate that the categories are applicable to objects of sensible intuition. He carried out this task by disclosing the necessity of a transcendental synthesis. In the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter, the B Deduction) transcendental synthesis has two subspecies: *synthesis intellectualis* (intellectual synthesis) and *synthesis speciosa* (figurative synthesis).¹ The distinction between the two types of transcendental synthesis is also mirrored in the structure of the proof of the B Deduction.² As several commentators have noted, the B Deduction in fact contains two parts.³ Each part seems to provide an account of a distinctive

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¹ All references to Kant's work other than the *Critique of Pure Reason* will be to the standard volume number and pagination of *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, *Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–). Translations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are from Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Translations from the *Prolegomena* are from Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1950). Translations from the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* are from *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath, trans. Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison, and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). As is standard, reference to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter, "CPR") are to pages of the first (A) and second (B) editions. The reference for the above quotation is CPR, B150–1.

² Transcendental synthesis is central to the argument of both versions of the Transcendental Deduction, but its role in the proof is altered in the second version of the Transcendental Deduction. In this paper, I will not address the question that concerns the relations between the two versions of the Transcendental Deduction.

³ See for example Dieter Henrich, "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," *The Review of Metaphysics* 22, no. 4 (June 1969): 641–2.

kind of transcendental synthesis. The first part (§§15–21) provides an account of intellectual synthesis while the second part (§§ 24–26) provides an account of figurative synthesis.⁴

The importance of figurative synthesis to Kant's theory is widely recognized. Nevertheless, this notion is notoriously obscure. It seems as though Kant's text does not clearly specify why figurative synthesis is required. A preliminary explication of figurative synthesis appears in §24. Kant's first step there is to recapitulate the results of the first part of the B Deduction. According to Kant, the synthesis established there is "purely intellectual."⁵ Intellectual synthesis is a synthesis by means of which the categories are "related through the mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, without it being determined whether this intuition is our own or some other but still sensible one."⁶ Intellectual synthesis apparently contains a gap that concerns the applicability of the categories to objects of intuition. By means of this synthesis "no determined object is yet cognized."⁷ But the nature of this gap is not clear. This gap seems to be related to a distinction between "objects of intuition" and "objects of intuition in general." However, if "in general" means "all," then given that the first part of the B Deduction established the applicability of the categories to objects of intuition in general, it established the applicability of the categories to all objects of intuition.⁸ In this case, why is the second part of the B Deduction indispensable for an account of the applicability of the categories to objects of intuition? One way out of this difficulty is to claim that in "in general" conveys in this context some negative implications that concern the possibility of knowing that the categories are applicable to objects of sensible intuition. But Kant's text provides no clue as to what these negative implications might be.

One might try to point out these negative implications by analyzing the passage that introduces figurative synthesis:

But since in us a certain form of sensible intuition *a priori* is fundamental, which rests on the receptivity of the capacity for representation

⁴ Compare Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chap. 7.

⁵ *CPR*, B150.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Compare Henry Allison, "Reflections on the B Deduction," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 25 (1986): 9.

(sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given representations in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think *a priori* synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of **sensible intuition**, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects that can be given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable of intuition *a priori*.

This **synthesis** of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, can be called **figurative** synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*), as distinct from that which would be thought in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called combination of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*); both are **transcendental**, not merely because they themselves proceed *a priori* but also because they ground the possibility of other cognition *a priori*.⁹

It appears that the gap involved in intellectual synthesis is related to the fact that intellectual synthesis abstracts from the *a priori* forms of intuition. This seems to be implied by the claim that the possibility of figurative synthesis is based on the fact that “in us a certain form of sensible intuition *a priori* is fundamental.” The following long and complex sentence provides further support for this hypothesis:

Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to **sensibility**; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determined and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, **in accordance with the categories**, must be the transcendental synthesis of the **imagination**, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition that are possible for us.¹⁰

Kant had earlier identified figurative synthesis with the transcendental synthesis of productive imagination. Productive imagination has three distinct features: (a) it is an effect of understanding on sensibility; (b) it is the faculty for determining *a priori* the form of sense in accordance with the unity of apperception; (c) it is the first application

⁹ CPR, B150–1. The boldface in these and the following passages is in the original.

¹⁰ CPR, B151–2.

of the understanding to sensibility and the ground of all others.¹¹ In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant already established that all objects of sensible intuition must be given in the forms of intuition. Here Kant adds the claim that figurative synthesis determines the forms of sense a priori in accordance with the categories. It might be argued that both claims suggest a promising answer to the main question in the Transcendental Deduction. If there are reasons to claim that the pure forms of intuition are determined in accordance with the categories, then the categories must apply to all objects of sensible intuition. Nevertheless, the question that concerns the nature of these reasons renders Kant's theory even more obscure than before. How could pure space and pure time be determined a priori by pure concepts such as "substance" and "cause"? Moreover, how could figurative synthesis cohere with the other claims that are part of Kant's transcendental theory of experience, in particular with the distinction between pure concepts and pure intuitions?

As expected, the secondary literature contains various answers to these questions. Many interpreters consider the question of the possibility of judgment and its relation to the alleged reality of the two types of transcendental synthesis as central to the argument of the B Deduction. There are at least two different approaches to interpreting the relations between the possibility of judgment and the two types of transcendental synthesis. One approach emphasizes the link between the possibility of judgment and the intellectual synthesis established in the first part of the B deduction. The clearest and most comprehensive presentation of this approach is found in Henry Allison's writings. Although Allison recognizes the indispensability of the second part of the B Deduction for a successful realization of the goal of the Transcendental Deduction, he in fact maintains that the reality of the intellectual synthesis (the synthesis that, according to Allison, is linked to the concept of judgment) does not entail the reality of the figurative synthesis. One of the advantages of Allison's approach is that it seems to be able to point out the negative implications of "in general" related to intellectual synthesis. Yet, as I will

¹¹ It should be noted that the third feature seems to conflict with the claim that the first part of the B Deduction already established the applicability of the categories "to objects of intuition in general." For according to the above sentence figurative synthesis indicates the first application of the understanding to objects of intuition that is "the ground of all others."

demonstrate in section 2, Allison's approach is inadequate for three reasons: (a) it is unable to explain the role of sensible intuitions in Kant's argument in the first part of the B Deduction; (b) it blurs the connection between the problem that concerns the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and the argument of the first part of the B deduction; (c) his interpretation of the first part of the B deduction inadvertently entails the dubious supposition that, according to Kant, empirical real objects cannot be determined by judgments.

The second approach emphasizes the reciprocal dependencies between the two types of transcendental synthesis and, therefore, also of the two steps of the B Deduction. A recent defense of this approach appears in Longuenesse's book *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*.¹² According to Longuenesse, the answer to the question of the possibility of judgment must combine the two types of synthesis, namely, the conceptual synthesis that concerns our capacity to "reflect upon" what is given in sensibility and a nonconceptual synthesis denoted by "*synthesis speciosa*." According to Longuenesse, the nonconceptual figurative synthesis is a synthesis that generates the forms of intuition discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetic.¹³ This claim is meant to clarify why the account of figurative synthesis presented in §26 completes the task that Kant aspired to accomplish in the Transcendental Deduction. Yet, as I will show in sections 3 and 4, this interpretation is inadequate for the following reasons: (a) it is incompatible with the logical basis for the distinction between forms of intuition and pure concepts; (b) it is unable to explain how the generation of the forms of intuition by means of "an effect of the understanding on sensibility" could be relevant to the question that concerns the applicability of the categories to objects of sensible intuition.

The interpretation that will be presented in what follows integrates elements from both approaches. Although I believe that it is a mistake to suppose that figurative synthesis generates the forms of intuition, the claim that all objects must be perceived in the sensible forms of intuition (a claim that serves no role in the first part of the B Deduction) is central to the argument of the second part of the B Deduction. As I will show in sections 4 and 5, figurative synthesis makes

¹² Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 219. For a related position see also Henrich, "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," 649.

possible the apprehension of objects that could be given in the sensible forms of intuition. As Kant claims in §24, without the combination of the manifold the mere form of intuition “does not yet contain any **determinate** intuition at all.”¹⁴ This claim seems to be incompatible with the results of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The synthetic unity of the combination of a manifold is not presented there as a condition for the possibility of having sensible intuitions of objects. Moreover, in §13 Kant notes that appearances “can certainly be given in intuition without the functions of the understanding.”¹⁵ Nevertheless, as I will show in section 4, both claims are in fact compatible. The fact that givenness of objects in intuition is not linked to the functions of the understanding does not entail that givenness is sufficient for being a determinate intuition.¹⁶

In order to see why givenness is insufficient for being a determinate intuition, three points should be noted. The first is that although the pure forms of intuition do not depend on sensible appearances, (pure) space and time could not be perceived if sensible appearances are not perceived in them. The second point is that the basic features that are relevant for the determination of intuitions as intuitions relate to the representational character of space and time, that is, to their being singular representations. Finally, given the transcendental ideality of space and time (presupposed by the Transcendental Deduction), that is, given the claim that space and time are ideal forms of representation, intuitions cannot be “in” space and time if it is not possible to know their spatial and temporal determinations.¹⁷ In section 4 I will show that Kant’s theory contains good reasons to claim that knowledge of spatial and/or temporal determinations cannot be established merely on the basis of givenness in the forms of intuition.

The following two claims therefore point out an inherent tension in the concept of sensible perception. If an object is in space and

¹⁴ *CPR*, B154.

¹⁵ *CPR*, A90/B122.

¹⁶ One could assume that an intuition is determinate if its phenomenal features are determinate and if its temporal and/or spatial features are determinate.

¹⁷ This claim is, in my view, essential to Kant’s overall epistemic project and is, as I noted earlier, related to the transcendental ideality of space and time. I will not address the reasons for Kant’s claim that space and time are transcendently ideal in the present article although I believe that they are more defensible than is usually assumed.

time, it must be spatially and temporally determined due to the representational character of space and in time. Yet, given the metaphysical and epistemic nature of space and time (their transcendental ideality), it must be possible to know the spatial and temporal determinations of the perceived objects, and this is not possible merely on the basis of givenness in intuition. This tension can be resolved only if one adds the necessary conditions required for the possibility of knowledge of spatiotemporal determinations. In other words, although the spatial and temporal determination of appearances is based only on the representational character of the sensible forms of intuition, the possibility of knowledge of these determinations (inherent in the notion of a form of intuition) requires appeal to the categories of the understanding. The claim that the categories provide the nonsensible conditions for the possibility of knowledge of spatiotemporal determination is established in the Principles. There are, however, no reasons to suppose that the claim that Kant makes in §26, according to which combination must be “already given *a priori*, along with (not in) these intuitions,” refers to different types of conditions.¹⁸

In section 5, I will explain why my interpretation does not affect the heterogeneity of the forms of intuition and the categories. The understanding and its pure functions are not required in order to generate the pure forms of intuition. They are presupposed by the possibility of the apprehension of space and time. On the other hand, knowable objects can exhibit the categories only if the objects that exhibit them are temporal and spatial. In section 6 I will suggest that this reciprocal conditioning is related to a distinction between the content of a pure representation and its conditions of exhibition. This distinction applies to a network of similar interdependencies between all the pure representations involved in empirical knowledge.¹⁹ The main idea that underlies this network of interdependencies is that a pure representation can be exhibited only if empirical objects are

¹⁸ CPR, B160.

¹⁹ It is important to note that this reciprocal conditioning does not affect what might be informally called the content of a pure representation. For example, it does not affect the fact that the truth conditions of judgments that ascribe a spatial property to an object do not involve time or the categories. The reciprocal conditioning between the forms of intuition and the categories is revealed only when one considers the metaphysical and epistemic status of the pure representations.

perceived and only if the empirical objects exhibit other pure representations. The notion of an object of possible experience is, in other words, the locus of the synthetic unity between the pure representations that must be involved in empirical knowledge.

My suggestion is that the differences between the tasks of the two parts of the B Deduction can be clarified on the basis of this network of interdependencies. Each part of the B Deduction provides an account of a different fraction of this network of reciprocal dependencies. The first part of the B Deduction provides an account of the reciprocal dependencies between “I think” and the categorical forms of synthesis, while the second part of the B Deduction accounts for the interrelation between the apprehension of space and time and the categories.²⁰

II

Objective Validity and Objective Reality. One of the fundamental questions raised by the B Deduction concerns the relations between its parts. In his book *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, Allison maintains that the two parts of the B Deduction are in fact independent.²¹ According to Allison, each part aims to establish a distinct epistemic feature of the categories; the first part establishes that of the objective validity of the categories while the second part establishes that of their objective reality. Allison maintains that this difference is related to the fact that the two parts of the B Deduction operate with distinct concepts of objects. He claims that the first part deals with “object in the logical sense” while the second part is concerned with object in the “real,” “weighty” sense.²²

According to Allison, the first part of the B Deduction contains a sound argument that establishes the necessary applicability of the categories to “objects in the logical or judgmental sense.” However, in

²⁰ That each part of the B Deduction appears to be incomplete is, I suggest, a result of the fact that “pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest”; *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* 4:263.

²¹ For a similar claim see Henrich, “The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction,” 642.

²² Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 134–5.

Allison's view, the question of their objective reality has a subtler answer. On the one hand, the objective reality of the categories can be demonstrated by showing that they must be applicable to the operations of the imagination responsible for the unification of time.²³ The perception, however, that renders the categories objectively real "is a mode of consciousness that has as its objects modifications of inner sense," not objects in the real "weighty" sense.²⁴ An argument that shows that the categories are objectively real must show that they are necessarily applicable to real objects. Yet according to Allison, the second part of the B Deduction fails to show that the categories are necessarily applicable to real objects. Allison's implicit supposition is therefore, that, in Kant's theory, the claim that a concept is objectively valid does not entail the claim that it is objectively real.

My aim in the present section will be to make clear why this line of interpretation is inadequate as an account of Kant's theory. Allison's position may be assessed in view of the following questions: (a) What role do sensible intuitions serve in the argument that establishes the objective validity of the categories? (b) Given Allison's account, in what sense could one claim that the objective validity of the categories does not entail their objective reality?

Let us begin by noting the three steps of Allison's interpretation of the first part of the B deduction. The first step consists in the claim that the notion of a single thinking subject potentially conscious of its a priori self-identity is necessarily presupposed by the notion of a complex thought.²⁵ If the subject can think a complex thought that consists of the representations A, B, and C, the subject that thinks A must be the same subject that thinks B and C. The second step is to claim that, according to Kant, a single subject would not be potentially self-conscious of its identity, if A, B, and C, were not synthesized in a single consciousness. Self-consciousness of identity is linked to the combination (synthesis) of the representations that are part of a single complex thought.²⁶ This synthesis apparently indicates a judgment. Each such judgment has a correlative object "in the logical or judgmental sense." The final step consists in the claim that the categories that represent the functions of the unity of the combination of

²³ Ibid., 162–4. Allison's demonstration presupposes that the objective validity of the categories was established in the first part of the B Deduction.

²⁴ Ibid., 167.

²⁵ Ibid., 138.

²⁶ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 142.

representations of all judgments are *ipso facto* presupposed by the (logical or judgmental) objects of judgments.²⁷

In order to examine this interpretation, it should first be noted that notwithstanding the fact that the principle of apperception also applies to other types of representations, Kant's aim in the Transcendental Deduction is to establish that intuitions must satisfy the conditions that make possible their belonging to a single consciousness. This is already stated at the beginning of the first part of the B Deduction. A manifold of intuitions, that is, of representations that "can be given prior to all thinking" is necessarily related to the "I think."²⁸ The title of §20 confirms this claim: "all sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as condition under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness."²⁹

What role does Allison assign to sensible intuitions? First, it must be noted that Allison's term "complex thought" seems to be somewhat misleading. Given that in Allison's account A, B, and C need not stand for propositions, all thoughts that combine at least one subject term and one predicate term are "complex." Indeed, Allison maintains that the categories are presupposed by all kind of judgments.³⁰ Moreover, an "object in the logical sense," the object relevant to the first part of the B Deduction, could be anything that a subject of a judgment indicates, namely, physical objects, properties, and abstract entities.³¹ Kant's explicit position is that the only intuitions available to us are sensible intuitions. However, if the class of the relevant terms susceptible for synthesis also includes terms that denote concepts, properties, and abstract objects, it follows that if Allison's interpretation is correct, the first part of the B Deduction is implicitly committed to a concept of an intuition different from Kant's official concept.

²⁷ Ibid., 144–8.

²⁸ CPR, B131–2.

²⁹ CPR, B143.

³⁰ According to Allison, "the pure concepts of the understanding are viewed by Kant as conditions of analytic as well as synthetic judgments." Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 122.

³¹ Allison quotes Reflexion 6350, (18: 676) in this context. According to this Reflexion an object (in the logical sense) is, "that which is represented through a totality of several predicates which pertain to it." See Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 146–7.

Despite the fact that it is problematic as an interpretation, it might be argued that the above conclusion sheds light on an important aspect of Kant's argument. For example, one could claim that the fact that the analytic unity of apperception is a necessary condition for making a complex judgment does not depend on Kant's concept of intuition. "Intuition" could be interpreted as the immediate grasping of particular content. Some of the features Kant ascribed to "intuition" are satisfied by this kind of intuition, in particular, "singularity" and "immediate relation to an object."³² The content immediately "given" or grasped could be identified with the (logical) object of an intuition. If the content A is distinct from that of B, grasping the former is distinct from the grasping the latter. Yet if a complex thought contains A and B, the subject that "thinks" A must be the same subject that "thinks" B. Considered in isolation, the respective content of A and of B does not suffice to establish the claim that the subject that thinks A must be the same subject that thinks B. Rather, that the subject that thinks A must be the same subject that thinks B is presupposed by the possibility of grasping A and B together in one complex thought.

The claim that the notion of a single consciousness could also be linked to the unity of a manifold of non-Kantian intuitions might be philosophically significant, but its adequacy as an interpretation requires the satisfaction of at least two further conditions. One must show how this claim clarifies the structure and goal of Kant's arguments and that it coheres with Kant's theory as a whole. As I will demonstrate, Allison's line of interpretation fails to fulfill both of the above conditions.

To begin, it can be shown that the claim that the categories determine all objects "in the logical or judgmental sense" of all kinds of "complex" judgments entails the claim that the unity of a manifold of intuitions is the same unity as that of a complex thought. This claim is manifestly false. Moreover, there is no textual evidence to suppose that Kant was committed to it. One could assume that Kant's goal in the first part of the B deduction is to establish the applicability of the categories to the manifold of intuitions by connecting the analytic unity of apperception and the synthetic unity of apperception. A subject potentially conscious of his self-identity must be able to self-ascribe intuitions. Intuitions could be self-ascribed only if they are

³² See *CPR*, A320/B377.

synthesized by a priori concepts. Since, according to Allison, the identity of the "I" "is first introduced as a necessary correlate of a single complex thought,"³³ the synthesis presupposed by self-ascription must be the synthesis of the elements united in a complex thought. It follows, however, that the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions in one consciousness is the unity of a complex thought.

Kant indeed thought that these two kinds of unity were necessarily related, but he did not equate them. This can also be demonstrated on the basis of some of the things that Allison says. According to Allison, the required synthetic unity of the manifold of representations is possible only if the representations are united under a concept.³⁴ But the claim that intuitions are synthesized only if their objects are united under a concept is not equivalent to the claim that the elements involved in a complex thought are united under a single concept. Although Kant maintains that the former claim is necessarily true, the latter could only be true with regard to one type of analytic judgment. It is manifestly false with regard to synthetic judgments. For example, the thought, "All men are mortal," consists of the representations "men" and "is mortal." Even if "men" and "is mortal" denote intuitions, they could not be combined together in the judgment "men are mortal" because they are both united under a concept. Rather, the judgment, "men are mortal," asserts that the predicate "is mortal" applies to all individual men.

That judgments possess their own kind of unity does not entail that the capacity to make judgments is irrelevant to the unity of the manifold of intuitions. The fact that this capacity is related to the synthetic unity of the manifold is indicated by the role of concepts in determining the unity of a manifold of intuitions. The relation between the synthetic unity of the manifold and the capacity to judge is stated in the following passage:

³³ Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 139.

³⁴ When Allison refers to the link between "the synthetic unity of consciousness," "judgment," and "object in the logical or judgmental sense," he makes the following claims: "it follows from the apperception principle that the unity of consciousness is impossible apart from the synthetic unity of representations, and since this synthetic unity can only be achieved by uniting these representations under a concept, and since (by definition) any such synthetic unity counts as an object, it also follows that the representation of an object is a necessary condition for the unity of consciousness." *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 146.

The same function that gives unity to different representations in a **judgment** also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an **intuition**, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of judgments into concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects *a priori*; this can never be accomplished by general logic.³⁵

Two points should be noted about this passage. The first point is that Kant does not assert here that the unity of a complex thought is the same unity as the unity of the synthesis of different representations in an intuition but rather that the same function that gives unity to the former is the function that gives unity to the latter. The second point is that it is quite clear that Kant is concerned with synthetic judgments which must involve an appeal to sensible intuitions.

Disregarding this difficulty, let us assume, as does Allison, that the first part of the B Deduction established the objective validity of the categories. The categories are concepts presupposed by all kind of judgments and, therefore, by all kinds of the correlative logical objects. But if the objects given in sensible intuitions must be objects susceptible to judgments, that is, objects that one can represent, the categories must apply to all such objects. According to Allison's line of interpretation, this is precisely what the first part of the B Deduction established. So construed, however, the objective validity of the categories entails their objective reality.

What might be the reasons for denying this claim? I suggest that there are two related reasons. The first consists in the supposition that it is conceivable that the terms "object in the logical or judgmental sense" (the objects that are the correlates of judgments) and "object in the real sense" refer to two classes of objects that have no common members. In this case, establishing the claim that the categories apply to objects that are members of the class of objects in the logical or judgmental sense does not entail that they apply to objects that are members of the other class.³⁶ It is implausible, however, that this

³⁵ *CPR*, A79/B104–5.

³⁶ Indeed, this seems to be Allison's position. According to Allison, the first part of the B Deduction established "the necessity of the categories for representing an object in the judgmental or logical sense. Clearly, it does not follow from this alone that the categories have any application to the actual content of human experience." Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 159.

construal is the correct interpretation of the difference between these two terms in Kant's writings. Given the alleged results of the first part of the B Deduction, this claim entails that it is possible that objects in the real sense are not objects that are the correlates of judgments. The claim that objects in the real sense cannot be the correlates of judgments is tantamount to the claim that objects in the real sense are in fact things in themselves in the transcendental sense.³⁷ That the categories might not be applicable to things in themselves does not involve Kant's critical theory in any difficulty. Kant repeatedly denied that the categories must be applicable to things in themselves (in the transcendental sense). Nonetheless, Kant's position clearly is that we must be able to represent and make judgments about empirical objects, that is, real objects in the empirical sense.³⁸

From what I have said so far, it appears that if a concept is objectively valid, it must be objectively real. The fact that this was Kant's position is implied by his claim that if the categories are not applicable to appearances, "these concepts would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance."³⁹ Here one might argue that, given Allison's account, if the objective validity of the categories entails their objective reality, the categories apply to objects of sensible intuitions on the basis of the conditions presupposed by all judgments. I suggest that this claim is false not due to the fact that objects "in the logical or judgmental sense" and "object in the real sense"

³⁷ Allison's distinction between the two respective senses of "real," "appearance," and "in itself," the empirical sense and the real sense, may be introduced in order to clarify the present issue. As Allison notes, "real" in the empirical sense, denotes, in Kant's theory, empirical objects, that is, objects as they are "in themselves in the empirical sense" that are distinct from appearances in the empirical sense. Empirical objects are appearances in the transcendental sense. Real objects in the transcendental sense are things in themselves in the transcendental sense. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 7–9.

³⁸ It should be noted that the fact that the notion of objective validity is related to a set of really possible but nonactual objects must be part of Kant's theory. Kant aimed to establish the conditions of possibility of experience and the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. A really possible but nonactual object is an object that could be experienced although it is not experienced. The categories are meant to be the conditions of possibility of experiencing really possible objects. Yet the class of really possible but nonactual objects is not identical to the class of logical objects that are the correlate of all kinds of judgments.

³⁹ CPR, A90/B123.

might refer to two classes of objects that have no common members, but rather in view of the claim that the logical subjects of all kinds of judgments presuppose the categories.

II

Figurative Synthesis and the Forms of Intuition. Given the results of the previous section one must conclude that the gap left by the first part of the B Deduction is inexplicable on the basis of Allison's line of interpretation. I now turn to examine a different account of this gap.

In her book *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Longuenesse emphasizes the primacy and importance of figurative synthesis to Kant's answer to his main question in the *Analytic*: how is discursive thought related to what is given in sensibility? According to Longuenesse, Kant's answer contains two parts. The first part of his answer "concerns the way we form general concepts from sensible objects."⁴⁰ The capacity "to elevate given representations to discursive forms," that is, to "reflect upon" what is given in sensibility, is what, according to Longuenesse, Kant calls the activity of analysis that consists of the operations of comparison, reflection, and abstraction.⁴¹ The forms of judgment guide this activity. This capacity presupposes a synthesis that must occur prior to analysis, which is required in order to make possible the reflection on the sensible given in accordance with the logical forms of judgments.⁴² The forms of analysis of what is given in sensibility provide the key to the forms of synthesis that must occur prior to analysis. The categories are concepts that universally represent these forms of synthesis. Therefore, the two parts of the B Deduction are two interrelated steps of one proof. The first part is concerned with the necessary conditions that underlie our capacity to reflect upon what is given in sensibility, while the second part deals with figurative synthesis, that is, the nonconceptual synthesis that must occur prior to analysis.

How is figurative synthesis related to the task of showing that the categories apply to objects of sensible intuition? As Longuenesse notes, Kant connects figurative synthesis to the distinction that he

⁴⁰ Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 10.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴² *Ibid.*

makes in §26 between forms of intuition and formal intuitions. In contrast to the common view, Longuenesse believes that it is a mistake to suppose that formal intuition is determined by concepts.⁴³ Figurative synthesis, the effect of the understanding on sensibility, denotes a nonconceptual synthesis, an effect of understanding on sensibility that generates the forms of intuitions discussed in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.⁴⁴

Before examining this contention more closely, let us try to see how the claim that figurative synthesis generates the forms of intuitions is meant to complete Kant's answer to his main question in the *Transcendental Deduction*.

Cause and effect are concepts by means of which appearances are thought (reflected discursively in judgments of experience). They are not, like space and time, intuitive representations in which appearances are *given*. Thus it is conceivable, said Kant at the beginning of the *Deduction*, that appearances be such that they cannot be reflected under any concept of causal relation, whereas it is impossible that an appearance be given that did not conform to the conditions of space and time. But now if we accept the argument of section 26, the very fact that appearances are given in space and time is a sufficient ground for their being in conformity with the categories, even though it remains true that they are not given *in* a category (as "in" an intuition) or even cognized *under* a category until the relevant operation of comparison/reflection/abstraction, together with a priori construction, have generated such cognition. Nevertheless, since the space and time of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* are, as intuitions, products of *synthesis speciosa* or "effect of understanding on sensibility," the fact that appearances are given in them is a sufficient warrant that they *can* be cognized as "determined [in themselves] with respect to one or the other form of judgment," and thus subsumed under the categories.⁴⁵

The categories are not intuitive representations in which objects are given. But since the forms of intuition are produced by means of an effect of understanding on sensibility, all the appearances that must be given in space and time conform to the categories. The categories are not generated before the activity of comparison/reflection/abstraction. Nevertheless, the preconceptual synthesis that makes possible the conformity of the sensible given and the categories is part of the pure a priori forms of intuitions.⁴⁶ Since all objects of sensibility must be given in the forms of intuition, their presentations allegedly

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 223–4.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 219, 223–4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 226.

contain a preconceptual synthesis that is the correlate of the discursive concepts of the understanding.

In order to assess this position, let us begin by noting that the skeptical contention discussed by Longuenesse in the above passage can be interpreted in two ways. It can either mean that it is (conceivably) not possible that the categories apply to the manifold, or that they do not in fact apply to the manifold and, therefore, that although they could apply to the manifold of sensible intuition it is false that they must apply to it.⁴⁷ Longuenesse vacillates between these two options. On the one hand, she claims that figurative synthesis provides a sufficient reason to claim that the categories conform to the manifold of sensible intuition. On the other hand, she claims that it provides a sufficient reason to claim that the manifold of sensible intuition could be subsumed under the categories. This vacillation is not accidental since both possibilities indicated by Longuenesse's account are problematic although for different reasons. On the one hand, if "conform" means merely "can," we are left without an answer as to why the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience. On the other hand, the claim that the preconceptual synthesis that generates the pure forms of intuition suffices to establish that the categories are conditions for the possibility of experience involves insoluble difficulties. This claim in fact means that the applicability of the categories to spatiotemporal objects is justified merely on the basis of the fact that

⁴⁶ The claim that time and space, our forms of intuition, are generated by means of "an effect of understanding on sensibility" seems to have some textual support. For example, when Kant introduces number as the pure schema of magnitude, he makes the following claim: "thus number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of homogeneous intuition in general, because I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition" (*CPR*, A142–3/B182). It should be noted, however, that this claim connects the schema of the pure concept to the apprehension of time. Also, it is far from evident that the connection between the mathematical categories and the forms of intuition is the same as that between the dynamical categories and the pure forms of intuition.

⁴⁷ This ambiguity also pertains to the following sentence that Longuenesse quotes in this context: "For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance" (*CPR*, A90/B123).

appearances are given in the pure forms of intuition. The claim that the pure forms of intuition are produced by “an effect of the understanding on sensibility” would not suffice for this purpose. It must be connected to the supposition that pure space and time already contain forms of synthesis that are linked to the (intellectual) synthesis prescribed by the categories. Yet when properly understood, this supposition means that the representational features of space and time provide sufficient grounds for the claim that the categories must be applicable to whatever appears in space and time. The problem raised by this supposition is that no feature that Kant ascribed to the pure forms of intuition in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* can provide a clue of why merely being given in the pure forms of intuition provides sufficient grounds to claim that the categories must be applicable to appearances. The singularity, infinity, and apriority of space and time and the nonspatiotemporality of things in themselves discussed in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* do not explain why, if no further reasons are (synthetically) added, it is inconceivable, for example, that objects that appear one after the other are not causally related.

IV

Synthesis and Figurative Synthesis. The two lines of interpretation examined fail in two different ways. Allison maintains that the categories are necessarily applicable only to objects “in the logical or judgmental sense” but is unable to explain why if they are applicable to these objects, they are not *ipso facto* applicable to sensible objects. Longuenesse claims that the correlation between the nonconceptual figurative synthesis and the conceptual (intellectual) synthesis is made possible by the fact that the forms of intuition are produced by “an effect of the understanding on sensibility.” Nevertheless, her line of interpretation blurs the heterogeneity of the forms of sense and the pure concepts. Given Kant’s conceptual scheme, this heterogeneity is unavoidable.

The line of interpretation to be presented in what follows is related to Henrich’s and Longuenesse’s interpretations. Both interpreters maintain that the fact that we possess pure intuitions is essential for the second step of Kant’s proof of the objective validity of the categories. Yet they both seem to suppose that the synthetic unity discussed by Kant in §26 concerns the unity of the pure intuitions of space and time. In contrast to that, I will show in the next sections

that the reason figurative synthesis is indispensable for the possession of determinate intuitions consists in the claim that the categories must be applicable to objects of sensible intuition by virtue of the fact that these objects must be given in the a priori forms of intuition. One advantage of this interpretation is that it does not affect the heterogeneity of the forms of intuition and the pure concept.

Let us begin by noting that figurative synthesis is a kind of synthesis. Synthesis presupposes the notion of a manifold of intuitions. There seem to be two possibilities for how this notion could be relevant to pure space and time. The first possibility is that pure space and time are constructed from a manifold of pure intuitions. It is clear, however, that this possibility must be ruled out on the basis of Kant's singularity thesis, according to which the divisibility of pure time and space does not entail that they are composed of the parts that they include. Intervals of time presuppose the whole time and are to be understood as limitations of time.⁴⁸ Regions of space are limitations of the whole space.⁴⁹ The second possibility is that the apprehension of pure space and pure time must involve a manifold of empirical intuitions. This claim is made explicit only in the Analogies. Yet, as I will show below, it is essential to the argument of the second part of the B Deduction. That the apprehension of space and time necessarily presuppose empirical intuitions is the reason why the introduction of the pure forms of sense to the argument of the B Deduction provides reason to claim that sensibility must be determined a priori in accordance with the categories.

One of Kant's central claims in §24 is that the mere forms of intuition do not in themselves contain any determinate intuition:

Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the former, rather, as the source of all combination, applies to all sensible intuition of objects in general, to the manifold of **intuitions in general**, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere **form** of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any **determinate** intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis.⁵⁰

According to Kant, a determinate intuition presupposes the combination of the manifold, and therefore, the synthetic unity of

⁴⁸ CPR, A31/B46–7.

⁴⁹ CPR, A23–4/B38–9.

⁵⁰ CPR, B154.

apperception in accordance with its pure concepts. Given the results of the Transcendental Aesthetic, this claim seems surprising. Kant's position there was that the fact that intuitions must be spatiotemporal immediately entails that intuitions are determined as intuitions, that is, that they possess determinate spatial and temporal features:

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their form, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time.⁵¹

It therefore seems that the determination of the intuitions that are in space and time is already established in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Why does Kant claim that the mere form of intuition does not contain any determinate intuition independently of the combination of the manifold in it? A partial answer to this question is found in the following passage:

We have **forms** of outer as well as inner sensible intuition *a priori* in the representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as **forms** of sensible intuition, but also as **intuitions** themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the **unity** of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Thus even **unity of the synthesis** of the manifold, outside or within us, hence also a **combination** with which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time must agree, is already given *a priori*, along with (not in) these intuitions, as condition of the synthesis of all **apprehension**. But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given **intuition in general** in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our **sensible intuition**. Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid *a priori* of all objects of experience.⁵²

It should first be noted that Kant's goal here is to establish that apprehension is possible only if the categories are applicable to the manifold of sensible intuition.⁵³ Kant's argument contains two main

⁵¹ CPR, A22–3/B37.

⁵² CPR, B160–1.

steps. The first concerns the distinction between space and time as forms of intuition and space and time as "intuitions that contain a manifold." Both are represented a priori. Given my previous discussion, it is clear that "intuitions that contain a manifold" cannot be identical to "the pure forms of sense." Kant repeatedly denies the claim that the pure empty forms of intuition could be represented as objects. This claim is also important for the account of matter presented in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. As Kant claims there, although absolute space must be presupposed by the representation of a movable space (matter), it is not a representation of an object. It has the status of an idea:

Absolute space is therefore necessary, not as a concept of an actual object, but rather as an idea, which is to serve as a rule for considering all motion therein only as relative; and all motion and rest must be reduced to absolute space, if the appearance thereof is to be transformed into a determinate concept of experience (which unite all appearances).⁶⁴

If a spatial object is perceived, a region of pure space must be perceived. Nonetheless, that the representation of the whole space epistemically precedes the representation of finite regions does not entail that if a finite region is perceived, absolute space is also perceived.⁶⁵ That absolute space has the status of an idea means that it cannot be given as absolute in perception.⁶⁶ Rather, absolute space serves as a rule for considering all motion as relative only. One claim concerns the ideality of space and time as forms of representation. The other claim pertains to their role as forms of intuition. It must be noted that since according to this theory space and time cannot be

⁶³ This is indicated by the last sentence of the above passage and by the examples that Kant presents immediately after it. See *CPR*, B162–3.

⁶⁴ *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* 4:559–60.

⁶⁵ The fact that this is so is related to the mathematical antinomies in particular and Kant's concept of infinity in general. A detailed examination of these important issues is beyond the scope of the present article.

⁶⁶ Kant's first explication of matter in the "Metaphysical foundations of phoronomy" is: "matter is the movable in space. That space which is itself movable is called material, or also relative space; that in which all motion must finally be thought (and which is therefore itself absolutely immovable) is called pure or absolute space" (4:480). The first explication of matter in the "Metaphysical foundations of phenomenology" is: "Matter is the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, can be an object of experience" (4:554). One must recall that the transcendental ideality of space and time is not merely presupposed by the argument in the second part of the B Deduction. The possibility of *synthesis speciosa* rests on the fact that "in us a certain form of sensible intuition a priori is fundamental" (B150).

perceived if empirical objects are not perceived in them, if space and time are perceived, then they are necessarily represented as containing a manifold of empirical perceptions. Space and time represented a priori as objects are, therefore, perceived (in contrast to pure) space and time.

Kant's second step in §26 consists in the following claims. First, everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time, outside or within us, must agree with the unity of the synthesis of the manifold. Second, this unity of synthesis of the combined manifold of representations is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions. Although "combination" is not part of our capacity to intuit objects, the possession of determinate intuitions is possible only if it is given along with the intuitions. We do not possess determined intuitions independently of figurative synthesis.

However, why must "combination" be given a priori "along with these intuitions"? As I have already shown, the features that render space and time forms of intuitions convey some nonconceptual forms of unification related to their representational character. It seems to follow that if empirical objects must be given in space and time, sensible intuitions must be determined as spatiotemporal intuitions on the basis of the fact that they are given to us in the forms of intuition. If so, no nonintuitive combination must be given a priori along with intuitions if they are to be determined as intuitions.

In order to explain why figurative synthesis is indispensable for the possession of determinate intuitions one must first clarify why givenness is insufficient for spatiotemporal determination. There are five Kantian claims that jointly explain why givenness is insufficient for spatiotemporal determination: (1) Space and time are a priori and singular; (2) We possess spatial and temporal intuitions; (3) Pure space and time cannot be perceived by themselves; (4) Successive and simultaneous spatiotemporal events and states are always given in succession; (5) It must be possible to know the spatiotemporal determinations of appearances.

In what follows, I will merely point out the origin of these claims and demonstrate why they entail that givenness is insufficient for spatiotemporal determination. A full account of these claims lies beyond the scope of the present article. Claim (1) is the main claim established in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. Claim (2) is a factual claim.⁵⁷ Claim (3) is an immediate result of Kant's arguments in the *Transcen-*

dental Aesthetic.⁵⁸ Claim (4) is one of the main premises of the arguments of the Analogies.⁵⁹ Kant does not state (5) explicitly; it is, however, implied by the ideality of space and time, that is, by the fact that pure space and time are forms of representations and that perceived space and time (space and time represented as intuitions that contain a manifold) are types of cognition.⁶⁰

It can be easily seen that (1)–(4) entail the impossibility of knowledge of the temporal determination of appearances. Claim (2) entails that some of the appearances given in a successive sequence of presentations stand for simultaneously existing objects or parts of objects. It follows from (1) that each temporal position can be occupied by indefinitely many distinct sets of possible empirical objects. Finally, since pure empty time is not perceivable if empirical objects are not perceived within it, one cannot perceive a pure interval of time and establish that some appearances occupy this interval. The temporal position of an appearance is always determined relative to the temporal positions of the other appearances.⁶¹ The same is true with regard to space. Since it must be possible to know the spatial and temporal determinations of appearance, appearances cannot be determined in time and space merely on the basis of the fact that they are given in intuition.

The claim that the categories are concepts that must be presupposed by the possibility of knowledge of spatiotemporal determination of objects is proven only in the *Analytic of Principles*. In §26 Kant

⁵⁷ In this context, it is important to distinguish between outer sense and empirical imagination. Only the former is a source of intuitions of objects. The latter contains representations that belong to empirical (reproductive) imagination. Kant draws this distinction in the *Refutation of Idealism*. See *CPR*, B276–7. Although Kant concedes that not “every intuitive representations of outer things include at the same time their existence” (that is the existence of the external object immediately given in them), he claims that dreams and delusions are “the reproduction of previous outer perceptions” (*CPR*, B278).

⁵⁸ See, for example, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* 4:281–5; *CPR*, A181/B225.

⁵⁹ *CPR*, A189/B234.

⁶⁰ See *CPR*, A320/B376–7. For a closely related claim see Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 85.

⁶¹ As Melnick suggests, this claim is one of the premises of the argument of the second and third Analogies. Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience*, 95.

merely claims that they represent the forms of synthetic unity of the combination “that is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions.”⁶² Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that the function of the categories in §26 is not the same function established in the *Analytic of Principles*.

V

The Heterogeneity of the Pure Forms of Intuition and the Categories. The argument of §26 aims to establish that the categories must be applicable to sensible intuitions as a condition of the possibility for their being determined intuitions. Let us assume, as does Kant, that the categories are the nonintuitive functions that fulfill this role and ask another question: How can this claim be compatible with the distinction between pure concepts and pure intuitions?

It should first be noted that Kant has grounds for claiming that the modes of unification conveyed by the features of space and time do not depend on the functions of the understanding. As his metaphysical exposition of the concepts of space and time demonstrates, the representations of space and time are not representations of discursive or general concepts.⁶³ He also has grounds to claim that the categories cannot originate from the sensible forms of intuition:

As far as their origin is concerned, the categories are not grounded on sensibility, as are the **forms of intuition**, space and time; they therefore seem to allow an application extended beyond all objects of the senses.⁶⁴

One does not think of anything merely by means of concepts. Yet:

If, on the contrary, I leave out all intuition, then there still remains the form of thinking, i.e., the way of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Hence to this extent the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think objects in general without seeing to the particular manner (of sensibility) in which they might be given.⁶⁵

⁶² CPR, B161.

⁶³ CPR, A31/B47; CPR, A24–5/B38–9.

⁶⁴ CPR, B305.

⁶⁵ CPR, A253–4/B309.

The most important characteristic feature of the pure concepts is clearly the fact that their necessity “belongs to their very conception.”⁶⁶ The concept of cause “signifies a particular kind of synthesis, in which given something A, some entirely different B is posited according to a rule.”⁶⁷ It goes without saying that no necessity binds one appearance to another appearance merely on the basis of the features of pure time, that is, the features on the basis of which they are distinguished and relate to each other in time.

Although the two types of a priori representations involved in empirical knowledge of objects are heterogeneous, it seems as if this heterogeneity is undermined by the arguments of §26. If, as I have claimed, the notion of a form of intuition implies that it must be possible to know the spatiotemporal determinations of appearances, it seems that Kant’s position contains an irresolvable puzzle. This puzzle consists in the claim that the features of the forms of intuition that are part of sensibility determine that they must convey some modes of unification that do not depend on the spontaneous faculty. Yet mere givenness in forms of intuition cannot convey these modes of unification without involving nonintuitive functions.⁶⁸ In order to avoid this puzzle, it seems as if space and time must either originate from the spontaneous operations of the understanding or that this nonintuitive faculty must somehow originate from the receptive faculty of sensibility. In both cases, however, Kant’s distinction between pure intuition and pure concepts is undermined.

This puzzle cannot be resolved if one is committed to the following claim: it must either be possible to know the spatiotemporal determinations of appearances merely on the basis of givenness in intuition, or it is inconceivable that a pure form of intuition has an essence that conveys modes of unification independently of the nonintuitive functions. But this disjunction is not necessarily true and Kant does not accept it. According to Kant, the following claims are true together: (a) the pure form of intuition has an essence that conveys modes of unification independently of the nonintuitive functions; (b)

⁶⁶ CPR, B168.

⁶⁷ CPR, A90/B122.

⁶⁸ This difficulty is related to a widespread criticism found in the secondary literature that the theory of time presented in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is incompatible with the theory of time presented in the *Analytic of Principles*. Compare Melnick, *Kant’s Analogies of Experience*, 22–30.

it is not possible to know the spatiotemporal determinations of appearances merely on the basis of givenness in intuition. This, I suggest, is essential to Kant's entire epistemic project, that is, to the claim that knowledge of empirical objects must involve synthetic a priori knowledge.

In order to see why both claims are compatible, one must distinguish between two types of features of the forms of intuition. One type concerns their character as representations. The other type concerns their metaphysical and epistemic nature. The singularity and a priority of space and time belong to the former type while their ideality belongs to the latter type. Although Kant's position is that an entity that possesses the features that belong to the former type must also possess the features that belong to the latter type, he does not maintain that it is a logical truth that this must be so. The necessary link between both type of features is established only when the conditions of the possibility of spatiotemporal objects (appearances) are made explicit. The most important condition stated in the Transcendental Deduction is that an "I think" must be able to accompany all intuitions.⁶⁹

If one merely considers the singularity of space and of time, it is conceivable that objects that are in space and time are spatially and temporally related, whether or not it is possible to know their spatiotemporal determinations. The independence of the modes of unification that are part of the pure representations of space and time results from their representational character. As explained above, the categories are required as conditions that make determinate intuitions possible only when one considers the possibility of perception of empirical objects. Kant is, therefore, committed to the following argument: (a) The apprehension of spatiotemporal appearances must be connected to possible knowledge of their spatiotemporal determinations; (b) Such knowledge is not possible merely on the basis of givenness in intuition; (c) Therefore, the possibility of appearances of objects in space and time requires the applicability of the categories to these appearances. However, (a)–(c) do not entail: (d) The a priori representations of space and time cannot be the sources of modes of unification that do not depend on the nonintuitive functions.

⁶⁹ *CPR*, B131–2.

In other words, space, time, and the categories have complementary independent roles in determining the concept of a possible object of experience. But they cannot determine empirical objects if they are not employed in conjunction.⁷⁰

The upshot of this argument is that the categories are not necessarily applicable to pure time and space but rather to spatiotemporal appearances by virtue of the fact that these appearances must be apprehended in the forms of sense a priori. It is the possibility of apprehension of the appearances in the a priori forms of sense, and *ipso facto* of the apprehension of the pure forms of sense themselves that is conceptually linked to the applicability of the categories. This, I suggest, is what the argument of the second part of the B Deduction endeavors to show.

VI

Figurative Synthesis and Synthetic A Priori Knowledge. My discussion in the previous section facilitates an explanation of one of Kant's most important claims in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In several parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant emphasizes the claim that pure representations can relate to objects only if they serve as the forms of empirical objects and as conditions of knowledge of empirical objects. Notwithstanding the fact that the content of the synthetic a priori judgments that serve as the conditions of the possibility of experience does not depend on experience, the appeal to an object of possible experience is required by the possibility of these judgments. Given my previous discussion, it can easily be seen that this claim is related to the fact that in Kant's theory the concept of an object of possible experience serves as the locus of the unity of the heterogeneous forms of intuition and pure concepts. This unity is expressed by the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding. The fact that a possible object of experience is the locus of the necessary unity of the heterogeneous pure forms of intuition and the categories is indicated by Kant's claim that without the presupposition of an object of

⁷⁰ "With us **understanding** and **sensibility**, can determine an object **only in combination**. If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case representations that we cannot relate to any determinate object" (*CPR*, A258/B314).

possible experience, the alleged pure principles of the understanding are not known a priori. "These principles are . . . apodictically certain"⁷¹ only if the concept of an object of possible experience is presupposed. "But in themselves they cannot even be cognized *a priori* (directly) at all."⁷² These claims could be explained as follows. The pure representation of time does not involve, for example, the concept of cause and the pure concept of cause does not involve the representation of time. The relation between them is synthetic.⁷³ If one abstracts from the concept of a possible object of experience, they are not necessarily related to each other. In this case, the judgments that assert their a priori necessary relation are not known a priori. Time, space, and the categories are necessarily synthesized only if the concept of a spatiotemporal object of possible experience (perception) is presupposed.

In the previous sections I explained why the concept of a spatiotemporal empirical object necessarily unifies time, space, and the categories by claiming that the apprehension of space and time must involve the necessary synthetic combination of the manifold of empirical appearances in accordance with pure concepts. Figurative synthesis is required in order to make possible the apprehension of spatiotemporal appearances and therefore also the apprehension of space and time themselves. It is important to note, however, that these complex synthetic necessary relations that hold between the pure forms of intuition, the categories, and the concept of a possible object of experience constitute only one part of the necessary synthetic connections that link all the pure representations involved in empirical knowledge. A full account of this network lies beyond the scope of the present article.⁷⁴ I will conclude this paper by briefly presenting the idea which it is based on and how it could be used in order to interpret some of Kant's familiar claims.

As shown earlier in this paper, the fact that the pure forms of sensibility possess their own modes of unification is compatible with the fact that they can be exhibited in intuition only if empirical appear-

⁷¹ CPR, A737/B765.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Compare Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 162–4.

⁷⁴ On this subject see Yaron M. Senderowicz, *The Coherence of Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming).

ances are combined together by means of the categories. In fact, the entire thread of arguments presented in the *Analytic* is based on the distinction between content and exhibition in sensibility. The content of each a priori representation involved in empirical knowledge—the “I think,” time, space, and the categories—does not involve the other a priori representations that comprise the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge. None of these representations is reducible or definable by means of the others. The content independence of the pure representations is clarified if one notes that the propositional content of some judgments that directly involves only one pure representation does not involve the other representations. As I showed earlier, this is also indicated by the heterogeneity of time and the categories. The representation of time cannot be analyzed by means of temporal relations between objects, and the causal relations that hold between them cannot be analyzed merely by means of temporal relations.⁷⁵ Similarly, some judgments about spatial relations do not involve the representation of time, the categories, or the “I think.” It is only at the level of the epistemic and metaphysical metatheory of a priori knowledge, the theory that concerns the epistemic and metaphysical nature of the pure representations, that these representations are shown to be dependent on the other representations. Although the content of each of the pure representations involved in empirical knowledge does not depend on the content of the other representations, each of these representations cannot be exhibited to the mind through itself. They can be exhibited only if empirical objects are given and if all the other pure representations are exhibited, some directly and others indirectly. Space and time are forms of intuition and are not (in themselves) perceptual objects.⁷⁶ They can be exhibited only if objects are given. The categories are empty and devoid of sense and meaning if they are not exhibited in intuitions.⁷⁷ Their exhibition in intuition necessarily depends (for us) on the exhibition of necessary temporal relations, that is, on their schemata. The categories

⁷⁵ Compare Melnik, *Kant's Analogies of Experience*, 24.

⁷⁶ “Time is not something that would subsist for itself” (CPR, A33/B49). “Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it is that they are represented in the mind completely *a priori*, would still be without objective validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use on the objects of experience were not shown” (CPR, A156/B195).

⁷⁷ CPR, A246.

acquire objective validity, that is, they are exhibited in intuition by determining time and (indirectly) space. Similarly, the apprehension of time and space depends on the applicability of the categories. As Kant claimed in the *Refutation of Idealism*, the representation of time does not only depend on the categories. Time can be exhibited only if spatial substances are exhibited.⁷⁸ Since the (subjective) given consists of a succession of appearances, empirical real space can be exhibited only if time is involved.⁷⁹ In order to think a line, one must draw it in thought.⁸⁰ Also, knowledge of coexistence in space (outer intuition) is possible only if simultaneously existing interactive substances are presupposed.⁸¹ The fact that this is how space and spatial objects are represented, however, is irrelevant to their spatial properties. Finally, intuitions are necessarily “intuitions for.” They are kinds of objective cognitions. Every spatiotemporal intuition is a representation that an “I think” must be able to accompany.⁸² The “I think,” however, can be conscious of its a priori necessary identity in all its possible representations only if the representations themselves are synthesized by means of rules prescribed by the pure concepts of the understanding.⁸³

This network of dependencies between the elements of synthetic a priori knowledge grounds the possibility of empirical knowledge of objects. As I noted in section 1, there are two kinds of transcendental synthesis, *synthesis intellectualis* and *synthesis speciosa*. Although Kant did indeed think that intellectual synthesis is more basic in that it establishes the necessary link between the necessary self-consciousness of identity of the “I think” (the representation that must be able to accompany all representations) and the a priori synthetic unity of consciousness in accordance with the categories, each kind of synthesis only represents one fraction of the necessary synthetic unity of the transcendental representations. Both types of transcendental synthesis together determine the (general) concept of an object of possi-

⁷⁸ *CPR*, B275–9.

⁷⁹ This is the one of the main suppositions of Kant’s argument in the Analogies of Experience. See for example, *CPR*, A192/B237.

⁸⁰ *CPR*, B154.

⁸¹ See *CPR*, A211–15/B257–62.

⁸² Kant’s claim in the B Deduction is that the spontaneous “I think” must be able to accompany all representations that come before thought, that is, intuitions. See *CPR*, B131–2.

⁸³ *CPR*, B133–6.

ble experience. The synthetic unity of the various elements involved in synthetic a priori knowledge is grounded in the concept of an object of possible experience.

My intention in the present article was primarily to elucidate the meaning of "*synthesis speciosa*" and to indicate how *synthesis speciosa* is related to Kant's critical epistemology. If my interpretation is correct, it sheds light on the intelligibility and depth of the principal idea that underlies Kant's theory of experience. Yet whether or not Kant's arguments successfully establish the interrelations between the pure representations and the concept of a possible object of experience is a different matter that deserves further scrutiny. I hope to address this issue elsewhere.

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THE DISSOLVING FORCE OF THE CONCEPT: HEGEL'S ONTOLOGICAL LOGIC

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I

OVER THE PAST FEW DECADES many attempts have been made to defend Hegel's philosophy against those who denounce it as crypto-theological, dogmatic metaphysics.¹ This was done first of all by foregrounding Hegel's indebtedness to Kant, that is, by interpreting speculative science as a radicalization of Kant's critical project. This emphasis on Hegel's Kantian roots has resulted in a shift from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Science of Logic*. Robert Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* can be considered

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¹I would like to thank Detlev Pätzold for his comments on an earlier version of this text. I will generally refer to the following edition of Hegel's works: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Werke*, ed. Edith Moldauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986). The texts are cited according to the following translations and abbreviations: *D*: "Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie," in *Jenaer Schrifte 1801–1807/The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy*, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977); *FK*: "Glauben und Wissen oder Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische und Fichtesche Philosophie," in *Jenaer Schrifte 1801–1807/Faith and Knowledge*, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977); *L I* and *II*: *Wissenschaft der Logik/Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1997); *Enc I*: *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse I/Hegel's Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); *Enc III*: *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse III/Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Other cited editions: *Phen: Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1806), ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988)/*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Minor modifications of translations have not been indicated; the translations of the *Encyclopaedia* are my own.

as having made one of the most influential contributions to this shift.² Pippin's "nonmetaphysical" interpretation of Hegel rightly contends that the *Science of Logic* does not pertain to a reality existing independently of thought, but to "thought's attempt to determine a priori what can be a possible thought of anything at all."³ For Pippin this entails that Hegel should be regarded as appropriating "Kant's claim about the 'self-conscious,' ultimately the 'spontaneously' self-conscious, character of all possible experience."⁴ I agree with Pippin that one cannot understand Hegel unless "one understands the Hegelian investment, the original engagement with Kant's critical philosophy."⁵ I would hold, however, that Pippin's interpretation of this engagement

² Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

³ *Ibid.*, 184. Klaus Hartmann was the first to have proposed a "nonmetaphysical" interpretation of Hegel without reducing the *Science of Logic* to an unsystematic form of category theory. See Klaus Hartmann, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976). Hartmann takes metaphysics to be the form of philosophy that makes existence claims (110), for instance about the ultimate foundation of reality. Arguing that ontology, on the other hand, concerns "an account of the determinations of the real" (103), he conceives of Hegel's *Logic* as an ontology that takes the form of a "theory of categories or of such determinations of the real as permit of reconstruction" (104; compare 110). Although I basically agree with this, I do not endorse Hartmann's view that Kant's philosophy differs from Hegel's in that only the latter is ontological. See also Klaus Hartmann, "Die ontologische Option," in *Die Ontologische Option. Studien zu Hegel's Propädeutik, Schellings Hegel-Kritik und Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Klaus Hartmann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976), 2. I consider Duquette's conception of categories as "principles of intelligibility" much more interesting in this respect. Compare David Duquette, "Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic," in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, ed. George di Giovanni (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 12. In *Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983), Alan White defends Hegel against the criticisms of the later Schelling by developing an interpretation of Hegel that is basically in line with Hartmann's views. But whereas Hartmann seems to apply the term "ontology" only to Hegelian logic, White determines ontology in general as the doctrine of categories, and transcendental ontology as presenting these categories as the conditions of possibility of experience (5–6; compare 78). Interestingly, he refers to the *Science of Logic* as "Hegelian transcendental ontology" (3; compare 71), an ontology distinguished from Kant's in that it pertains to the conditions of possibility of thought as such, thus including those of transcendental philosophy itself (5).

⁴ Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

threatens to lose sight of the proper achievement of Hegel's philosophy. By arguing that the unity of self-consciousness constitutes the "original source of Hegel's hermetic claim about thought's self-determination,"⁶ Pippin to my mind ignores, first, that Hegel takes the Kantian notion of self-consciousness to be nothing more than the concrete manifestation of the pure concept and, second, that Kant's transcendental philosophy, though radically critical of the dogmatic metaphysics of his day, does all but abandon the possibility of a critical ontology. Defending Hegel against his antimetaphysical critics, Pippin is right in taking Hegel into the Kantian camp, but he does this by sacrificing the question as to the possibility of ontology, a question I believe to be pivotal for both Kant and Hegel.

In his article "Ontologie nach Kant und Hegel," Hans Friedrich Fulda moves in the opposite direction. Fulda puts Kant's transcendental philosophy in perspective by pointing out that Kant himself saw the *Critique of Pure Reason* as preparing a new ontology.⁷ He distinguishes, in line with Kant, between a precritical and a critical ontology and determines these modes of ontology as two different ways of investigating the conditions of possibility of any object of experience.⁸ Arguing that Hegel in the *Science of Logic* adopts not only Kant's critique of dogmatic ontology but also his conception of a critical ontology, Fulda comprehends transcendental and speculative logic as two different postdogmatic modes of ontology. These modes do not pertain to reality as it is in itself but merely to the a priori concepts that constitute something as a knowable object at all. I fully endorse Fulda's claim that the basic difference between Kant and Hegel lies in

⁶ Ibid., 232.

⁷ Hans Friedrich Fulda, "Ontologie nach Kant und Hegel," *Metaphysik nach Kant?* ed. Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), 45–80, especially 48–53. Compare Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1968), A845. According to Fulda, Kant's new ontology was to contain a general theory concerning the objects of thought as such and a specific theory concerning the objects of possible experience (49). Stephen Houlgate, "Thought and Being in Kant and Hegel," *The Owl of Minerva* 22, no. 2 (1991): 131–40, also stresses Hegel's indebtedness to Kant. He takes the view that Hegel's logic is not just an ontological logic but a metaphysical logic as well (132). I agree with Houlgate's view—developed on the basis of the *Phenomenology*—that Hegel's ontology had to take the form of a logic because one can, according to Hegel, only understand being through understanding how consciousness must conceive of being (133; compare 140).

⁸ Fulda, "Ontologie nach Kant und Hegel," 60.

the fact that Kant develops his critical ontology primarily by means of a transcendental examination of the human understanding, while Hegel examines the pure concepts as they are in themselves.⁹

One might view Pippin and Fulda as interpreting Hegel with regard to two different tendencies in Kant's critical philosophy, tendencies which Kant himself sought to reconcile: on the one hand the tendency to conceive of transcendental apperception as the ultimate principle of any judgment, on the other, the tendency to develop an ontology pertaining to the pure concepts that constitute the whole of possible objects of experience. I agree with Fulda that Hegel reduces the first tendency to a subordinate moment while accomplishing the latter in a much more radical manner than Kant could have possibly done. It is quite understandable that interpreters who have argued for a nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel have tended to ignore the ontological intentions of Kant's transcendental and Hegel's speculative logic. This one-sided position, however, demands to be reconciled with the position it tends to exclude from itself. The former opposition between Left and Right Hegelians seems to have lost much of its relevance. I believe that this also holds for the more recent opposition between metaphysical and Kantian interpretations of Hegel. In what follows I hope to show that Hegel's transformation of transcendental philosophy implies neither that he relapses into dogmatic metaphysics, nor that he abandons the project of a postcritical ontology.

I will do this by starting out from Hegel's own understanding of the relation between his logical science and Kant's transcendental logic, focusing mainly on the transcendental analytic. Since Kant distinguishes his transcendental logic from the metaphysics of, among others, Leibniz and Wolff, I will also consider the relation between Hegel's logic and this former metaphysics. It is by no means my intention to offer a historical reconstruction of Hegel's relation to Kant. Focusing in particular on sections of the *Science of Logic* devoted to Kant, I will rather draw on Hegel's understanding of Kant in order to expound upon what I consider to be the systematical thrust of the *Science of Logic*. Accordingly, I will not dwell on Schelling's, Fichte's, or anyone else's influence on Hegel's interpretation of Kant.

⁹ Ibid., 61.

The first texts in which Hegel sketches out his own philosophical program with reference to Kant are the *Differenzschrift* and *Faith and Knowledge*. In my view, both texts hinge upon the question concerning the possibility of pure, immanent knowledge after Kant's critique of metaphysics. *Faith and Knowledge* argues that this kind of knowledge can be achieved when the capacity of thought to bring about its own content is ascribed not just to synthetic judgments a priori but to reason itself. In this text, Hegel identifies reason both with the productive imagination and the transcendental unity of apperception.¹⁰ Since Hegel, in this respect, remains more or less bound to Kant's subject-philosophy, I will not address this issue here. With respect to the *Science of Logic*, I consider it much more relevant that Hegel, already in his early work, moves beyond an analysis of the faculties of thought by elaborating a conception of the pure movement in which something brings about its own content through distinguishing itself from itself and identifying itself with the other of itself. In what follows I will argue that he does this basically by radicalizing Kant's notion of a priori synthetic judgments.

II

Hegel's Interpretation of Kant in His Differenzschrift. At the beginning of his *Differenzschrift* Hegel exposes what he considers the task of philosophy by distinguishing between the genuine speculative principle of Kant's philosophy and the distorted manner in which it actualizes this principle. As in his later texts on Kant, Hegel seeks to extricate this principle from its inappropriate mode of appearance so as to develop a philosophy capable of allowing this principle truly to actualize itself. Hegel takes the genuine speculative principle of Kant's philosophy to consist in the unity of subject and object, a unity expressed most clearly in the deduction of the categories. For Kant conceives of the categories as pure products of thought that simultaneously constitute "objective determinations," that is, determinations capable of bridging the gap between concept and being.¹¹ According to Hegel, however, Kant considers the identity between subject and

¹⁰ "This original synthetic unity. . . is the principle both of productive imagination . . . and of the intellect" (*FK*, 305/70; compare 308/73).

¹¹ *D*, 10/80.

object, brought about by the pure concepts, merely at the level of empirical knowledge. Although he exposes pure concepts which unify sense experience and hence constitute the objects of natural science, he maintains that the realm of sense experience itself is an “absolute a posteriori realm.”¹² Insofar as Kant considers this realm to be absolutely different from the realm of thought, “nonidentity is raised to an absolute principle.”¹³ Thus, Hegel argues that for Kant, thought is capable of constituting objectivity by means of the categories but cannot acquire content independently of something outside of thought itself.¹⁴ It is crucial for Hegel that this opposition between a priori form and a posteriori content be overcome:

As culture developed, oppositions that used to have significance as spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and intellect, freedom and necessity, etc., have taken the shape of the opposition between reason and sensibility, intelligence and nature, and, with respect to the universal concept, between absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity. The sole interest of reason consists in sublating such rigid oppositions.¹⁵

Kant’s transcendental logic essentially offers the possibility of sublating the oppositions brought about by discursive understanding, yet it fails actually to accomplish this. This is why Hegel sets out to develop a logic measuring up to that of Kant but distinguishing itself from the latter by adopting the absolute unity of subject and object as its guiding principle. Hegel thus faces the task of transforming Kant’s conception of the unity of subject and object in such a way that their opposition becomes subordinated to their absolute unity.

From the *Differenzschrift* onward, Hegel maintains that thought directs itself not only to that which is different from itself, that is, reality as given in sense perception, but also to contents brought about by itself, that is, to the pure concepts that disclose reality insofar as it is knowable. These concepts allow empirical knowledge to bridge the gap between itself and the given appearances in a merely relative manner. Although thought is, in most cases, unaware of these concepts themselves, it is, in Hegel’s view, capable of turning its attention

¹² *D*, 10/81.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *D*, 104/164.

¹⁵ *D*, 21/90 (translation modified); compare 27–8/96; *FK*, 302/67–8. Here Hegel ignores the difference between the a posteriori content of thought and that which Kant determines as objectivity, that is, the totality of the objects of experience constituted by the pure concepts.

to these pure contents and hence to directing itself exclusively to that which belongs to the realm of thought itself. Thus turning the essential determinations of thought itself into the sole object of thought, it sublates the opposition between subject and object in an absolute manner.¹⁶ This is precisely what Hegel's *Science of Logic* is intended to achieve. This logic is in agreement with transcendental logic in that it pertains to the pure concepts that make it possible to determine something as an object at all. Contrary to Kant, however, Hegel maintains that the mode of thought exclusively directed to these, its proper determinations, constitutes a proper mode of knowledge and even the highest possible one.

The only way for Kant to block the path of dogmatic metaphysics and hence to guarantee the finite reach of human knowledge consists in separating reality insofar as it is knowable from reality insofar as it can be thought. Thus, whereas the rationalistic metaphysics of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff claimed to have achieved knowledge of reality as it is in itself, transcendental philosophy limits the domain of possible knowledge to reality insofar as it is given in sense perception. Now Kant grounds the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge by distinguishing between understanding and reason. He basically conceives of the understanding as the capacity to determine something discursively, a capacity he considers to underlie the natural sciences. The understanding does not bring about its own objects but is capable of determining given objects on the basis of the categories. Reason, on the other hand, is conceived as the faculty that brings about its own objects in order to achieve insight into reality insofar as it can be thought, but it is not capable of determining these objects by means of the categories. When the understanding penetrates the domain of speculative thought and purports to be able to establish a priori

¹⁶ "In the transcendental intuition all opposition is sublated, all distinction between the construction of the universe by and for the intelligence, and the construction of the universe as an organization intuited as objective and appearing independent, is nullified. Speculation produces the consciousness of this identity" (*D*, 43/111). In his aforementioned article "Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic," Duquette argues that "for Kant, there can be no meaningful attempt to provide a content for concepts, the operation of which transcends the conditions of sensuous experience." The content of Hegel's *Logic*, on the contrary, "is simply thought itself without restriction to a determination of the conditions of spatio-temporal experience" (4).

judgments concerning the metaphysical ideas (the world conceived as totality, the soul, God), it will transcend its immanent boundaries and produce judgments that have no objective validity. When reason—the faculty of speculative thought proper—thus puts itself into the service of the understanding, it will comprehend reality in terms of oppositions such as those between subject and object, infinity and finitude, freedom and necessity. This form of reflection Hegel calls “isolated reflection.”¹⁷

Hegel adopts Kant’s conception of the difference between understanding and reason as faculties of thought that ground two possible forms of philosophical reflection. I take it, however, that Hegel transforms Kant’s conception of these faculties in two important respects. First, he broadens Kant’s concept of the understanding to the effect that it comes to include transcendental philosophy itself. According to Hegel, Kant himself fell prey to this discursive mode of reflection in that he isolated contrary determinations from the movement which brings about their synthetic unity just as much as dogmatic metaphysics. He thus maintains that Kant was not able to free his philosophy from the grip of discursive thought, a mode of thought which he criticized only in its form as dogmatic metaphysics. The mode of philosophical reflection that brings about oppositions should, according to Hegel, yield to the philosophical reflection—the work of reason proper—which resolves them into their synthetic unity. The second shift that Hegel accomplishes consists in endowing pure reason with the capacity to acquire knowledge, a capacity of which it was deprived by Kant.¹⁸ Reason, however, achieves this knowledge not by determining metaphysical ideas by means of concepts which have their contrary outside of themselves but rather by comprehending the unity of contrary determinations:

[R]eason opposes the absolute fixation of the dichotomy brought about by the understanding; and it does so all the more when the absolute opposites themselves originate in reason.¹⁹

Thus, precisely when contrary conceptual determinations originate not so much in sense perception as in pure thought itself, reason should be able to grasp their true unity. Hegel as yet comprehends

¹⁷ *D*, 26/94.

¹⁸ “What must be shown above all is how far reflection is capable of grasping the absolute” (*D*, 25/94).

the movement in which a concept lets its contrary determinations become opposed to each other so as to actualize their unity, in terms of the difference between the separating activity of the understanding and the unifying activity of reason. It is important to note that for Hegel the relation between these faculties is necessarily asymmetrical. This is to say that reason divides off its discursive moment from itself and allows this moment, the understanding, to become independent and exercise its discursive power. In doing so, reason at once reduces itself to a finite faculty posited over against the other of itself. Reason, however, is ultimately capable of subjugating the proper activity of the understanding to the truly speculative insight into the unity of contrary determinations.²⁰ We will see that the *Science of Logic* no longer grounds the analytic and the synthetic moment of reason in two different subjective faculties. It comprehends, rather, the movement in which a pure concept accomplishes itself as the totality of itself and of its contrary without reference to its subjective manifestation. By adopting this movement as its absolute principle, philosophy should be able not only to abolish oppositions such as that between subject and object but, moreover, "to produce a totality of knowledge, a system of science."²¹ Hegel's early texts, however, have not yet developed the means actually to elaborate such a system.

III

Hegel's Conception of the Transcendental Synthesis in Faith and Knowledge. In *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel notes that Kant's question as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori expresses the idea

¹⁹ *D*, 22/91 (translation modified). Compare: "The infinite, insofar as it gets opposed to the finite . . . is something rational as posited by the understanding. . . . By fixing it, the understanding sets it up in absolute opposition to the finite; and the reflection which had risen itself to the plane of reason by sublating the finite, now lowers itself again to [the plane of] the understanding by fixing the activity of reason into producing oppositions" (*D*, 21/90 [translation modified]).

²⁰ "In the struggle of the understanding with reason the understanding gains strength only to the extent that reason forsakes itself" (*D*, 24/93). Ultimately, reason forces the understanding to give itself "the law of self-destruction" (*D*, 28/96; compare 30/97–8). This self-destruction of the understanding is the subject matter of Kant's doctrine of the antinomies.

²¹ *D*, 46/113.

of true rationality.²² He adds, however, that Kant conceived of this task

with far too little definiteness and universality . . . [H]e did not move beyond the subjective and external meaning of this question and believed he had established that rational cognition is impossible.²³

If Hegel is to demonstrate that such a mode of knowledge is indeed possible, he will therefore have to extricate the synthetic judgment a priori from its external and subjective appearance in transcendental philosophy. Kant argues that synthetic judgments a priori have a content that is neither analytically implied in the concept itself nor derived from sensory impressions. These judgments are precisely of the kind that metaphysics had always considered its proper mode of knowledge: judgments such as everything which is has a cause, substance is that which subsists over time, or the soul is immortal, are both a priori and synthetic. Kant claims that the latter judgment is invalid because the soul cannot become an object of knowledge at all. The first two judgments, on the other hand, do not necessarily have to be taken as stating something about reality itself. They are valid, according to Kant, only if conceived as the necessary principles that allow thought to acquire knowledge of the world insofar as it is given in sense perception. Thus, while Kant affirms the possibility and even necessity of these and similar ontological principles, he denies the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, that is, knowledge acquired independently of sense perception and pertaining to reality as it is in itself.

Hegel does not address the question as to what exactly synthetic judgments a priori bring together, but he merely notes that in synthetic judgments a priori subject and predicate are at once heterogeneous and absolutely identical.²⁴ He criticizes Kant for conceiving of this transcendental synthesis “only as a product and in its appearance as judgment” and not as the essence of reason itself.²⁵ This is to say

²² *FK*, 304/69. The *Science of Logic* states in this respect that “Kant’s notion of *synthetic a priori judgments*—the notion of something differentiated which equally is inseparable, of an identity which is in itself an inseparable difference—belongs to what is great and imperishable in his philosophy” (*L* I, 240/209).

²³ *FK*, 304/69.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *FK*, 317/81.

that Kant assigns the capacity of bringing about pure syntheses only to the mode of thought which depends on sense perception to acquire content, that is, to the understanding. Denying this capacity to reason, Kant reduces reason to a formal identity posited over against the manifold.²⁶ Thus, while on the one hand he elevates reason above the level of the relative syntheses brought about by the understanding, on the other hand he deprives reason of the capacity to accomplish itself as the absolute synthesis of subject and object, that is, as a mode of knowledge begetting its content independent of sense perception.

By thus conceiving of reason as an empty, formal unity, Kant reduces its theoretical function to a merely regulative one.²⁷ Reason is only granted a constitutive function insofar as it occurs as practical reason. Reason, "as practical reason, is nonetheless supposed to become constitutive again, to give birth out of itself and give itself content."²⁸ For Kant, theoretical reason

makes no claim to autonomous dignity, nor does it claim to beget the son out of itself. It should be left to its own emptiness and to the unworthiness stemming from its . . . lack of need for . . . immanent knowledge.²⁹

By distinguishing between theoretical and practical reason Kant seeks to guarantee both the finitude of human knowledge and the infinite character of the principle that guides moral life. There is no doubt that Hegel intended precisely to reinvest theoretical reason with the capacity to beget its own content, that is, to accomplish itself as the ultimate transcendental synthesis. According to Hegel, pure reason should be defined not as a formal unity but rather as a unity which determines itself by immanently distinguishing itself from itself and identifying itself with the other of itself. This primordial synthetic activity allows reason to accomplish itself as a mode of knowledge that is

²⁶ *FK*, 317/80.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Hegel maintains that Kant's system is entangled in a contradiction in that "this infinity, strictly conditioned as it is by its abstraction from its opposite, . . . is yet at the same time held to be absolute spontaneity and autonomy" (318/81). For Hegel, reason itself "is nothing else but this identity between heterogeneous elements of this kind" (304/69).

²⁸ *FK*, 317/81.

²⁹ *FK*, 318/81–2 (translation modified). Hegel here ignores that Kant distinguishes between the pure origin of ideas and concepts and the possible application of the latter; according to Kant, reason is not able to determine the ideas it begets.

neither analytical nor dependent on sense perception, in other words, as immanent knowledge.

Hegel certainly agrees with Kant that former metaphysics could not but fail to achieve this knowledge. He maintains, however, that reason nonetheless has the means of satisfying its ineradicable desire for immanent knowledge. If reason is to acquire immanent knowledge, it should no longer aspire to make claims about reality as such but instead to comprehend the movement in which pure thinking synthetically brings about the totality of the a priori concepts that constitute reality insofar as it is knowable. In order to achieve this form of immanent knowledge—and this is what occurs in the *Science of Logic*—Hegel has a few more steps to take. First, he will have to distance himself more radically from transcendental philosophy by no longer comprehending the movement that yields the primordial syntheses of contrary conceptual determinations in terms of subjective faculties. The syntheses brought about in synthetic judgments a priori should be traced back not merely to the synthetic activity of reason but to the absolute synthetic activity that Hegel will come to call the “absolute concept.”³⁰ The *Science of Logic* will, second, consider the particular pure concepts as constituting in themselves the synthetic unity of themselves and their contrary and to strive for the actualization of this unity. I will now sketch how Hegel conceives of former metaphysics and transcendental logic as one-sided positions calling for their sublation.

IV

Hegel, Kant, and General Metaphysics. In the preface to the first edition of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel remarks that logical science constitutes metaphysics proper or purely speculative philosophy, and that this science has hitherto been much neglected.³¹ This science is distinguished from common logic in that the latter confines itself to the formal rules of thinking and abstracts from any content.

³⁰ Kant's extremely important thought “that there are synthetic judgments a priori . . . contains the beginning of a true apprehension of the nature of the concept.” This nature consists in being divided within itself (*L* II, 260–1/589).

³¹ *L* I, 16/27.

Hegel takes the genuine content of the logical science, on the other hand, to consist in the totality of "pure essentialities" or "pure thoughts."³² Conceiving of the investigation of these necessary forms of thought as "the loftier business of logic," he argues that the first two parts of the *Science of Logic*—the objective logic—correspond in part to Kant's transcendental logic.³³

Kant considers these pure categories to constitute the basis of synthetic judgments a priori. These judgments enable thinking to unify the manifold of sensory impressions, for example, with respect to the relation between a substance and its properties, the relation of different things according to their size, or the relation between different things as cause and effect. The a priori judgments which enable thinking objectively to determine its given representations do not in themselves produce actual empirical knowledge. That is why I propose to conceive of these judgments as expressing specific ontological perspectives, that is, perspectives that enable thought to constitute something as an object at all. The term "ontological perspective" may seem to contradict itself. In Kant's view, classical ontology thought it could achieve knowledge of reality itself by means of pure concepts, while the term "perspective" rather suggests the necessarily finite reach of these concepts. I would like to argue, however, in line with Fulda, that Kant's critique of traditional ontology by no means implies that he abandons the investigation of those concepts that constitute reality insofar as it is can be known, concepts which for that reason may still be called "ontological." By determining ontology as the mode of philosophy pertaining to the concepts that constitute reality insofar as it can become the object of knowledge, Wolff's and Leibniz's ontology, Kant's transcendental logic, and Hegel's speculative logic can be conceived as three different modes of ontology.³⁴

³² *L I*, 17/28.

³³ *L I*, 27/37; compare 59–60/62–3; *Enc I*, §41.

³⁴ Since the *Logic* mostly abstracts from the question concerning the possible application of the pure concepts, it does not become clear at first sight that these concepts constitute ontological perspectives, that is, make it possible to determine something as an object of thought. With respect to the concept "finitude," Hegel clarifies that this concept allows us to *speak about things* in a certain way: "When we say of things that *they are finite*, we understand thereby that . . . non-being constitutes their nature and being" (*L I*, 139/129).

Kant himself takes great care to emphasize that pure concepts themselves have no content and can therefore never originate knowledge independent of sense perception. Hegel, to the contrary, argues that Kant's transcendental logic "treats of the concepts which refer a priori to *objects*, and consequently does not abstract from the whole content of objective knowledge."³⁵ A concept such as "causality" has a content other than the concept "substance," albeit that this content is of a different kind than the content which constitutes a necessary precondition for empirical knowledge.³⁶ Kant criticizes former metaphysics for identifying the concepts which determine the structure of thinking with the immanent determinations of reality itself.³⁷ Insofar as something lets itself be determined, it owes its determination completely to the activity of thought. The transcendental analytic corresponds, nevertheless, to former ontology, or general metaphysics, insofar as they both pertain to the general concepts which enable thought to represent something as existing, as different from something else, as possible, as substance, as cause, as ground, and so forth.

Hegel does not elaborate on the relation between Kant's transcendental logic and former ontology. He takes it that transcendental logic considers the concepts which pertain a priori to objects, but he criticizes Kant for comprehending these concepts not so much in terms of their mutual relations as in terms of their abstract relation to the ego.³⁸ Notwithstanding that, it cannot be denied that Kant's logic somehow takes the place of former general metaphysics. Now Hegel states that his own objective logic replaces not only transcendental logic but also former metaphysics—more specifically ontology—thereby conceiving of metaphysics as "the scientific building over the world elaborated by thought alone."³⁹ In my view, Kant would not so much deny the possibility of a construction constituted by thought alone as argue that we cannot know whether it would coincide with

³⁵ *L I*, 59/62.

³⁶ "The assertion that the categories taken by themselves are empty is ungrounded, for they owe their content, if to nothing else, to the fact that they are *determined*. Of course the content of the categories is not perceptible to the senses. . . ; but that is to be considered a merit rather than a defect." (*Enc I*, § 43, Addition [translation modified]; compare *L I*, 42/48).

³⁷ Kant refers in particular to Leibniz's "intellectual system of the world" (see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B326–7).

³⁸ *L I*, 60/63.

³⁹ *L I*, 61/63.

the rational structure of reality itself. He would hold that such a building only allows thought to bring home what is given in sense perception. In sum, former ontology, Kant's transcendental analytic, and Hegel's objective logic correspond in that they investigate the pure concepts which one way or another ground our actual knowledge of objects. In my view, both Kant and Hegel take these concepts to constitute the ontological perspectives that allow thought to relate itself to objects at all. Although these ontological perspectives unfold nowhere else than in actual human thought itself, their a priori nature makes it possible to reflect on the way they unfold in the element of pure thought that constitutes the a priori basis of human thought.⁴⁰ When making judgments in daily life and in the sciences, we do not have to be conscious of the a priori perspectives grounding these judgments. It is, according to Hegel, precisely the task of philosophy to make thought conscious of these initially unconscious ontological perspectives.⁴¹

V

Hegel, Kant, and Special Metaphysics. Kant maintains that these ontological perspectives cannot be used to determine the proper objects of metaphysics, that is, the world as totality, the soul, and God. The transcendental dialectic constituting the second part of the transcendental logic exposes what goes wrong when reason does set out to determine its proper objects by means of pure concepts. Insofar as this dialectic is concerned with the metaphysical ideas, it can be considered to replace former special metaphysics, which included cosmology, rational psychology, and rational theology. Hegel, who again does not mention Kant here, notes that his objective logic replaces not only general but also special metaphysics, that is, the metaphysics

⁴⁰ Compare *L I*, 57/60. In "the element of knowledge . . . the moments of spirit spread themselves out in that form of simplicity which knows its object as its own self. . . . Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into a whole, is *Logic* or *speculative philosophy*" (*Phen*, 29/22; compare 48/40).

⁴¹ "The activity of thought which is at work in all our ideas, purposes, interests and actions . . . occurs unconsciously. . . . To let thought become conscious of the *logical* nature which animates spirit, this is the task" (*L I*, 26–7/37 [translation modified]).

which “attempted to comprehend with the forms of pure thought particular substrata taken primarily from the realm of representation, namely the soul, the world, and God.”⁴² This raises the question as to the difference between the ways in which Kant’s transcendental dialectic and Hegel’s objective logic replace special metaphysics. In his transcendental dialectic, Kant convincingly demonstrates that metaphysics comes into conflict with itself when using concepts originating in thought itself to determine infinite substrates such as the world, the soul, and God, that is, ideas originating in thought itself. His critique of metaphysics stands or falls by the separation between a domain within which the pure concepts can be used to determine objects and a domain within which they cannot be used for that purpose. That is why his transcendental logic is divided into an analytic and a dialectic, a division that corresponds to that between general and special metaphysics. Contrary to Kant, however, Hegel has no interest whatsoever in the question of whether pure concepts are used to determine finite or infinite substrates. What matters to him is only the nature of these concepts themselves:

Logic, however, considers these forms free from those substrata, from the subjects of representation; it considers them, their nature and worth, as they are in and for themselves.⁴³

I take Hegel here to mean that whether a concept such as cause is used to determine empirical objects or God has bearing on neither the nature of the concept itself nor its relation to the other pure concepts. Hegel endorses Kant’s view that metaphysics had made an uncritical use of the pure forms of thought, that is, it did not question their suitability to determine the rational structure of reality itself.⁴⁴ He holds, however, that Kant’s critique is not yet the “genuine critique” of metaphysics in that it conceives of these forms as *a priori* concepts that are deprived of a proper content and remain posited over against the *a posteriori*.⁴⁵ Hegel considers his own objective logic, on the other hand, to achieve the genuine critique of the pure forms of thought in that it exposes the movement in which these forms bring about their own content, that is, determine themselves instead of some substrate

⁴² *L I*, 61/63.

⁴³ *Ibid.* (translation modified).

⁴⁴ *L I*, 61–2/64.

⁴⁵ *L I*, 62/64.

outside of themselves. Although Kant distinguishes the pure forms of thought from their possible applications, he is, according to Hegel, unable to comprehend them as moments of this self-determining movement. From Hegel's perspective, therefore, it no longer matters whether the pure concepts subsequently constitute the basis of judgments that derive their content from sense experience or from infinite substrates such as the soul or God.

By thus abstracting from the kind of substrates from which judgments derive their content, Hegel's objective logic can abolish the difference between analytic and dialectic, and hence between general and specific metaphysics. Yet Hegel still has to account for the specific reach of an ontological perspective opened up by a specific concept. When we say of things that they are, but also that "being" can be predicated of God, the concept "being" can be considered to open up a twofold ontological perspective in such a way that this concept can determine both the absolute principle of reality (a principle that former metaphysics called God) and the objects of empirical knowledge. I will return to this issue in sections 8 and 9. In any event, Hegel's claim that the objective logic achieves the genuine critique of the pure concepts implies that this logic replaces both the metaphysics that used these forms uncritically and Kant's critique of this metaphysics. However, by arguing that concepts do not necessarily depend on sense perception to acquire content Hegel, for all his critique, puts himself in a position that is difficult to distinguish from that of dogmatic metaphysics.

VI

The Pure Concepts as Determinations of Reality Itself. It is crucial for Kant to maintain that synthetic judgments a priori cannot reach out to the rational structure of reality itself and must be limited to reality insofar as it is given. Former metaphysics, on the contrary, believed that "thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things form one and the same content."⁴⁶ This is also true of Hegel's logical science.⁴⁷ Hegel calls the movement generating these

⁴⁶ L I, 38/45.

⁴⁷ L I, 43/49.

pure concepts “objective thinking,” the “objectifying activity,” or “thought as such.”⁴⁸ This objectifying thinking is “instinctive” in that it grounds the acts of thought accomplished deliberately.⁴⁹ The logical science generates its own content by reconstructing the movement in which thought has brought about the conceptual determinations that constitute reality as we know it.⁵⁰ That is why its sole subject matter consists in the movement which generates pure concepts such as being, becoming, infinity, causality, substance, ground, life, teleology, and so forth:

This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth.⁵¹

The pure concepts ground the ontological perspectives that together constitute reality insofar as it can become the object of the sciences, that is, insofar as it is rational. This is for Hegel the only determination of reality worthy of the name “actuality.”⁵² It does not follow from this, however, that the *Logic* purports to determine the objects of special metaphysics: it pertains, no less than the *Critique of Pure Reason* does, to the totality of conceptual determinations that allow thinking to relate to objects at all, thus restricting itself to the domain of former ontology. Because the movement in which objectifying thought unfolds its immanent content does not depend on random decisions of consciousness, Hegel considers the *Logic* to be the “exposition” of that which “the thing-in-itself is in truth, what truly is in it-

⁴⁸ *L I*, 43/49, 60/62.

⁴⁹ *L I*, 27/37; compare 28/38. This objectifying activity “may be taken for *thought as such*. But this act should no longer be called consciousness; consciousness embraces within itself the opposition of the ego and its object, an opposition which is not present in that original act” (*L I*, 60/62–3).

⁵⁰ The logical science forms the “reconstruction” of both the concepts that determine thought unconsciously and the concepts reflected upon by philosophy (*L I*, 30/39–40). By means of this reconstruction—which is at once the “immanent deduction” of the determinations of the concept (*L II*, 252/582)—speculative knowledge constructs itself into a system (*L I*, 17/28; compare *D*, 47, 111/116, 170). Compare Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View,” 104–5.

⁵¹ *L I*, 43–4/49–50.

⁵² “[O]nly in its concept does something possess actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), and to the extent that it is distinct from its concept it ceases to be actual” (*L I*, 44/50).

self."⁵³ For Hegel, however, the thing in itself no longer refers to the transcendental metaphysical ideas of which God is the most perfect one but exclusively to the absolute principle of both knowledge and reality insofar as it can be known. Since this principle is nothing but the movement in which objectifying thought determines itself by unfolding the totality of pure concepts, Hegel, unlike Kant, holds that this principle is comprehensible as "the connected whole of its determinations."⁵⁴ Thus, by claiming that the pure concepts express the true nature of things he does not relapse into a precritical position but merely emphasizes that the totality of these concepts allows thinking to constitute reality insofar as it can be known.

VII

From the Ego to the Concept. Hegel values former metaphysics for identifying the determinations of thought with the determinations of reality itself. He maintains, however, that this metaphysics had been unable systematically to reconstruct the totality of these determinations and that only Kant's transcendental philosophy opens up the possibility of such a deduction.⁵⁵ The *Critique of Pure Reason* achieves this by grounding the pure concepts in the synthetic activity of the subject.⁵⁶ Hegel, for his part, argues that the genuine deduction of these concepts can only be achieved by tracing them back to the pure concept that precedes any separation between subject and object. Thus, he will have to sublimate the perspectives of former metaphysics and of critical philosophy into a perspective from whence the deduction of the totality of pure concepts can be truly achieved:

While Kant has made the profound observation that there are synthetic a priori principles and has recognized their root in the unity of self-consciousness and therefore in the identity of the concept with itself, yet he adopts the specific connection, the concepts of relation and the synthetic principles themselves from formal logic as given; their deduction should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of

⁵³ *L I*, 130/121.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Enc I*, §33. Hegel notes in the *Logic* that in traditional logic the logical forms "have disintegrated into fixed determinations that are not held together in an organic unity" (*L I*, 41/48 [translation modified]).

⁵⁶ *L I*, 45, 59/51, 62.

self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this genuinely synthetic progress—the self-producing concept.⁵⁷

According to Kant, synthetic judgments a priori are based on pure concepts and articulate the perspectives that constitute reality insofar as it can become the object of knowledge. Now Hegel argues that pure concepts can only yield synthetic judgments a priori if they are not purely formal but determine themselves from within and hence generate their own content: they have to be synthetic in themselves. In order to reconstruct the totality of these—so to speak—a priori synthetic concepts, Hegel first conceives of them as specific modifications of what he takes to be the subjective principle of any synthetic activity, that is, of pure reason. This line of thought is already developed in *Faith and Knowledge*. As we have seen, Kant conceives of the synthetic judgments a priori as finite projections of the subject, projections that only reach out to the manifold given in sense perception. In order to let these ontological perspectives pertain to the conceptual determinations of reality itself insofar as it can be known, Hegel must, second, extricate the synthetic principle that generates these concepts from its merely subjective manifestation. This only occurs in the *Science of Logic*. Here Hegel conceives of reason as the way in which the absolute principle of synthetic unity—which he calls simply “concept” or “pure concept”—unfolds in the element of finite subjectivity.⁵⁸ He is aware, however, that the absolute nature of this principle could not have been grasped without Kant’s resorting to the subject:

But in order for philosophy to make any real progress, it was necessary that the interest of thinking should be drawn to a consideration of the ego, of consciousness as such . . . , so that in this way the cognition of the *infinite form*, that is, of the concept, would be introduced. But in order that this cognition may be reached, that form has still to be relieved of the finite determinateness in which it is ego, or consciousness. The form, when thus thought out in its purity, will have within itself the capacity to *determine* itself, that is, to give itself a content, and that a *necessarily* explicated content—in the form of a system of determinations of thought.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *L II*, 505/789; compare 268–9/595; *L I*, 40–1, 60/47, 63.

⁵⁸ In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel also uses the term “absolute concept” (compare *Phen.*, 115/100).

This is precisely what the *Science of Logic* seeks to achieve. Thus, whereas Kant endowed only practical reason with the capacity of self-determination, Hegel also ascribes this capacity to theoretical reason but only subsequently to comprehend reason as such as the merely subjective manifestation of the pure concept.

What Hegel means by "the pure concept" or "the concept" is, in my view, nothing but the animating principle of any movement in which something, whatever it is, determines itself by distinguishing itself from itself and identifying itself with the other of itself. This synthetic movement can be recognized in the self-determining activity of plants, animals, and human beings. It can also be recognized in the way self-consciousness divides itself into a purely formal ego and an empirical consciousness so as to accomplish itself as the synthetic unity of both.⁶⁰ The *Logic*, for its part, does not pertain to the ways in which the concept manifests itself in the elements of exteriority or subjective spirit but directs itself exclusively to the unfolding of the concept in the element of pure thought itself. Within this element the pure concept accomplishes itself as the totality of the concepts that enable subjective thinking to constitute something as an object at all:

[T]he profounder basis is the soul itself, the pure concept which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of the subjective thinking of them. To let thought become conscious of the *logical* nature which animates spirit, this is the task.⁶¹

⁶⁰ *L I*, 61. Compare: "The concept, when it has developed into a *concrete existence* that is itself free, is none other than the *I* or pure self-consciousness. . . . [T]he *I* is the pure notion itself which, as concept, has come into *existence*. . . . It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the *unity* which constitutes the *nature of the concept* is recognized as the original synthetic unity of *apperception*, as unity of the *I* think, or of self-consciousness" (*L II*, 253–4/583–4). Self-consciousness is "the *existent and therefore empirically perceptible pure notion*, the absolute self-relation" (490/777). We are justified "in referring to the nature of the *I* in order to learn what the concept is" (255/585). For Hegel, however, this nature is nothing but "the pure self-related unity" that is at once "self-related negativity" (253/583; compare 487/774). The formal movement in which something remains identical to itself while distinguishing itself from itself—the movement of the concept—can be recognized in the movement whereby pure self-consciousness distinguishes itself into itself and empirical consciousness, but this movement should not be identified with this concrete manifestation. Regarding this issue I disagree with Pippin's position as discussed in the introduction.

⁶⁰ Compare *Enc III*, §423.

⁶¹ *L I*, 26–7/37 (translation modified); compare *L II*, 563/835; *Phen*, 48/40.

Hegel calls the movement in which the pure concept unfolds the totality of its determinations the "genuine synthetic progress"⁶² because it forces every concept to accomplish itself as the totality of itself and its contrary, that is, as a synthetic unity. A pure concept, then, is nothing but the self-determining movement in which it distinguishes its contrary determinations from itself, lets them become independent, and forces them to give up their independence. In this way it establishes its immanent content. This a priori synthetic movement occurs implicitly insofar as objectifying thought, throughout the history of thought, generates the concepts which determine both subjective thought and the realm of possible objects. The logical science does nothing but let philosophy become conscious of the movement in which the pure concept, behind its back, has unfolded the totality of its determinations in the element of pure thought.⁶³ For Hegel, this ultimate self-consciousness of philosophy can be achieved only by disentangling the truly ontological thrust of the transcendental analytic from its concern with the subjective faculties of knowledge, and by disentangling the thrust of the transcendental dialectic from its concern with the metaphysical ideas. Both interventions allow Hegel to comprehend the totality of the pure concepts as they are in and for themselves.

VIII

The Synthetic Concepts as Definitions of the Absolute. Hegel endorses Kant's view that the metaphysical ideas, conceived as determinations of reality as it is in itself, do not permit of predication by

⁶² *L II*, 505/789.

⁶³ "[I]n the progress of exposition . . . it is of capital importance always clearly to distinguish what is still *in itself* and what is *posited*, the determinations as they are in the concept, and as they are as posited, of as being-for-other. This is a distinction which belongs only to the dialectical development and which is unknown to metaphysical philosophy, which also includes critical philosophy. The definitions of metaphysics . . . seek to assert and produce only . . . that which exists in itself" (*L I*, 131/122 [translation modified]). Thus, just as the *Phenomenology* exposes the necessary development of the various modes of consciousness that takes place behind the back of consciousness itself (*Phen*, 68/56), the *Logic* exposes the development of the pure concepts that takes place behind the back of philosophy for as long as it has not yet achieved its completion.

pure concepts which are finite in that they are posited over against their contraries. Kant infers from this that these ideas do not lend themselves to any determination whatsoever. Hegel, by contrast, argues that reality as it is in itself does not lend itself to being determined in the same manner as the objects of sensory experience. Disagreeing with Kant's conclusion that knowledge "has no other forms of thought than finite categories,"⁶⁴ he sets out to show that the pure concepts not only constitute the realm of objectivity but also determine the absolute principle of reality as such.

As mentioned above, Hegel is not concerned with the representation of this absolute principle in terms of a substrate of which certain properties can be predicated. Instead, he conceives God, the world, and the soul as inadequate representations of the way in which this principle, the pure concept, unfolds in the elements of pure thought, spatio-temporal exteriority, and finite spirit respectively. Whereas metaphysics considered God to accomplish most perfectly the mode of thought which generates its content independent of sense perception, Hegel maintains that this thought occurs nowhere else than in human consciousness, albeit mostly without its being aware of this. For Hegel, the absolute principle commonly represented as God is nothing but the principle that brings about the totality of conceptual determinations that underlie both human knowledge and reality insofar as it can become the object of knowledge.

Now if the pure concept underlies any movement in which something brings about the synthetic unity of itself and the other of itself, and if each of the pure concepts constitutes a specific determination of the concept, then they must each in their own way express this movement. Thus, a concept like infinity, for example, does not express the synthetic movement of the pure concept as long as it is posited over against the concept of finitude. Hegel, for his part, comprehends the concept of infinity as the synthetic movement that posits its immanent determinations infinity and finitude over against each other and, by resolving their opposition, accomplishes itself as their unity. To clarify this, I will now turn to a remark in the *Encyclopedia* where Hegel explains the difference between speculative science and former metaphysics with reference to the idea of the soul. Whereas former metaphysics purported to determine the soul by predicating terms

⁶⁴ *L I*, 216/191.

such as unity, indivisibility, and unchangability of it, Kant, on the other hand, argues that the soul does not let itself be determined at all; speculative philosophy

contains the totality of those determinations . . . which dogmatism takes to be permanent and true only insofar as they are separated from each other. . . . The soul is neither finite only, nor infinite only; it is really the one just as much as the other, and in that way neither the one nor the other. In other words, such isolated determinations are invalid, and they hold true only as sublated.⁶⁵

If both determinations are reduced to one-sided moments, they can no longer be predicated of an underlying substance; something cannot be determined by two contrary predicates at once unless it is comprehended as being in movement.⁶⁶ From the perspective of speculative science, then, the soul is nothing but the inadequate representation of the movement in which the infinite principle of human life actualizes its immanent determinations by distinguishing itself into itself and its finite, corporeal manifestation.⁶⁷ This movement can only be adequately expressed by means of concepts that in themselves accomplish a similar movement.⁶⁸ Seen in this way, it is neither necessary nor possible to maintain the absolute heterogeneity among the idea of the soul, the soul as a thing in itself, and its empirical manifestation, and hence to restrict the scope of the categories to the realm of appearances. The soul itself, however, is nothing but the manifestation of the pure concept in the element of finite spirit. That is why concepts that consist of the synthetic unity of contraries, such as unity and plurality, infinity and finitude, essence and appearance, can equally be considered as constituting specific and hence finite determinations of the absolute principle itself.

⁶⁵ *Enc* I, §32, Addition.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ "In this identity of interior and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself felt" (*Enc* III, §411; compare *Enc* I, §§216, 218). One should note that Hegel's remarks here concern the soul as determined by dogmatic metaphysics and not the concept of the soul that occurs in his philosophy of the spirit. Compare *L* I, 258/223–4.

⁶⁸ "[T]he proposition in the form of a judgment is not suited to express speculative truths. . . . Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgment this is not expressed" (*L* I, 93/90–1; compare *D*, 36–7/105; *Phen*, 48/39–40).

Now Hegel notes repeatedly in both the *Logic* and in the *Encyclopaedia* that concepts that constitute the synthetic unity of contraries might be regarded as definitions of the absolute. Drawing on the language of traditional metaphysics, he remarks at the beginning of the *Doctrine of Being* that

the concept of the unity of being and non-being—or, in a more reflected form, the unity of difference and non-difference . . . could be regarded as the first, purest, that is most abstract definition of the absolute—as it would in fact be the case if we were at all concerned with the form of definitions and with the name of the absolute. In this sense, that abstract concept would be the first definition of this absolute and all further determinations and developments only more specific and richer definitions of it.⁶⁹

Evidently, Hegel is not concerned with the name of the absolute, as it refers to a substrate derived from representations just as much as the name of God. Neither can the determinations of the pure concept adequately be called definitions since definitions couple a single predicate, rather than a unity of contrary determinations, to a subject.⁷⁰ Taking all this into account, Hegel indicates that pure concepts, insofar as they accomplish themselves as the synthetic unity of contrary determinations, constitute specific determinations of the pure concept which former metaphysics represented as God.⁷¹ Thus, by reconstructing the possible conceptual determinations of this absolute principle, the *Science of Logic* can be viewed as replacing former special metaphysics. But insofar as these synthetic concepts in turn ground the ontological perspectives which constitute reality insofar as it can

⁶⁹ *L I*, 74/74; compare *Phen*, 49/40–1. In the *Logic* Hegel also states that the concept of the infinite can be conceived as a definition of the absolute (*L I*, 149/137), and that the saying that the absolute, or God, is the measure of all things, is infinitely truer than the definition that equates the absolute with being (390/329). The *Encyclopaedia* likewise notes that “being” can be considered to constitute the most abstract and poorest definition of the absolute (*Enc I*, §86, Addition; compare §85). This is also true of the concept “nothingness” (§87). Contrary to the unity of being and nonbeing, that is, becoming, these concepts have not yet accomplished themselves at all as the unity of themselves and their contrary and therefore can hardly count as definitions of the absolute.

⁷⁰ Compare *Enc I*, §85.

⁷¹ The pure concept is “the foundation of the specific concepts.” “When those determinations of thought which are only external forms are truly considered in themselves, this can only result in demonstrating their finitude and the untruth of their supposed independent self-subsistence” (*L I*, 30/39).

be known, the *Science of Logic* at once replaces former general metaphysics.

Let me offer another example. Before I can determine an empirically given object as cold or warm, bigger or smaller than something else, possible or necessary, or as the cause of something else, I must already have determined it as something that is. This a priori determination constitutes an ontological perspective by dint of which something can present itself as an object of experience in the first place. This ontological perspective is grounded in the pure concept being.⁷² Insofar as this concept allows thought to pertain to reality as such, it belongs to the realm of general metaphysics. Yet it simultaneously belongs to the realm of special metaphysics in that it constitutes a possible determination of the absolute principle of reality. Whereas metaphysics would say that "being" can be predicated of both God and of created things, I take Hegel to argue that the ontological perspective based on the concept of being first constitutes a determination of the pure concept itself and, second, allows thought to constitute on that basis its objects of experience as things that are. Accordingly, by abstracting from the question of whether pure concepts are predicated of finite or infinite substances, the *Logic* can be considered to enfold the domains of general and special metaphysics into each other.

It emerges immediately, however, that the concept of being constitutes a most inadequate determination of both the pure concept itself and the objects of experience: the ontological perspective based on this concept does not even allow thought to distinguish between one thing and another. I would not be able to determine something as cold or warm, that is, as colder or warmer than something else, had I not implicitly determined it as the unity of what it actually is (cold) and what it is not but could possibly become (not cold). Thus, to de-

⁷²The *Logic* does not explicitly state this, but limits itself to determining being as the first content of pure knowledge (*L* I, 72/73). This knowledge, however, consists in the insight into the way objective thought has always already brought about the categories that ground our knowledge of reality insofar as it is given in sense perception. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* notes of sense-certainty: "All that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing" (*Phen*, 69/58). This relation to given representations, which expresses itself in language, is thus made possible by the ontological perspective grounded in the concept of being.

termine something as either the one or the other, I must from the outset order my sense perceptions with regard to both a priori contrary conceptual determinations. In other words, the synthetic unity of being and nonbeing constitutes the content of the most simple ontological perspective. This synthetic unity is also the first to determine the absolute concept itself as the synthetic unity of contrary determinations.⁷³ Thus, by determining the ultimate principle of reality as synthetic unity of being and nonbeing, objectifying thought opens up an ontological perspective that ultimately enables the determination of an object of experience as, for example, either cold or not cold. The content of the ontological perspective which grounds the possibility of this empirical predication, however, does not consist of either being or nonbeing, but in the synthetic unity of these contraries. Only thus can it both determine the absolute concept itself and open up thought to the realm of empirical objects.⁷⁴ I will now try to show that Hegel considers this latter possibility to be grounded in the movement whereby a concept posits its contrary determinations over against each other so as to let them become independent.

IX

The Role of Synthetic Concepts in Finite Knowledge. In the *Logic* that constitutes the first part of the *Encyclopedia* Hegel again proposes that the pure concepts be conceived as definitions of the absolute, but he now specifies this idea as follows:

Being itself . . . as well as the logical determinations in general may be conceived as definitions of the absolute, or as *metaphysical definitions of God*; but to be more precise, [one should] always [consider them to be] only the first, simple determination of a sphere and then also the third, which is the return out of the difference into the simple self-relation. . . . The second determinations, which constitute a sphere in its be-

⁷³ "*Becoming* is this immanent synthesis of being and nothing" (*L* I, 100/96).

⁷⁴ I will not elaborate here on the further modifications of the ontological perspective constituted by the unity of being and nonbeing. These modifications achieve ever richer determinations of the pure concept itself and allow thought to comprehend its objects in terms of their qualitative and quantitative determinations.

ing-different [from the first and third moment], are, on the other hand, definitions of the finite.⁷⁵

What Hegel refers to here as sphere is, in my view, none other than what I have so far called an ontological perspective. According to Hegel, such a perspective distinguishes itself into three moments, of which the first and the third constitute determinations of the pure concept. Each of the concepts that yield a specific ontological perspective form the synthetic unity of conceptual determinations such as infinity and finitude, unity and plurality, indivisibility and divisibility, cause and effect. To acquire empirical knowledge the understanding brings unity into its sensory representations by predicating one out of two contrary determinations of something: it determines something as either cold or not cold, divisible or indivisible, cause or effect, substance or property, means or end. This is to say that a specific ontological perspective only lends itself to determining empirical objects if the contrary determinations of a synthetic concept have somehow disentangled themselves from their synthetic unity in order to establish themselves as independent concepts. I take it that Hegel's abstruse reference to "a sphere in its being-different" bears on the modification of an ontological perspective where this becoming independent of contrary determinations has occurred so as to ground the possibility of empirical knowledge.

Since the concept being has not yet synthetically integrated its contrary, nothingness, into itself and for that reason constitutes the most inadequate determination of the pure concept, I will refer to the concept of causality to clarify what I believe to be at stake here. When the ontological perspective based on the concept of causality opens thought onto the realm of possible objects, it first determines the absolute concept, a principle traditionally represented as God, as a cause that constitutes in itself the synthetic unity of cause and ef-

⁷⁵ *Enc I*, § 85. Compare: "The forms of *determinate being* (*Dasein*) find no place in the series of those determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the absolute," for they are "posited only as determinate and finite forms" (*L I*, 149/137 [translation modified]). The "forms of determinate being" seem to refer to conceptual determinations that can only be assigned to finite things: "Determinate being is therefore the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of finitude. . . ; quality, otherness, limit—like reality, being-in-itself, the ought, and so on—are the imperfect inculcations of the negation in being (*die unvollkommenen Einbildungen der Negation in das Sein*)" (*L I*, 174/157 [translation modified]).

fect, that is, a cause that actualizes itself without being dependent on something outside of itself. Thus, the concept "causality" can be taken to constitute a specific definition of the absolute concept. The ontological perspective based on this concept allows thought, second, to interpret the objects of sensory experience as the cause of something else or as being caused by something else, that is, as either cause or effect.⁷⁶ It could be argued, therefore, that if this perspective is to disclose reality as the totality of things that are causally connected, it would have to isolate the contrary conceptual determinations enfolded in the concept of causality from their primordial unity so as to let them gain independence. Cause and effect are thus transformed into finite concepts and hence enable thought to acquire knowledge of finite objects. This modification can be conceived as a movement in which the ontological perspective based on the concept of causality turns itself toward reality insofar as it is given in sense perception. Because the *Logic* exclusively investigates the ontological concepts as they are in themselves and hardly ever addresses the question as to their possible application, it is difficult to discern that Hegel considers each concept with regard to the way in which it on the one hand—as a synthetic unity of contraries—determines the absolute concept, and on the other—as opposition—constitutes the condition of possibility of empirical knowledge.

Now one might consider it the proper work of the understanding to let these contrary determinations become posited over against each other, thus preparing the ground for the empirical sciences. When reason, however, allows the understanding to transcend its proper domain in order to determine reality insofar as it can be thought, the understanding uses its proper ontological perspective—based on

⁷⁶I will limit myself here to what I consider to be the principle of the way Hegel conceives of the concept of causality. Only insofar as this concept lets its contrary determinations—in this respect, cause and effect—become independent, does it accomplish itself as the finite mode of causality that we would normally identify with causality as such. The *Logic* distinguishes in this respect between formal and finite causality and argues that the first is characterized by necessity: "Only as this necessity is cause self-moving, beginning from itself without solicitation from an other" (*L* II, 224/559). Formal causality "is the infinite relation of absolute power whose content is pure manifestation of necessity. As finite causality, on the other hand, it has a *given* content and occurs merely as a difference external to this identical content, which in its determinations is one and the same substance" (*L* II, 225/560 [translation modified]; compare *Enc* I, §153).

conceptual oppositions—in a way that is doomed to fail. For as Kant had shown in his doctrine of the antinomies, metaphysics—that is, speculative thought completely overruled by the understanding—is unable to acquire knowledge of the world as such by means of concepts that have their contrary outside of themselves. Thus, metaphysics takes for granted that concepts such as being, cause, or indivisibility can be applied to finite as well as to infinite substrates. Thus, one might argue that metaphysics relies on that modification of an ontological perspective which is only meant to ground empirical knowledge, namely, the modification where two contrary conceptual determinations have isolated themselves from their primordial unity. Whereas Kant infers from this that pure concepts do not permit of a nonempirical use at all, Hegel argues that contrary conceptual determinations which have isolated themselves from their primordial unity constitute just one modification of a specific ontological perspective and hence should not be mistaken for that perspective as such. In other words, Kant was no more aware than former metaphysics of the movement in which the pure concept brings about the opposition between its contrary determinations only to resolve them into their truly synthetic unity. According to Hegel, it is precisely this synthetic unity of contrary determinations—that is, an ontological perspective according to its first and third moment—that is capable of determining the pure concept and hence reality insofar as it can be thought.

The movement in which the contrary determinations of the concept causality isolate themselves from their primordial unity not only makes it possible for thought to achieve empirical knowledge but also constitutes a necessary precondition for the movement in which this concept explicitly achieves the synthetic unity of cause and effect, that is, accomplishes itself as a cause that does not depend on something outside of itself. Thus, the third moment of the movement in which the concept of causality unfolds its immanent determinations pertains as much to the absolute principle of reality as the first. The movement in which the concept of causality actualizes itself—a movement which only the *Logic* permits to occur systematically—lays bare, however, that this concept considered in itself as yet inadequately determines the absolute principle of reality. This is to say that the determination of the absolute concept in terms of cause and effect is not yet fully in accordance with its synthetic nature; these terms, just as, for that matter, all specific pure concepts, are in the end only

appropriate for constituting the a priori ground of empirical knowledge.

The pure concept itself can be considered to constitute the principle which allows speculative science to comprehend the synthetic unity of oppositions such as that between spirit and nature, subject and object, essence and appearance, infinity and finitude, freedom and necessity. Hegel's *Logic* grounds the possibility of this truly speculative ontological perspective by making philosophy aware of the conceptual movement that resolves all contrary conceptual determinations into itself. The *Logic* lets every pure concept modify itself so as to posit its contrary determinations over against each other. This is what actually occurs in philosophy when reason lets itself be overruled by the understanding, as it did both in former metaphysics and in transcendental philosophy. Yet the *Logic* allows this to happen only in order subsequently to subjugate this opposition, by dint of the concept's absolute force, to the genuinely speculative modification of this concept, that is, to its synthetic unity. Although the *Logic* allows speculative reason to hold sway over the understanding time and again, it seldom refers explicitly to the recurrent conflict between the discursive and speculative mode of thought that it actually plays out.⁷⁷ Unlike Hegel's early texts, the *Logic* no longer interprets these modes in terms of their subjective occurrence but conceives of their conflict, to which it owes its development, as a conflict between the movement in which the pure concept itself posits its contrary determinations over against itself and the movement in which it resolves them into their unity. These two movements might be conceived as the analytic and synthetic moment of the pure concept, moments that ultimately constitute the logical ground of the understanding and speculative reason respectively.⁷⁸ For Hegel there can be no doubt as to the outcome of their conflict. After all, the logical science stages their struggle in such a way that it cannot but be decided in favor of reason.

⁷⁷ Hegel characterizes the understanding as the mere external or incomplete mode of reflection, that is, the reflection that only posits contrary conceptual determinations over against each other. Compare *L I*, 16–17, 38, 140, 160, 166–70/27–8, 45, 130, 145, 150–2; *L II*, 285–8/610–2; *Phen*, 25/18.

⁷⁸ Compare: "But though the method of truth which comprehends the subject matter is . . . itself analytic, for it remains entirely within the concept, yet it is equally synthetic, for through the concept the subject matter is determined dialectically and as an other" (*L II*, 566/838; compare 557/830, 563/836).

X

The Metaphysical Substances Dissolved. I have argued above that Hegel's ontological inquiry into the pure concepts disregards their possible application and hence no longer maintains the difference between Kant's transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. The second edition of the *Logic* devotes two extended remarks to the Kantian antinomies.⁷⁹ For reasons of space I will not dwell on these remarks here, but I will only indicate what I take to be the general thrust of Hegel's interpretation of the antinomies in order to show that it yields the same result as his interpretation of Kant's transcendental analytic. This will also give me the opportunity to bring the argument developed so far to its conclusion.

Hegel notes already in his *Differenzschrift* that the antinomy is "the contradiction that resolves itself, the highest formal expression of knowledge and truth."⁸⁰ He repeatedly praises Kant for having shown that contradictions between classical metaphysical propositions necessarily occur when thought unfolds itself in the element of finitude, that is, when the objects of reason are viewed from the perspective of the understanding.⁸¹ Thus, when metaphysics purports to have proved that the world as such either has a beginning in time or does not have a beginning in time, it wrongly presupposes that isolated concepts such as "infinity" and "finitude" can be predicated of reality as it is in itself. However, whereas Kant merely reduces the an-

⁷⁹ These remarks concern the antinomy of indivisibility and divisibility (*L* I, 216–27/190–9) and of limitation and nonlimitation (*L* I, 271–6/234–8). Hegel, as always here distinguishes between Kant's "great merit" (*L* I, 216/190) and his misleading elaboration of the antinomies. Hegel basically argues that the contrary conceptual determinations expressed in the antinomies are grounded not so much in the inappropriate application of pure concepts as in these concepts themselves: "In order to gain the antinomy in its purity and to deal with it in its simple concept, the determinations of thought must not be taken in their application to and entanglement in the general idea of the world, of space, time, matter, and so forth; . . . These determinations . . . must be considered purely on their own account, since they alone constitute the essence and the ground of the antinomies" (*L* I, 217/191; compare *Enc* I, §48 and §48, Remark). For a general discussion of Hegel's critique of Kant's antinomies, see John Llewelyn, "Kantian Antinomy and Hegelian Dialectic," Hegel's Critique of Kant, ed. Stephen Priest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

⁸⁰ *D*, 39/108.

⁸¹ *FK*, 319–20/84.

tinomies to a contradiction proper to speculative thought,⁸² Hegel maintains that the antinomies can truly be resolved if speculative thought first recognizes their synthetic unity and, second, refrains from predicating such synthetic concepts of substrates such as the world or God.⁸³ This is something to be further explained. At the end of the *Science of Logic* Hegel again states in this respect that he considers it

an infinite merit of Kantian philosophy . . . to have given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic in the sense of the examination of the determinations of thought in and for themselves. The subject matter, kept apart from thinking and the concept, is an image or even a name; it is in the determinations of thought and the concept that it is what it is. Therefore these determinations are in fact the sole thing that matters; they are the true subject and content of reason, and anything else that one understands by subject matter and content in distinction from them has value only through them and in them.⁸⁴

Instead of predicating conceptual determinations of a "fixed subject of representation," one should conceive of such a subject as a concept that must "in and for itself submit to the dialectic."⁸⁵ The infinite movement whereby the pure concept unfolds its immanent determinations forces any concept to give up its purported independence:

Thus all the oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example finite and infinite, individual and universal . . . are in and for themselves a transition; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear is the product of their concept's own reflection. If a consideration that ignores the concept stops short at their external relation, isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions, it is the concept, on the contrary, that keeps them steadily in view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic.⁸⁶

⁸² *FK*, 320/84.

⁸³ "In this way, the solution is that one conceives of this antinomic propositions . . . as absolutely heterogeneous and without having anything in common. And indeed, in comparison with the insipid and unsubstantial connection of freedom and necessity, of the intelligible world and the sensible world, their pure and complete separation has the merit [of permitting] the pure positing of their absolute identity. But this was not what Kant had in view when he separated them so sharply; he intended the separation to be the absolute" (*FK*, 320/84 [translation modified]).

⁸⁴ *L* II, 559–60/833.

⁸⁵ *L* II, 560/833.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

The synthesis of contrary conceptual determinations such as infinity and finitude is the result of the movement in which the concept of infinity posits these, its immanent determinations, over against each other so as actually to accomplish itself as their unity. Hegel refers to this movement as the proper reflection of the concept.⁸⁷ The external mode of reflection, on the other hand, only allows the pure concepts to achieve the first moment of this proper reflection, that is, the movement in which these contrary determinations are posited over against each other.⁸⁸ This movement, actually accomplished by the understanding, thus prepares the ground for a metaphysics seeking knowledge of reality as it is in itself by predicating these determinations of the world, the soul, or God.

Now when a synthetic concept such as infinity is allowed also to accomplish the second moment of its immanent reflection—and this is what happens in the logical science—then Kant's argument against metaphysical knowledge no longer obtains. A concept that has accomplished the unity of itself and its contrary therefore seems to fulfill all the requirements for adequately determining the metaphysical ideas. From the perspective of logical science, however, these ideas are nothing but inadequate representations of the movement in which the pure concept manifests itself in the elements of spatio-temporal exteriority, finite spirit, and pure thought respectively. Since this movement completely dissolves the substantiality of the absolute itself and its occurrence as world and soul, it leaves nothing to assign predicates to except the pure concept itself. The synthetic concepts therefore do not determine something outside of themselves, but ultimately they constitute nothing but the immanent determinations of the pure concept.

Thus, by developing an ontological perspective grounded in the synthetic unity of contrary determinations, philosophy might seem to have become capable of satisfying its ineradicable desire for knowl-

⁸⁷ Compare *L* I, 16/27.

⁸⁸ The conceptual determinations brought about in external reflection "have the form of being-in-and-for-itself. This makes them count as essential, and instead of passing over into their opposites they appear rather as absolute, free, and indifferent toward each other. Consequently, they are stubbornly opposed to their movement" (*L* II, 31/405). Thus, insofar as these concepts have occurred in the history of thought without accomplishing themselves as synthetic unities, the *Logic* forces them, as it were, to give up their purported independence.

edge of reality as it is in itself. Yet at the very moment in which it struggles out of the grasp of the understanding, which had for so long frustrated this desire, nothing remains of this reality but the pure concept itself and the totality of its immanent determinations; that is, the pure synthetic concepts grounding both knowledge and reality insofar as it can be known. By depriving its object of all substantiality, then, the *Logic* achieves the immanent knowledge which Kant had considered impossible, without for that matter relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics:

The solid ground which argumentation has in the unchanging subject is therefore shaken, and only this movement itself becomes the object.⁸⁹

In this article I have not been able to show that the three parts of the *Logic* pertain, first, to pure concepts that have not yet accomplished their synthetic unity at all, second, to concepts that by positing their contrary over against themselves have merely accomplished their external reflection, and, third, to concepts that have to some extent accomplished their true reflection. Nor have I considered the way Hegel's speculative system reconstructs the a priori concepts that—throughout the history of Western thought—one way or another have been constitutive of thought as such and of the scientific interpretations of nature and spirit that together have created the world as we know it. All three parts of the speculative system can be regarded as allowing these concepts actually to accomplish themselves as the synthesis of their contrary determinations. The system does this by, as it were, creating the pure element within which a synthetic concept is no longer thwarted by the separating force of the understanding—as it had been in the actual history of thought—but rather subjugates this force to its synthetic unity.

Now Hegel maintains that the dissolving force of the pure concept—a force he calls “absolute negativity”—determines not only the purely immanent unfolding of the a priori concepts but also the modes of self-actualization that have actually occurred in nature and in the history of spirit. He would by no means deny that the element of spatio-temporal exteriority offers greater resistance to absolute negativity than the element of pure thought. Yet insofar as he conceives of this exteriority as the merely external manifestation of the pure concept

⁸⁹ *Phen*, 45/37.

itself, in my view, he cannot account for the radical incapacity of human culture to reconcile itself with that which in ever new guises emerges as the other of itself. The self-consciousness of contemporary culture that occurs, among others, as philosophy, has no reason to be self-satisfied. It is my contention that a critique of Hegel along these lines, a so to speak genuine critique of Hegel, only has a chance of succeeding if one begins by conceiving of the *Science of Logic* as an ontological logic that is not susceptible to the prevailing critique of dogmatic metaphysics.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF

ACHTENBERG, Deborah. *Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. xiv + 218 pp. Cloth, \$62.50; paper, \$20.95—This book is based on arguments presented in Achtenberg's 1982 doctoral dissertation and several of her recent articles. In this book, Achtenberg forcefully and convincingly argues that a crucial connection exists between Aristotle's metaphysics and ethics and that Aristotle's ethics can be read on two levels—"in terms of its imprecise but fully justified claims," or "in terms of the more precise metaphysical, physical, and psychological principles and arguments consideration of which gives the ethics greater articulation or depth" (p. 63). She argues that ethical virtue and emotions for Aristotle are cognitive: they involve cognition, not simply of particulars, but of the *value* of the particulars. In this, Achtenberg presents a sort of value realism that is, paradoxically, relative and relational at the same time. For Aristotle, she contends, "there are two principal types of value," "the good and the beautiful" (pp. 7–8). The good (and the beautiful) is an analogical equivocal, that is, an imprecise universal that shares some important similarity among its instantiations but will show up in the particulars in varied and oftentimes wholly unexpected ways. Achtenberg further argues that the good and the beautiful can be understood in terms of metaphysical concepts of *telos*, *entelecheia*, or *energeia* of a thing, a person, or an act because *telos* is what makes a thing complete, truly being "what it is." In sum, "[a] *telos* (*entelecheia*, *energeia*) is a principle of preservation or enrichment" for the things of which it is the *telos* (p. 53), just as sight is the *telos* of the eyes (p. 46), and virtue is "*energeia* of the soul" (p. 117). Although *telos* sets a limit concerning what is to be done and what is not, it is the kind of limit that is properly called "constitutive limit" as opposed to harmful or destructive limit. Ethical virtue, friendship, and just government are examples of *telos* as constitutive limitation because they make the subjects that possess them flourish, whereas moral vice, animosity, and unjust government are examples of destructive limitation. In light of this, Achtenberg offers a new interpretation of the Aristotelian "mean," which denotes neither a trivial middling amount nor an uninspiring routinized behavior, but what is "the appropriate or the needed" in each

*Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

situation. She concludes that, contrary to many other moral theorists, Aristotle's appreciation of the perception of the value of the particulars as constituents of a flourishing life is an example of "imaginative construction" that makes parts (for example, an act) meaningful in light of the whole (for example, a flourishing life), rather than an imaginative deconstruction that reduces a whole into senseless parts. She sums up the book by providing an assessment of Aristotle's ethics in terms of its strengths and weaknesses.

In support of her arguments, Achtenberg examines a wide variety of passages from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *Categories*, *Prior Analytics*, *De Anima*, *De Motu Animalium*, *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, and so on. She gives an admirably unified reading that solves many puzzles that exist in Aristotle's texts. In addition, she carefully responds to interpretations of Aristotle's ethics given by, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, John McDowell, Nancy Sherman, Steven Salkever, Bernard Williams, Julia Annas, Terence Irwin, Timothy Roche, and Myles Burnyeat. She also nicely draws out interesting implications of Aristotle's theory by comparing Aristotle's view to those of Plato, Marcus Aurelius, the Hebrew Bible, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Freud, and twentieth-century object relations theorists.

Achtenberg exhibits a thorough understanding of the history of philosophy and a good familiarity and handling of texts. I like this book very much. However, the following are points for the author to consider. First, although Aristotle has a generally positive view about the nature of desires and emotions in our moral formation (namely, he does not see all of our emotions as brute impulses), it seems to be an overstatement to interpret Aristotle as holding the position that *all* human emotions, regardless of their types, are to be developed or cultivated. This is contrary to Achtenberg's remark that "[f]or Aristotle, I maintain, positive emotions (desire, confidence, friendship, joy, etc.) are called for by positive situations, actions, or things, negative emotions (fear, hatred, envy, pity, etc.) by negative situations, actions, or things" (p. 114). In fact, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6.1107a9–15, Aristotle clearly states that hatred, shamelessness, and envy are always bad—they do not admit of a mean because "it is not possible ever to be right with regard to them." Thus, these passions should be suppressed rather than developed. Secondly, although the book has a good discussion of various examples of what a *telos* is, the *telos* of human being (as a life of rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue) was never explicitly and fully elucidated. A more extensive discussion of the subject is very much desirable. It would benefit readers in making important connections between ethical and intellectual virtues.—Ann A. Pang-White, *University of Scranton*.

AMERIKS, Karl. *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy*. Modern European Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xiii + 351 pp. Cloth, \$58.00—This book contains material from some 15 years of scholarly work on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its reception by his

immediate successors. While large parts of the book rely on previously published articles, Ameriks has worked these earlier publications into a monographic study by integrating them into an overall argument now prefaced by a detailed introduction to the book's main thesis and rounded out by a conclusion that provides a "final perspective" (p. 338) on the study as a whole. The central thesis of the book may be summarized as follows. The reception of Kant's philosophy by his contemporaries and immediate successors, and above all by Fichte and Hegel, was decisively influenced by the way in which Reinhold transformed the Kantian enterprise into a foundationalist system in which all propositions were to be derived from a first grounding principle (Reinhold's so-called Principle of Consciousness). This is significant because in the process Reinhold "managed to distort the basic meaning of Kant's original doctrine" (p. 126). As a result, German idealism after Kant can by no means be said to be the continuation and completion of Kant's Copernican revolution. Rather, Kant's position constitutes an "alternative to this ambitious foundational project" (p. 222). The post-Kantian development thus breaks with Kant's much more modest view of what a system of philosophy can and should be. A crucial role in this process of misinterpretation of Kant's intentions falls to Reinhold's recasting of what Ameriks calls Kant's "long argument to idealism" into Reinhold's "short argument" (pp. 127, 163), that is, the exclusive reliance by Reinhold on the argument from representation according to which the thing-in-itself is "unrepresentable" (p. 127) and hence dispensable. The Reinhold of the "Elementary Philosophy" of 1789–91 thus believed to possess a shortcut to idealism which made Kant's complicated justification of the complementarity thesis (the "long argument") redundant. It also established the immanence of representational consciousness as the exclusive ground of all claims to knowledge and thus prepared the way for the closed, "absolutist" systems that became the hallmark of post-Kantian idealism. Ameriks unfolds this argument in four parts dealing first with Kant's more modest claims concerning system and knowledge as a backdrop for the subsequent discussion (part 1), the motivation for and the content of Reinhold's revision of Kant's philosophy (part 2), Fichte's practical foundationalism as inspired by Reinhold (part 3), and Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy (part 4). The book covers other topics as well such as an illuminating discussion of the notion of apperception in Kant and Fichte as compared to contemporary interpretations of the apperception theory (pp. 234–64). The introduction also argues for a compatibilist alternative to Kant's theory of freedom which would minimize Kant's metaphysical commitment to the existence of an absolute spontaneity (see p. 19) and thus make Kant's position an even more modest one.

Ameriks makes his central thesis concerning Reinhold's role as compelling as it could be made, but this may not be enough to persuade all of his readers. The influence of Reinhold on Fichte is undeniable, and yet it is questionable whether Fichte, let alone Hegel, were influenced by Reinhold's short argument to the extent that they developed an "overwhelming commitment" to it (p. 170). To establish influence is a tricky task, and the evidence is often tenuous. Ameriks refers to the

"Reinholdian spirit" that lives "vividly" on in Fichte (p. 221). This is a plausible claim, but is it sufficient to maintain that Fichte's *Grundlage* is in fact the working out of Reinhold's program? After all, in 1798 Reinhold renounced his own approach in the Elementary Philosophy and publicly embraced Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* in a review of Fichte's writings. When we come to Hegel, the case in favor of Reinhold's influence is even more difficult to establish. As Ameriks points out, Hegel decisively moved away from representationalism altogether (p. 23), not to mention that he was critical of Reinhold's project. It remains debatable, therefore, to view Hegel "as merely completing the process of Kant's reception initiated by Reinhold and Fichte" (p.185). As Hegel remarks in a footnote in the introduction to the *Science of Logic*, one must take one's bearings from Kant himself, not from his interpreters and followers who "in some instances have only displayed a crude—not unavenged—contempt" for Kant's "detailed consideration of important, *more specific* aspects of logic" (pp. 61–2, translated by Miller). This does not sound like an endorsement of the short argument. Still, much of Ameriks's discussion of Hegel's critique of Kant in part 4 is extremely valuable. It is to be hoped that Ameriks's study will provide renewed inspiration for another hard look at the inner dynamics of German idealism.—Klaus Brinkmann, *Boston University*.

BEETS, M. G. J. *Socrates on the Many and the Few: A Companion to Plato's Politeia. Part I Books I-V*. Baarn: Duna, 2002. 352 pp.—This is not, the author admits, a scholarly work. "No attempt has been made to review and digest the masses of publications" (p. 5). Nor is it a textbook with a pedagogical purpose; students would be nonplussed. Beets's aim is to rethink the *Republic* philosophically, continuing a line of interpretation offered in earlier books. He claims to provide a faithful translation of the first five books of Plato's *Republic*, along with commentary. Despite the book's lack of scholarship, its esotericism, and interminable repetitiveness, this aim is laudable.

A prologue translates and discusses 341b7–344d3 of Plato's *Seventh Letter*. Traditional readings have not made clear why Socrates must act as "midwife" who leads people to discover for themselves the natures of things. Beets argues that truth is ineffable; it is, however, already present but dormant in the mind. Those two points combined require Socratic midwifery. The significance of Socrates' "divine guide" has also been left dark. Beets argues that Socrates' *daimon* provides infallible access to this ineffable and perfect truth. Ultimately, Socrates' sole purpose in arguing with any interlocutor is simply to show the shortcoming of intuition and discursive reasoning and to awaken him to the "infallible guide within himself" (p. 39).

Beets insists on separating ineffable reality from mere appearances so sharply that even discursive reason is bundled along with perceptual intuition and opinion and is divorced from reality and truth. Hence though he distinguishes three "levels," there is no mediating third and not much room for participation or dialectic in Beets's reading.

"Intuition" marks the first of these three levels. Without the aid of thought, perceptual intuition accesses spatio-temporal "reality" where things are linked by a succession of "horizontal" causes (pp. 342-3). "Discursive thinking" marks the second level. It includes both logical thinking and reflection on intuitive experience, and the "complex . . . stepwise reasoning of the scientist and the philosopher" (p. 343). Both are "founded upon a supposedly trustworthy 'logic' derived from perception of events" and their "horizontal" causality. Both evince the mind in its "bonded and quasi-severed state" (p. 343). The truly free mind is found at the third level. Its knowledge or insight is the "immediate effect of its 'vertical', first, itself uncaused cause" (p. 343).

These three Platonic or quasi-Platonic principles are used to interpret the text, as Beets admits, "perhaps somewhat reiteratively" (p. 343). Beets claims that "facts" and what we ordinarily take to be knowledge belong to the intuitive level, are effable, and can be transmitted by teaching. However, the subject matter with which Plato is concerned is a "mental experience," a matter of insight or illumination. An effect of a "vertical" cause inaccessible to the senses, it is incommunicable and unteachable. Thus only by being a midwife can Socrates "bring to light what is already present" (p. 12).

Beets's skepticism about Socrates' ability to teach the esoteric truth or communicate the vertical cause and its effect in mental experience (p. 13) leads him to separate sharply knowledge from names, definitions, images, and true opinion (p. 17). These belong to the intuitive level—or to the reflection upon it that engenders discussion—or are merely conceptual. The same rift between a perfect noetic grasp of an ineffable noumenal entity and every other kind of thinking appears again and again.

I find it important that at 342a7-e3 (cited by Beets) and elsewhere, Plato implies that noetic apprehension of the form(s) is prepared and presaged by other activities of soul. Clearly, opinion and knowledge (and their objects) are distinct in Plato, but tradition ascribes to him a teaching about mediation, participation, and dialectic that underwrites a punctuated continuity between levels of the divided line, steps of the "ladder of love," and so on. Beets is so concerned to honor noetic insight that his neo-Platonic-cum-neo-Kantian reading of the dialogue obscures this teaching and leaves no room for "degrees of being." It is good to try to rescue intellectual intuition from the ravages of post-Kantian thought. But I doubt whether that requires disparaging intuition and discursive thought so thoroughly as Beets recommends.—May Sim, *College of the Holy Cross*.

BENNETT, Jonathan. *Learning From Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume*, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 420 pp. Cloth, \$55.00; paper, \$29.95—Claiming to learn something from a philosopher can be fraught with difficulty. I may dispute your claim that Descartes taught you the tenability of voluntarism because I dispute the tenability of Descartes's voluntarism: I just don't think it is there to be learned. The idea of learning from a philosopher becomes even more charged given that what one learns is in some sense relative to what one already holds true. What Jonathan Bennett learns (or claims is to be learned) from Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and from the empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume, is often relative to his functionalist leanings (on certain subjects, at least). Obviously, if functionalism is the standard of truth by which learning is judged, nonfunctionalists may well not buy those lessons. As for Jonathan Bennett's brand of history of philosophy, he agrees with Robert Sleigh that it "is not necessary to study the history of a philosophical problem in order to make a fundamental contribution toward the understanding, perhaps even the solution, of that problem" (vol. 1, p. 3). He and Sleigh may be right, though this does not mean that one's understanding of a problem is not altered by knowledge of its history, or that a contribution or solution to it would not be different if conditioned by such knowledge. Bluntly put, built into philosophical ideas are further ideas reflecting the times and constituting part of the issue in question; so while in the process of bending an idea one need not expose its historical fibers, those fibers are there for consideration as part and parcel of philosophical analysis generally. It is not clear, however, that Bennett fully accepts this point about the historical nature of ideas, for in his recommendation that "[e]arly modern studies would be healthier, more muscular, if every practitioner also sometimes did work that was purely philosophical and in no way historical" (vol. 1, p. 2) is a distinction between muscle-building "pure philosophy" and history of philosophy. Clearly he rejects the idea that early modernists can get fit for their subject at home rather than in the "pure philosophy" gym.

Mostly what Bennett learns from these six philosophers is not their positive doctrines. Rather, his learning takes the form of reconstruction and analysis of what he deems to be otherwise incorrect views. A good example is found in his treatment of Berkeley's attack on the conceptual defects of materialism. On Bennett's analysis, Berkeley's case rests on a flawed theory of representation, but Bennett sticks with Berkeley nonetheless. We see the same kind of learning in his excellent chapter 29 on the reasons behind Berkeley's mistaken reading of Locke, as well as in his discussion the nature of and reasons for phenomenalism in Berkeley's work. Incidentally, many scholars will take exception to Bennett's (to my mind strained) argument that Berkeley's assurances that idealism squares with common-sense materialism are merely rhetorical. Throughout his study Bennett readily and generously acknowledges debts for insights he has received from other interpreters of these six great philosophers, insights which often cause him to revise or recant some of his own earlier views. For instance, a big climb-down is found in his assessment that the doctrine of tropes, which he once dismissed as nonsense but now accepts, does not bear negatively upon the

notion of bodies as modes in Spinoza's monist philosophy. Again, Bennett revises his earlier views on Locke's two-faced attitude toward substance, as something both indispensable and "intellectually disgraceful," and shows it to be a case of "genius in a bind."

Bennett considers most of the main areas of early modern epistemology and metaphysics: the nature of knowledge, truth, modality, belief, ideas, images, sensation, abstraction; the nature of substance, mind, identity, matter, space, time, and causation. A few points of note for this reviewer were Bennett's discussion of the Cartesian view of space; the seriousness with which he regards defenses of Descartes against the charge of circularity in the *Meditations*; and especially the sustained focus on the theories of substance and identity, particularly as they appear in the writings of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. Students of Spinoza's philosophy will be interested in Bennett's (to my mind convincing) replies to the doyen of Spinoza-studies, Edwin Curley, on the question of motion in Spinoza's philosophy. The analysis of Spinoza's treatment of teleology is of interest, as is the argument that Spinoza is an attribute-dualist. In my view Bennett is most incisive in his explanation of Spinoza's parallelism.

Obviously, however, a work of this breadth is bound to ignite debate. Two of the arguments that caught my attention concern, respectively, Descartes's voluntarism and Galen Strawson's 1989 attempt to mitigate Hume's skepticism about causation. Drawing from an earlier (1994) paper on Descartes's voluntarism, Bennett claims that Descartes's big insight is that "a proposition's modal status is not a monadic property, but rather a relation that it has to human intellectual capacities" (vol. 2, p. 62). However, this seems to miss the point, essential to Descartes's voluntaristic refusal to place limits on what is possible or impossible absolutely speaking, that human intellectual faculties are themselves constructed through and thus relative to the will of God. This means that far from the "philosophical core of the doctrine [having] nothing to do with God" (vol. 2, p. 62), it has everything to do with God. As for Bennett's treatment of Strawson's mitigated Humean skepticism, he convincingly demonstrates that Strawson fails "to learn from Hume the best things that he [that is, Hume] has to teach" (vol. 2, p. 281). His analysis goes awry, however, when he attempts to recast the Humean texts that really do support Strawson's interpretation. Where Strawson has legitimate grounds for seeing Hume as referring to "unknowable causes lying deeper than any regularities," that is, metaphysical entities, Bennett reads Hume simply as demanding "deeper physics." But this seems to forget the very antimetaphysical lesson of Hume's analysis that Bennett claims to learn, namely, that there is no such thing as "deeper" physics: we only ever operate at the surface level of things where all physics ever amounts to is the identification of ever widening regularities.

From whom among these six great philosophers has Bennett learned the most? It is difficult to say, since the central doctrines of all six of the philosophers in question provide grist for his philosophy mill. Still, I would guess that Hume has taught him the most. No less than others is Hume subject to Bennett's critical dissection, but much more than oth-

ers does he provide Bennett with insights into issues of current concern. In one sense this should not surprise, since by most accounts Hume is the father of modern analytic philosophy. On this latter score Bennett carefully sets the record straight about why Hume occupies this hallowed position (vol. 2, §244). By his practice throughout this study Bennett makes an strong case for the contemporary relevance of the six great philosophers from whom he has learned. You too will learn much from the philosophers treated in this study, and from Bennett himself.—David Scott, *University of Victoria*.

BRAINARD, Marcus. *Belief and Its Neutralization: Husserl's System of Phenomenology in Ideas I*. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. xvii + 331 pp. Cloth, \$86.50; paper, \$29.95—Brainard's systematic introduction to Husserl's systematic introduction to phenomenology shows the underlying teleological directedness and sense of Husserlian thought as a striving toward absolute rationality. It is a structural analysis of and commentary on *Ideas I*, the 1913 work that introduces the transcendental aspects of the newly emerging phenomenology, including reduction, the pure ego, the noesis–noema correlation, eidetic intuition, and the static analysis of intentional acts. In a sense, Brainard has written three different books here.

First, he gives a very helpful overview to the beginner on the underlying motivations that remain constant and unified throughout Husserl's work (pp. 1–21). It is an overview that focuses in particular on how the beginning of phenomenology, the reduction to the field of pure consciousness, is undertaken again and again with a view to the telos of thought, which is essential clarity about Being. Insofar as Husserl aims at knowledge of essences, in and through sense and noema, there is a priority of being over thought—thus, the text that many think gives the most *prima facie* evidence of a kind of transcendental idealism, *Ideas I*, is actually the most realist of texts, according to Brainard. This preliminary section also treats the often thorny issue about Husserl's relation to and conception of the history of philosophy. Brainard argues that Husserl's unabashed view is that the history of thought is a continuum that amounts to one progression and has one underlying sense, namely the complete rationalization of humanity as well as the rationalization of the empirical. It is from the singularity of this task, a task that has fallen into the hands of Husserl to attempt to complete, that the unity of his thought is derived.

Second, there is the main text itself, a careful step-by-step analysis of the key sections of Husserl's text (pp. 21–225). Despite the fact that Husserl referred to *Ideas I* seventeen years later as a mere “fragment,” Brainard works on the assumption that “a careful analysis reveals that it contains everything essential to Husserlian thought,” especially because

it is "the only one in which Husserl lays out his whole system." (pp. 28, 29) The systematicity of *Ideas I* is based to a large degree upon two different sets of bipolarities.

On the one hand, Brainard distinguishes maximal, positive modes of consciousness from minimal modes: belief/neutralization, reason/unreason, evidence/empty. Brainard's most detailed argument focuses on the first of these bipolarities, on the fundamental difference between positional consciousness (belief) and neutral consciousness (lack of belief), which posits nothing, is unproductive and indeed annihilating consciousness, and thus cannot rise to the level of reason because it is indifferent to reason's guiding function. What drives the striving of consciousness through and through is belief, which, unlike its counterpart, potentially contains the actuality of rational insight. The centrality of belief to the essentially thetic quality of intentionality is thus underscored by highlighting the irrational character of neutral consciousness.

On the other hand, Brainard focuses on the teleological bipolarities, in which the end or telos is somehow potentially present in the beginning: how the goal of a rationalized humanity is already somehow present in the striving of the individual to be rational, how temporal genesis is already latent in a static analysis of intentionality, and finally, how absolute reason or God is the uppermost limit to the striving of the pure ego, which constitutes the lowermost limit of Husserl's system (p. 220).

Third, Brainard has given what seems to be an exhaustive overview of the relevant literature on *Ideas I* and its central claims by providing over 460 endnotes (pp. 229–305). These notes reveal that Brainard's methodological approach to the structural aspects of Husserl's system as a whole is influenced by Heribert Boeder, especially by his *Das Vernunft-Gefüge der Moderne* (1988). While these endnotes will be relatively unhelpful for the beginner, they do contain some of Brainard's most provocative arguments about Husserl's notion of God as absolute reason.

At least two critical questions arise that call into question the thesis that *Ideas I* constitutes a relatively closed system of phenomenology. First, Brainard does not investigate the horizons in which the ego is given to itself, including the passive, prepredicative structures of the presentations of things. An analysis of these structures, as carried out in genetic phenomenology, would decenter the absoluteness of the pure ego revealed by the reduction. In other words, Brainard does not consider in enough detail the preegoistic necessary conditions of rationality, which, though prepredicative, are no less oriented toward the teleology of the achievement of truth. Second, although Brainard raises crucial questions about an oft-overlooked concept of Husserl's God, he does not come to anything more than the most tentative conclusion that God is absolute reason, which is the uppermost limit to the teleological striving for absolute reason. More attention needs to be paid to the possibility that if God is reason, and reason is a predicate of evidential consciousness, then God becomes a mere predicate, indeed, as one suspects, nothing more than a Kantian ideal.—Daniel J. Dwyer, *Boston College*.

CICOVACKI, Predrag. *Between Truth and Illusion: Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity*. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. x + 229 pp. Cloth, \$60.00; paper, \$21.95—Cicovacki traces postmodernism's subjectivism, relativism, and nihilism to Kant's "Copernican revolution," which granted the subject epistemic priority over the object. Nonetheless Cicovacki insists that Kant also offered an inchoate view according to which neither subject nor object has epistemic priority. Instead, on this view, truth itself becomes the harmonious interaction between subject and object. Cicovacki's project is to flesh out and improve upon this inchoate view, offering it as an alternative to postmodernism.

Thus Cicovacki, like John McDowell, John Haugeland, and other like-minded philosophers, regards objects and nature itself as actively partnering with the thinking subject to yield knowledge. Nature, for them, is not passive in the way in which modernity views it, as an object for dissection and analysis, but active—or, better, interactive—contributing not merely to the content but the very form of knowledge. Further, Cicovacki, like McDowell and Haugeland, gets his inspiration from Kant. And all three engage both the analytic and Continental traditions. Nonetheless Cicovacki stands out in being directly concerned with Kant himself and the postmodern milieu into which Kant's views, he claims, ultimately grow.

Cicovacki's book would be suitable for anyone with a background in Kant and interest in moving beyond standard (especially analytic) theories of truth. Some knowledge of contemporary analytic and Continental philosophy would help but is not necessary.

Chapter 1 introduces different questions concerning the nature of truth. It closes by explaining the sense in which Kant is at the crossroads of modernity: while Kant's Copernican revolution minimizes the ontological priority of the object over the subject, Cicovacki explains that Kant need not have affirmed the epistemological priority of the subject over the object. Instead, Cicovacki explains, Kant might have developed those lines of thought, most notably in the *Critique of Judgment*, granting subject and object epistemic parity, thereby changing the direction of the history of modern philosophy and modernity generally.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 constitute part 1, "Truths." Chapter 2 considers both Kant's and postmodernists' conception of commonsense truths, leading to a discussion of realism, idealism, and pragmatism. Chapter 3 turns to their conception of scientific truths, leading to a discussion of the nature of scientific knowledge. Chapter 4 claims to evaluate their conception of what Cicovacki calls "metaphysical" truths, though it really discusses the metaphysical problem of truth itself, from Parmenides to Wittgenstein, closing with remarks on Cicovacki's own interaction theory of truth.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 constitute part 2, "Illusions." Chapter 5 considers what Cicovacki calls "metaphysical illusions," prime examples of which are Kant's own antinomies. Chapter 6 turns to what Cicovacki calls "religious" illusions and Kant's project of keeping religion "within the limits of reason alone," situates that project within the European Enlightenment, and discusses Kant's views on the biblical Job. Chapter 7 claims to evaluate what Cicovacki calls "moral illusions," though it really discusses limitations in Kant's views on morality. These chapters are

largely exegetical. Nonetheless they advance Cicovacki's theme that the postmoderns inherit from Kant the denial that metaphysics, religion, and morality—like science itself—have any subject-independent Archimedean point from which to make claims.

Finally, chapters 8, 9, and 10 constitute part 3, "Can Truths Make Us Free? ". Here Cicovacki concludes his narrative, from Kant to postmodernism, and provides some details about his interaction theory of truth. Chapter 8 rehearses some of this narrative and argues that Kant is himself a metaphysician in just the sense he despised, dogmatically asserting the distinction between noumena and phenomena, and ultimately offering postmodernists a false dichotomy. Chapter 9 elaborates on the postmodernist predicament, suggests that, for Kant, art might be way of harmonizing subject and object, and again explores how nature might partner with the thinking subject to yield knowledge. Finally, chapter 10 ties together Cicovacki's discussion of truth, illusion, and related concepts, offering a persuasive diagnosis of how individuals and civilization evolve in their understanding of each. It then touches upon some revisions necessitated by Cicovacki's understanding truth as interaction.

Between Truth and Illusion: Kant at the Crossroads of Modernity offers insights into postmodernism and Kant's role in shaping it. Nonetheless, its subtitle should not be ignored: when Kant is not a point of departure for Cicovacki's own views, Kant is himself the object of study. In fact, Cicovacki offers only glimpses of his own theory of truth throughout the book; especially at the end he might have offered more pages than the few that he does to its actual development.—Nathaniel Goldberg, *Washington, DC*.

DE VRIES, Hent. *Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. xxiii + 443 pp. Cloth, \$64.00; paper, \$26.95—This book deals with an alleged turn to religion in an era of "post-theism" (p. xiii). It emphasizes "the intrinsic connection between religion and violence" (p. xv), though the operative notion of "violence" is virtually identical with "any and every kind of influence or causation whatsoever," including rational persuasion, except, perhaps, where respectful of human freedom (chapter 2). The author begins with Kant, then discusses Kierkegaard, but mainly dialogues with contemporary Continentals like Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and Carl Schmitt.

If you relish paradoxes, this is the book for you. The writings quoted are full of them; the book is largely about "a category beyond all categories" (pp. 181, 329, 349), "atemporal temporality" (p. 183), "the radical possibility of the impossible itself" (p. 189), the "concept without concept" (p. 191), "the myth of the myth, the metaphor of the metaphor" (p. 273), "hospitality-without-hospitality, brotherhood-without-brother-

hood, messianicity-without-messianism" (p. 310), "relation without relation" (pp. 325, 342), "ethics beyond ethics" (p. 333), and "the One plus or minus One, no longer exactly One, or more than One" (p. 356). The author and his protagonists seem to conceive of God only as "wholly other"; nothing constructive can be said about God except perhaps that the wholly other really isn't wholly other because it is wholly-other-than-other (pp. 158, 175–86, 281–2, 313, 388).

If you don't relish paradoxes and can't distinguish them from contradictions and similar nonsense, this book is probably not for you. You might think that these people have transformed all philosophizing into their much discussed "Babel" (pp. 266–73). You might wonder: Why isn't "paradoxical thinking" or "radical thought" just a lame excuse for sloppy thinking, or no thinking at all. Have these people turned all language into poetry, or into metaphors so radicalized that all words mean everything, anything, and nothing at all? For them, are all words substitutable infinitely for every word (pp. 352, 263, 394 n.)? For them do all words have transcendental meanings having nothing to do with living languages? For them do all words mean their opposites—nonviolence is violence, hospitality is inhospitality, friendship is enmity? Shades of George Orwell! As Derrida puts it, "There is Babel everywhere" (p. 272).

What they say is so confusing (and confused?) that we may be quite uncertain about whether we agree or disagree with them. Do they simply take the mystification route to the obvious? Perhaps they only intend to affirm more plainly expressed truisms like: there is an awful lot that we don't know; there are no philosophical certainties or absolute beginning points; we official philosophical custodians of rationality do not agree about what reason is or what it authorizes us to believe; we can never completely transcend the limitations of our own time and place; when we try to avoid ontology or metaphysics, it inevitably slips back in; many concepts mean nothing without their polar opposites; every affirmation implies a negation; human nature is deeply corrupt; the worst within us lies barely submerged below the surface and threatens constantly to erupt; our benevolence is often self-serving and deceptively exploitative; we never perfectly realize our ideals; concepts like "religion," "violence," "friendship," and "responsibility" are open-ended and can never be defined completely with absolute precision; and historical religion has often condoned violence. If this is all they are saying, who could disagree? They are not the first to identify such conundrums. Yet, they seem to think that they are probing, if not fathoming, much deeper mysteries, though what they are escapes me.—Rem B. Edwards, *The University of Tennessee*.

DOSTAL, Robert J., editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. xiii + 322 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$23.00—This collection of twelve essays (plus an introduction) achieves well the many objectives of the series within which it is placed: (1) It is a useful reference

book, especially in light of both the beginning biography and concluding bibliography. (2) It is a "non-intimidating" introduction, particularly in regard to the three initial essays by Dostal, Grondin, and Wachterhauser. (3) It has a great deal of interest for specialists in philosophical hermeneutics and in many other fields.

An informed biography by Dostal situates concisely Gadamer's intellectual achievements in the contexts of his life events and intellectual influences. Grondin, a Gadamer biographer himself, writes in this volume on the "core" topic of understanding. He elucidates three different meanings of understanding as they appear in *Truth and Method*—an intellectual grasp, a practical know-how (in the sense of "knowing one's way around"), and as agreement in the sense of "coming to an understanding"—and concludes by indicating how Gadamer and Heidegger differ with respect to the hermeneutic circle. Wachterhauser deals with an equally important topic, truth, and identifies a "hermeneutical fork" between philosophers for whom hermeneutics entails its demise and those for whom, like Gadamer, it is a corrective. He argues that the emphases on historical and linguistic conditionedness require neither epistemological relativism nor the rejection of realist ontology. A final core concept, language, is given a challenging and rewarding treatment by Figal who carefully analyzes—within the working out of the event of meaning—strong emphases on both openness, for example, the priority of the question, and closedness ("unified stream of historical life"), and queries as to the difficulties of reconciliation.

Four further essays deal with Gadamer's significance in ethics and politics, the human sciences, aesthetics, and theology. Two contributors, Warnke and Taylor, are well known for roles in the "interpretive turns" of political philosophy and philosophy of the social sciences. Warnke emphasizes the nonstatic character of tradition in the "Aristotelian" aspect of Gadamer's thinking, the openness to difference in dialogue of the "Kantian" aspect, and the pluralistic inclusion in the conversation as a less recognized "Hegelian aspect." Taylor honors Gadamer by re explicating the usefulness of the "fusion of horizons" in opposition to a conception of the human sciences dominated by natural scientific explanation. He claims that our fusing with horizons from alien societies and epochs allows us "to acknowledge the humanity of their way, while still being able to live ours" (p. 142). Baker, Jr. and Lawrence employ yet another Gadamerian concept, the "eminent text," in regard to lyric poetry and theology. For the former, poetry as language in an "eminent sense" has a speculative structure apart from philosophy that "discloses not a world so much as the being of world, the phenomenon of worldliness" (p. 161). For the latter, the New Testament is an "eminent text" with "an exceptional mode of historical being" that allows it, even though repeated, to function in an "originative" way which is not only normative but also "constitutive" of ourselves.

The remaining essays deal either with important historical figures for Gadamer or with his most important debates. Zuckert explains why philosophy begins with Plato and Aristotle for Gadamer and why there is continuity between them (Aristotle's critiques of Plato are not rejections of his thinking but rather attempts to clarify his intended

meaning). Pippin probes carefully how much Hegel is implicated, or not implicated, in Gadamer's attack on the primacy of self-consciousness and, conversely, how much Gadamer's description of the "happening" of the game overlooks an "active adherence" to the rules, which exhibits Hegelian reflectiveness and collective "mindedness" on the part of the players. With many references to Heidegger in previous essays, Dostal adds a needed essay regarding Gadamer's relationship to him and points to a crucially salient difference—Heidegger is a "meditative" thinker waiting for the voice of the gods, while Gadamer is "dialogical." Bernstein concludes the collection with a carefully balanced appraisal of Gadamer's two most famous dialogues—the protracted debate with Habermas on the universality of philosophical hermeneutics and the almost contracted discussion with Derrida on deconstruction.

An irony of this judiciously compiled and excellent volume is that the greatest praise for Gadamer may appear in a parenthesis. Pippin writes, "Indeed, only Hegel and Heidegger (and, one should now of course also say, Gadamer) have shown how philosophy itself should be understood not merely to have a history, but to be its history" (p. 228). While correct, the praise presents also a challenge for philosophical hermeneutics—namely, to respond to those who are inclined toward neither Gadamerian or Heideggerian linguistic ontology nor Hegelian philosophy of history and indeed come from a completely different historical tradition of analytic philosophy. More bridging, both hermeneutical and otherwise, of the "longstanding divide" (Thomas Kuhn) is necessary for the praise to receive its proper due.—Jerry Wallulis, *University of South Carolina*.

DÜSING, Klaus. *Subjektivität und Freiheit: Untersuchungen zum Idealismus von Kant bis Hegel*. Spekulation und Erfahrung, series II, vol. 47. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002. 321 pp. Cloth, €50.00—This volume contains nine essays published between 1980 and 1997 by Klaus Düsing, the director of Cologne's *Husserl-Archiv*. It is divided in four parts: (1) theoretical philosophy in transcendental idealism; (2) theory of subjectivity and metaphysics in speculative idealism; (3) ethics and theory of freedom; and (4) idealistic aesthetics. It is, however, focused in its entirety on the notion of subjectivity from Kant to Heidegger. Philosophical discussions about subjectivity or self-consciousness are enjoying a renewed success, as Düsing notes in his introductory essay on the notion of subjectivity in classical and contemporary German philosophy (p. 7–32). But this comes after a long period of dearth, during which it was mainstream to decompose the unity of the self-consciousness into a complex of conscious or preconscious lived experiences (p. 7). Düsing does not question the nature of the brain; his wish is to take a stance on what separates consciousness from self-consciousness or spirit, which English speakers might want to think of also in terms of mind (p. 11–12). Obviously, Kant and Hegel come handy for such an endeavor. In fact, the basis of all contemporary theories of self-

consciousness and subjectivity is provided by Kant's theories of apperception and imagination. Kant does not conceive of thinking as an anonymous process. He insists on the "I think," namely, on the unity of self-consciousness (p. 21). Kant did not, however, specify how is it possible for logical forms and categories to think through this "I think," which is their constitutive center of origin (p. 22). In other words, how can both pure logic and the theory of pure subjectivity claim to be founding elements, if they cannot be opened up by thought itself? The young Fichte and the young Schelling based their philosophical attempts on an interpretation of the theory of subjectivity in terms of transcendental idealism, which, however, leaves unexplained how one should provide a scientific treatment for transcendental idealism that implies those determinations and laws of pure logic that transcendental idealism cannot do without.

It was Hegel who gave the most satisfying answer. While writing his logic in terms of a theory of pure subjectivity, Hegel followed a completely new strain. He shows (1) that philosophy is about the gradual constitution (and restitution) of pure subjectivity, so that (2) the whole deduction of the categories ends up by being nothing else but the self-deployment of pure thought of itself in its determinations (pp. 23). The first part of the volume includes papers on Kant's theory of time (pp. 35–88), on Kant's theory of imagination (pp. 89–110), and on Kant and Heidegger on the circle of self-consciousness (pp. 111–40); the second part contains papers on constitution and structure of the identity of the ego (p. 143–80), on Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of apperception (pp. 143–80), and on negative theology in Schelling and Hegel (pp. 181–207); the third part includes papers on spontaneity and freedom in Kant (pp. 211–35), Hegel on Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* (pp. 236–50); the fourth part has papers on Schelling's aesthetics of genius (pp. 253–74), and on tragedy in Hölderlin and Hegel (pp. 275–321). Düsing thus provides a very welcome integration and some afterthoughts to his milestone book on the role of subjectivity in Hegel's logic (see *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik: Systematische und entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Prinzip des Idealismus und der Dialektik*, third edition [Bonn: Bouvier, 1995]).—Riccardo Pozzo, *University of Verona*.

FITZGERALD, Michael J. *Albert of Saxony's Twenty-five Disputed Questions on Logic. A Critical Edition of His Quaestiones circa logicam*. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des mittelalters 79. Leiden: Brill, 2002. ix + 433 pp. Cloth, \$177.00—Albert of Saxony was a major figure in fourteenth-century logic—one of the most creative and productive periods in the history of logic. He has, however, always been overshadowed by the towering figures of William Ockham and John Buridan, and hence his works are neither edited nor studied as much as they deserve.

Michael Fitzgerald has certainly remedied this to a great extent by publishing an edition of Albert's *Quaestiones circa logicam* (Questions on Logic). The *Questions* is not as well known as Albert's greatest work on logic, the *Perutilis logica* (The Very Useful Logic), but it is a very sophisticated work completed during his Paris period between 1351 and 1362. It is a rich work as well, which discusses some of the key issues in the philosophy of logic. For example, he treats problems of meaning, reference, oblique terms, universals, and contradictions.

The book also contains several appendices with transcriptions from Radolphus Strode and Albert's writings on the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Sophismata* and the logic of Porphyry. Together the edition and the appendices make the book produced by Fitzgerald a very important work that will greatly enhance our knowledge of Albert's thinking.

The critical edition of the Latin text of the *Questions on Logic* is a solid piece of work. It is based on six manuscripts, but four are singled out as the main manuscripts and they are used to create the text of the edition. It is not clear from Fitzgerald's introduction whether these are the only known manuscripts. On occasion the editor has added words or prefixes, which he believes to be missing in the manuscripts, within brackets. In most cases the additions are fine but in some places they simply make no sense, but since the additions are always marked this does not affect the usefulness of the text.

Fitzgerald's introduction to the edition is, however, a bit unorthodox. It does not attempt to place the text and its doctrine in context as one would expect, but instead it sets out to defend the originality of Albert's works. It is true that most contemporary commentators of Albert's works have claimed that he is a somewhat unoriginal although bright follower, if not student, of Buridan.

In his defense of Albert, Fitzgerald goes to the other extreme—occasionally even arguing that Buridan is criticizing Albert or that Buridan has taken some of his views from Albert. The basis for these claims is very weak, as far as I can see. The truth lies probably somewhere in between these extremes. Even if Albert was not a student of Buridan, they certainly shared fundamental convictions about the nature of philosophy and logic, but this does not mean that one copied the other. Albert was a very competent philosopher that most certainly came to the positions he held by thinking for himself, and I do not think anybody has ever doubted this.

Albert's *Questions on Logic* is by no means a simple work and was not meant for beginners or students new to the field of logic. Each question cuts right into an ongoing debate and assumes that the reader is already familiar with the problem. One example is the debate on supposition theory at the time. Logicians before Ockham argued that there were three basic kinds of supposition, namely personal, simple, and material. Ockham held on to this tripartite division, but being a nominalist he could not claim that a term having simple supposition stood for a universal or common nature. He instead claimed that such a term stands for the concept in the soul, which it immediately signifies. Buridan took the natural next step and eliminated simple supposition entirely. He in fact claimed that in the mental language there is only personal supposi-

tion and hence eliminated material supposition as well. Surprisingly, Albert follows Ockham and retains both simple and material supposition. I would have expected him to follow Buridan here.

Appendix six contains transcriptions of two very interesting questions from Albert's commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. The first question (really question three of the work) is about whether every doctrine or intellectual discipline is developed out of preexisting cognitions, or, to use a more familiar term, innate ideas or concepts. The second one (really the seventh) concerns the question whether it is possible for us to know anything. The discussion and the issues dealt with in these questions are strikingly modern and could have been written in the seventeenth century rather than the mid-fourteenth century. These extracts certainly support the view some scholars have argued for in recent years, namely, that it is to the early fourteenth century and particularly to the nominalist tradition starting with Ockham that we should look to find the emergence of modern philosophy, and not to Descartes in the seventeenth century. Let us hope that Fitzgerald's edition sparks new interest in Albert's thinking and also in fourteenth-century nominalism.—Henrik Lagerlund, *Uppsala University*.

GLOYNA, Tanja. *Kosmos und System: Schellings Weg in die Philosophie*. Schellingiana, Vol. 15. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002. viii + 301 pp.—It can hardly be denied that since Schelling's early comment on Plato's *Timaeus* was published (F. W. J. Schelling, "*Timaeus*" (1794). Schellingiana, Vol. 4, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994, 177 pp.) the research on Schelling's philosophical beginnings has been thoroughly renewed. This text documented for the first time Schelling's in-depth acquaintance with Plato while he studied in Tübingen (1790–95) and exhibited at the same time his characteristically Kantian reading and understanding of Plato's theory of creation. Two years later, in 1996, Michael Franz refined Schelling's view on Plato during his years in Tübingen, by commenting on hitherto unpublished new material from the *Berliner Nachlass* (M. Franz, *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien*, Neue Studien zur Philosophie, Vol. 11, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996, viii + 344 pp.). With Tanja Gloyna's *Kosmos und System*, another major study is added to the attempt at unravelling the significance of Platonic philosophy to Schelling's early writings.

Gloyna's aim is to reconstruct "Schelling's journey into philosophy," that is, the time of his philosophical apprenticeship that results in his so-called first philosophy around 1795. In order to do so, she makes three distinct moves. First, she offers her readings of Schelling's recently revealed Platonic Studies, that is, the *Timaeus* and the texts published by Franz, but in addition, she relies on new material: the transcriptions of Schelling's *Tübinger* notebooks from the *Berliner Nachlass*. These notebooks, though they have not yet been published, were put at Gloyna's disposal by Klaus Grotzsch, who is responsible for their eventual critical edition. References in these notebooks and other texts

allowed Gloyna to list the major, though nowadays almost forgotten, authors Schelling relied on for his interpretations of Plato and Kant. As a consequence, Gloyna's next step in reconstructing "Schelling's journey into philosophy" consists in the successive exploration of the various interpretations of Kant and Plato that is offered by these authors. Finally, and to put the foregoing to the test, Gloyna concludes with a reinterpretation of Schelling's first philosophy, contained in *Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt* (1794) and *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen* (1795).

The main results of Gloyna's investigation are, again, threefold. In the first place, she endorses wholeheartedly the alleged importance of Plato's philosophy for Schelling's philosophical apprenticeship. Indeed, she is able to qualify some of the conclusions which other scholars reached in this respect. The analyses of Schelling's notebooks, according to Gloyna, reveal the young Schelling adapting the "christian Platonism" of his days, being the theorem of the equal accessibility of eternal truth by revelation and by reason, which explains the similarities between Plato's philosophy and christian theology. Secondly, Gloyna argues that as from the *Timaeus*, Schelling's view on Plato changes drastically. He drops "christian Platonism" and starts reading Plato from a Kantian point of view. The basic argument for doing so, according to Gloyna, was Schelling's underlying view of the history of philosophy as being a single and gradual development of the truth. As a result, Platonic themes and insights could perfectly be met again at different times and with a different idioms but would nevertheless assert the same truths. In Schelling's view this is exactly what happened to be the case with Plato and Kant: in Kant, the Platonic insights ultimately were met anew. Although this could easily lead us into thinking that Schelling read Plato in a Kantian manner—which, at times, he certainly did, Gloyna indicates that for the very same reason, Schelling was also authorized to read Kant in a Platonic way—which he did indeed, and perhaps even more frequently. This relates to Gloyna's third and probably most spectacular assessment: in Schelling's *Timaeus*, she discovers the main key for what afterwards became the singularity of Schelling's philosophical system: its perfect mirroring between the system of nature and the (transcendental) system of knowledge, between *Kosmos* and *System*. Gloyna, in this respect, points to a phrase in the *Timaeus* in which Plato is said to be "always transferring the subjective to the objective." At first sight, Gloyna argues, Plato thus seems to be an inverted Kant, but against the background of Schelling's view on the history of philosophy, the Platonic system soon turns out to be the implied counterpart of the Kantian system. For the Platonic theory of creation, with its forms shaping the material substratum, mirrors the Kantian theory of knowledge, with its a priori structures producing the objects of knowledge. Both theories, according to Schelling, point to one and the same truth: the existence of an absolute reality of which nature and human knowledge are the objective and subjective manifestations of equal value.—Antoon Braeckman, *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium*.

HALBIG, Christoph. *Objektives Denken. Erkenntnistheorie und 'Philosophy of Mind' in Hegel's System*. Stuttgart: Friedrich Fromann Verlag, 2002. 400 pp. Cloth, €69.00—The book explores Hegel's epistemology and philosophy of mind, primarily using Hegel's *Encyclopedia* and his *Logics*.

Halbig first investigates the views of other scholars on Hegel's system. On one side, it is seen to be another metaphysical project (Taylor). On the other side, it exemplifies historical relativism (Solomon). In the middle, it represents the development of Kant's critical philosophy (Pippin, Pinkard).

Then, Hegel's view on other philosophy of mind constructs is presented, such as on Condillac's sensualism and on empiricism. It is here that Halbig defines Hegel's *Geist*. The concept of *Geist* requires as a necessary though not sufficient condition (this would be the subject's labor toward this concept) the situatedness of the subject in an ideal cultural environment. The concept of *Geist* has more breadth than the situated historical view of it. It is intelligence that actualizes *Geist*. The recognition of the world as reasonable results in an internalization of *Geist*. Although Halbig argues that, for Hegel, this constitutes certainty of the world, in footnote 1 on p. 80 he admits that Hegel also classified it as belief. *Geist* works through the individual and Halbig gives a broad definition of *Geist* that encompasses all areas of human cognition such as soul, consciousness and self-consciousness. Moreover, the subject-object relationship of *Geist* must be seen in an intersubjective, communicative context (p. 93). *Geist* is developing toward an ideality, and only the concept of *Geist* can make adequate claims about the world. The subject represents this ideality. Hegel's broad concept of *Geist* suggests a *Verleiblichung*—a translation of reason into affects or sensations. Throughout the book Halbig argues that, for Hegel, the different components of *Geist* (sensation and thinking) inform and transform each other to constitute the concrete unity of *Geist*.

The author justifies Hegel's holistic view of *Geist* as living entity by investigating modular theories of the mind, such as J. Fodor's, with an excursus into the foundational work of F. J. Gall. Hegel assumes an interconnectedness of the different components of the mind whose content can be changed by educational processes. Philosophical reflection upon one's situated common sense might lead to a different understanding, which, in turn, changes one's common sense. Nonetheless, philosophical reflection does not come naturally. It requires practice and can only be achieved in a cultural environment that is sympathetic to abstract thinking. Clearly, *Geist* only produces truth in its most developed form.

Still, it remains debatable whether this truth constitutes ontological truth. Halbig argues this position in dismissing Fulda's epistemological truth assumption as allowing for an unwarranted skepticism. Halbig points out that Hegel uses correctness, that is, "correspondence of a thing in our imagination," and truth, that is, "correspondence of a thing with itself" (p. 185). He consequently concludes that Hegel's concept of truth represents an ontological truth.

The book then explores Hegel's view on empiricism, on Kant's and on Jacobi's philosophy. He criticizes empiricism (mainly Hume) for not sufficiently honoring its epistemological implications, that is, the importance of the subject. In contrast to Kant's philosophy, Hegel highlights the concept of the concrete unity of *Geist*, an elemental, though in Kant's work neglected, consideration for epistemology. Halbig presents that Hegel made an ontological truth claim in his discussion of Kant's philosophy. Hegel also critiques Jacobi's philosophy of immediacy, that is, immediate knowledge of actuality based on perception. This epistemology lacks conceptual scrutiny of perceptions. For Hegel, immediate knowledge comes from reason which is influenced by history and experiences.

The author summarizes his findings in the concluding chapter of the book. *Geist* has the potential toward truth regardless of the societal framework. Nonetheless, *Geist* requires that the subject can be educated within a supportive culture and that the subject is not subdued by arbitrariness or by ignorance. Halbig contends that Hegel's truth represents an absolute idealism and a direct realism. He discusses John McDowell in support of his position, though McDowell represents a holistic cognitive science as an enabling condition not as a constitutive condition (p. 335). Halbig delineates his interpretation from the common interpretation of Hegel's epistemology and ontology as a nonfoundational foundationalism allowing for a historical schematic relativism (see, for example, Winfield). In the concluding pages, Halbig debates other Hegel interpreters who do not go as far as to infer direct realism upon Hegel's epistemology.

The book exemplifies Hegel's complex epistemology. It is of special value for those who query the importance of affects and of *Verleiblichung* within Hegel's understanding of *Geist*. Halbig argues with many Hegel interpreters in order to make the point that Hegel's epistemology grasps the thing-in-itself. However, I suspect that few readers are convinced. Nonetheless, the book displays a myriad of arguments related to Hegel's epistemology and ontology that is highly beneficial for a better understanding of Hegel's logic.—Erich P. Schellhammer, *Royal Roads University*.

HALL, Jonathan M. *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. xviii + 312 pp. Cloth, \$50.00—Good historical writing not only gives us insight into the past, it also loosens the hold the present has on us and enables us to engage that present with increased critical self-awareness. By exploring the relationship between ethnicity and culture in the formation of the self-consciousness of Greeks as Greeks (the idea of Hellenicity) in the ancient world, Jonathan M. Hall enables us to grasp more coherently the dynamic and complex ways that ethnic identities are formed (and fluctuate) and the different roles such identities can play in the elaboration of cultural identities. Such understanding is crucial for the world we live

in because, as he notes in his opening discussion of the debates surrounding the sense of "Britishness," "ethnic and national categorization has assumed an increasing importance" (p. 5) within contemporary cosmopolitanism.

The basic set of questions that animates his study is formulated as follows: "Who did the Greeks—or Hellenes, as they called themselves—believe they were and why? On what criteria did they base their sense of Hellenic consciousness? In short, how 'ethnic' were the Greeks?" (p. 5) In response to these questions, the author develops two principal arguments. The first, which occupies the bulk of the book (chapters 2–5—there are six chapters in all), attempts to make the case "that a subjective sense of Hellenic identity—over, above or in addition to regional, civic or subcivic affiliations—emerged in Greece rather later than is normally assumed" (p. 5). The normal assumption, challenged in chapter 4, is that "a self-conscious sense of Hellenic identity first emerged as a result of the colonial expeditions of the eighth century" (p. 6). The general idea here is that, through these "great colonizing movements," the Greeks were brought "into direct confrontation with indigenous peoples whose language, beliefs, customs and general way of life seemed desperately alien" (p. 90). Close attention to what the historical record (both archaeological and literary) can be made to reveal shows how such an assumption is unfounded and betrays a gross oversimplification of the complex and dynamic characteristics of ethnic identification. Indeed, it is Hall's appreciation of these complex and dynamic characteristics that is of most philosophical interest. Part of the point of his study is both to narrow and to focus the concept of ethnicity which, for Hall, "denotes both the self-consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group ('ethnic identity') and the dynamic process that structures, and is structured by, ethnic groups in social interaction with one another" (p. 9). To capture the sense of ethnic self-consciousness as it is played out in this dynamic process, Hall makes use of the idea of "fictive kinship" which, while linking identity to kinship, insists that tracing actual genetic lineage is less important than the fact that "ethnic members act *as if* they are related" or, put otherwise, the "fictive and performative dimension of ethnic proclamation" (p. 15) is what needs to be emphasized (which this French-Canadian reviewer working and writing in predominantly English-speaking North America performatively confirms here and now). Such an emphasis sets the stage for Hall's claim that ethnicity needs to be understood as a specific type of cultural identity (to be contrasted with linguistic identity, religious identity, or occupational identity) whose distinguishing feature is the idea that "the symbols upon which it draws revolve around notions of fictive kinship and descent, common history and a specific homeland" (p. 17).

This distinction between ethnic and cultural identity is at the core of Hall's second principal argument (elaborated in the final chapter) which makes the claim that "the definitional basis of Hellenic identity shifted from ethnic to broader cultural criteria in the course of the fifth century" (p. 7). In other words, *Hellas*, or Hellenicity, needs to be understood as a cultural rather than a racial or ethnic concept. Such a view impacts on how we are meant to understand the relation the Greeks had

(and bequeathed) to the “barbarian other,” or what Hall calls the “barbarian antitype” (p. 199) that plays an increasingly prominent role in the dramatic works of the Classical period. Hellenicity needs to be understood as a cultural identity where the barbarian is not radically other but rather is insufficiently culturally educated according to “Athenoconcentric” (p. 202) norms. And this identity forms part of an attack on the ethnically (however fictitiously performed) grounded elites.

In addition to providing a mirror to contemporary ethnic proclamations and the strategic cultural cosmopolitanism that seeks to discredit them, Hall's work, with its extensive bibliography, is a model of historiographical sophistication. It is sure to be of value to anyone interested in exploring how carefully playing literary evidence off of archaeological evidence and vice versa can yield historical intelligibility.—Réal Fillion, *University of Sudbury*.

HILL, Thomas E., Jr. *Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. xi + 415 pp. Cloth, \$72.00; paper, \$19.95—This anthology contains several of Thomas E. Hill's essays on the contributions various basic Kantian themes can be seen to make to the topics of human welfare and moral worth. The essays have been written over the last decade, and all but two have been previously published in academic journals and anthologies. This volume complements one published in 2000 entitled, *Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives*, and it is part of Hill's “ongoing project to develop a moral theory in the Kantian tradition that is as plausible as possible” (p. 279). The essays reveal Hill's Kantian sympathies and sensibilities, without being apologies for Kantian ethics: what Hill takes to be untenable Kantian claims are identified and explicitly rejected. What Hill takes to be unreasonable interpretations of Kantian points suffer a similar fate. The anthology has a very useful introduction by Hill, which provides a brief synopsis of each essay as well as the organizing principles behind the selections and their ordering. Those readers who do not think of themselves as Kant scholars will not be out of their depths.

The first of three sections is entitled, “Some Basic Kantian Themes.” In the first essay, Hill develops the Kantian requirement that moral reasoning be grounded in an a priori method, the notion of duties as categorical imperatives, and the requirement that moral agents have autonomy of will. In so doing, he is guided by the desire to show how the essential elements of these key Kantian notions can be reconciled with what he takes to be a common sense morality and to deflect some of the criticisms engendered by Kant's apparent exceptionless absolutism (which Hill claims is required by Kant's understanding of the categorical imperative and not by his insistence on an a priori method) and his rhetoric about setting aside all empirical considerations. The second essay in this section delivers an explicitly sympathetic and modest interpretation of the goodness ascribed to the good will, while the third essay examines the justificatory role of actual, possible, and hypothetical con-

sent standards, and argues that the second and third are essentially the same. This essay is perhaps the odd one out both stylistically and in terms of its content, being both more technical and less obviously a contribution to the themes of human welfare and moral worth than the other essays.

The second section, "Human Welfare: Self Interest and Regard for Others," contains five essays, including two previously unpublished ones. The first three include discussions of the relations between rationality and morality (especially as they concern self-interested behavior), between duties of beneficence and those of self-love, and between happiness and human flourishing. The first of the previously unpublished essays raises questions about the stringency of altruistic duties and the place of supererogatory acts in Kantian ethics, and the second inquires into the kinds of value judgments that are implicit in persons' choices of ends. A recurrent Kantian theme through all the essays is the importance of the freedom of the autonomous agent to make rationally deliberative choices. Other moral positions, both historical and contemporary, are brought to bear on these discussions, and the positions that are defended—or sometimes sketched—are often acknowledged to be "reconstructions" of Kantian positions.

The third section, "Moral Worth: Self-Assessment and Desert," begins with an essay that examines four distinct conceptions of conscience and shows how Kant's conception fits his theory better than other conceptions available at the time. The next two essays in this section treat of judicial punishment and of how it is associated with assessments of the moral worth of others. The final essay, "Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues," addresses the charge that Kantian ethics generate unresolvable moral dilemmas. It concedes that a Kantian ethics may involve gaps, but it argues that the indeterminacy is preferable to the alternatives and may even be welcome under certain circumstances. It also attempts to show that a Kantian ethics not only permits but also expects the agent acting in good will to experience justified feelings of agent regret in cases of tragic moral conflict, thereby demonstrating how Kantian theory coincides with reflective ordinary opinion.

The anthology includes some important essays that succeed in showing how basic Kantian principles can be employed to illuminate some central moral concepts. Collectively, the essays contribute to Hill's larger aim, which is "to distinguish Kant's basic moral theory from unwarranted particular conclusions, to show its appeal so far as possible, to call attention to its shortcomings as I see them, and to suggest modifications to make Kantian ethics more plausible at least on some issues" (p. 165). In so doing, they invite the reader to think about human welfare and moral worth through a modified Kantian perspective.—Christine McKinnon, *Trent University*.

KESTENBAUM, Victor. *The Grace and Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. 261 pp. Cloth, \$45.00; paper, \$20.00—Many commentators on John Dewey's pragmatism contend that, after an early emphasis on the role of transcendent ideals in his philosophical studies of aesthetics, ethics, religion, and education, Dewey gradually but conclusively adopted an instrumentalist account of reason and a thoroughgoing naturalism. Stanley Cavell, for example, suggests that Dewey's pragmatism has little place for transcendence and does not take metaphysical distinctions seriously. Kestenbaum's elegantly written book makes a convincing case for the thesis that Dewey's philosophy always remained committed to the "atmospheric" priority of transcendent ideals, to a horizon of meaning which "outruns" the empirically verifiable. Dewey's striking reference to "the grace and severity of the ideal" provides the title and leit-motif for this study, for it suggests that the transcendent ideals are experienced as guides in the pragmatic struggle for the good. Dewey also describes our relationship to the ideal as "the most far-reaching question" of philosophy.

Borrowing a theme from Merleau-Ponty, the author describes Dewey's pragmatic account of meaning as situated at the intersection of presence and absence, visible and invisible, tangible and intangible. For example, Dewey's treatment of the central importance of habit in the development of the self demonstrates that his naturalism is far removed from a reductive materialism. He acknowledges both the physiological and phenomenological dimensions of habit. As the author puts it: habit is "the concept best suited to do justice to the historical, organized, projective, anonymous features of experience. Habit is history naturalized, history become a nature" (p. 143).

Our intellectual and moral habits may sometimes be as rigid and intractable as our long established comportment. But habit is not fate. Dewey asserts that "in the midst of effort" and even in "the thickest practicalities" we may be responsive to the "shadowy background" of the realm of transcendent ideals.

Kestenbaum artfully relates Dewey's effort to locate meaning in the intersection of pragmatic struggle and intangible transcendence to the comparable approaches of several more contemporary authors. Some brief comments on his comparisons with such diverse thinkers as Michael Oakeschott, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Wallace Stevens may serve to indicate the breadth and richness that he brings to these enlightening comparisons.

Michael Oakeschott holds that ethical deliberation may best be described as "the reciprocal adjustment of habits and imagined outcomes." Because habits of mind are only partially explicit and are therefore not easily formulated as propositions or rules, and because imagined outcomes belong to the realm of not yet fully explicit goals or ideals, the rationality of deliberation is more closely linked to the ensuing conduct rather than to some fully premeditated and clearly formulated purpose. Rationality is "a quality of the conduct itself" rather than a characteristic of some fully reflective strategy. Kestenbaum points out that this description is remarkably similar to Dewey's claim that deliberation is more like a "dramatic rehearsal" that "stamps" a proposed conduct at

once as good or evil. He adds that it is this direct sense of value belonging to the conduct itself rather than an explicit consciousness of rules and goals that governs the decision to act. Kestenbaum notes that Robert Sokolowski makes a similar point when he says that the rationality operative in ethical deliberation has its site not in some systematic ideal network but "in proximity to performances" (p. 117).

Hans-Georg Gadamer suggests that we need to rehabilitate the positive sense of prejudgment which has been camouflaged and distorted by the negative notion of prejudice. Our prejudgments are not necessarily unjustified or erroneous biases. All too human in their limits, they are nonetheless modes of openness to the world. Kestenbaum observes that this interpretation of our prejudgments closely resembles Dewey's description of habit. He adds, however, that Gadamer's analysis unfortunately construes the preservation of the past in our present as mainly an achievement of reason. Dewey's description of habit highlights more effectively the richer and more corporeal preconditions of our openness to the world.

It has often been said that Dewey's discussion of religious faith detaches piety and reverence from transcendence. Kestenbaum acknowledges that Dewey sometimes suggests that he fully endorses Santayana's view that religion and poetry are essentially identical except that poetry becomes religion when it intervenes in life and religion becomes poetry when it detaches itself from the pragmatic struggles of life. On the other hand, Dewey maintains that religious believers have been right in describing the experience of transcendent ideals as "an influx from sources beyond conscious deliberation and purpose" (p. 182). The intentional objects of faith experience "stir and hold us" but the meanings they bestow are beyond truths for the intellect (p. 185).

A concluding chapter compares Dewey's frequent references to transcendent ideals that "mark a break with the ordinary" with similar passages from Wallace Stevens's poetry. For example, in "The Sail of Ulysses," Stevens refers to "the particular thought" of "the living man in the present place" as a thought "that bends the particulars to the abstract" and as "the difficult inch on which the vast arches of space repose." The latter evocative image, Kestenbaum observes, captures what Dewey meant by our experience of a "more" which is not simply a magnification of some antecedent reality or ideal" (p. 204).

This book is a significant and eminently readable contribution to our understanding of the work of John Dewey.—Richard Cobb-Stevens, *Boston College*.

KISIEL, Theodore. *Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretive Signposts*. Edited by Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz. New York and London: Continuum, 2002. xvi + 259 pp. Cloth \$115.00; paper \$33.95—This collection of nine important essays by Theodore Kisiel, most of them written and published in the 1990s, is a necessity for every

Heideggerian, American or European. The editors who put this volume together are both recognized European Heidegger scholars: Alfred Denker is a member of the Centre des études Heideggeriennes and Director of the Centre Philosophique Les Trois Hiboux in (Pont de Cirou) France. He is author of the *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2000), editor of a collection Heidegger's letters between 1912 and 1933, and author of several scholarly papers on Heidegger. Marion Heinz, a full professor of philosophy at Siegen University in Germany, has written a book and several articles on Heidegger among her impressive output. She received her Ph.D. in 1980 at Wuppertal with a dissertation on early Heidegger, which was published in 1982 as *Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität*. Her later habilitation on Herder was accepted at the same university in 1991 and subsequently published. She is editor of one of the collected works of Heidegger (GA 44, on Nietzsche's eternal return), author of two dozen articles, as well as editor of several volumes in the area of feminist theory.

As author of *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), a meticulously documented 600-page volume which placed him among the most careful and authoritative interpreters of Heidegger, Kisiel needs no introduction to Heideggerians. His meticulous translation of GA 20, *History of the Concept of Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) and his earlier translation of Werner Marx's *Heidegger and the Tradition* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971) mark him as an outstanding translator. The discussion of whether an introduction and impedimenta should be added to the GA volume (even corrections!) that he translated, and the refusal on the German side, sparked a rather acrimonious exchange of letters between the Heidegger Conference of America and the German holders of copyright, and in that debate Kisiel has remained over the years an active critic of the editorial policies of the publishers of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Rightly so, since the present volumes simply make a critical edition eventually necessary and deprive present readers of much important information.

Absent this needed commentary, the writings of Kisiel take on an increased significance by providing valuable background information on the influences at play on the early Heidegger in his book on *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* and now further background details in this collection of nine essays, a tracing of Heidegger's path of thought from early to late. *A Handbook to Heidegger* would be a possible title to the present assemblage of Kisiel's essays (a full list is provided as an appendix at the back of the volume), except that one of the editors, Alfred Denker, has already produced a *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy* (cited above). Each essay offers a wealth of detail. The first, "Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology," is especially important. It gives Kisiel's factual commentary on Heidegger's interlude with the Nazis. In light of the scandal aroused by Victor Farias's *Heidegger et le nazisme* (1987), Kisiel's 38 pages of facts try to go "Beyond Farias and Ott" (compare pp. 17–24) to construct "a philosophical biography" of Heidegger. One can only be grateful for a treatment that is neither sensationalistic or outraged and defensive.

Chapter 2 is the missing introduction, that Kisiel could not include, to his translation of the *Prolegomena to the Concept of Time*. This is something every owner of that translation would want to have to make the translation complete. Chapter 3, "The New Translation of *Sein und Zeit*: A Grammatological Lexicographer's Commentary," surprises readers by finding strengths and weaknesses in both translations. Instead of hailing Joan Stambaugh's new translation as putting us in the promised land of translating Heidegger's masterwork, he looks at the context of both translations and finds Macquarrie and Robinson's somewhat stilted English still has a lot to offer. As the Editor's foreword notes, Kisiel's hermeneutical approach is to place the text in the biography, chronology, and doxography of the author's work (pp. vi–vii). This hermeneutical approach, this attention to context, is his special strength and the trademark of his work, which subsequent readers will increasingly value. This discussion will be of interest to every reader of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* in English.

"Heidegger (1907–1927): The Transformation of the Categorical," (chapter 4) was for this reader one of the most interesting chapters. This was not only because of its very penetrating remarks on the relationship of Heidegger to Dilthey, but because it traced how the Aristotelian, Kantian, and then especially Husserlian term was transformed in meaning by Heidegger from "the immanent structures of intentional consciousness [Husserl] to the ecstatic structures of worldly existence"—in the terminology of American philosophy this was "a Gestalt switch" (p. 100).

Space does not permit a discussion of the remaining chapters on such matters as the term *Existenz* in Heidegger on its way to *Sein und Zeit*, the importance of Emil Lask, the move from a focus on intuition to a focus on understanding: "transposing Husserl," and the final chapter on the mathematical and hermeneutical a priori. All are a delight to read and they give one a deeper grasp of the transition from Husserl to Heidegger. In doing so, they also give the reader a fuller idea of what Heidegger was all about as he tried to articulate in words the "one thing" that he as a thinker tried to think.

This book offers a valuable continuation and supplement of Kisiel's indispensable work on early Heidegger, and it should be in every library, public and personal, that offers commentary on perhaps the most radical and controversial thinker of the twentieth century.—Richard E. Palmer, *MacMurray College*.

KUNTZ, Marion Leathers. *The Anointment of Dionisio: Prophecy and Politics in Renaissance Italy*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. xviii + 446 pp. Cloth, \$55.00—In the spring of 1566, a mysterious stranger appeared in Venice and began to preach around the Piazza San Marco. He called himself Dionisio Gallo, and no one has ever discovered whether that was his real name. Dionisio had come

from France where he had apparently been rector of the College de Li-sieux, although even that small detail of his life has not been established definitively. He claimed that in 1563 the Virgin Mary had anointed him in a mystical vision and that his prophetic mission was initiated with this anointment. Through his preaching and his writing, he criticized many of the same abuses in the Church that had been cited by Luther and by the reform commission established by Pope Paul III. The Council of Trent had completed its sessions, but Dionisio, along with many others, did not believe that the Council had accomplished the work of reform.

Eventually Dionisio came to the attention of the Inquisition and was imprisoned over a period of a year and a half. During that time he was questioned often, usually confounding the inquisitor with his enigmatic answers and his counterquestions. His inquisition was apparently atypical since he was asked little about his beliefs concerning doctrine. The inquisitor's greatest concern centered on the question of the Church's right to hold riches and property, which was a crucial question for both Catholic and Protestant reformers. After enduring the horrible conditions of prison life, he was found guilty of holding public assemblies contrary to the command of the Holy Office, assemblies at which he expressed some heretical and scandalous opinions. However, the judges decided that he had acted "not from error of intellect but from a certain disturbance of soul, agitated by certain disquieting humors" (p. 176). Therefore they concluded that he could not be held responsible for those actions. He was banished from Venice and nothing more is known of his life after that.

Dionisio Gallo's brief appearance on the Venetian stage allows Marion Kuntz to display the rich tapestry of life in that city through the narrow window of its prophetic preoccupations. There was apparently a strong link between the Venetian nobility and prophetic preacher-reformers who were attracted to Venice because of its openness to the prophetic voice. Humanists and artisans testify to the prophetic ambience. It was, for example, in Venice that Guillaume Postel translated the cabalistic *Zohar* from the original Aramaic into Latin. The prophetic voice in Venice was grounded in medieval and Biblical sources and focused itself chiefly on the reform of the Church.

Although this book does not explicitly address the philosophical issues of the day—indeed, Dionisio himself seldom dealt with philosophical or theological themes—it does provide insight into the relationship between religion and politics in Venice and in the Renaissance world in general. Thus it brings to life in vivid detail the setting in which modern political philosophy was born.

Dionisio believed "that his role was to bring about the accord between heaven and earth by demanding that the Church be reformed. The reformation of the Church would then signal a reformation of society, a universal brotherhood" (p. 20–1). His work, the *Legatio*, provided the "true and absolute method" for accomplishing the reform of the Church and society (p. 209). Dionisio saw himself as inaugurating a new order of things, a universal state in which society would be ordered

according to divine principles. His *Legatio* was the constitution of that new order. In this he echoes Guillaume Postel who also dreamed of a universal monarchy both spiritual and political.

There is much about Dionisio, as Kuntz presents him, that suggests that the judgment of the Inquisition was correct. This was a man who suffered from disquieting humors. (He proposed, for example, that he should direct the church of Gaul and Germany, while the pope directed that of Italy and Spain.) Nevertheless, he allows us to imagine a world in which the question of the relationship between religion and politics is not only taken seriously but actually debated in the public square.

Marion Kuntz's treatment of prophecy also gives us a glimpse of the role of reason and the claims of reason in that debate. "There is an important relationship in the sixteenth century between the prophetic voice and the emphasis on human reason" (p.135). The prophet believed that his reason had been restored by Christ, that his understanding had been restored to its state before the Fall. The philosopher would like to know more about this possibility of reason and whether it is in any way connected to the notion of reason that is about to emerge in modern Europe.

This book is a work of extensive scholarship and erudition, and a worthy successor of Marion Kuntz's work on Postel. At its deepest level, it is an appreciation of the truth of the "myth of Venice."—Ann Hartle, *Emory University*.

MALPAS, Jeff, Ulrich ARNSWALD, and Jens KERTSHER, editors. *Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer*. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. London: MIT Press, 2002. xiv + 363 pp. Paper, \$25.00—The title of this collection of essays contains a productive ambiguity that carries through the collection. The essays, by such notable thinkers as Alasdair MacIntyre, Robert Pippen, Paul Ricoeur, Stanley Rosen, Charles Taylor, and Gianni Vattimo, address both Gadamer's own life and work that spanned just over a century and the philosophical century which he inhabited, most notably, the century in which philosophy itself grappled with the end of metaphysics and the concomitant loss of the absolute universal. It is a collection that takes up from varying philosophical standpoints the ensuing linguistic turn as well as the problem of reason in both its practical and theoretical forms. Still further, it is a collection of essays which together argue that the hermeneutical standpoint articulated by Gadamer in *Truth and Method* may be philosophy's best methodological hope. What makes this collection of essays both unique and invaluable is its attempt to perform a Gadamerian "fusion of horizons"; it not only brings philosophy together with other disciplines such as religion, art, and poetry, it also brings together Continental and analytic responses to Gadamer's hermeneutical project and to the issues confronting philosophy in Gadamer's century, a century that paradoxically remains ours.

Gerald Burns's essay argues that "one of the basic projects of philosophical hermeneutics is to give an account of the rationality of everyday rationality" (p. 43). This account, however, is impossibly difficult given that there is no Archimedean standpoint within the complex system of the everyday from which to articulate the whole. Burns proposes a "principle of insufficient reason" learned from rhetoric and found at play in the hermeneutical experience of art. Jay Garfield's essay, "Philosophy, Religion, and the Hermeneutic Imperative," calls for a fusion of horizons with Asian philosophy arguing that Western philosophy cannot so quickly dismiss the former by claiming it is religious in the way that Western philosophy is not. Stanley Rosen's essay on dreaming and wakefulness, first given as his inaugural lecture at Boston University in 1994, is perhaps the most beautifully written essay of the collection. A reflection on poetry and philosophy in which he rejects Prospero in favor of Achilles, Rosen is clearly influenced by Gadamer's insistence that philosophy's task is to hone our sense of the real by responding to the complexities of ordinary experience with extraordinary clarifying responses.

Essays by MacIntyre and Ricouer respectively grapple with the problem of history and the transmission of tradition. Both essays confront a notoriously difficult problem in Gadamer's work, namely, how to think the new if the hermeneutical project is always embedded in a historical horizon. Pippen's essay takes up the role of reflection in the hermeneutical project, as it defends a Hegelian notion of understanding rooted in the Kantian theory of judgment against a Heideggerian notion of understanding as "disclosedness" and arguing that Gadamer's hermeneutical project would do well not to forget its debt to Hegel.

Vattimo's essay, "Gadamer and the Problem of Ontology," is a first rate explication of Gadamer's claim, "Being that can be understood is language" (p. 301). Certainly the essays that bring together Gadamer with Wittgenstein and Davidson are working from out of this claim. Ulrich Arnszweig compares Wittgenstein's and Gadamer's understanding of language games and forms of life. Three essays, including one by Charles Taylor, compare Davidson's "principle of charity" with Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." Jeff Malpas's essay addresses the importance of these comparisons: "[It] is not to be found in the mere observation of philosophical convergence but rather in the new light that can be shed through such a 'fusion of horizons' on the ideas that are themselves at issue" (p. 196).

My one criticism of the book is found in the opening essay by Hans Albert. Influenced by Karl Popper, Albert lays out his basic disagreement with what he calls Gadamer's "universal hermeneutics and the linguistically oriented idealism influenced by it" (p. 22). He concludes by saying he has no hope his criticism will have an impact on any of Gadamer's many readers, including those in the analytic tradition. The essays that follow bear out the validity of his despair; they all develop aspects of a universal hermeneutics that renders reality thoroughly linguistic. The subsequent lack of response to this inaugural and quarrelsome essay calls into question how seriously other authors in this volume take what seems to be a generally shared agreement regarding the standpoint involved in the fusion of horizons. This is articulated best by

MacIntyre as the standpoint that “puts the interpreter’s questions in question, to talk back and to do so in its own terms rather than those of the interpreter” (p. 165). The lack of response to Albert attests to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of “talking back in someone else’s terms” and points to a limit to the possibility of the fusion of horizons, or, more precisely, a limit to stepping outside one’s conceptual schema, something which most of the essays in this collection optimistically deny.—Peg Birmingham, *De Paul University*.

MARION, Jean-Luc. *Being Given. Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*.

Translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. xi + 385 pp. Paperback, \$24.95—Jean-Luc Marion is one of several contemporary French philosophers who focus upon the issue of givenness and gift; other notable French thinkers who have addressed this theme are Jacques Derrida and the late Claude Bruaire. Although they come to different conclusions, all of them agree that the theme of gift, donation, or givenness is not merely one interesting topic among many, but that it is rather indispensable to any serious reflection on the nature of the whole. For Marion in particular, the question of givenness guides, to some extent, all of his work. In *God Without Being*, for example, he argues that when the Biblical God announces his name in Exodus—“I am who am” (Exodus 3:14)—what matters is not so much that he gives his *name* to Moses, but that he *gives* it. Hence, in Marion’s reading, God’s most proper name is not being or the scholastic *Ipsium esse subsistens* but “love”—which, for Marion, is the “icon,” as he calls it, that allows the incomprehensible to be seen while impeding any conceptualistic reduction of it. *Being Given* (BG) is the second volume of a trilogy whose first part, *Reduction and Givenness*, proposes what Marion considers the phenomenological principle: “so much reduction, so much givenness.” The first volume argues that every phenomenology is a phenomenology of givenness—in the sense both of an objective and a subjective genitive. BG clarifies the meaning of givenness by addressing three distinct questions over the course of its five books: (1) whence does givenness proceed? (Book 1); (2) what does givenness give? (Books 2 to 4); and (3) who receives what is given? (Book 5). The principal insight of the work concerns what Marion calls “the saturated phenomenon,” a theme that will be treated more fully in the third volume of his trilogy, *In Excess*.

Givenness seems to call for an “origin,” something that gives what is given, but Marion holds that phenomenology does not regard the phenomenon in its appearing as a gift given to someone by someone. Nor, according to him, does givenness seek to spell out the passivity of intuition. Marion tries to bring to fruition Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology by arguing that, although they disclosed the fundamental significance of givenness, they also misconceived it. Since Husserl interprets what appears according to the “unquestioned paradigm of

objectness," he makes givenness dependent on a constituting *ego* (p. 32). When Heidegger subsequently identifies the *es* of *Es gibt* with *Er-eignis*, he reduces givenness to being and thus "abandons" it (p. 39). Gift, object, and being must be perceived in light of givenness and not the reverse. Although givenness defines every phenomenon—even death and nothingness (pp. 53–61)—and thus somehow appears in what is given, it also remains withdrawn from it. Therefore, the "foreign" origin that givenness seems to imply is not "outside" but "inside" the given; givenness gives itself from itself (p. 82): "what shows itself, gives itself" (p. 12) because "what gives itself shows itself" (p. 69). In this sense, givenness is "the instance *par excellence* of immanence" (p. 117). Givenness, Marion argues, is the *fundamentum inconcussum* whose form is not Cartesian self-possession but radical self-abandonment (p. 59).

If givenness gives from itself, what it gives cannot be explained in terms of causality or gratuity. Dialoguing with Derrida, in Book 2, Marion explains that to conceive it along such lines is to make givenness dependent on a logic of commerce or exchange. The freeing of givenness from such reductivism, however, must be done phenomenologically and not deconstructively (p. 83). Marion proposes, therefore, a phenomenological reduction that would bracket the three elements involved in the exchange of gift: a giver, a thing given, and a recipient. Such an *epoché* reveals that a gift can be accomplished without the giver (when, for example, the giver is anonymous or he is unaware of giving; pp. 94–102), the receiver (as in the case of the universal recipient of Matthew 25; pp. 91–4), or the gift (the greatest gifts give "no-thing"; pp. 106). The phenomenon so reduced, the "given," is privileged in that it affords access to givenness without reducing it either to some thing or to a transcendental horizon. Marion also argues that givenness is an "insistent power [that] makes the gift decide itself as gift through the twofold consent of the givee and the giver, less actors of the gift than acted by givenness" (p. 112). One wonders whether he does not, with this assertion, undermine his intention of articulating givenness in terms of immanence insofar as it very much seems to imply a hypostasization of givenness. Marion claims, in any case, that givenness is never to be thought in terms of "subject."

Through the deployment of an array of novel concepts that purport to be both nonmetaphysical and noncausal (hence such terms of art as "anamorphosis," "contingency," "unpredictable landing," and "*fait accompli*"), Marion argues in Book 3 that the given is intrinsically and irrevocably given because it is not determined by any transcendental conditions. To understand the nature of the given Marion proposes that we begin not, as Kant or Husserl would have it, with phenomena poor in intuitive content (such as logical or mathematical truth) but with those of a "rich" intuitive value, which he terms "*saturated* phenomena." This is the most significant move Marion makes in the book; his phenomenology ascribes to the saturated phenomenon a primordial and paradigmatic significance (p. 227). In Book 4, he advances four main categories of saturated phenomena: the event, the idol, the flesh, and the icon (which mean to "saturate" the Kantian categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality). He also argues that givenness is of such a nature

that it is able to admit within it the possibility of divine revelation (p. 236). For Marion, the event of Christ is, accordingly, neither “an exception” nor just another phenomenon. Instead, it is paradigmatic, the apex of the saturated phenomenon: Christ is an unforeseeable event that the human gaze cannot bear (idol); he not only fulfills the human gaze but is also the apex of visibility (flesh); the event of Christ, the icon *par excellence*, constitutes the subject as his witness (p. 239).

In Book 5, Marion addresses the issue of the subject to whom givenness is given: the “gifted”—which is neither a new transcendental I nor the solution to the contemporary problem of overcoming subjectivity (p. 322). The gifted is simply “what comes after the subject” (p. 262), the witness constituted by what gives itself (pp. 261–71). With a brilliant analysis, Marion argues that the given elicits a call which is received by and thus constitutes the gifted. This analysis does not transform the given into God, being, or a subject. The given is and remains anonymous because its goal is only that of arousing the gifted (p. 298). In fact, the call is seen only in the necessarily belated, and thus historical, “responsal.” On the other hand, the analysis of the call illustrates that acknowledging that what gives itself shows itself only to and through the gifted does not mean that givenness is dependent upon the gifted. Admitting limits, givenness does not limit itself because the gifted has the privilege of being “received by what he receives” (p. 322). In fact, either “by excess [for example, saturated phenomenon] or by default [death, mathematical idealities, the *cogito*] givenness must in many cases renounce appearing—be restricted to abandon” (p. 319). Givenness’s immanence, Marion contends, is thus thoroughly respected and able to open access to the Other in his proper individuation: love.

Marion’s work makes a strong case for the absolute value of givenness, in whose light every phenomenon, including that of revelation, is to be interpreted. At the end of *BG*, one might well wonder whether, in order to restore to love its dignity (p. 324), it would not be necessary to disclose the relation between givenness and (absolute) freedom. An analysis of givenness does not only require determining the whence, what, and to whom of givenness—as Marion does in his book; it must also ask why there is givenness at all, a question which Marion does not seem to address sufficiently. In fact, gift and givenness also bespeak gratuity, fullness, and positivity. These latter connotations offer a fundamental contribution to the understanding of the reason why what appears gives itself, and why givenness or donation can indeed have such a fundamental importance. Gratuity—which does not mean lack of reasons—need not be perceived within an economic logic. It rather indicates the fullness of an ontological freedom that gives itself from itself to itself and to the other. A freedom conceived in these positive, absolute terms is the freedom of the (Christian) absolute, a God-Gift, which lets itself be thought philosophically. Whether such a thing could be adequately considered in exclusively phenomenological terms is, however, another story.—Antonio López, *John Paul II Institute*.

MELE, Alfred. *Motivation and Agency*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xiii + 264 pp. Cloth, \$49.95—Why do we do what we do? Alfred Mele attempts to answer this question and related ones by drawing from the fields of action theory, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and even empirical psychology. The result is a book that is clearly written, shows a command of the contemporary literature in a number of fields, and attempts to offer rigorous solutions that nonetheless take into account commonsense opinions about these topics. Moreover, Mele organizes the book well and helps the reader to keep in mind the whole project by recapitulating his arguments and drawing connections between discussions in various chapters.

Mele divides the book into four parts: motivation and action, motivation and normativity, strength and control, and decision, belief, and agency. A lot of the legwork is done in the first part. In the first chapter, for instance, Mele defines terms (motivation, desire, action-desire, and intention) and makes distinctions (occurrent vs. standing desires, extrinsic vs. intrinsic desires) that are used throughout the book and to which he often refers the reader. More immediately, these terms and distinctions allow Mele to provide a general sketch of his own views. As he puts it, he accepts “the familiar *causal* approach” to explaining human action, which he opposes to “anticausalist teleologism” (p. 38). Mele makes good use of the contemporary literature in rejecting the anticausalist view while clarifying what his causal approach entails. The anticausalist, says Mele, has a fundamental difficulty answering Davidson’s challenging question: “[I]n virtue of what is it true that a person acted in pursuit of a particular goal?” (p. 39). Unfortunately, Mele himself does not spell out the notion of cause at work in his causal approach. Given that his approach is opposed to anticausalist teleologism, it is safe to say that he is not including all four causes that, say, Aristotle would identify, but only something like efficient or agent causality. It would have been helpful, though, for Mele to be more explicit about this.

The effect of this limited notion of cause is clearer in the second part of the book, especially when Mele analyzes the roles of belief and desire in bringing about human action. In his analysis of motivation, Mele seems fundamentally committed to a type of Humean psychology, which means that he is not concerned with delineating capacities of the human soul and their objects but rather with looking at human agents as subjects having attitudes. In dealing with motivation from this perspective, a key move is to discover a human attitude that encompasses motivation, that is, an attitude that has the power to move one to a human action, and Mele argues that an action-desire is just such an attitude. By encompassing motivation within action-desire, Mele appears to place the weight of causality of action on the shoulders of desire. He argues persuasively that belief alone cannot shoulder the responsibility of bringing about human action, but in so doing he is unclear about the role that cognitive activity does play in human action. A more robust causal theory that includes formal and final causes among types of causes (and includes capacities within the human psyche) would perhaps have an easier time delineating the various causal roles of belief and desire in human action.

Moreover, crucial to Mele's analysis of motivation is an argument from listlessness, that is, a situation involving a depressed individual who believes he ought to do something but whose belief has no motivating force. To be sure, turning our attention to such an example does make clear how belief seems to lack motivational force. It seems, however, that Mele needs to make a better case that a depressed individual—that is, an individual that many would say is not a properly functioning moral agent—really meets the criteria of human agency. But this issue is clarified to some degree in chapter 10.

In the third part of the book, Mele covers two topics related to motivation, namely, motivational strength and self-control. He admits that his coverage of these topics is not complete. Despite this, however, Mele manifests an ability to focus on a particular question, to address key aspects of that question using the contemporary literature, and to make a case for his own solution. In particular, in this third part he shows that explaining human action is more nuanced than simply pointing to the strongest desire that a person has at the moment. Indeed, as he recognizes, his account of self-control brings him to the doorstep of a discussion of free will, for which he lacks space and time in this book. The distinctions made in chapters 7 and 8, however, may help to serve as a basis for such a discussion in the future.

The fourth part of the book deals with a variety of issues that stem from discussions in the previous parts of the book. Chapter 9, for example, deals with decisions. Mele asks what decisions are and shows that they take place, which is a bigger task than it may at first appear. Chapter 10 is an interesting discussion of "human agency *par excellence*" that helps to put the rest of the book in perspective. As mentioned above, it may have been helpful for Mele to address some of the questions raised in this chapter in the second part of the book, since not all his readers may agree that "the project of providing an account of human agency *par excellence* . . . is distinct from the project of providing an account of what it is to be a free and morally responsible agent" (p. 220). For Mele, the akratic agent is evidence that these projects differ. But what if an akratic agent can be understood fully only in light of an excellent agent? If so, then these two projects may not be so distinct.

For the sake of the reader's understanding of the book as a whole, however, Mele's discussion of human agency *par excellence* is helpful, for it shows the reader that the account of human action given in the earlier parts of the book is a sort of "least common denominator" account, that is, one that makes clear the fewest criteria that need to be met in order for an event to qualify as a human action (which may explain why Mele is comfortable making an argument from listlessness in the second part of the book). Although one may not expect Mele to provide a full-fledged defense of his methodology in a book of this sort, questions do remain concerning how one should study human action—indeed, questions that would perhaps entangle one in epistemological issues, from which Mele retreats early on (p. 7).

Chapter 11 concludes the book with another intriguing discussion, this time concerning motivated belief. How things look to someone because of how he would like them to look is not only a fascinating issue

in its own right, but it also causes me as a reviewer a certain amount of self-reflection concerning a possible difference between what Mele's positions in this book actually are and how they look to me. Hopefully my account gives a quick peek into what Mele's positions actually are, although one more sympathetic to his approach and presuppositions may see them rather differently.—Matthew Walz, *Thomas Aquinas College*.

MORRISON, Benjamin. *On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place*. Oxford Aristotle Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. viii + 194 pp. Cloth, \$45.00—This book is a revised version of Morrison's doctoral thesis. Unlike many revised theses, however, this book is very readable and clearly presented. Against the common, predominately negative view of Aristotle's notion of place, this book takes a positive approach to place and has as its explicit aim to set out clearly Aristotle's account of place in *Physics* 4.1–5 in such a way as to revive it as a piece of genuinely important philosophy. The author's refreshingly positive approach to this much-maligned topic in Aristotle serves to sustain the reader's interest in the author's interpretation of the sometimes complex and perplexing texts of *Physics* 4.

It is the author's position that *Physics* 4.1–5 "tells us exactly what it is for bodies, causes, parts, etc. to be somewhere, and shows us that there is no paradox or absurdity which arises in the concept of motion in so far as it is understood as a change of place" (p. 10). According to the author, on his interpretation, Aristotle's account of the practice of locating things, common to natural scientists and ordinary people, "is elucidated, articulated and vindicated" (p.10).

Some of the highlights of Morrison's interpretation of locating things for Aristotle, which lead to and then include Aristotle's familiar but troublesome definition of place, are the following claims, for which the author argues rather convincingly. (1) Place is a philosophically complex and philosophically interesting and important topic in Aristotle's philosophy. (2) In the *Physics*, Aristotle provides the philosophical foundation for understanding what one means when he says that something (or, in fact, everything) exists somewhere (see p. 15 and following). (3) Proper places themselves are not in a place; that is, the question of, for example, where I am and more importantly where is the air that surrounds me "is a question of the position of a part in the whole, and not a question of the *place* of a part" (p. 102). (4) Although there are some affinities between the two accounts, Aristotle's account of proper place differs from the medieval concept of formal place.

In support of claim (1), Morrison points out the importance of motion and change and especially locomotion (see *Physics* 8) in Aristotle's philosophy in general. Clearly, if we are to understand locomotion as change of place, which Aristotle regards as the primary kind of motion, which alone can be continuous and the kind of change caused by the First Universal Mover, we must understand the notion of place itself. Thus, it seems Morrison rightly emphasizes the significance of place in

Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. Moreover, there is no question that motion and place are very important topics in particular in Aristotle's philosophical astronomy and biology.

In support of claim (1), Morrison also points to the causal power of place. In particular, after maintaining (correctly, I believe) that elements do not have "natural places," the author goes on to show that "place appears in the definition of the elements; [but] they are not to be identified with that definition" (p. 31). In other words, place is part of the definition of fire, for example, and explains why fire goes up. Moreover, we need only think of the example of nearness and nontwinkling of planets in *Posterior Analytics* 1.13 to recognize that position like place can have a causal role in Aristotle's philosophy. The topics of position and place, as Morrison contends, are clearly very significant in Aristotle's philosophy in general.

In support of claim (2), Morrison argues convincingly that Aristotle has a solution to Zeno's puzzle of place and the apparent need for infinite places. It is the author's contention that by distinguishing different senses of "in," Aristotle successfully answers Zeno's puzzle. Most importantly, Aristotle shows that nothing is in itself except for a whole, which is made up a container and its contents. A thing can be in itself only in a derivative sense, in respect to its parts (p. 102). In light of Aristotle's notions of "in," and his notions of intermediate places and surroundings (*to periechon*), we can rightly conclude that in order to locate a body, we must refer to its surroundings to which it is related; and which, most commonly, are the whole universe. It is to this most common surrounding that we must ultimately relate a body in order to say absolutely where it is. Thus, we can say that everything is somewhere, but places are not necessarily in something, in the local sense of "in." Therefore, there is no need to become entangled in the puzzle of an infinity of containers, as Zeno's interpretation suggests.

In support of claim (3), Morrison presents the following analysis of where someone is. In locating oneself, for example, one has three different relations to the universe, the air, and the earth. I am in the air in that I am almost completely surrounded by it, and I am in contact with it. The air is my proximate container. "I am also in the universe in that I seem to be proximately surrounded by it, but I am also included in it, a part of it. I am on (*en*) the earth; but I am not surrounded by it, even though I am in contact with it" (p. 65). Although *Physics* 4.2 does not define one's proper place, we can see, on Morrison's interpretation, that *Physics* 4.2 points us toward, and adumbrates rather clearly, how we are to think of a thing's proper place.

Thus, when at *Physics* 4.4.211b6–9, Aristotle gives his more technical definition of place as "the limit of surrounding body at which it is in contact with that which is surrounded," we are prepared for this familiar but rather difficult formulation by the way Morrison has carefully interpreted earlier passages in *Physics* 4. A few lines after 211b6–9, Aristotle reformulates his technical definition to "the first immobile limit of that which surrounds, that is the place of something" (212a20–1). As we would expect, the author concludes his discussion of place by clarifying the meaning and significance of "immobile."

"Immobile," according to Morrison, is best understood in relation to the whole universe. Most importantly, the surroundings to which my or any body must be related in order to say where it is are the whole universe, and these most common surroundings are immobile and at absolute rest (p. 101). And, therefore, from the perspective of something's place in the universe, one will always be able to say exactly where that something is.

Morrison further argues that, for Aristotle, the fact that one can determine any object's proper place is due to the fact that the inner limit of the universe where it is in contact with an object is the proper place of that object and guarantees that every object (or body; that is, everything with a limit) in the universe has a place (p. 158). Moreover, locomotion makes sense as the change of that place in the context of the entire universe.

Lastly, the author supports claim (4) by clarifying the difference between his interpretation of place in Aristotle and the medieval concept of formal place to which Morrison's account is similar. If something's place is the inner limit of its surroundings, Morrison argues, then that limit could be changing. That is to say intermediate places, unlike the universe as a whole, can be mobile. Against the notion of "empty" formal space, Morrison explains, the proper place of something is an actual surface. According to the author, it makes a difference how you specify the inner limit of something, for example, a boat in a river; for only some ways will count as specifications of the place of something, and some will not. To use the example of a boat in the river, one can determine the inner limit of the river as that which remains the same around the boat to be specified with respect to size and shape; but these are formal features of the river not the boat, and the place of the boat is not identified with that form (p. 172). The formal features of a river (that is, formal space) do not constitute the actual surface with which a boat is in contact, and thus those formal features cannot be considered the proper place of the boat. As this reviewer interprets Morrison, the proper place of the boat, most technically, is where in the moving river, as an intermediate place, the boat is in contact with the inner limit of the universe, which surrounds the river. The relatively immobile river as a whole, on the other hand, is a place of the boat, which does help us locate the boat, but it is not the boat's proper place. The boat is in contact with the inner limit of the universe, where, at any given moment, it is in contact with the surface of the river, and with the air surrounding the boat; and this is the boat's proper place with respect to the absolutely immobile universe of which the boat is a part.

In his book, Morrison offers answers to many classic problems and puzzles associated with Aristotle's concept of place. Whether he successfully answers all or most of the difficult puzzles and objections associated with Aristotle's concept of place, each reader will have to decide for himself. I would point out, however, that I believe Morrison's interpretation is a plausible and defensible one.

In this review, I have only touched on what I consider to be some of the highlights of Morrison's well-written and well-argued account of place in Aristotle. Anyone interested in Aristotle, the history of philosophy and science, or ancient philosophy will want to read this refresh-

ingly positive and philosophically interesting account of the seemingly ordinary yet very complex notion of place.—Thomas V. Upton, *Gannon University*.

PAPINEAU, David. *The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. viii + 242 pp. Cloth, \$29.95—In his *The Roots of Reason*, a collection of previously published and, in places, slightly modified essays on rationality, David Papineau shows himself to be a “tough-minded” philosopher, to use William James’s famous descriptor, but one with a flair for the unconventional; he is a hard-nosed naturalist who eagerly entertains and often embraces unexpected, controversial, and counterintuitive theories.

No single theme or thesis runs through all six essays, though they are united by Papineau’s naturalist methodology, which, whenever possible, makes recourse to empirical data and recent scientific theories—namely, evolution and quantum mechanics—and denies the need to go beyond such theories to account for the phenomenon of the human mind. In general, the essays deal with the nature, standards, and evolution of theoretical and practical rationality.

The first and most formal essay is a defense of Papineau’s version of naturalism, “reliabilist consequentialism,” against the claim that it cannot accommodate norms of judgment. Papineau’s response is not to deny the existence of such norms of judgment but rather to deny their *sui generis* character; “truth-seeking,” for example, is a hypothetical imperative founded upon prior moral or personal values. Continuing this theme of truth-seeking, the second essay offers an evolutionary explanation of theoretical rationality as a biological side-effect of two more immediate biological goals—“understanding of mind,” the ability to attribute mental states to other beings, and “means-end reasoning,” a type of practical reasoning in which agents draw new, general conclusions from general information, information that goes beyond the experience or genetic past of the agent. This type of reasoning—its nature, its irreducibility to more primitive cognitive designs, and its evolution—are the subject of the third essay.

The last three essays concern practical rationality in general and Papineau’s (and, in the fourth essay, coauthor Helen Beebe’s) explication and defense of the notion of “knowledge-relative probability.” Faced with situations in which the outcome of a given action is less than certain, an agent, if he is rational, will correctly adjust his degrees of belief to the probability of each possibility. But what it means to adjust correctly one’s degrees of belief or to be practically rational is a matter of considerable debate. Many presume that the rationality of an agent should be measured by the degree to which his beliefs coincide with “single-case probabilities” or “the rock-bottom metaphysical probabilities fixed by all probabilistic laws and all particular facts about specific

situations" (p. 135). However, Papineau argues that, as counterintuitive as it might be, the rationality of agents should be determined by "knowledge-relative probabilities," probabilities based upon the agent's knowledge of the salient features of the decision situation. Throughout the last three essays, this kind of probability is explained, defended, extended to contexts involving causality—not mere correlation—and found, curiously enough, to be consistent with the "many-minds" interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Papineau's substantial and original contribution to these long-standing debates largely consists in his willingness to interweave divergent strands of thought. Just when he appears to adopt a Humean anthropology, arguing that truth-seeking is not a *sui generis* norm of judgment but, rather, a "derived prescription orientated to moral and personal values" (p. 9), he defends the thesis that there is a type of practical reasoning, viz., "means-end reasoning," that is irreducible to the cognitive designs of simple animals and is peculiar to human beings. Likewise, after arguing against the adoption of "single-case probabilities" as the standard for practical rationality largely on the grounds of theoretical economy, he offers a tentative endorsement of the many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics, a metaphysically generous interpretation, to say the least. According to this interpretation, when a chancy situation arises, "all alternatives outcomes with non-zero probability will occur" (p. 229), and "[w]hen an intelligent being interacts with a complex quantum system, its brain acquires a corresponding complexity" (p. 226). For example, in relation to the problem of Schrödinger's cat, Papineau writes, "One aspect of your brain sees a live cat, another a dead cat" (p. 226). This is hard-nosed naturalism with a twist; certainly such an eclectic combination of positions and tendencies makes for good reading.

Readers not immersed in British and American analytic philosophy of science over the last thirty years may find Papineau's writings a bit insular. Of course, the evolution of rationality and the philosophy of quantum mechanics are highly specialized fields of interest. But underpinning these technical inquiries are more general conceptual investigations into the nature of belief, intentionality, truth, freedom, language, mind, rational choice, probability, and anthropology—subjects that have a much longer history and broader audience than these essays would seem to indicate. However, the book's limitations in this regard are considerably softened by its clear, richly illustrated, and occasionally witty prose, which invites the nonspecialist into the debate without compromising Papineau's own significant contribution.—
Andrew J. Peach, *Saint Mary's University of Minnesota*.

PHILLIPS, D. Z. *Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. vii + 330 pp. Paper, \$26.00—
Twenty-five years after publishing *Religion Without Explanation*, D. Z. Phillips thought it time to reassess the book in the form of a second edi-

tion. With the amount of time passed since the first edition, it is not surprising that he quickly realized the revision must instead be rewriting.

The result is a book that stands quite ably on its own. Out of a total of thirteen chapters, eight are new. Chapters deemed worthy of inclusion a second time were appositely sculpted, modified, and corrected.

Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation, though appropriately titled, finds its verve in comparison with two other hermeneutical approaches: the hermeneutics of recollection and the hermeneutics of suspicion. Perhaps better, Phillips wishes to go "beyond the hermeneutics of recollection and the hermeneutics of suspicion to the hermeneutics of contemplation" (p. 30).

As explained in chapter 1, "Hermeneutics and the Philosophical Future of Religious Studies," the hermeneutics of recollection and the hermeneutics of suspicion, popularized by Paul Ricoeur, "were distinct modes of interpreting religion in religious studies" (p. 1). The hermeneutics of recollection, contending the religious person is in touch with something real—something which needs to be heard—sets to retrieve "this 'something' for our age" (p. 1). Despite the sympathetic tone this mode of interpreting religious concepts carries, Ricoeur at least understands that what emerges must first pass through the varied criticisms of religion: the hermeneutics of suspicion.

With the necessary "passing through" for the hermeneutics of recollection, the analysis Phillips presents in subsequent chapters should do the trick. It is a gauntlet lined by the likes of Hume (chapter 3), Feuerbach (chapter 4), Marx and Engels (chapter 5), Freud (chapter 8), and Durkheim (chapter 9). These were some of the masters of suspicion Phillips discussed in *Religion Without Explanation*. But finding his 1976 discussion lacking in appreciation for their respective challenge to religious belief, this time around Phillips wishes to grant the devil his due.

In chapter 4, "Feuerbach: Religion's Secret?," Phillips confesses that his original assessment of Feuerbach did not do justice. This time, with help from Van A. Harvey, Phillips now believes he correctly shows the force of Feuerbach's challenge. But unlike many philosophers of religion who see only ill-will on the part of Feuerbach (and other masters of suspicion), akin to Ricoeur's style, Phillips sees there is much to learn from the critique, Feuerbach not excluded. For example, with a little help from Wittgenstein, and mostly from Rhees, Phillips says "Feuerbach brings out, brilliantly, how the confused rupture between the divine predicates and 'God' as a metaphysical subject separates such a 'God' from the practical realities of religion and threatens to make 'belief' 'f' a purely theoretical belief" (p. 96).

In the chapter entitled "Hume's legacy," Phillips readily admits Hume is a master of suspicion in his own right. There is more, however, to Hume's hermeneutical contribution, especially when the hermeneutics of contemplation is understood "not as a matter of apologetics, but of contemplating possibilities of sense" (p. 57). Granted that the hermeneutics of suspicion wishes to discard what is unintelligible—a point Hume forces home in the *Dialogues*—Phillips believes Hume has inadvertently allowed for religious possibilities, in the hermeneutics of

contemplation, by not considering all the religious possibilities. The reasons, *en gros*, are twofold. Firstly, because the *Dialogues* is concerned with a particular type of religion: deism. If Hume's attack is successful, this would still allow for other forms of religious belief. Secondly, turning to *Natural History of Religion*, Phillips notes the effect Hume had on J. G. Hamann and Kierkegaard. Here Phillips is thinking of Hume's criticism of the belief that religious belief was only a matter of intellectual assent (p. 57).

Other chapter titles indicate the breadth of Phillips present study: "Marx and Engels: Religion, Alienation and Compensation"; "Freud: The Battle for 'Earliest' Things"; and "Durkheim: Religion as a Social Construct." Other chapters, true to Phillips's style, painstakingly scrutinize Lucien Uvy-Bruhl (chapter 10, "Uvy-Bruhl: Primitive Logic"); Peter Berger (chapter 11, "Berger: The Avoidance of Discourse"); and Peter Winch (chapter 12, "Winch: Trying to Understand").

Acknowledging the various criticisms and counter-criticisms to be taken into account, Professor Phillips, in the form of the hermeneutics of contemplation, wishes also to recognize "the religious and aesthetic possibilities of sense" (p. 145). And given the breadth of perspectives represented through the three hermeneutical types—including many others added throughout the sections to each chapter—I think it fitting to describe this present volume as a richly crafted and serious dialogue. As Phillips concludes, "And so it will go on."—G. Elijah Dann, *University of Toronto*.

REID, Thomas. *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*. Edited by Derek Brooks. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. xiv + 651 pp. Cloth, \$95.00—With this volume, the third in what will be a total of ten, the scholarly debt to Knud Haakonssen and Penn State University Press continues, as they provide authoritative editions of the works of Thomas Reid. The current volume is based on the one edition (1785) of this work that appeared in Reid's lifetime, and it differs from that edition solely in the correction of typographical errors in the original. Appended to the *Essays* is Reid's "Three Lectures on the Nature and Duration of the Soul," in which the indestructibility of matter grounds Reid's naturalistic argument for the immortality of the soul.

The *Essays* were published decades after Reid's *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* (1764) but retain all the color and analytical acuteness that made the earlier work a prize specimen of the Scottish Enlightenment. There are eight essays in all, the first underscoring the difficulties associated with the mind's studying its own operations. The proper method of conducting such difficult study will pay close attention to the structure of language and to the consequential actions of persons in actual life. As these actions are effects, they will reflect antecedent causes arising from the intellectual and affective processes of the actor. Lan-

guage, which, of course, may mislead, is often the most reliable guide to thought, for it is the sign-system with which one person makes known to others the widest range of thoughts and sentiments.

Following the preliminaries, there are essays devoted to the major faculties or operations of the mind: perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, and taste. Students of Reid will discover in each essay elaborations and clarifications of points first developed in the *Inquiry*. There are trenchant summaries of philosophical thought from the ancients to Reid's contemporaries, these summaries augmenting essays on the different powers and faculties of the mind. There is the well known Reidian rehearsal of the methods of Bacon and Newton, the modesty of the latter in the matter of causal explanation, Reid's own rejection of hypotheses and his commitment to "patient observation, . . . accurate experiments, . . . [and] conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from observation and experiment" (p. 49). Also, and in ways remarkably current, Reid is relentless in his analysis of the meaning of words as actually used, and often and misleadingly misused. A mere hint of Reid's own acumen in this regard is found in such observations as, "If all truths were necessary truths, there would be no occasion for different tenses in the verbs by which they are expressed" (p. 468).

Regarding this new edition, not enough can be said briefly in its favor. Derek Brookes and Knud Haakonssen have given the reader useful, thoughtful, and instructive annotations throughout. This sort of work is painstaking, too often thankless, sometimes even unacknowledged. It is, however, precisely the work that furthers scholarship, triggers ideas, refines perspectives, builds connections to still other arguments, and so on. The general index and the index of names are most helpful, as is Knud Haakonssen's brief but informing introduction to the volume. As with all the volumes produced so far in this series, the *Essays* displays high standards of production and, alas, a comparably high price. Perhaps it is asking for too much to look to a not too distant time when a boxed set of all the volumes, in paperback editions, might render Reid's works more widely accessible.—Daniel N. Robinson, *Oxford University*.

SAGI, AVI. *Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd*. Translated by Balya Stein. Value Inquiry Book Series, Vol. 125. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002. iii + 193 pp. Cloth, \$37.00—"[E]ven if we cannot characterize the whole of Camus's *œuvre* by one overall assessment, the leit-motif of his entire work is still his contest with the question: How should we live in this world? What is a worthy human existence?" (p.29).

Professor Avi Sagi presents here the English version of his original Hebrew. He has been teaching for many years courses on Albert Camus (1913–60) at Bar-Ilan University in Jerusalem. "In Israeli society," he states in the introduction, "which has long been contending with violence and conflict at levels of intensity unknown in Western society,

Camus's thought has found paths to the hearts of young men and women thirsty for a human voice at once consoling and demanding. I have often been amazed at the interest that Camus's thought evokes in Israel, even when issues of life and death have pushed aside other 'philosophical' questions. As a result, I have been privileged with an achievement unusual for philosophers. The Hebrew version of this book became a best-seller, and I tend to think that this is not due to my writing but to Camus's unique powers as a man and as a thinker."

Professor Sagi's enthusiastic admiration for Camus never wanes for a moment. He claims that Camus is a philosopher using the artistic medium of literature and drama to work out his vitalistic philosophy, flowing from an intense experience of his personal life always yearning for transcendence and facing the ultimate ethical questions. Sagi thus believes that Camus follows the models of Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, to whom he devotes careful attention, as distinct from "systematic" or "academic" philosophers.

Camus moves from a Cartesian solipsism described in *The Myth of Sisyphus* (1942) and *The Outsider* (1947) ending in the concept of the absurd and its resulting alienation. Then, a transition takes place from Cartesian solipsism with a skeptical ethical neutrality toward the development of the concept of solidarity, in an open-ended quest, in works like *The Plague* (1947) and *The Rebel* (1951). In the latter, he criticizes both the vertical (eternal) transcendence of Christianity and the horizontal (historical) transcendence of Marxism, and this led him to a heated controversy with Jean Paul Sartre.

Through the experience of abject poverty of his childhood in his native Algiers, his successful academic career in quest for meaning, and the shattering experience of occupied France during World War II, Camus was hankering for a mystical communion of solidarity with nature and humanity. This led him to one of his last works, *The Fall* (1956), where he described a sort of secularized Christianity, adapting the other-worldly or eternal values of the latter to a conception of this world excluding any afterlife.

His life ended tragically in a car accident in 1960 at the age of 46, three years after having been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. On that occasion, he stated that the award should have been given to his admired mentor, André Malreaux.

Given the open-ended character of his philosophy, and his last works, an adaptation of Faulkner's *Requiem for a Nun* (1956) and Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed* (1959), there might have been further developments. In fact, he was quoted as saying that his work had not even begun.

One thing, however, was clear: his apparently complete rejection of Christianity. Sagi devotes especially the thirteenth chapter of his book to this point. He quotes Jean-Claude Brisville asking Camus in an interview: "—You once wrote, 'Secret of my universe: imagine God without the immortality of the soul.' Can you define more exactly what you meant?—Yes, I have a sense of the sacred and I don't believe in a future life, that's all" (p. 146).

Sagi's book, with all its undeniable merits of analysis and synthesis, presents some *lacunae*. One in the omission of extremely important philosophers of our time in connection with the approach to a personal transcendent deity. He barely mentions Buber and Lévinas, but he overlooks Ricoeur, Marcel, Wittgenstein, Rosensweig, Herschel, Jaspers, Frankl, Maritain, Mounier, Lansberg, Picard, Edith Stein, Von Hilderband, and so forth, as well as the works of Henri de Lubac and A. Dondeyne and their influence on Vatican II's *Gaudium et Spes* on the subject of atheism.

Here is just one sample from G. Madison in "Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject," in *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (The Library of Living Philosophers, 1995, pp. 88–9): "The Problem that Camus posed in his book, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, subtitled *Essai sur l'absurde*, was essentially this: In the absence of any access on our part to transcendent values (or what today people might refer to as 'transcendental signifieds') what, if any, are our 'grounds' for asserting the priority of meaning over meaninglessness? Camus, of course, concluded that there are none and proceeded accordingly to elaborate a philosophy of the absurd whose purpose was to banish hope as a form of escapism. This conclusion was logical and consistent, given Camus's approach to the question of meaning; it was dictated by his method, which was basically that of a philosophy of consciousness.

"In this book, Camus, in a quasi-Cartesian fashion, undertook to do an inventory of consciousness, asking in effect: What exactly do I know with certainty? *That* I am is certain, but *who* or *what* I am most certainly is not. All statements as to the 'what' or 'who' of existence, its meaning are mere *interpretations*, and thus do not qualify as *knowledge*. Whence Camus's conclusion: Existence is basically meaningless, absurd. The point to note, however, is this: Camus's demand for epistemological and metaphysical certainty, *knowledge*, for a stable Archimedean point, was itself thoroughly foundationalist and rationalistic, and thus quite unreasonable. Above all it ignored that the most basic characteristic of human existence: action. As we have seen, it is the very nature of action that it commits us to meaning, purposiveness. As acting subjects, we always go beyond what we know, and quite rightly so. Camus was never able to give a convincing rebuttal to the suicide option—which is what he wanted to do—because he considered human beings merely in their quality of knowing subjects and completely ignored the fact that they are also acting beings. Thus the conclusion that Ricoeur draws in regard to the question as to the meaningfulness of existence is actually much more in line with the phenomenological-hermeneutical facts of existence."

But perhaps the most important omission in Sagi's book is that of the monumental work of Charles Moeller, *Litterature du XXe Siecle et Christianisme* (Casterman, with Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and German versions). The first of its five volumes, entitled *Le Silence de Dieu*, devoted its first chapter to Camus, followed by Gide, A. Huxley, Simone Weil, Graham Greene, Julien Green, and Berranos; the third, entitled *L'espérance humaine*, includes Malreaux; and the fourth, entitled *L'espérance en Dieu, Notre Per*, includes Gabriel Marcel.—Joseph M. de Torre, *University of Asia and the Pacific*.

SALLIS, John. *On Translation*. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. xii + 125 pp. Cloth, \$42.95; paper, \$19.95—John Sallis's study on the activity of translation is a methodical reflection structured as variations on a theme. The theme, certainly, is the play of sameness and alterity in the act of translation.

The variations reveal the manifold richness of this act. As a whole, the text reveals the act of translation looking at itself from four distinct perspectives. Throughout, Sallis touches upon the domains of rationality, language, meaning, and creativity.

Sallis articulates the thesis at the outset: "translation goes astray" (p. xi). While he takes it to be true that the act of translating runs through the entire domain of human rationality, from thought to experience, the author argues that the classical determination ("the goal of translation is *sameness of meaning*," p. xi) is never attained in any pure form but always involves alterity, even if only the alterity of another language. "It is as if an ineradicable errancy belonged intrinsically to the very truth of translation" (p. xi).

This thesis is approached and confirmed in the subsequent four chapters as four variations. The variations move from the idealized dream of nontranslation (chapter 1), through the twofold dimension of translation at large in drama (chapter 2) and translation of words in language (chapter 3), to the final encounter with untranslatability in painting and music (chapter 4). Each chapter takes up the theme anew. The four converging chapters elaborate upon the theme as mirrors reflecting both the alterity of each perspective and the common dynamic act of translation reflected within it. Each translates translation into its own medium of discourse, its own world of signification.

Chapter 1 presents the ideal of pure translatability as the dream of modernity. Thinking is inscribed within propositional and representational (visual) models. The chapter presents the idealized dream of a single, pure universal alphabet of human knowledge (Leibniz), a type of "zero point" prior to any human linguistic discourse that could ground understanding while still defining it as only attainable through language. This dream is deconstructed and philosophically dissolved by Heidegger into translation itself. "In the fabric of discourse in which thinking enacts itself, there is not a single thread that has not been spun and woven by translation" (p. 19).

Chapter 2 begins anew from the dramatic world of Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. The most richly developed chapter, here the author examines the play according to the many modes of translation that occur within it (Bottom's *translation* into the Ass, the translation of the actors into the play within the play, the translation into the faery world, the recognition that the entire play has itself been a dream). The play as single unified act of representational *presence* is deconstructed to show the manifold of internal translations within. It is also cast against the German translation of Schlegel to reveal the external dimensions of its translatability.

Chapter 3 takes up an additional vantage point, this time to focus more carefully upon the primary realm within which translation is seen to function: that of language and philosophy of language. Here the development from Plato through Cicero to Locke concludes with

Gadamer's "Every translation is already interpretation" (p. 72 n. 26), revealing that the work of translation involves re-creation. The Schlegel translation of Shakespeare's work reappears, as passages from the original are contrasted with their German translation. Finally, Benjamin's break with the classical determination is actually seen to be a reconstitution of this ideal as a liberation of pure meaning. Sallis suggests that the redetermining of translation as regulated transformation, engaged by a lawful play of imagination (p. 110). Attention to the act of discourse, rather than a remote vestige of meaning, reveals that which the act itself makes manifest, that which it lets come to presence.

This final appeal to the activity of linguistic discourse in chapter 3 points the way to chapter 4, wherein the reflection begins with modes of untranslatability: poetry, painting and, most forcefully, music. Here, at the limit (or beyond the limit) of the bounds of translation the reader is called to reflect upon Mendelssohn's *Incidental Music to a Midsummer Night's Dream* and upon the variety of ways the musical sequences translate the meaning of the play.

This work is a fascinating study of meaning and language as the fundamentally representational models of modernity are deconstructed to reveal the dynamism of rationality and creativity that links music, drama, philosophy and art. It is a thought-provoking and engaging interdisciplinary study that both affirms and transcends the modern categories of language and meaning.—Mary Beth Ingham, *Loyola Marymount University*.

SCHANTZ, Richard, editor. *What is Truth? Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy*, vol. 1. New York: de Gruyter, 2002. 339 pp. Cloth, \$54.95—"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate and would not stay for an answer," writes Francis Bacon, in his "On Truth." The Pilatean question stands in the title of this collection of twenty original papers, a time-honored question that today is again a focal point of philosophical discussion. The aim of the editor, Richard Schantz, who teaches at the University of Siegen, is to provide an assessment of five competing answers: truth is correspondence, truth is coherence, truth is pragmatism, truth is a primitive unanalyzable property, and truth is disquotation.

The correspondence theory opens the volume supported by papers by William Alston, David Armstrong, Richard Boyd, Michael Devitt, and Richard Schantz. In order to maintain a robust theory of truth, which is the main point of this first group of papers, one has to continue developing accounts of the ontological status of facts, the status of correspondence, and the status of propositions. Papers by Robert Brandom, Dorothy Grover, Paul Horwich, and Michael Williams defend the deflationist theory of truth, which is most accredited among the epistemic accounts of truth, claiming, namely, that the truth of a statement does not consist in an external relation to a feature of reality but in its possessing a positive epistemic status within our conceptual scheme or within our

experience. Deflationary or minimalist views of truth, some of them inspired by Tarski's seminal works, others by the second Wittgenstein, end up maintaining the exact contrary of the correspondence theory, that is, truth has no substantive role to play in philosophy. Deflationism is attacked in the papers submitted by Marian David, Colin McGinn, and Peter van Inwagen, while Tarski himself is revisited by Anil Gupta and Jaakko Hintikka. Pragmatic theories of truth insist that there is a close connection between the concept of truth and our human experience and practice. They are represented by the paper of Jay Rosenberg. The notion that truth is an unanalyzable primitive concept is discussed by Michael Dummett, Lorenz Puntel, Ralph Walker, and David Wiggins. Quine's own disquotational definition of truth is explained by Wolfgang Künne.

This is an important book, the first of a series of three volumes dedicated to debates in contemporary philosophy (a second volume is planned on the externalist challenge, and a third on prospects for meaning), and one is indeed thankful to Schantz for having brought together such a complex variety of positions. Schantz himself is a defender of the correspondence theory, which, to his view, finds only one serious competitor: deflationist or minimalist theories.—Riccardo Pozzo, *University of Verona*.

VAN FRAASSEN, Bas C. *The Empirical Stance*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. v + 282pp. Cloth, \$30.00—Van Fraassen begins with a swingeing attack on metaphysics in general and analytical metaphysics in particular. This is reasonably familiar territory, as he is best known for his antimetaphysical understanding of science. His chief complaint is that metaphysics purports to be a factual enterprise, but under examination it turns out to be mere word play. Analytic metaphysics offers a formal parallel with scientific inquiry—it offers “explanations” which mimic scientific explanations but which have no real purchase on us. No one offers genuine probabilities, specificities, or achievable goals; it is idle word play (p. 27). However, such word play exerts a deep pull on philosophers: “Even analytic metaphysicians uninterested in religion succumb to this fascination with the logical problem of theodicy. But I point to it only as an instructive parallel. The constructed God is not so different from the constructed world. Both are abstract simulacra of something real and important whose appeal lies mainly in the logical problems they engender and the virtuoso displays of ingenuity we can enjoy” (p. 30).

What is the alternative for philosophy? Van Fraassen defends an empiricist position, but he notes the difficulty in figuring out what this really means. Many seem to think it is the same thing as materialism, but he disagrees. He points out that materialism is quite problematical as a philosophical position, since it is in constant change—and classic materialists such as Smart or Place have to hold a doctrine which is either defunct or else is contentless. Rather than holding to a thesis or defending

certain kinds of belief, empiricism is really about a stance, an approach to the world involving attitudes, commitments, values, goals (p. 48). "Being or becoming an empiricist will then be similar or analogous to conversion to a cause, a religion, an ideology" (p. 61). But isn't that subjective, isn't it selling out on the objectivity which philosophy prizes?

Van Fraassen puts great emphasis on the question of conceptual revolution, or conversion. If a conceptual revolution is truly revolutionary, then it will be very different to what has gone before. But that means it will appear unintelligible or irrational to those in the prerevolutionary state. So how do we get to an idea of rationality which crosses from pre- to postrevolutionary states? Van Fraassen holds that one traditional form of epistemology is incapable of making sense of this. This is "Objectifying Epistemology"—the traditional sort we're all familiar with—internalism, externalism, foundationalism, reliabilism, and so on. What is required is a different kind of epistemology—"Voluntarist Epistemology." The heroes of this form are philosophers like Pascal and William James. Emotions, values, and projects all play a genuine role in forming an account of the world. With these in play our theoretical accounts of the world are not the pristine, pseudoscientific, once and for all answers of the metaphysicians, but rather they are as ambiguous as lived existence is. This ambiguity is not a defect but rather the very condition of making conceptual advances.

An argument is rehearsed, deriving from seventeenth-century religious apologetics, which illuminates problems of conceptual revolution and intellectual conversion. Were Protestants right to assert *sola scriptura* and similarly were empiricists right to hold to *sola experientia*? What counts as scripture/experience, what it means and what its implications are, is not answered by scripture/experience alone. The historical Protestant response to this argument—that these things are clear enough by the lights of their own group—leads to the problem of competing groups or competing communities of interpretation. Clashes between such communities, which shake the internal confidence of a group, are like revolutions and can lead to conversion. But flux and ambiguity is a prerequisite for this to happen. It is part of the human condition and epistemologically irresponsible to try to get rid of it. This is accommodated by voluntarism but not by objectivism.

The book finishes by distinguishing science from secularism. Secularism can best be captured by holding that it has great respect for the "objectifying approach" of science and is satisfied with that alone. Van Fraassen holds that objectification is just a (emphasis on indefinite article) paradigm of inquiry (p. 173). There are other, nonobjectifying approaches to reality including art, religion, and personal interaction.

In this book, Van Fraassen has woven together themes in an ingenious manner which offers a new way of thinking about the epistemological project. It would have been good, however, to get some of his views on the a priori. To reject metaphysics is to abandon any synthetic a priori. Some of the recent powerful impulses to do analytic metaphysics have come, however, from a dissatisfaction with empiricist and pragmatist accounts of the a priori. Furthermore, Van Fraassen occasionally says things like "the questions of what science is and what it is to be secular

are only historically and culturally related, not by any internal necessity" (p. 154). A genuine empiricist would, it appears, not need to make this specific claim, as there aren't any such necessary connections. So why does Van Fraassen feel the need to reject this specific one? On the basis of this book, his answer, whatever it is, will not be prosaic.—Paul O'Grady, *Trinity College Dublin*.

WALLACE, William A. *Domingo de Soto and the Early Galileo*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2004. xiv + 340 pp. Cloth, \$105.95—William A. Wallace's credentials as a Galileo scholar are well established. With seven books to his credit, notably *Prelude to Galileo* (1981), *Galileo and His Sources* (1984) and *Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof* (1992), he is certainly one of the world's foremost students of Galileo and his period. It is this period, that of late medieval and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century science, that most interests him. Hence the title of this work. Wallace's extensive knowledge of what was being accomplished in philosophy and science at university centers such as Salamanca, Coimbra, Oxford, Paris, Padova, and Rome are here brought to bear on the years spanning Soto and Galileo. Wallace moves from late scholasticism with its high confidence in intellect and its ability to achieve certitude in science, through the eclecticism spawned by the nominalism of Ockham and the Oxford "Calculators," to the resurgence of confidence in intellect and scientific certitude claimed again in the Iberian Peninsula and in Italy, and that at the very time it was being questioned in England.

The present volume consists of fourteen essays based on lectures given in university circles over a period of three decades. These summarize the fruit of a lifetime of scholarship developed at greater length in other of Wallace's writings. Representative chapters are entitled "Domingo de Soto and the Iberian Roots of Galileo's Science," "Domingo de Soto's 'Laws of Motion': Text and Context," "The Certitude of Science in Late Medieval and Renaissance Thought," "Galileo's Pisan Studies in Science and Philosophy," and "Dialectics, Experiments and Mathematics in Galileo." Wallace's work dispels the myth of a sharp distinction between medieval and modern science, a myth fostered in part by the positivist Ernst Mach, who, for ideological reasons, ignored Galileo's Aristotelian and scholastic sources.

This volume begins with the work of the Spanish Dominican, Domingo de Soto, who, in the course of his lectures on Aristotle's *Physics*, first proposed that the motion of falling bodies is uniformly accelerated with respect to time. Soto presented this teaching in the second edition of his *Physics* published at Salamanca in 1551, more than eighty years before Galileo developed it in his *Two New Sciences* of 1638. Galileo knew of Soto's *Physics*, as evidenced in one of Galileo's Latin manuscripts written around 1590.

It is Wallace's contention that the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century grew directly out of techniques of quantification having been introduced into studies of natural philosophy. "What is important," Wallace writes, "about these sixteenth-century thinkers is that they recognized that the study of quantity pertains not only to mathematics but to natural philosophy and metaphysics as well. Quantity is an integral part of a thing's nature, and important for the fact that physical quantity is the intermediary through which the powers and sensible qualities proper to corporeal natures come to exist within their structures." Galileo considered natural philosophy to be so integral to his studies that he insisted on being recognized as a philosopher, asking that his title as Court Mathematician to the Grand Duke of Tuscany be revised to read "Mathematician and Philosopher to the Grand Duke." Of himself Galileo said, "I have studied more years in philosophy than months in mathematics." He developed his new science with the aid of *principia*, *definitiones*, and *suppositiones*, intent on providing strict proof of the *proprietaes* and *passiones* he attributed to his subject. Galileo understood well what constitutes a strict demonstration, and Wallace observes that nowhere in the *Dialogue on the Two World Systems* (1632) does Galileo claim to have demonstrated the earth's motion. In fact Galileo possessed an extraordinary grasp of Aristotle's philosophy, so much so that he was able to engage the peripatetics of his day on the finer points of their interpretations.

Wallace devotes Essay 13 of the present volume to a discussion of Galileo's "regressive methodology," comparing it to that of William Harvey and Sir Isaac Newton. This chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Anyone who aspires to a knowledge of the period under consideration would do well to begin with this volume. Few possess the linguistic abilities or even the knowledge of where to look for the relevant material. In the manner of a sleuth, Wallace has explored the archives of Europe, consulted unpublished manuscripts of Galileo's predecessors, and Galileo's own unpublished work. As if to justify the truth of an old saying, "People don't write original books; books beget books," Wallace displays the intellectual *conditio sine qua non* for the takeoff of seventeenth-century science. No paradigm shift here. Aristotle's *Physics* and *Posterior Analytics* continue their tutorial role.

Not only did Soto and Galileo hold to an Aristotelian view of science and scientific method, Wallace argues, but Harvey and Newton did as well. Science is not simply description and prediction, as Mach would have it, but an ongoing effort to understand by means of demonstration *proper quid*. On this account the intellect moves from the observation of sensible phenomena to their cause or causes and then back again as it understands how the ontological structure is responsible for the effects discerned.

Since this volume is a collection and not a monograph, there is no concluding chapter. After acknowledging Galileo's experimental genius and the import of his discoveries, Wallace makes the following statement, which summarizes much of his findings: "In my view his [Galileo's] ability lay in knowing how to pose suppositions that permit experiments to be made, and then verifying in the experiments themselves

that the suppositions hold up within the degree of accuracy needed to justify them." Therein lay the genius of the Father of Modern Science.—
Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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On Being Simple Minded, PETER CARRUTHERS

Why Not to Trust Other Philosophers, CHARLES HUENEMANN

This article argues that in some cases we should not rely on the testimony of experts but instead should insist upon knowing things for ourselves. One such case is when we ourselves are experts; another such case is in matters of core philosophical beliefs. The first section sketches an account of what it is to know something for ourselves; the second section argues that there is a special, existential value in coming to philosophical beliefs through one's own cognitive resources ("epistemic authenticity"), a value which perhaps rivals the value of having true beliefs. The third section argues that the importance of epistemic authenticity in philosophy may well serve to demarcate philosophy from other disciplines.

Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them,
PIERRE LE MORVAN

Since the demise of the sense-datum theory and phenomenalism in the last century, direct realism in the philosophy of perception has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity. Although there have been attempts in the literature to refute some of the arguments against direct realism, there has been, as of yet, no systematic treatment of all eight of the main arguments against it. This paper aims to fill this lacuna in the literature by discussing all eight of these arguments and the argumentative strategies direct realists may deploy to counter them.

Immortality and Doomsday, ALASDAIR RICHMOND

*Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

Unapologetic Forgiveness, GLEN PETTIGROVE

"I accept your apology" and "I forgive you" often are used interchangeably, suggesting that, at least in some circumstances, forgiving and accepting an apology are coextensive. But what if an apology is not forthcoming? What if the perpetrator of the wrongful act has not acknowledged, or perhaps even refuses to acknowledge, his misdeed? A number of people have argued that one should not forgive the unapologetic. Sometimes the claim that one ought not forgive the unapologetic amounts to advice: It is imprudent to forgive or seek to be reconciled with unapologetic wrongdoers. However, at times the suggestion carries more than just the tone of pragmatism. It reflects the conviction that it is morally objectionable to forgive the unapologetic. It is with objections of the latter sort, namely, moral objections, that this paper is concerned. The response to these objections sheds light on the relationship between forgiveness and trust, condonation, self-respect, punishment, justice, and apology. The author argues that it is both possible and permissible to forgive the unapologetic.

Another Plea for Excuses, MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN

According to a standard account, one has an excuse for what one has done just in case one's action was morally wrong but one is not morally culpable for it. It has recently been argued that excuses, so understood, are impossible. In this paper, this argument is examined and rejected.

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat? DAVID LEWIS*Counting the Holes*, ROBERTO CASATI and ACHILLE C. VARZI

Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes—or so says Argle.

Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory, M. J. CRESSWELL

David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analyzed in terms of its counterpart. The author first explains why the counterpart relation depends on *de re* modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be

used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. The author then looks at test sentences in (the intensional) natural language, and shows that none of them provides compelling evidence that a counterpart semantics is needed.

Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth, MARIAN DAVID

Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory of truth is a genuine rival theory: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan "truth is correspondence to fact"; and it really is a theory of truth.

Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties, ANDY EGAN

Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us, or force us, not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us—though this time they probably don't force us—to give up this theory as well, and to identify properties with functions from [lang]world, time[rang] pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on—the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self-locating.

Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature, ADAM ELGA

The "best-system" analysis of lawhood [Lewis, 1994] faces the "zero-fit problem": that many systems of laws say that the chance of history going actually as it goes—the degree to which the theory fits the actual course of history—is zero. Neither an appeal to infinitesimal probabilities nor a patch using standard measure theory avoids the difficulty. But there is a way to avoid it: replace the notion of "fit" with the notion of a world's being typical with respect to a theory.

Desire Beyond Belief, ALAN HÁJEK and PHILIP PETTIT

David Lewis [1988, 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the "Desire-as-Belief Thesis." Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. The authors explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. They begin by providing back-

ground on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. They then introduce what the authors call the indexicality loophole: if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent's mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus they propose a variant of Desire-as-Belief that exploits this loophole. The authors argue that a number of metaethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, they show that with one central sort of evaluative belief—the belief that an option is right—the indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, “good” is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti-Humean can dodge the negative results.

Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance, NED HALL

David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle—the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability—in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival nonreductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. The author argues that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken.

As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction, RICHARD HANLEY

David Lewis's approach to analyzing truth in fiction, significantly amended by “Postscripts” in 1983, has been widely criticized on three main grounds, and it seems fair to say that nearly every writer on the subject thinks that one of these grounds is sufficient to show that Lewis is mistaken. The author argues that with some minor revision, Lewis's approach survives all extant objections. Indeed, the author judges the Lewis approach to be even more successful than Lewis himself seems to think.

Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves, RAE LANGTON

Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees, in “Ramseyan Humility,” but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. The author compares the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argues that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the skeptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete; knowledge of things in themselves would remain elusive.

Modal Realism with Overlap, KRIS McDANIEL

In this paper the author formulates, elucidates, and defends a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that he defends has several interesting

features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analog of endurantism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.

David Lewis and Schrödinger's Cat, DAVID PAPINEAU

In "How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?" David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed, it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.

The Context of Essence, L. A. PAUL

The author addresses two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have *de re* modal properties? Second, what is the best defense of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? The author critically discusses several theories of how objects have their *de re* modal properties and addresses the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, the author shows how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts.

Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide, GIDEON ROSEN and
NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH

This paper defends the idea that there might be vagueness or indeterminacy in the world itself—as opposed to merely in our representations of the world—against the charges of incoherence and unintelligibility. First, the authors consider the idea that the world might contain vague properties and relations; they show that this idea is already implied by certain well understood views concerning the semantics of vague predicates (most notably the fuzzy view). Next, they consider the idea that the world might contain vague objects; they argue that an object is indeterminate in a certain respect (color, size, and so on) just in case it is a borderline case of a maximally specific color (size, and so forth) property. Finally, the authors consider the idea that the world as a whole might be indeterminate; they argue that the world is indeterminate just in case it lacks a determinate division into determinate objects.

Lewis on Intentionality, ROBERT STALNAKER

David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls "global descriptivism." The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come

closest to making it true. The author gives an exposition of this account, as he understands it, and tries to bring out some of its consequences. He argues that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. He distinguishes some different senses in which Lewis's theory might permit, or be committed to, a kind of holism about intentional content, and he considers both the sense in which Lewis's account might be said to be an internalist account and the motivation for this kind of internalism.

Transworld Similarity and Transworld Belief, BARRY TAYLOR

Relations of transworld similarity play an essential role in Lewis's system. Analysis reveals that they involve the possibility of detailed transworld belief. Such belief is problematic within Lewis's framework. He has an answer to the problems raised, but it relies on a dubious distinction between natural and mere properties. Replacing that distinction with a respectable one undermines an essential part of his case against one of his chief opponents, the linguistic ersatzist.

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
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Local Motion and the Principle of Inertia: Aquinas, Newtonian Physics, and Relativity, THOMAS McLAUGHLIN

The author argues that the Aristotelian definition of motion, "the act of what exists potentially insofar as it exists potentially," and the mover causality principle, "whatever is moved is moved by another," are compatible with Newton's First Law of Motion, which treats inertial motion as a state equivalent to rest and which requires no sustaining mover for such motion. Both traditions treat motion as such as requiring an initial, generating mover but not necessarily a sustaining motor. Through examining examples of motion as treated by Newtonian physics, and through arguing that potential energy is Aristotelian potentiality, the author argues that the First Law is understandable according to the Aristotelian definition as an incomplete act with a two-fold ordination of the same potentiality. He then proposes that, through the notion of spacetime, special and general relativity instantiate motion as a unity of differentiated prior and posterior parts that do not coexist in reality.

From Opposition to Reciprocity: Karl Jaspers on Science, Philosophy, and What Lies Between Them, RONNY MIRON

This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. The problem discussed is how to characterize the relationship that

exists between science, defined on pure Kantian grounds as a universally valid knowledge of phenomenal objects, and philosophy, conceived by Jaspers as the transcending mode of thinking of personal *Existenz* rising toward the totality and unity of Being. Two solutions to that problem arise from Jaspers's writings. The oppositionist view is based in his earlier philosophy of *Existenz*. It describes the discrepancy between determinateness, bestowed by science to its objects, and freedom of self-determination, which is both a synonym and a condition of possibility for *Existenz*. The reciprocal view is based in Jaspers's later works, where he focuses on exploration of his concept of Being (*das Umgreifende*). By contrast with most of Jaspers's commentators, the present interpretation is anchored in a developmental and contextual understanding of Jaspers's thought. Showing the transcendental background of this topic, the proposed interpretation allows us to abstain from viewing the two solutions as incoherent or contradictory and instead to see them as constitutive of a single philosophical course.

Material Differences Between History and Nature, ANDREW P. PORTER

This paper finds at least nine material differences between acts in history and entities in nature. (1) Nature rules out intentional structures essential to human acts. (2) Material trajectories in nature are unique, but acts in history are open to multiple interpretations. (3) In terms of set theory, history is bigger than nature. (4) Historical acts cannot be demarcated from the rest of the world by interactions with the world at a boundary. What happens far off-stage can transform human acts in focal view. (5) Human acts can be revised after the fact. Material trajectories in nature cannot be. (6) Meaning and interpretation are constitutive of human acts. (7) Human acts may involve physical motions; they do not always do so. (8) Human acts always involve final causes. (9) Efficient causes in nature determine their effects; efficient causes in history may not.

Whose Rationality? Which Cognitive Psychotherapy? Metaphysical Facts and a Second Look at Richard Brandt's Second Puzzle for Utilitarianism, BRADLEY N. SEEMAN

Richard Brandt's "Second Puzzle" for utilitarianism asks: What is meant to count as benefit or utility? In addressing this puzzle, Brandt dismisses "objective" theories of utility as prejudging substantive moral issues and opts for "subjective" theories of utility based either on desire satisfaction or happiness, so as to welcome people with a variety of substantive moral commitments into his utilitarian system. However, subjective theories have difficulties finding principled grounds for elevating one desire over another. Brandt attempts to circumvent the difficulties through his "reformed definition" of rationality, a definition that hinges on his notion of cognitive psychotherapy. Cognitive psychotherapy asserts that a desire is rational only once it is vividly exposed to relevant, available information. The author argues that Brandt's notion of cognitive psychotherapy tacitly builds substantive metaphysical and ethical commitments into his reformed definition of rationality, thus rendering his theory of utility an objective theory. Answering Brandt's "Second

Puzzle" forces not only Brandt but also utilitarians more generally to take up substantive metaphysical and ethical commitments from the outset, commitments that substantially predetermine the outcomes generated by their utilitarian systems.

The Priority of Respect: How Our Common Humanity Can Ground Our Individual Dignity, RICHARD STTTH

In this essay, the author notices that the priority of persons, the unbridgeable political gap between persons and mere things, corresponds to a special sort of moral and legal treatment for persons, namely, as irreplaceable individuals. Normative language that conflates the category of person with fungible kinds of being can thus appear to justify destroying and replacing human beings, just as is done with things. Lethal consequences may result, for example, from a common but improper extension of the word "value" to persons. The attitude and act called "respect" brings forth much more adequately than "value" the distinctively individual priority of persons, allowing our common humanity to be a reason for each person's separate significance. The author argues that unless we focus on the respect-worthiness of human life rather than on its value, we will not be able to argue coherently against those who think its destruction permissible.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 42, No. 3, July 2004

Virtue as "Likeness to God" in Plato and Seneca, DANIEL C. RUSSELL

Although Plato's thesis that virtue is "likeness to God" is repeated in several dialogues and is prominent among ancient Platonists, today it is often treated as too otherworldly to be of much relevance to us. In this paper the author takes a new approach to this thesis, as he works, on the one hand, from its development in Plato's *Philebus* and, on the other, from the development of an analogous thesis in Stoicism, particularly Seneca. In both cases, likeness to God is not an escapist ideal but instead demonstrates the superiority of our character that acts in relation to circumstances, to those circumstances themselves.

Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral Psychology, RICO VITZ

In this paper the author argues that Hume's account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the *Treatise* to the second *Enquiry*. He shows that Hume uses the term "sympathy" to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benev-

olent motivation. The author attempts to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an "original principle" in Hume's sense. He concludes by suggesting how his interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume's account of benevolent motivation possible.

Hume's Knave and the Interests of Justice, JASON BALDWIN

On one straightforward reading, Hume's *Treatise* argues that justice and other artificial virtues originally arise due to rational reflection on self-interest. David Gauthier and Stephen Darwall have offered ingenious competing interpretations to the classic interest account in order to accommodate the threat allegedly posed by Hume's "sensible knave" (a free rider). Paying special attention to the evolution of interested motives in the development of Humean artificial virtues, the author argues that the interest account can accommodate sensible knaves and makes better sense of Hume's text than do Gauthier's and Darwall's alternatives.

Wittgenstein, German Organicism, Chaos, and the Centre of Life,
RICHARD McDONOUGH

This paper takes its point of departure from Wittgenstein's remarks on 608 of *Zettel*, that there is no reason why the order of our thought and language could not arise "out of chaos" or "nothing." "Why," Wittgenstein asks, should the system of brain impulses "continue further in the direction of the center?" Commentators have been quick to interpret the "center" here as the neural center and, therefore, to interpret the "chaos" and "nothing" as neural chaos or nothingness. Thus, cognitive scientists accuse Wittgenstein of holding the incoherent view that it is possible that the skull might turn out to be empty and, derivatively, of denying the results of modern neurophysiology. The author argues that these are misreadings of the text based on a founding misreading of the word "center," and that, in turn, is based on a failure to recognize that Wittgenstein is a member of a German organicist tradition in which the expression "center," applied to living organisms, has a long and venerated usage in which it means, very roughly, the center of life.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 101, No. 1, January 2004

In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth, GILA SHER

This paper offers an analysis of the major difficulties facing a substantive (informative, explanatory, theoretical, nondeflationist, nonminimalist, nonquietist) account of truth. It suggests that substantive theorizing in philosophy faces similar difficulties to those faced by other fields of knowledge

(for example, science and mathematics), and it investigates two complementary difficulties, those of disunity and unity, as they apply to truth. The former is the problem of confronting the diversity and multidimensionality of truth, reflected, for example, in the substantial differences among the truth conditions of physical, mathematical, and philosophical statements. The proposed solution is moderate pluralism which, unlike other pluralistic theories, centers on the plurality of correspondence principles. The latter is the problem of discovering and accounting for the principles unifying truth on various levels of generality. The paper offers initial accounts of two highly general principles: the principle of "immanence," a so-called core principle, and the principle of logicity, a special principle.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 101, No. 2, February 2004

Logic and Absolute Necessity, SCOTT A. SHALKOWSKI

The received view about necessities is that logical necessity is the least controversial necessity since it does not commit one to anything beyond a logic. An extension of this view is that if other metaphysically significant necessities are recognized, those other necessities are best understood in terms of logical necessity. It is argued here that both the received view and its extension are misguided. Logical necessity is not free of metaphysical commitments and is best understood as encapsulating a special class of essentialist claims. Bob Hale's argument for the thesis that logical necessity is absolute necessity is examined and rejected. Psychologism and formalism can provide no account of logic that yields a reasonable necessity, while model-theoretic approaches do so only to the extent that some distinct modality is presupposed. A brief essentialist account of logical necessity, one that promises to accommodate ordinary and philosophical argumentative practices, is sketched.

Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees' Rights, MARGARET GILBERT

A promisee's right to the performance of the promise is a Hohfeldian claim-right, a right against the promisor, who has a correlative directed duty. H. L. A. Hart characterized a directed duty as one involving a special, limited authority of a right-holder over the will of the holder of the correlative duty. This characterization fits the case of a promisee well. Does Thomas Scanlon's careful "moral principle" account of promissory obligation account for a promisee's rights? It seems not. More generally, it is doubtful whether any moral principle account can do so. A "third way" is needed, an alternative both to the "social practice" accounts Scanlon rejects and to moral principle accounts.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
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On the Systematicity of Language and Thought, KENT JOHNSON

The last twenty years or so have seen a lot of discussion about systematicity. Almost all discussions of systematicity assume that natural languages and thought are systematic, and that it is clear what systematicity is. Both these assumptions are problematic. As systematicity is standardly conceived, natural languages are not systematic. This problem proves to be quite robust, due to a common but inaccurate assumption about the organization of linguistic natural kinds. When this assumption is corrected, it becomes uncertain what the systematicity of natural language amounts to. The problems for the systematicity of thought are at least as serious as those for language. These problems also show that systematicity has no rightful, interesting role in the debates about cognitive architecture.

What Can Kant Teach Us about Emotions? MARIA BORGES

This article analyzes Kant's theory of emotions and what he can teach us about them. It will challenge two models that have been used to explain his theory: Sabini Silver's opinion, according to which emotions for Kant follow the pain model, as they are precognitive and involuntary phenomena; and Baron's point of view, according to which Kant held that we are responsible for our emotions. The argument will show that both interpretations are misleading since there is not a unique model for emotions in Kant. There is a continuum from uncontrollable emotions, like anger, to those that are capable of being cultivated and rationally controlled. The author argues that Kant's account of emotion includes both physiological aspects and cognitive contents, mainly evaluative beliefs. The article aims at showing that Kantian moral theory contributes an outstanding theory of emotions to contemporary debates, one that acknowledges physiological as well as cognitive aspects.

THE MONIST
Vol. 87, No. 3, July 2004

Classes, Worlds, and Hypergunk, DANIEL NOLAN

Hypergunk, ALLEN HAZEN

Chopping Up Gunk, JOHN HAWTHORNE and BRIAN WEATHERSON

Grit or Gunk: Implications of the Banach-Tarski Paradox, PETER FORREST

In this paper, the author uses intuitions about the quantity (measure) of extended things to argue for a trichotomy: either there are no extended things; or a given finite extended thing is point-free gunk (that is it has no points as parts); or it is made of grit, that is there are only finitely many points. This Grit or Gunk dichotomy excludes what the author calls the orthodoxy, namely, that (1) there are points; and (2) not merely are points represented by coordinate triples; but (3) every set of triples of reals represents a region of space. His argument relies on the Banach-Tarski paradox, namely that given the orthodoxy and the Axiom of Choice it can be shown that a spherical region of unit radius is the sum of five regions each congruent to five regions whose sum is two spheres of unit radius.

Extended Simples: A Third Way Between Atoms and Gunk, PETER SIMONS

The author argues that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, namely, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems, the author proposes a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out some of its consequences and show it withstands the obvious questions it faces. He concludes by mentioning some precedents for this view in Democritus, Kant, and Whitehead, with close variants in Boscovich, Harré, and Markosian.

Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple, KATHLEEN HAWLEY

There is a well known argument that given the impossibility of metaphysical vagueness, there can be no restrictions on composition. That is to say, either every plurality of objects has a fusion, or none does. This is because any well-motivated, moderate restriction on composition permits the impermissible: borderline cases of composition. This paper considers the prospects for an analogous argument about restrictions upon simplicity or upon the having of proper parts. If metaphysical vagueness is impossible, must it be that either every object has proper parts or else none does? Does every well-motivated moderate restriction upon simplicity permit borderline cases of simplicity?

Simples, Stuff, and Simple People, NED MARKOSIAN

The author recently defended a view about mereological simples called MaxCon. His defense of MaxCon committed him to saying that at least in some cases, talk about matter, or stuff, is not reducible to talk about things. In the current paper, the author explores in greater detail this claim about the irreducibility of stuff to which the MaxConner is committed. He also discusses a different (but related) objection to MaxCon, which involves the possibility of mereologically simple people who come into contact with one another. This discussion also involves some issues concerning names and the way we refer to things (whether simple or complex) and stuff.

Plurals and Simples, GABRIEL UZQUIANO

The author argues that statements ostensibly about composite material objects cannot be paraphrased in terms of plural reference and quantification over simples alone. Nor will it do to attempt to generalize the devices of plural reference and plural quantification to include plurally plural reference and quantification or even to postulate the existence of higher-order plural properties of simples. One does better if one helps oneself to singular reference and quantification over sets of simples, but, as a result, one obtains paraphrases that invite to the identification of what appear to be composite material objects with sets of simples. But this is not a welcome outcome for someone who plainly denies that there are material objects such as chairs, tables, or planets.

 PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 79, No. 1, January 2004

Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights, JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Religious toleration first became legally enshrined in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Religious toleration led to the practice of

more general intersubjective recognition of members of democratic states which took precedence over differences of conviction and practice. After considering the extent to which a democracy may defend itself against the enemies of democracy and to which it should be prepared to tolerate civil disobedience, this article analyzes the contemporary dialectic between the notion of civil inclusion and multiculturalism. Religious toleration is seen as the pacemaker for modern multiculturalism, in which the claims of minorities to civic inclusion are recognized so long as members of all groups understand themselves to be citizens of one and the same political community.

How Popper [Might Have] Solved the Problem of Induction, ALAN MUSGRAVE

Popper famously claimed that he had solved the problem of induction, but few agree. This paper explains what Popper's solution was, and defends it. The problem is posed by Hume's argument that any evidence-transcending belief is unreasonable because (1) induction is invalid, and (2) it is only reasonable to believe what you can justify. Popper avoids Hume's shocking conclusion by rejecting (2) while accepting (1). The most common objection is that Popper must smuggle in induction somewhere. But this objection smuggles in precisely the justificationist assumption (2) that Popper, as here understood, rejects.

Ethics and the Tractatus: A Resolute Failure, KEVIN CAHILL

The paper assumes for its starting point the basic correctness of the so-called "resolute" reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, a reading first developed by Cora Diamond and James Conant. The main part of the paper concerns the consequences this interpretation will have for our understanding of Wittgenstein's well-known remark in a letter to a prospective publisher, that the point or aim of his book was an ethical one. The author first gives a sketch of what, given the commitments of the resolute reading, the ethical point of the book will be, and then argues that given these commitments and Wittgenstein's own philosophical biases at the time he wrote the *Tractatus*, the book cannot serve the ethical purpose for which it was written.

Property and Its Enemies, ANTHONY DE JASAY

Ownership is a relation with characteristics that force society to function more effectively and that make property a target of much hostility. Among the intellectual enemies of property, Locke is arguably the most influential. His "enough and as good left for others" condition, that he believed to be easily satisfied, was a failed attempt morally to justify property. Instead, it succeeded in undermining its legitimacy. Hume identified the existence of a convention—in today's language, a Nash-equilibrium—which, being wholly voluntary and ageless, has attractive moral qualities besides ensuring the "stability of possession." A recent attack against the "myth of property" by Murphy and Nagel is guided by an erroneous understanding of the nature of conventions.

The Logical Function of "That," or Truth, Propositions and Sentences, JONATHAN HARRISON

Section I explains that it is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false. It is true "Dogs bark" does not make sense. It is true *that* dogs bark does. Sections II and III argue that Davidson is wrong about "that." Section IV explains the difference between "implies" and "if . . . then . . ." Sections V–VIII argue that Russell, and not Quine, is right about the subject matter of logic. Section IX argues that the objectual and substitutional interpretations of quantifiers are compatible. Sections X–XVI show the implications for well-known theories of truth; that is, truth correspondence. Sections XVII–XX concern the implications for the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the principle of noncontradiction. Section XXI is a recapitulation. Section XXII discusses "that" and entailment. Section XXIII concerns propositions not entities, subsistent or otherwise.

On the Parallel between Mathematics and Morals, JAMES FRANKLIN

The imperviousness of mathematical truth to antiobjectivist attacks has always heartened those who defend objectivism in other areas, such as ethics. It is argued that the parallel between mathematics and ethics is close and does support objectivist theories of ethics. The parallel depends on the foundational role of equality in both disciplines. Despite obvious differences in their subject matter, mathematics and ethics share a status as pure forms of knowledge, distinct from empirical sciences. A pure understanding of principles is possible because of the simplicity of the notion of equality, despite the different origins of our understanding of equality of objects in general and of the equality of the ethical worth of persons.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Vol. 67, No. 2, September 2003

Concepts and Conceptual Analysis, STEPHEN LAURENCE and ERIC MARGOLIS

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. The authors show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis does not succeed. At the same time, they argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists need not disregard intuitions altogether.

Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism, OLLI KOISTINEN

This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of 1p16 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion as to how Spinoza might have been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. The author argues that Bennett's and Garrett's interpretations of Spinoza's necessitarianism have shortcomings which justify an attempt to offer an alternative proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance-property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the "no shared attribute" thesis.

What Are Emotions About? LILLI ALANEN

This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity, and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist, which reduces emotions to nonintentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist, the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of cognitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of "deep" objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, as the author argues that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.

Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will, GIDEON YAFFE

Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator's ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator's ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. Manipulators see to it that their victims comply even in the face of forces that threaten to derail them from the manipulator's desired course. It is suggested that this has an impact on freedom because part of what we desire in wanting to be free is the availability of forms of life very different from those we actually enjoy.

Qualia that It Is Right to Quine, MANUEL GARCÍA-CARPINTERO

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar, and Searle. The author's goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section three. In the first part, the author contrasts a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which he will object. In the second part he sets the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based.

The Transcendental Necessity of Morality, JOSEPH HEATH

David Gauthier tries to defend morality by showing that rational agents would choose to adopt a fundamental choice disposition that permits them to cooperate in prisoner's dilemmas. In this paper, the author argues that Gauthier, rather than trying to work out a prudential justification for his favored choice disposition, should opt for a transcendental justification. The author argues that the disposition in question is the product of socialization, not rational choice. However, only agents who are socialized in such a way that they acquire a disposition of this type could acquire the capacity to use language. Given the internal connection between language and thought, this means that no agent endowed with such a disposition could rationally choose to adopt another. Thus, rational reflection by moral agents upon their own fundamental choice disposition will have no tendency to destabilize it.

Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self-Knowledge, RAM NETA

Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible "error theory" concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. The author attempts to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to possess.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
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Perceptual Entitlement, TYLER BURGE

This paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement," that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is then

ated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is a priori associated with a certain representational function that can be known a priori to be a function of perception. The paper connects antiindividualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states—hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined.

Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience, ALISON SIMMONS

Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the *Dioptrics* and *Treatise on Man* tells a different story. The author argues that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualities but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception.

Realism and Human Kinds, AMIE L. THOMASSON

It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper, the author draws out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and she shows that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, thus protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. In closing, the author considers some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.

Scepticism and Its Sources, SAMIR OKASHA

A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson, have argued that skepticism about the external world stems from the foundationalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, the author offers a brief characterization of the logical form of skeptical arguments. He suggests that skeptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are underdetermined by the evidence on which they are based. Drawing on this characterization of skepticism, the author argues that Williams, Stroud, and Davidson are right to see the foundationalist assumption as essential to the skeptic's argument but wrong to think that skepticism is inevitable once that assumption is in place. By pursuing an analogy with some recent debates in the philosophy of science, the author tries to locate the additional assumptions which the skeptic must make, in order to derive his conclusion.

RATIO

Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2004

Loar's Defense of Physicalism, STEPHEN LAW

Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point of departure observations about what is or is not conceivable. The author argues that there remains an important, popular, and plausible-looking form of conceivability argument that Loar has entirely overlooked. Though he may not have realized it, Saul Kripke presents, or comes close to presenting, two fundamentally different forms of the conceivability argument. The author distinguishes the two arguments and points out that while Loar has succeeded in refuting one of Kripke's arguments, he has not refuted the other. Loar is mistaken: physicalism still faces an apparently insurmountable conceptual obstacle.

The Limits of Mercy, CHRISTOPHER BENNETT

Our characters are formed, at least in part, by forces beyond our control. Should this lead us to mitigate the responsibility of those who turn out badly? Martha Nussbaum argues that we ought to be merciful to wrongdoers on these grounds. Against Nussbaum, the author argues that we have important moral reasons to treat people as responsible for character and hence to eschew mercy. Treating someone as responsible is required if we are to treat them as a moral agent, to treat them as having a moral point of view that is worth hearing. However, the author's point is not that there are no reasons for mercy but simply that there are other reasons, having to do with respect, that pull in the opposite direction. The result is not a decision procedure for all cases but a better understanding of the complex moral geography.

A Non-Retributive Kantian Approach to Punishment, MICHAEL CLARK

Traditionally Kant's theory of punishment has been seen as wholly retributive. Recent Kantian scholarship has interpreted the theory as more moderately retributive: punishment is deterrent in aim and retributive only insofar as the amount and type of penalty is to be determined by retributive considerations (the *ius talionis*). It is arguable, however, that a more coherent Kantian theory of punishment can be developed which makes no appeal to retribution at all: hypothetical contractors would have no good reason to endorse punishment distributed retributively. This position is first sketched behind Rawls's neo-Kantian veil of ignorance, and it is suggested that the same theory will emerge from Scanlon's more relaxed neo-Kantian position.

Tarski's Hidden Assumption, HARTLEY SLATER

It is clear that Tarski's T-scheme, "T

" if and only if p," does not hold universally. It is not expected to hold, for instance, with ambiguous sentences or with indexical sentences. Making explicit the circumstances where it does hold, however, is not just logical housekeeping. It turns out to have more radical consequences for the whole approach to semantics associated with Tarski than has previously been envisaged.

Can We Describe Possible Circumstances in which We Would Have Most Reason to Believe that Time Is Two-Dimensional?
GRAHAM OPPY

How one answers the question whether time could be two-dimensional depends upon what one takes to be the essential properties of time. The author assumes that it is essential to time that it has a "sense" or "direction"; and, on the basis of this assumption, he argues that no one has yet succeeded in giving a clear account of how it could be that time is two-dimensional. In particular, he argues that no one has yet succeeded in describing possible circumstances in which we would have serious reason to entertain the hypothesis that time is two-dimensional.

Is Induction Epistemologically Prior to Deduction, GEORGE COUVALIS

Most philosophers hold that the use of our deductive powers confers an especially strong warrant on some of our mathematical and logical beliefs. By contrast, many of the same philosophers hold that it is a matter of serious debate whether any inductive inferences are cogent. That is, they hold that we might well have no warrant for inductively licensed beliefs, such as generalizations. The author argues that we cannot know that we know logical and mathematical truths unless we use induction. Our confidence in our logical and mathematical powers is not justified if we are inductive skeptics. This means that inductive skepticism leads to a deductive skepticism. He concludes that we should either be philosophical skeptics about our knowledge of deduction and induction, or accept that some of our inductive inferences are cogent.

Emotional Disorder, DEMIAN WHITING

In this paper the author aims to provide a characterization of emotional disorder. He begins by criticizing the thought that an agent can be judged to be experiencing an emotional disorder if his emotion causes him some type of harm. This then leads him to develop the claim that emotional disorder relates to sufficiently inappropriate emotion, where (sufficiently) inappropriate emotion relates to emotion that fails to be (sufficiently) responsive to the agent's beliefs and/or desires. Finally, he concludes the paper by suggesting that if an essentially noncognitivist conception of emotion is accepted, then on the characterization of emotional disorder that he defends, there may exist strong grounds for thinking that cognitive therapy will be an inappropriate form of treatment in cases of emotional disorder.

Paradise Lost and the Question of Legitimacy, WENDY C. LAMBLET

This paper reconstructs the deficiencies of formal democracies to explain the internal injustices of the modern state, the self-righteous swaggering foreign policy of Western powers, and the dangerously over-simplified, polar logic characterizing the war rhetoric of the modern era. In a brief tour through the nonliberal tradition of democratic thought, drawing connections between the tragic mythological origins of Western understandings of self and world, the paper attempts to demonstrate that a failure to find alternate, healthier means of value-creation has caused Westerners, in their constructive identity work, to adhere themselves to their systems with a ritualized, "religious" fervor. Legitimacy in the world becomes, in the final analysis, a simple matter of might. The possession of firearms and bread render self-sanctifying myths legitimating aggressions on the argument of "good" powers fighting the battle against "evil" contaminants.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

IntelLex has recently released *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes* in its Past Masters English Letters collection of electronic texts. The English Letters feature correspondence, journals, and notebooks from important figures from 1100–1950. *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes* (from the Clarendon edition) contains the definitive two volumes of letters published by Oxford University Press and edited by Noel Malcolm. More details are available at <http://www.nlx.com/titles/title122.htm>.

In the March 2004 issue of this *Review*, a translator's note appeared on p. 549, following the translation of Leo Strauss's piece, "The Place of the Doctrine of Providence according to Maimonides." As printed this note contains certain errata, most notably regarding page references, and it is hereby corrected:

In this early work on Maimonides, Strauss scrupulously reassembles some of the scattered "chapter headings" in the *Guide of the Perplexed*. He is thus able to uncover Maimonides's "decisive rationalism" (p. 544 n. 20) and to show strikingly that for Maimonides the question of (particular) providence is a theme of political philosophy in accord with "a genuine philosophic tradition" (pp. 540–3). This article plays a notable role, among Strauss's eleven essays and chapters on Maimonides published over forty years, in elucidating why for Strauss, as he puts it elsewhere, Maimonides was "the truly natural model, the standard that must be guarded against every distortion, and the stumbling-block on which modern rationalism falls" (*Philosophy and Law*, opening paragraph).—S. M.

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
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
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